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Abstract 
 This dissertation examines the Amway Corporation, the world’s largest multi-level marketing 
company. Since its inception, Amway has purported to offer individuals the ability to go into 
business for themselves and to participate in free enterprise through direct sales. At the same time, 
many have attacked Amway as a fraudulent pyramid scheme that trades in false promises and leaves 
its distributors financially and psychologically worse off  than before they joined. In addition to 
running the company for over three decades, Amway’s cofounders, Richard DeVos and Jay Van 
Andel, along with members of  their families, have been influential players in the Republican Party 
and movement conservatism going back to the 1970s.  
 Amway draws our attention to important subtleties in the post-World War II conservative 
movement. DeVos and Van Andel were prominent avatars of  an ideology known as small-business 
conservatism. Like other champions of  free enterprise, small-business conservatives attacked “big 
government,” but they additionally articulated a critique of  corporate capitalism. Amway promoted 
an economic model known as “compassionate capitalism,” which was premised on the liberating 
potential of  individual proprietorship. Amway also widens the geographic lens of  the modern Right, 
highlighting the role that parts of  the American North played in cultivating conservatism. Western 
Michigan, where DeVos and Van Andel were born and raised, has a long conservative tradition 
dating back to the mid-nineteenth century and shaped to a large degree by the region’s Dutch-
American community, which practiced a particularly conservative strain of  Calvinism. DeVos and 
Van Andel have had a hand in many of  the key moments in the history of  American Right over the 
last four decades, underscoring the importance of  Grand Rapids to the conservative movement.
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On the surface, Amway is a company which markets soaps, cleaners, vitamins and food supplements, 
cosmetics, jewelry, smoke detectors, burglar alarms, hardware and software of  all kinds….But 
Amway does something else too. It sells a marketing and motivational system, a cause, a way of  life, 
in a fervid emotional atmosphere of  rallies and political-religious revivalism. 
-Steve Butterfield  1
 In April 1970, Barron’s magazine published an article documenting the nationwide growth of  
door-to-door selling. Notwithstanding “the hesitancy of  housewives to open the door to a strange 
knock and its susceptibility to fraudulent operators,” the article observed that “the industry flour-
ished throughout the ‘Sixties.” Among the companies it mentioned by name were established entities 
like Avon and the Encyclopedia Britannica, as well as “a relative newcomer, Amway Corp.” Head-
quartered in Ada, Michigan, located within metropolitan Grand Rapids, Amway had only been 
around since 1959. Nonetheless, the company had managed remarkable growth over the preceding 
eleven years. Amway sold half  a million dollars’ worth of  products in its first year of  business. Two 
years later, the company established an international presence, setting up shop in Canada. When it 
reached its ten-year mark, Amway racked up eighty-five million dollars in sales and claimed one 
hundred thousand distributors between the United States and Canada. Accordingly, the company 
dubbed 1969 the “Year of  Achievement.” However, 1969 also became “The Year of  the Great Dis-
 Steve Butterfield, Amway: The Cult of  Free Enterprise (Buffalo, NY: Black Rose Books, 1986), 2.1
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aster,” courtesy of  a fire that broke out at Amway headquarters that summer, hurting seventeen em-
ployees and causing around five hundred thousand dollars in damages.  2
 Today, Amway is one of  the best known and most profitable direct sales companies in the 
world. According to Forbes, the company earned approximately $8.6 billion dollars in revenue in 
2017, making it number forty-two on its list of  “America’s Largest Private Companies.” The compa-
ny’s website boasts around three million distributors “operating in more than 100 countries and ter-
ritories[.]” Additionally, the company employs around twenty thousand people, many of  whom help 
to manufacture its product line, which has expanded beyond soap and household cleaning products 
— its original offerings — to include vitamins and dietary supplements (Nutrilite), cosmetics 
(Artistry), haircare (Satinique), and cookware (iCook), among others. The overwhelming majority of  
the company’s sales — around ninety percent in 2009 — now occur internationally, with China as 
the company’s biggest market.   3
 This growth has, unsurprisingly, made the cofounders and their families very wealthy. At the 
time of  his death in 2018, Richard DeVos was the 107th richest American according to Forbes, with 
an estimated net worth of  $5.4 billion. His lifelong friend and business partner, Jay Van Andel, 
passed away in 2004, but his family is worth about the same as DeVos, making them the forty-ninth 
richest family in the country back in 2015. The company remains under the sole ownership of  the 
DeVos and Van Andel families. Richard DeVos retired in 1992 due to health problems, at which 
point his oldest son, Dick, replaced him as president of  the company. Three years later, Jay Van An-
del followed suit. His son, Steve, took over his position as chairman. (In 2002, Dick DeVos left the 
 “Welcome Mat: It’s Out for the Fast-Growing Door-to-Door Vendors,” Barron’s National Business and Financial Weekly, 2
April 13, 1970, 11, 19, 20; Wilbur Cross and Gordon Olson, Commitment to Excellence: The Remarkable Amway Story (Elms-
ford, NY: The Benjamin Company, Inc, 1986), 19, 46, 48-49; Kathryn Jones, Amway Forever: The Amazing Story of  a Global 
Business Phenomenon (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011), 55-56. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compas-
sionate Capitalism,” 7.
 Amway, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/companies/amway/ (accessed November 23, 2018); Business Opportunity, 3
Amway, http://www.amway.com/about-amway/business-opportunity (accessed November 23, 2018); Family of  Brands, 
Amway, http://www.amway.com/about-amway/family-of-brands (accessed November 23, 2018); Jones, Amway Forever, 
4. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 1-2, 7.
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company and was succeeded by his brother Doug.) The DeVoses and Van Andels are prominent 
figures in the Grand Rapids community, as evidenced by the sheer number of  buildings named after 
them or their company: the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel, DeVos Place, Van Andel Arena, the Helen 
DeVos Children’s Hospital, the Van Andel Institute, and more. The founding families have also be-
come prominent figures on the American Right, as evidenced most recently when Betsy DeVos, 
Richard DeVos’s daughter-in-law, joined President Donald Trump’s cabinet as his secretary of  edu-
cation. Though the families have championed a variety of  causes over the decades, they have been 
most enthusiastic about free enterprise. In his 2014 memoir Simply Rich, Richard DeVos wrote, 
“When we started Amway, we thought, ‘It’s okay to start a business to make money, but what’s the 
ultimate purpose of  our business? What does it stand for? What’s driving it emotionally beyond just 
trying to make money?’ So ‘Standing Up for Free Enterprise’ was our battle cry.”  4
 Amway has generated significant controversy throughout its existence. Among its champi-
ons, praise is effusive. Books extolling the virtues of  the company and its business model bear such 
titles as Empire of  Freedom, The Possible Dream, Commitment to Excellence, and American Victory. At the 
other end of  the spectrum, Steve Butterfield, a former Amway distributor, compared Amway to a 
cult and even suggested that it bore a resemblance to fascism. Amway has been the subject of  sever-
al investigations by major news outlets, most famously in 1983, when Mike Wallace and 60 Minutes 
ran a segment on Amway that featured interviews with the cofounders as well as distributors, some 
of  whom had negative opinions of  the company. The company has also faced numerous legal chal-
lenges, including a Federal Trade Commission investigation that ran from 1975 to 1979 into whether 
or not it constituted a pyramid scheme, a lawsuit by the state of  Wisconsin in 1982 that centered on 
claims of  misrepresentation, criminal tax evasion charges brought by the government of  Canada 
 Richard DeVos, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/profile/richard-devos/?list=billionaires (accessed November 23, 4
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(also in 1982), and, perhaps most bizarrely, a defamation case in the mid-1990s in which Amway and 
various distributors were accused of  spreading allegations that Procter & Gamble was linked to Sa-
tanism.  5
 The layman’s term for what Amway does is direct sales: a more technical and precise designa-
tion is multi-level marketing. Direct sales simply involves one individual selling goods or services to an-
other without the presence of  a third-party intermediary (a retail store, for example). In that respect, 
direct sales is probably the oldest and most basic form of  economic exchange. Those who study di-
rect sales typically draw a distinction between direct sales as practiced by companies like Amway and 
earlier, pre-corporate modes, typically referred to as peddling. The main function of  most direct sales 
firms consists of  setting and enforcing a set of  rules and regulations that the sellers affiliated with 
them must abide by, as well as supplying the sellers with their inventory. Within the universe of  di-
rect sales firms, some, like Amway, operate as multi-level marketing enterprises. This means that, in 
addition to moving product, distributors also try to bring new individuals into the business, thereby 
creating “layers” of  salespeople, each person having someone “above” them who recruited them 
(with someone above that person, and so on) and also potentially people “below” them whom they 
have recruited (plus even more below those, and so on).   6
 The cornerstone of  what distributors euphemistically call “the business” is the Amway Sales 
and Marketing Plan, more commonly shortened to the sinister-sounding “the Plan.” To join, a 
prospective distributor must be sponsored by someone in the business, at which point the new re-
cruit joins that distributor’s network: in Amway terminology, they are now a “leg.” Their sponsor is 
referred to as their “upline,” whereas they are their sponsor’s “downline.” Once sponsored, an 
 Butterfield, Amway: The Cult of  Free Enterprise, 146-162; the 60 Minutes special is discussed in Jones, Amway Forever, 5
94-96, Cross and Olson, Commitment to Excellence, 118-120, DeVos, Simply Rich, 135-137, and Charles Paul Conn, Promises 
to Keep: The Amway Phenomenon and How it Works (1985; New York, NY: Berkley, 1986), 67-71; Jones, Amway Forever, 62-75, 
78-82, 107-117. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 15.
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Amway distributor has two potential sources of  revenue. One comes from the sale of  Amway prod-
ucts: purchase inventory at wholesale, sell it at retail, pocket the difference. As Charles Paul Conn, 
the author of  several laudatory books on Amway, pointed out, “Amway distributors are discouraged 
from random peddling of  their products to strangers [i.e., ‘door-to-door’ selling]; instead, they rely 
on what they call ‘person-to-person’ sales, making customers of  friends, family members, people 
they already know.” Additionally, distributors can earn money from sponsorships: the company will 
pay an upline a bonus equivalent to a certain percentage of  their downline’s sales. If  a person’s 
downline in turn sponsors someone else, then that original upline will also receive a bonus based on 
any of  their sales, and so on.  7
 A 1986 copy of  the Sales and Marketing Plan explained how distributor bonuses are calcu-
lated: “All AMWAY® products are assigned two sets of  numbers: Point Value (PV), which does not 
change, and Business Volume (BV), a dollar figure which changes with inflation….BV is the dollar 
value established for a product before any regional warehousing cost (known as surcharge) is added 
to arrive at the suggested retail price.” The size of  one’s bonus, then, is a function of  both PV and 
BV. The following chart, taken from that same edition of  the Plan, spells out how these bonuses are 
computed.  8
 Conn, Promises to Keep, 120; Discussions of  the Plan and its associated terminology can be found in Conn, Promises to 7
Keep, 78-82, Jones, Amway Forever, 47-49, 91-92, Wilbur Cross, Amway: The True Story of  the Company That Transformed the 
Lives of  Millions (New York, NY: Berkley, 1999), 199-205, Butterfield, Amway: The Cult of  Free Enterprise, 71-72, and “The 
Amway Sales and Marketing Plan,” in Harris, “Of  Prophecy and Profits,” 452-468. Portions reproduced in Mondom, 
“Compassionate Capitalism,” 7.




The total monthly point value indicated in the chart above includes not just a distributor’s own sales, 
but also the sales of  any of  their downlines. The following chart indicates how income is calculated 




 If  a person in a distributor’s downline goes ahead and sponsors someone as well, then that 
person’s earned PV and BV are also factored into the total. When a distributor has had a total 
Figure 1: PV/BV Table 
(Source: Harris, Of  Prophecy and Profits, 454)
Figure 2: PV/BV Chart 
(Source: Harris, Of  Prophecy and Profits, 454)
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monthly PV of  7500 for three straight months, they then qualify as a “Direct Distributor.” In 
Amway parlance, they have “gone Direct” and have “broken off ” from their sponsoring distributor. 
The Sales and Marketing Plan spelled out some of  the perks of  going Direct: Direct distributors 
“may buy products, literature, and sales aids directly from the company rather than from [their] 
sponsor or Direct distributor,” they “receive a maximum 25% Performance Bonus each month 
[they] qualify” and “are invited to attend an exciting expense-paid seminar at corporate World Head-
quarters.” Beyond Direct, distributors can qualify for various “pins,” most of  which Amway names 
for precious metals and stones. From lowest to highest, they are: Ruby, Pearl, Emerald, Diamond, 
Executive Diamond, Double Diamond, Triple Diamond, Crown Direct, and Crown Ambassador.  9
 But Amway is more than just a company with a convoluted business model. David John 
Harris has described the company as “a cultural movement mobilized by a ‘thematic worldview.’” 
This distinguishes Amway from most other capitalist enterprises, which are merely profit-seeking. In 
addition to selling a catalog of  products, Amway has also promoted a fairly comprehensive philoso-
phy of  life. In Harris’s words, “Amway promises to provide a ‘way of  life’” as well as “a path to self-
fulfilment and self-realization.” Indeed, some have suggested that the Amway worldview may, to an 
extent, rival the company’s soaps, detergents, and vitamins as its chief  product. In an apt turn of  
phrase, Nancy Sue Ammerman has written that “[t]he products are a vehicle for the system, rather 
than the other way around.”   10
 The company and its boosters have admitted as much. A newspaper ad from September 
1970 bore the heading “Amway is an Idea.” Meanwhile, Commitment to Excellence, a semi-official com-
pany history published in 1986, declared that “[a]lthough soap products do indeed figure prominent-
 Harris, “Of  Prophecy and Profits,” 454-456, 466-468; Conn, Promises to Keep, 80-81. Portions reproduced in Mondom, 9
“Compassionate Capitalism,” 7.
 Harris, “Of  Prophecy and Profits,” 3, 6-7; Nancy Sue Ammerman, “‘Because People Buy Soap’: Amway and the 10
Priests of  Capitalism” (M.A. thesis, University of  Virginia, 1983), 1.
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ly in the marketing programs, along with other lines, they are not as vital as the intangible commodi-
ty that distributors seek: opportunity,” explaining, 
Opportunity has been referred to in one book about Amway as “The Possible Dream.” The dream 
becomes reality through the Sales and Marketing Plan, not simply a formula for selling products, but 
a blueprint for owning and operating an independent business. The essentials include financial inde-
pendence, the chance to be your own boss, freedom from punching a time clock, and very often a 
second income.  11
  
 As a matter of  course, Amway — and, to a lesser extent, its external admirers — has tried to 
temper expectations, lest the business get panned as a get-rich-quick scheme: distributors who make 
excessive or unrealistic claims about the benefits of  joining Amway can face sanction. That said, it is 
clear that, in Ammerman’s words, “[a]lthough according to the company a person who wants thirty-
five extra dollars a month to complete his car payment and makes that thirty-five dollars is just as 
successful as a man who wants a new Cadillac every six months and gets it, the emphasis among re-
cruiters is on thinking big[.]” Amway is simultaneously a business and a value system, each insepara-
ble from the other: the products cannot be sold unless there are individuals motivated to become 
distributors, and selling the products  — along with recruitment — is the means by which distribu-
tors hope to fulfill their dreams.  12
**********  
 Amway and the political work of  its founding families shed light on the nuances of  post-
World War II free enterprise ideology and compel us to expand the political geography of  modern 
conservatism. Historians have detailed extensively the ways in which the resurgence of  free enter-
prise ideology in the decades after World War II represented a reaction against the expansion of  the 
 “Amway is an Idea,” Assabet Valley Beacon, September 17, 1970, 23; Cross and Olson, Commitment to Excellence, 147.11
 Ammerman, “‘Because People Buy Soap’,” 3, 8.12
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federal government that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. In the four decades between the rise of  
the New Deal and the election of  Ronald Reagan, conservatives of  all stripes — members of  the 
business class, politicians, intellectuals, evangelists, and others — pursued a variety of  strategies to 
discredit and dismantle the regulatory and welfare states and to win over the American public to free 
enterprise. Their motivations for waging this war varied. Business conservatives, for one, no doubt 
saw greater regulation and the new social programs as threats to their bottom lines. For some evan-
gelicals, meanwhile, the New Deal state was a stepping-stone to socialism and communism, which, 
in turn, presented a threat to Christianity.   13
 The conservative crusade against “big government” took many forms. The immediate post-
war years, for instance, saw a resuscitation of  welfare capitalism, support for the Taft-Hartley Act 
and “right-to-work” laws at the state level, as well as attempts to impress American Christianity into 
service on behalf  of  the market. In 1964, business interests and free-enterprise ideologues rallied 
around Senator Barry Goldwater, the first major-party presidential candidate to reject an accommo-
dation with the New Deal order. Throughout the 1970s, a number of  corporations sought to use 
schools as vehicles for selling free enterprise to the next generation. And in the mid- to late 1970s 
two grassroots efforts aimed at curbing government spending gained traction at the state and na-
 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of  the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York, NY: 13
W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), xi-xii; Darren E. Grem, The Blessings of  Business: How Corporations Shaped Conservative 
Christianity (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 13-118. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate 
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tional levels: the movement to add a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution and the tax 
revolt.  14
 Amway highlights the important role that small-business conservatives played in this cam-
paign and their unique perspective on the meaning of  “free enterprise.” As used here, small-business 
conservatism describes a specific ideological orientation. Although committed to limited government, 
small-business conservatism also raised concerns about the potentially corrosive effects of  large, 
anonymous, bureaucratic corporations on individualism. It hearkened back to older, pre-corporate 
ideals of  individual autonomy and economic self-sufficiency. Rather than looking to the government 
for “handouts” or to corporations for employment, small-business conservatives called on individu-
als to work for themselves and to support themselves and their families through their own labor.  15
As Bethany Moreton writes, champions of  small business “extolled the entrepreneur as a rare and 
special type, not content with the ordinary round of  bureaucracy in corporate life.” They promoted 
 For a detailed look at free-market activism across this entire timespan, see Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands. For works on 14
the early postwar years, see George Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s (Urbana, IL: University of  
Illinois Press, 1994), Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-60 (Ur-
bana, IL: University of  Illinois Press, 1994), Nelson Lichtenstein, State of  the Union: A Century of  American Labor (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of  
American Politics (Philadelphia, PA: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2013), and Kevin Kruse, One Nation Under God: How 
Corporate America Invented Christian America (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015). On school outreach, see Bethany E. 
Moreton, “Make Payroll, Not War: Business Culture as Youth Culture,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in 
the 1970s, Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 52-70, and 
Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of  Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 173-192. On the balanced budget movement, see Iwan Morgan, “Unconventional Politics: The Campaign 
for a Balanced-Budget Amendment Constitutional Convention in the 1970s,” Journal of  American Studies, 32 no. 3, part 1 
(December 1998): 421-445. On the tax revolt, see Robert O. Self, “Prelude to the Tax Revolt: The Politics of  the ‘Tax 
Dollar’ in Postwar California,” in The New Suburban History, Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue eds. (Chicago, IL: 
The University of  Chicago Press, 2006), 144-160 and Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, 
Society, and Politics (2001; Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 193-217. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compas-
sionate Capitalism,” 2.
 The phrase “small-business conservatism” should not be construed as ascribing a particular political leaning to the 15
small business community as a whole. Not all small businesspeople are conservatives, and being a small businessperson 
— or, indeed, being a businessperson at all — is not a precondition for adhering to small-business conservatism.
  !11
a “small-p populism,” Nicole Hemmer similarly explains, raising alarms about monopolistic corpora-
tions and other impersonal forces that might undermine liberty.  16
 Amway and its cofounders exemplified this small-business conservatism. As James Robin-
son, author of  a 1997 pro-Amway book titled Empire of  Freedom, put it, Amway was “a movement of  
people away from dependency on big government and big companies.” Beginning in the 1970s, De-
Vos and Van Andel became involved in the conservative effort to promote free enterprise and roll 
back government, creating the Center of  Free Enterprise and supporting the tax revolt when it came 
to Michigan. At the same time, in an effort to convince people to become distributors, Amway and 
its allies also attacked the shortcomings of  real-world capitalism. When Amway’s boosters wanted an 
unfavorable contrast to direct selling, they did not choose the “welfare queen” who sponged off  the 
federal dole, but rather the stuck-in-a-rut employee whose wages and hours someone else dictated. 
As pro-Amway books and speeches given at Amway distributor events made plain, the company tar-
geted for recruitment individuals dissatisfied with traditional, nine-to-five employment, who felt that 
their jobs did not pay enough or were not emotionally rewarding, and who desired greater control 
over their lives.  17
 Amway presented direct sales as the key to attaining both financial independence and life 
satisfaction. Amway distributors were “independent business owners,” and Amway allegedly offered 
them more money, freedom, independence, and the ability to form positive, fulfilling relationships.  18
“Independent business ownership,” in turn, was part and parcel of  the company’s own model of  
free enterprise. Dubbed “compassionate capitalism” by Richard DeVos, it envisioned an economic 
system driven by — to use the subtitle of  his 1993 book on the subject — “people helping people 
 Moreton, “Make Payroll, Not War,” 58-69; Nicole Hemmer, Messengers of  the Right: Conservative Media and the Transforma16 -
tion of  American Politics (Philadelphia, PA: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 7, 14-15, 21-24, 45-46, 51, 139-142. 
Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 3.
 James W. Robinson, Empire of  Freedom: The Amway Story and What It Means to You (Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 17
1997), 194. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 3.
 “Independent business owner” is the company’s term for its distributors. (Jones, Amway Forever, 3.)18
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help themselves,” one that afforded individuals the opportunity “to become what they want to be.”  19
Compassionate capitalism, which Amway supposedly embodied, offered a vision of  free enterprise 
premised more on cooperation and mutual aid than on competition.  20
By espousing such ideals small-business conservatives struck a chord with many Americans, 
winning converts to the free-market gospel and emerging as a potent force in the Right’s forty-year 
crusade against the New Deal.  Indeed, the company’s set up derived from a workaround to the 21
New Deal devised by earlier innovators in the direct sales industry in the 1930s, who managed to get 
distributors classified as “independent contractors” rather than employees in order to avoid being 
subject to Social Security provisions or minimum wage legislation. Amway’s “independent business 
owners” have a measure of  autonomy over their distributorships, but they remain wedded to a larger 
corporate entity and must abide by its rules and regulations. In its business model, then, Amway has 
straddled the divide between big and small business. This hybridity allowed Amway to become a ve-
hicle for an ideology that attacked the alienating facets of  capitalism while becoming a lucrative 
global corporation.  22
 Since Amway’s brand of  free enterprise focused more on critiquing capitalism than “big 
government,” understanding its origins requires looking somewhere besides the New Deal and the 
rise of  the interventionist state. More so than the 1930s and 1940s, compassionate capitalism traces 
 Richard DeVos, Compassionate Capitalism: People Helping People Help Themselves (1993; New York, NY: Plume, 1994), 10.19
 Compassionate capitalism underscores the diverse — and competing — views among conservatives about the nature 20
of  the free enterprise system. Even when committed to “free enterprise” in principle, they have often disagreed about 
what it looked like in practice. Indeed, some conservatives have expressed misgivings about or even outright hostility 
toward capitalism. For instance, see Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the Depression (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) and Peter Kolozi, Conservatives Against Capitalism: From the Industrial Revolution 
to Globalization (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017). Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate 
Capitalism,” 3-4.
 Work by Benjamin Waterhouse also promises to shed further light on the uses of  small business in conservative poli21 -
tics in the 1970s and 1980s. See Benjamin C. Waterhouse, “The Small Business Myth,” Aeon, November 8, 2017, https://
aeon.co/essays/what-does-small-business-really-contribute-to-economic-growth (accessed May 2, 2018).
 Biggart, Charismatic Capitalism, 33-41. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 4. 22
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its roots back to the immediate postwar years. The late 1940s and 1950s witnessed the emergence of  
what the economist John Kenneth Galbraith called “the affluent society.” Americans who had en-
dured sixteen years of  first depression and then wartime exuberance now found themselves living in 
a nation richer than it had ever been in its history. Postwar prosperity allowed millions of  Americans  
— most of  them white — to join the ranks of  the middle class, go to college (particularly if  they 
were veterans), and partake in new forms of  conspicuous consumption.   23
 This unprecedented abundance, however, coexisted — and, to some extent, gave rise to — a 
crisis of  autonomy, a pervasive sense that individuality and self-reliance were on the decline. James 
Patterson wrote that the postwar years were marked by “fears about the nation’s psychological 
health. Buzzwords and phrases exposed these fears: ‘alienation,’ ‘identity crisis,’ ‘age of  anxiety,’ 
‘eclipse of  community.’ The ‘uprooted’ peopled America. ‘Mass society’ obliterated identity and ‘in-
dividualism.’ Society was a ‘lonely crowd.’” The aftermath of  World War II saw growing concern 
about real and perceived threats to people’s mastery over their own lives.   24
 The economic dimension of  this anxiety is especially important for understanding Amway. 
Social critics like C. Wright Mills, William Whyte, and others drew attention to the deleterious effects 
of  white-collar corporate capitalism, pointing to the ways in which it contributed to the erosion of  
economic independence and the spread of  more alienating, less fulfilling types of  work. Amway pre-
sented compassionate capitalism — and its avatar, direct sales — as a remedy for an economy that 
failed to provide materially or psychologically rewarding work and that denied many individuals the 
opportunity to work for and support themselves. The sociologist Nicole Woolsey Biggart has argued 
that “direct selling organizations have a stake in the persistence of  impersonal workplaces and mean-
ingless work.” That economy very much came of  age in the postwar period.   25
 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1958).23
 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (1996; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 24
1997), 339.
 Biggart, Charismatic Capitalism, 174.25
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 In addition to appropriating a critique of  postwar capitalism, Amway also borrowed liberally 
from one of  the most popular methods for combating the crisis of  autonomy: self-help and positive 
thinking. Everett Hannan has written that positive thinking “permeates the interaction of  distribu-
tors at their meetings and is the central concern of  their books and tapes,” while David John Harris 
has noted that Amway distributors are regularly encouraged to purchase and read “standard and ob-
scure self-help and self-realization manuals[.]” Although self-help and positive thinking are often 
treated as two sides of  the same coin, they actually developed separately: self-help dates back to the 
colonial period, while positive thinking first emerged in certain American Protestant circles in the 
middle of  the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the terms are not exactly synonymous. Broadly 
speaking, self-help describes an individualist approach to achieving objectives or solving problems. 
Self-help insists that the individual is ultimately in control of  — and therefore solely responsible for 
— the course and quality of  their life: if  a person wants to be financially prosperous, for example, all 
they need to do is commit themselves to that goal and follow a concrete set of  steps that will help 
them reach it. Self-help can be practiced either individually or in groups where participants mutually 
support one another (think Alcoholics Anonymous). Positive thinking, meanwhile, refers to the tech-
nique of  achieving certain goals through changes in one’s attitude and habits of  thought. Positive 
thinking, therefore, is a form of  self-help, but not all self-help necessarily involves positive thinking, 
although most does.   26
 It should come as no surprise that the fifties were arguably the golden age of  self-help and 
positive thinking, the decade that classics like The Power of  Positive Thinking and The Magic of  Thinking 
Big were published. Such books seemed to offer a way for individuals to take control of  their own 
lives. In later years, Amway incorporated self-help and positive thinking precepts into both compas-
 Everett J. Hannan, “The Social Reconstruction of  Meaning: A Qualitative Study of  Education within an Amway Dis26 -
tributor Group” (D.Ed. thesis, University of  Southern California, 1987), 127; Harris, “Of  Prophecy and Profits,” 27; 
Gary R. VandenBos, ed., APA Dictionary of  Psychology, Second Edition (Washington, DC: American Psychological Associa-
tion, 2015), 955.
  !15
sionate capitalism and direct sales itself. The company sought to persuade distributors that they 
could do well in the business and, in turn, get whatever they wanted out of  their lives if  they just 
had enough determination and commitment to making it work. 
 Amway and its founding families also attest to the existence of  an organic conservatism and 
evangelical Protestantism in the American North, expanding our understanding of  where conser-
vatism came from. The term “American North” refers to the area corresponding roughly to the Civil 
War-era Union: that is, the Northeast and the Great Lakes states. In his 1969 book The Emerging Re-
publican Majority, Kevin Phillips described the Northeast as the hub of  “establishmentarianism,” 
which was “centered on the profits of  social and welfare spending, the knowledge industry, con-
glomerate corporatism, dollar internationalism and an interlocking directorate with the like-con-
cerned power structure of  political liberalism.” Still, he stressed it was “not a regional monolith.” He 
identified several pockets of  conservatism in the Northeast, such as the Roman Catholic and “non-
Yankee” populations of  the Mid-Atlantic states, along with suburban communities. As for the Great 
Lakes region, he wrote that it was “a transition zone between Heartland and Northeastern politics”: 
in other words, parts of  it continued to lean Democratic, but it also presented opportunities for Re-
publicans.  27
 Within the American North, the Great Lakes region — part of  what is now pejoratively re-
ferred to as the Rust Belt — is especially significant. The Rust Belt received a great deal of  attention 
in the wake of  Donald Trump’s victory in 2016. In the run-up to the election, the filmmaker, ac-
tivist, and lifelong Michigander Michael Moore predicted that Trump would win in part, he said, be-
cause his message appealed to struggling Rust Belt voters. After November 8th, a number of  popu-
lar and scholarly autopsies singled out the Rust Belt as essential to Trump’s coalition. Alec MacGillis 
of  ProPublica dubbed Trump’s success in the region the “revenge of  the forgotten class.” Writing in 
the British Journal of  Sociology, Michael McQuarrie argued that “[t]he 2016 election outcome was the 
 Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969), 44, 123-186, 330-357.27
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product of  a Rust Belt revolt against Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party,” which, according to 
him, had abandoned the region to its economic doldrums. Beyond the Rust Belt, there are other 
present-day signs pointing to conservatism’s strength within the American North, including Trump’s 
popularity in Staten Island and Long Island as well as the election — and reelection —  of  hard-
right governors like Scott Walker in Wisconsin, Rick Snyder in Michigan, and Paul LePage in 
Maine.   28
 These contemporary data points illustrate the need to trace the historical roots of  Northern 
conservatism. Too often, the American North is either left out of  the story of  modern conservatism 
altogether, or, to the extent that it appears, it is characterized as the appendage of  some other re-
gion’s conservatism. Take evangelical Protestantism, for example, a critical element in the modern 
conservative coalition. Evangelical Protestantism is often associated with the “Bible Belt” of  the 
South. James Gregory identified the roots of  Protestant evangelicalism in the South, writing that 
“[t]he gospel highways coming out of  the South carried change throughout the land, into cities and 
into suburbs across the North and across the West, indeed also across national borders.” While he 
conceded that “[e]vangelicalism never belonged exclusively to the South,” he nonetheless contended 
that “[e]vangelicalism fueled itself  into aggressive growth in the second half  of  the twentieth centu-
 Michael Moore, “5 Reasons Why Trump Will Win,” MichaelMoore.com, http://michaelmoore.com/trumpwillwin/ 28
(accessed November 24, 2018); Ronald Brownstein, “How the Rustbelt Paved Trump’s Road to Victory,” The Atlantic, 
November 10, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/trumps-road-to-victory/507203/ (accessed 
November 24, 2018); Bob Davis and John W. Miller, “The Places That Made Trump President,” Wall Street Journal, No-
vember 12, 2016, A1; Josh Pacewicz, “Here’s the real reason Rust Belt cities and towns voted for Trump,” The Washington 
Post, December 20, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/20/heres-the-real-rea-
son-rust-belt-cities-and-towns-voted-for-trump/ (accessed November 24, 2018); Alec MacGillis, “Revenge of  the For-
gotten Class,” ProPublica, November 10, 2016, http://www.propublica.org/article/revenge-of-the-forgotten-class (ac-
cessed November 24, 2018); Michael McQuarrie, “The Revolt of  the Rust Belt: Place and Politics in the Age of  Anger,” 
The British Journal of  Sociology, 68 no. S1 (2017): S120-S152; Jason Grant, “Donald Trump Resonates on Staten Island,” 
New York Times, April 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/live/new-york-primary-2016/staten-island-is-donld-trump-
country/ (accessed November 24, 2018); Rachel Shapiro, “Why Trump triumphed here: Staten Island voting by the 
numbers,” SILive.com, November 11, 2016, http://www.silive.com/news/2016/11/heres_how_donald_trump_ 
fared_o.html (accessed November 24, 2018); Nicholas Confessore, “Long Island Represents Both Hostile Territory and 
Fertile Ground for Trump,” New York Times, April 13, 2016, A14; David Freedlander, “Why Long Island Still Loves 
Trump,” Politico, May 23, 2018, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/23/donald-trump-ms-13-long-is-
land-218417 (accessed November 24, 2018).
  !17
ry based on momentum that began with the diaspora [i.e., the migration of  black and white South-
erners out of  the region].”   29
 An emphasis on “highways” from the South, however, can cause us to overlook those pock-
ets of  evangelicalism that emerged of  their own accord in the American North. Grand Rapids pro-
vides just the case study for this. Beginning in the mid-1800s, large numbers of  Dutch immigrants 
arrived in western Michigan. By the end of  the century, first- and second-generation Dutch-Ameri-
cans comprised a significant portion of  the population of  Grand Rapids and its surrounding towns. 
These Dutch migrants identified as Reformed/Calvinist and created a vibrant Reformed community 
that included not just churches but also schools like Calvin and Hope College. Richard DeVos and 
Jay Van Andel both hailed from that Dutch immigrant community and were raised in the Reformed 
faith.  
 It is impossible to write about Dutch Calvinism in any broad, sweeping way. Dutch Calvin-
ism is rich, diverse, and — thanks to an incalculable number of  schisms — complex. What can be 
said, is that Dutch Calvinism helped to lay the foundations for political conservatism in Grand 
Rapids and was an essential ingredient in DeVos and Van Andel’s politics. Dutch Calvinism provided 
a theological justification for limited government while also acting as a cudgel against progressive 
forces in the Grand Rapids area, particularly organized labor.  30
 The neglect of  Northern evangelicalism is part and parcel of  a larger inattention to North-
ern conservatism on its own terms. Historians of  conservatism have, for obvious reasons, focused 
tremendously on modern conservatism’s origins in the South. Attention then shifted to the West and 
Southwest. Meanwhile, the American North has remained understudied. In recent years, several 
works have come out that have filled in this deficit, some of  them works of  history, others with a 
 James N. Gregory, The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of  Black and White Southerners Transformed America 29
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of  North Carolina Press, 2005), 234-235. 
 For more on Dutch Calvinism in the United States, see James D. Bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America: A History of  30
a Conservative Subculture (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984).
  !18
more contemporary focus. These include Daniel Kramer and Richard Flanagan’s co-authored book 
on Staten Island, Colleen Doody and Tula Connell’s work on 1950s Detroit and Milwaukee, respec-
tively, and two books on present-day Wisconsin. These books offer detailed studies of  how these 
cities/regions provided fertile ground for right-wing activism and the embrace of  conservative 
ideas.   31
 By and large, however, the American North is portrayed as the home of  Nelson Rockefeller, 
Gerald Ford, and other “losers” in the New Right’s takeover of  the Republican Party. When North-
ern conservatism does enter the picture, it is usually to note its relationship to conservatism else-
where, implying that it had little real power on its own. Joseph Lowndes, for instance, discussed al-
liances between northern and southern conservatives, but placed southerners in the driver’s seat, 
writing that “segregationist intellectuals, citizen activists and politicians attempted to align them-
selves with forces outside the South from the onset of  the New Deal,” and did so using the language 
of  race. He further contended that “the success of  modern conservatism depended on the mobiliza-
tion — and nationalization — of  many different southern political elements,” and that “as opposed 
to the Republican capture of  the white South, we may better speak of  a southern capture of  the Re-
publican Party.”   32
 Grand Rapids complicates this analysis in two ways. First, it reveals a conservatism that, 
though unquestionably shaped by race, was not especially interested in race. More so than race, the 
small-business conservatism practiced by Amway’s founding families was informed by religion as 
 For an overview of  regional shifts in the historiography of  American conservatism, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conser31 -
vatism: A State of  the Field,” The Journal of  American History, 98 no. 3 (2011): 731-732; Daniel C. Kramer and Richard M. 
Flanagan, Staten Island: Conservative Bastion in a Liberal City (Lanham, MD: University Press of  America, 2012); Colleen 
Doody, Detroit’s Cold War: The Origins of  Postwar Conservatism (Urbana, IL: University of  Illinois Press, 2013); Tula A. Con-
nell, Conservative Counterrevolution: Challenging Liberalism in 1950s Milwaukee (Urbana, IL: University of  Illinois Press, 2016); 
Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of  Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of  Scott Walker (Chicago, IL: The 
University of  Chicago Press, 2016); Dan Kaufman, The Fall of  Wisconsin: The Conservative Conquest of  a Progressive Bastion 
and the Future of  American Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018).
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well as changes in American capitalism after World War II — its main concerns centered on issues 
of  class and the role of  government in the economy and society. Second, it challenges the “capture” 
narrative. The problem with the idea of  “capture,” whether by the South or any other part of  the 
country, is that it privileges certain regions over others and denies agency to the supposedly cap-
tured. Often overshadowed by the Democratic, relatively more liberal politics of  Detroit, western 
Michigan has been reliably conservative for a number of  decades. The extensive political activism of  
the DeVos and Van Andel families, which spans four decades, includes hundreds of  millions of  dol-
lars in donations, and encompasses some of  the most important individuals, institutions, and advo-
cacy organizations on the contemporary Right, compels us to consider Northern conservatism as a 
force in its own right, and to bring it into greater parity with the South and West. Northern conserv-
atives unquestionably worked alongside southern and western ones and were energized by them, but 
they also had power and influence independent of  them. 
 Studies on Amway have been few and far between. Books about the company abound in the 
popular press. Most fall primarily into two broad categories: (i) those written by the cofounders and 
“Amway sympathizers” (a term fashioned by Charles Paul Conn to refer to those not directly affiliat-
ed with the corporation but who championed it), and (ii) those written by current or former distrib-
utors, which encompasses books laudatory as well as critical of  the company. And then there are the 
works of  Dominique Xardel and Kathryn Jones, which are not so much scholarly inquiries into 
Amway as overviews of  the company’s history and how it operates, and while both claim impartiali-
ty, the label better fits Jones than it does Xardel.   33
 The phrase “Amway sympathizer” can be found in Conn, Promises to Keep, 6. Xardel stated that his book was “a sin33 -
cerely enthusiastic account of  today’s number one direct selling company,” but then immediately went on to insist that it 
is “[i]mpartial and uncensored,” while Jones described her book as “neither an exposé nor an authorized corporate biog-
raphy, but an unbiased, journalistic look” at Amway [Dominique Xardel, The Direct Selling Revolution (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1993), x; Jones, Amway Forever, xvi]. With the proviso that total objectivity is impossible in any work 
of  nonfiction, generally speaking, Xardel’s tilted more towards the laudatory. Several chapters feature transcriptions of  
interviews with distributors (and, in one chapter, Richard DeVos himself) with very little subsequent analysis or push-
back, and the voices of  those who have criticized Amway go unheard. Jones, meanwhile, does a somewhat better job of  
offering balance. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 8.
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 Academic historians have done little with Amway, or, for that matter, direct sales more 
broadly. Work on Amway in the humanities and social sciences has instead occurred elsewhere, par-
ticularly in sociology and anthropology. Justin Green and Joan D’Aiuto were among the earliest aca-
demics to study Amway. They made a number of  important observations that subsequent studies of  
the corporation have corroborated: (i) the importance on the supposed non-material benefits of  par-
ticipating in Amway, which include making friends, strengthening marriages and families, and “help-
ing others”; (ii) the “quasireligious” qualities of  the company, particularly as pertains to “Amway’s 
rallies, seminars, and conventions”; and (iii) the relationship between the economic and the social in 
Amway’s business model.  34
 Subsequent studies of  Amway have validated these conclusions and built on them.  
Linda Oldham Lester, Sandra Maureen Grant, Nancy Sue Ammerman, and David John Harris have 
each focused, to one extent or another, on defining Amway’s philosophical principles, and despite 
differences in phraseology, their findings more or less overlap. Lester identified positive thinking as 
“the ideological charter of  the group,” characterizing it as “an intensely patriotic, conservative tradi-
tion which is ardently capitalistic and sees spirituality as intrinsically interwoven with material wealth, 
successful family life, and ‘the American way’ in general.” Grant wrote that “Amway’s philosophy is 
that of  sponsoring, training, and motivating.” Ammerman identified several elements of  the compa-
ny’s core values, including egalitarianism, individualism, and the importance of  wish-making. Al-
though there is obviously a healthy dose of  materialism within Amway, Ammerman, like Green and 
D’Aiuto, stressed the non-material benefits that distributors believe they obtain, such as the ability to 
spend more time with their spouses and children. And in perhaps the most exhaustive study of  
 Writing in 1987, Hannan characterized the Green and D’Auito article as “the one social science journal article to ad34 -
dress the Amway phenomenon to date.” [Hannan, “The Social Reconstruction of  Meaning,” 27]; Justin Green and Joan 
D’Aiuto, “A Case Study of  Economic Distribution Via Social Networks,” Human Organization, 36 no. 3 (1977): 311-314. 
With regard to (iii), they wrote that Amway “earns substantial profits….through a social network of  distributors,” and 
that the company “distribute[s] belongingness as well as economic rewards to its sales force” [Green and D’Aiuto, “A 
Case Study of  Economic Distribution Via Social Networks,” 314].
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Amway’s ideological underpinnings, Harris characterized Amway as “a cultural movement mobilized 
by a ‘thematic worldview.’” This worldview, he wrote, “relies heavily upon a secularized version of  
American millenialism [sic],” and its components include “independence, success, opportunity, self-
fulfilment [sic], family, community, and nationalism[.]” Everett Hannan, meanwhile, studied the role 
that distributor meetings as well as motivational books and tapes play in reinforcing the company’s 
worldview and keeping individuals in the business. He argued that they “are central to a process in 
which distributors are actively involved in reconstructing the meaning of  their economic activity,” 
writing, 
In light of  the minimal economic return, and the social costs involved, it is unlikely that a distributor 
would be successful without continually reconstructing meaning for such activities….The books, 
tapes, and meetings, and their ideology of  success, serve to restrict alternative meanings attached to 
a distributor’s social and economic activities. As distributors transact, or symbolically interact, with 
their curriculum, they redecide, or reconstruct, the social reality necessary to build their businesses.  35
 Focusing on the direct sales industry more generally, with Amway as just one example along-
side companies like Mary Kay, Avon, and Tupperware, Nicole Woolsey Biggart’s 1989 book, Charis-
matic Capitalism, is not a study of  Amway per se. Nonetheless, her book is important because it offers 
some useful comparisons between direct sales and more conventional capitalist enterprises. “Direct 
selling organizations,” she wrote, “offer a conscious alternative to firms as a way to organize eco-
nomic activity for a profit, as a technique for managing labor, and as a means of  earning income.” 
For example, direct sales companies lack the divisions of  labor found in traditional firms, and in-
stead “concentrate ownership, management, and labor within every distributor.” The key difference 
she pointed to — and here she concurred with Green and D’Aiuto — is that “[w]hereas bureaucrat-
 Linda Oldham Lester, “Success: A Phenomenological Analysis of  the Belief  System of  the Amway 35
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ic firms seek to exclude nonwork social relations in order to control workers, the direct selling indus-
try pursues profit in the opposite way, by making social networks serve business ends.”  36
 For all of  the invaluable insights that these studies provide, they by and large lack the histori-
an’s touch. For instance, most do not attempt to situate Amway in either time or place, discussing 
neither American society in the immediate aftermath of  the Second World War nor Grand Rapids, 
the city that DeVos and Van Andel were born and raised in, where Amway’s headquarters remain, 
and to which they committed a significant portion of  their fortunes. Some do, to their credit. Big-
gart, for example, included two chapters on the early history of  direct sales and economic develop-
ments in the 1940s and 1950s, while Harris devoted significant attention to religious fundamentalism 
and the cultural celebration of  the peddler. But even these are lacking in certain respects. Historiciz-
ing Amway, as this project does, reveals Amway as a key economic and political force in the twenti-
eth century and beyond.  37
  
********** 
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter I, “The American Way,” explores the 
early biographies of  the cofounders — their upbringings, how they met, and what they did prior to 
Amway — and follows the company over the first decade of  its existence. It pays particular atten-
tion not just to the cofounders’s own stories, but also to the history of  Grand Rapids going back to 
the 1840s. The Grand Rapids context is among the more glaring oversights in the present scholar-
ship on Amway. It is impossible to fully understand either Amway or DeVos and Van Andel’s politi-
 Biggart, Charismatic Capitalism, 7-8. Green and D’Aiuto argued that “Amway is able to capitalize on the alienation gen36 -
erated by industrialized societies,” writing that “as development (from traditional to mass industrial to mass postindustri-
al society) has proceeded, the traditional social structures which provided belongings have fragmented under the impact 
of  this growth,” and consequently “people are forced to seek new groups to satisfy their need to belong” [Green and 
D’Aiuto, “A Case Study of  Economic Distribution Via Social Networks,” 314].
 Biggart, Charismatic Capitalism, 20-69; Harris, “Of  Prophecy and Profits,” 102-232.37
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cal activism without considering how Grand Rapids shaped their life trajectories and their world-
views. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the arrival of  the first Dutch settlers in western Michigan, 
the religious beliefs they brought with them, the community that they formed in the greater Grand 
Rapids area, as well as some important developments in Grand Rapids over the first three decades 
of  the cofounders’s lives. The economic, social, and cultural transformation of  America writ large 
after World War II is also crucial to Amway, and accordingly this chapter surveys that as well. Most 
of  that survey focuses on detailing the crisis of  autonomy: specifically, how some of  the leading in-
tellectuals and social critics of  the day understood it and its causes, as well as how ordinary Ameri-
cans confronted it. 
 Chapter II, “Capitalism with a Human Face,” turns its attention to the corporate philosophy 
of  Amway. That philosophy was communicated to people within Amway through “tools”: media 
ostensibly intended to educate distributors in how to run their businesses and offer motivation. The 
organizing concept for this chapter is “compassionate capitalism.” Compassionate capitalism illus-
trates the ways in which Amway sought to position itself  as a remedy to the ills of  postwar corpo-
rate capitalism, one of  the root causes of  the crisis of  autonomy. The chapter also explores the 
promises that Amway and company boosters made about direct sales by analyzing distributor suc-
cess stories that appeared in many Amway tools. These vignettes featured a fairly cookie-cutter nar-
rative arc: distributors joined Amway on account of  some personal adversity, such as loss of  or dis-
satisfaction with a job, mounting debt, and the like, and though they might have encountered skepti-
cism from those close to them (e.g., parents, friends, coworkers) and/or had difficulties in the early 
stages of  the business, they stuck with it and did well. These stories reinforced a central tenet of  the 
Amway system (and, indeed, of  the self-help and positive thinking tradition that informed it): that 
success was possible for anyone who tried hard enough. 
 Chapter III, “Scamway,” explores the backlash to Amway and its business model. Although 
Amway has grown into a multi-billion dollar global corporation, it has also faced criticism and scru-
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tiny on multiple fronts. This began in earnest in the mid-1970s, fueled to an important degree by 
two concurrent activist movements: the consumer movement and the anti-cult movement. On its 
face, the two were unrelated: the first focused on businesses behaving badly, while the second looked 
to free people from repressive, esoteric new religious movements. Amway, however, is one (though 
not the only) instance of  overlap: Amway was attacked both for unscrupulous business practices and 
for allegedly exercising cult-like control over its distributors. This chapter focuses on three manifes-
tations of  backlash against Amway: (i) anti-Amway confessionals authored by former distributors 
who grew disillusioned with the company; (ii) media reporting on the company and its business 
practices (such as the Detroit Free Press’s exposés in 1982 and the 60 Minutes special on Amway in 
1983); and (iii) government investigations of  and lawsuits against Amway. These collectively repre-
sented an assault on many of  the essential elements of  compassionate capitalism and the company’s 
promises. Perhaps the longest-lasting and most damaging accusation leveled against Amway is that it 
represents a pyramid scheme, one that lures in individuals in dire straits with unrealistic promises 
and then coaxes them to invest time and money to build up a business that cannot succeed, funnel-
ing that money up to a small clique of  distributors at the top.  
 Chapter IV, “A Cosmopolitan Character,” turns to Amway’s global expansion.  Amway 38
made its first international appearance very early in its existence. In 1962, only three years after its 
founding, DeVos and Van Andel brought Amway to Canada. In 1971, Amway expanded into Aus-
tralia, its first overseas market, followed quickly thereafter by Great Britain two years later. Over the 
course of  the 1970s and 1980s, Amway also added West Germany, Taiwan, France, and Japan to its 
list, among others. The 1990s were an especially important decade for Amway’s global growth. The 
end of  the Cold War allowed the company to penetrate Eastern Europe, and in 1995, Amway en-
 The title of  this chapter comes courtesy of  a line in The Communist Manifesto, wherein Marx and Engels remark that 38
“[t]he bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of  the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country” [Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition. (1888; 
Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2001), 39].
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tered China, which has become its largest national market. For the company, its global reach under-
scores the transnational and transcultural appeal of  the Amway opportunity and the Amway world-
view. At the same time, in a number of  the countries that it has entered into, the company has had 
to find ways to evolve and accommodate itself  to various local particularities, be they legal regimes, 
unique consumer tastes and preferences, or cultural skepticism about direct sales. Amway thus offers 
a nuanced answer to the question of  whether globalization has contributed to or encouraged ho-
mogenization. Although this is a work of  American history, Amway’s international activity is worthy 
of  inclusion for three reasons. First, it is essential for understanding how Amway became a multi-
billion dollar company and, in turn, how the cofounders accumulated their fortunes: as mentioned 
earlier, most of  Amway’s business now happens outside of  the U.S.. Second, Amway’s global pres-
ence figures prominently in the company’s self-image, evidence, according to the cofounders and 
company boosters, of  the universality of  its values. And third, Amway’s reception by foreigners has 
not been entirely positive. Indeed, many of  the same suspicions and allegations directed at Amway 
in the United States have also had currency abroad, resulting in some of  the most dramatic episodes 
in the company’s history.  39
 Chapters V and VI move away from Amway itself  to explore other commitments that the 
cofounders and their families have taken on. Chapter V, “Corporate Citizens,” examines the role that 
the DeVoses and Van Andels have played in the revitalization of  Grand Rapids. Beginning in the 
1950s, the growth of  the surrounding suburbs drained people and resources out of  the city, hollow-
ing out the downtown. The founding families became involved in the effort to turn around Grand 
Rapids’s fortunes in the 1970s, and since then they have made a number of  key contributions to the 
city, among them a posh hotel as well as several entertainment venues and medical facilities. These 
investments have succeeded in their stated purpose, in that they have helped turn Grand Rapids 
 Jones, Amway Forever, 55, 61, 141-142, 145-152; Cross, Amway, 140-141. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compas39 -
sionate Capitalism,” 7.
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back into a desirable city to visit, work, and live in. More discreetly, however, they have also been an 
important element of  the founding families’s political project. In keeping with their faith in free en-
terprise, both DeVos and Van Andel expressed hostility to extensive state involvement in the econ-
omy and society, believing instead that public functions like economic development are best handled 
by private actors. In Grand Rapids, they sought to put these principles into practice. 
 The final chapter, “Kingmakers,” turns to politics. The founding families have been very ac-
tive in Republican Party and conservative politics at both the state and national levels since at least 
the 1970s. In Michigan, for example, DeVos and Van Andel helped back an effort to cap state taxes 
in the late seventies, and more recently, the DeVoses have spearheaded the proliferation of  charter 
schools and sought (unsuccessfully) to create a voucher system. The cofounders have also donated 
large sums to the GOP over the decades and have been close to many prominent Republicans, 
among them Gerald Ford. In 2006, Dick DeVos, Richard’s son, ran as the Republican candidate for 
governor of  Michigan against Jennifer Granholm and lost. Following Betsy DeVos’s nomination as 
education secretary in November 2016, the Center for Responsive Politics labeled her “a political 
fundraising juggernaut.” In addition to her bond to the Amway families, Betsy DeVos is also the sis-
ter of  Erik Prince, the founder of  Blackwater. In the DeVos-Prince family, then, we find, symboli-
cally united, the three constitutive elements of  modern conservatism: free enterprise, political Chris-
tianity, and militarism.  40
 Jones, Amway Forever, 6, 125, 168-169; Jack Noland and Anna Massoglia, “Betsy DeVos and her big-giving relatives: 40
Family qualifies as GOP royalty,” Center for Responsive Politics, December 1, 2016, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2016/12/betsy-devos-big-giving-relatives-family-qualifies-gop-royalty/ (accessed November 24, 2018).
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I 
The American Way 
The thousands of  Amway distributorships are dramatic proof  that the American spirit of  free en-
terprise is, and will continue to be, a vibrant force at home and abroad. Every distributor is, in effect, 
an ambassador, earning respect and support for the democratic way of  life. When we acknowledge 
the success of  Amway, we are really showing our support for the American concept of  doing busi-
ness. A free enterprise economy can only exist under the patronage of  a free government. 
-Gerald R. Ford  1
 Wilbur Cross described 1959 as a “year of  business accomplishments great and small, from 
the introduction of  the computer microchip to the first transistorized television set and the birth of  
the Barbie doll.” Compared to that, the founding of  the Amway Corporation was “a seemingly 
humble happening” that ranked “[v]ery low on the list of  newsworthy events that year[.]” Richard 
DeVos noted in his autobiography that he and Jay Van Andel started Amway during what looked 
like the halcyon days of  global Communism. The year 1959, after all, opened with the Cuban Revo-
lution. Two years prior, the Soviet Union had beaten the United States to space with Sputnik. And in 
1961, the Soviets conducted the first manned space flight. Because of  all this, DeVos wrote, “citi-
zens of  the United States….were seriously wondering if  they were taking second place to commu-
nism” and “thought communism could be the wave of  the future and might even overtake 
America.”  2
 These juxtapositions about the year 1959 — that it simultaneously saw important innova-
tions in consumer products as well as the spread of  Communism into the American hemisphere — 
speak to a larger truth about the United States in the decade and a half  after the Second World War. 
 Cross and Olson, Commitment to Excellence, 7.1
 Cross, Amway, 13; DeVos, Simply Rich, 104.2
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On the one hand, it was, to borrow the title of  James T. Patterson’s book on the period, an age of  
“grand expectations,” one defined by economic expansion, a demographic boom, suburbanization, 
and unprecedented levels of  college attendance. At the same time, despite these developments — 
and, to some extent, because of  them — many Americans in the late 1940s and 1950s felt pro-
foundly unsettled. The escalation of  tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
prospect of  nuclear war, and hysteria about Communist penetration into the U.S. had a lot to do 
with that. But on a more existential level, there was also deep unease — and, indeed, dissatisfaction 
— among many Americans about the nature of  postwar society and where and how they fit into it. 
Many Americans in this period were afflicted by a crisis of  autonomy, believing that they no longer 
exercised control of  their own lives. In response to this crisis, postwar Americans turned to a variety 
of  remedies that they believed would alleviate their angst and allow them to regain control, most 
prominent among these self-help and positive thinking.  3
 This unease formed the foundation for the small-business conservatism espoused by 
Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel. Narratives about postwar free-enterprise ideology have generally 
stressed its roots in the 1930s and 1940s, in the backlash to the New Deal state. Challenging ac-
counts that tied the rise of  conservatism to a reaction against the “movement of  movements” of  
the 1960s and 1970s, Kim Phillips-Fein argued that “[i]f  we shift focus from cultural to economic 
issues, it becomes clear that the origin of  modern conservative politics and ideology predates the 
1960s….It begins instead in the reaction against the New Deal.”   4
 To understand the roots of  Amway’s peculiar brand of  free enterprise — and, by extension, 
small-business conservatism’s antipathy towards “big business” — we have to look not to the New 
Deal, but rather to the postwar crisis of  autonomy. The crisis of  autonomy had a number of  causes, 
but arguably one of  the most significant was economic. In the eyes of  writers like William Whyte, C. 
 Patterson, Grand Expectations, 311-316.3
 Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, x, xii.4
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Wright Mills, and Daniel Bell, postwar corporate capitalism and the growth of  the white-collar sec-
tor threatened economic independence, since more and more people were now working for some-
one else, quashed individuality and encouraged conformity, and forced people to perform tedious, 
uninteresting work.  
 After its founding, Amway offered up a vision of  free enterprise — compassionate capital-
ism — and an economic activity — direct sales — that in many respects represented a response to 
these critiques. As we will see in Chapter II, compassionate capitalism encouraged individuals to 
stop performing work that they found unfulfilling and to go out and start their own businesses. One 
easy way to do that, according to the company, was becoming an Amway distributor. Amway pre-
sented direct sales as a way for people to become “independent business owners,” to take command 
of  their own lives and live them as they wished, and to find true satisfaction in their work. Key to 
Amway’s pitch was drawing attention to and attacking those aspects of  traditional salaried work that, 
according to the company and its boosters, disempowered people. Which meant that Amway spent 
more time directly attacking capitalism than the excesses of  government intervention, no doubt an 
uncomfortable position for such a stalwart champion of  free enterprise to find itself  in. Amway 
promoted the idea that individuals could achieve whatever they wanted in life so long as they worked 
hard enough and believed in themselves. Accordingly, Amway appropriated many of  the self-help 
and positive thinking principles that had such saliency in the 1950s and that themselves have a long 
history in American culture, marshaling them in support of  free enterprise. 
 This chapter also delves into the early lives of  Amway’s cofounders and the history of  
Grand Rapids itself. The life stories of  Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel are important not only to 
the company’s own history, but also to its branding. In addition to the autobiographies that both 
DeVos and Van Andel wrote, many Amway promotional books have included a few pages or per-
haps a chapter or two detailing how the two men met and why they started Amway. David John Har-
ris observed that “[t]he story of  ‘Rich and Jay’ follows the outlines of  the hero’s journey. The tale is 
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replete with calls to adventure, interventions and tests, thresholds to cross, enlightenment and a re-
turn to the world armed with knowledge of  the ‘way’ for others to follow.”   5
 In the Amway universe, DeVos and Van Andel are not just individual success stories, but 
also templates that those in the business should follow. Charles Paul Conn wrote in 1979 that DeVos 
and Van Andel “are flesh-and-blood examples of  the most important shared values of  half  a million 
people” and that they represent “a towering testimony to the ability of  men to rise above the com-
monplace by sheer force of  ability and will.” DeVos and Van Andel’s pre-Amway biographies are 
therefore essential for understanding the corporation’s worldview and how it has marketed itself  to 
distributors, both of  which the next chapter discusses in greater detail. In telling the story of  their 
lives, DeVos, Van Andel, and company boosters highlighted or interpreted specific episodes in ways 
that presented the cofounders as the embodiments of  the company’s values. DeVos and Van Andel 
portrayed themselves as men of  modest backgrounds who overcame various obstacles and became 
successful businessmen through their own hard work and resolve. As we will see, however, a number 
of  details about their upbringings belie this narrative, and underscore the fact that both DeVos and 
Van Andel grew up advantaged in several important respects.  6
  
********** 
 Jay Van Andel was born in Grand Rapids, Michigan on June 3, 1924. He was the only child 
of  James and Nella Van Andel (neé Vander Woude), who married on June 25, 1923: James was 
twenty-six, Nella twenty-four. About a year later, on May 28, 1924, twenty-one-year-old Simon De-
 For examples of  cofounder biographies in pro-Amway literature, see Conn, Promises to Keep, 9-17, Charles Paul Conn, 5
The Possible Dream: A Candid Look at Amway (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1977), 13-38, Cross, Amway, 
13-23, Cross and Olson, Commitment to Excellence, 9-32, and Robinson, Empire of  Freedom, 8-11; Harris, “Of  Prophecy and 
Profits,” 234.
 Charles Paul Conn, The Winner’s Circle (1979; New York, NY: Berkley, 1980), 15.6
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Vos married nineteen year-old Ethel Dekker. On March 4, 1926, Ethel gave birth to their first child: 
a son named Richard.  7
 Their families had a lot in common. Both, for example, had a history of  independent busi-
ness ownership. Before moving to the United States from the Netherlands, Van Andel’s grandfather 
was a small businessman, selling bicycles and working as a blacksmith, leaving the country after both 
enterprises failed. His father, too, went into business for himself  as a car salesman. DeVos’s paternal 
grandfather, meanwhile, ran his own general store, while his maternal grandfather was, in DeVos’s 
words, “an old-fashioned ‘huckster,’” driving around town to sell produce. Direct selling, in other 
words, ran in the family. According to DeVos, it was through his huckster grandfather that he made 
his first sale, “a batch of  onions left over after he had finished his regular route.” That sale, DeVos 
wrote, “taught me a lesson in persistence that would pay dividends for a lifetime.”  8
 Both men grew up in the city’s Dutch-American community. Richard DeVos’s grandfather 
Adrian was born in the Netherlands in October 1860 and came to the United States in 1873. In ei-
ther 1885 or 1886 he married a woman named Antje — also a Dutch immigrant, having arrived in 
1884 when she was eighteen or nineteen — and had seven children with her: five sons (Francis, 
Cornelius, Lawrence, James, and Simon) and two daughters (Cornelia and Susanna). Jay Van Andel’s 
father James, meanwhile, was himself  an immigrant, born in April 1897 in the city of  Haarlem in the 
Netherlands. He arrived in New York City aboard the New Amsterdam on August 20, 1906 and, from 
the looks of  it, settled in the Grand Rapids area shortly thereafter. In his autobiography, DeVos de-
scribed the Dutch who migrated to the region as “hardworking, thrifty, practical, and strong in their 
 Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 2; 1930 U.S. census, Kent County, Michigan, population schedule, Grand Rapids, third 7
ward, sheet 1B, James and Nella Van Andel, http://www.ancestry.com; Michigan Department of  Community Health, 
Division of  Vital Records and Health Statistics; Lansing, MI, USA, Michigan, Marriage Records, 1867-1952, Film: 169, 
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(Nashville, TN: J. Countryman, 2000), 28.
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Protestant Christian faith,” remarking, “I owe much to my Dutch heritage: a love of  freedom, a solid 
work ethic, an entrepreneurial spirit, and strong faith.”  9
 Since the cofounders’s roots in this community — in particular, the fact that both were 
raised in the Dutch Calvinist tradition — played an important role in shaping their later political 
views, it is worth reviewing the history of  the Dutch in Grand Rapids. Dutch immigration to west-
ern Michigan began in 1847 and peaked in the 1880s. A number of  factors motivated Dutch migra-
tion to the United States. Religious grievances stemming from reforms to the Dutch Reformed 
Church instituted by William I, king of  the Netherlands from 1815 to 1840, played some role. In 
response to William’s ecclesiastical policies, a conservative splinter group called the Seceders 
emerged, which William sought to repress.   10
 After 1840, however, tensions relaxed following the ascension of  William II, who succeeded 
his father after he stepped down. This suggests that persecution was not a driving factor in this peri-
od. According to David Vanderstel, only six percent of  those who left for America in 1847 said that 
religion was the reason they were going. More important in 1847 were economic factors, including 
high taxes, high unemployment, limited industrialization relative to neighboring western European 
nations, and the country’s very own potato famine. These inspired the first exodus of  Dutch out of  
the Netherlands and to the United States, spearheaded by Albertus Van Raalte. Van Raalte chose 
western Michigan primarily because there was plenty of  land available, and because the area had a 
valuable natural resource: namely, timber. Accordingly, in 1847, Van Raalte bought land for and 
 1900 U.S. census, Kent County, Michigan, population schedule, Grand Rapids, twenty-third ward, sheet 23A, Adrian 9
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11/13/1991, NAI Number: 5742972, Record Group Title: Records of  District Courts of  the United States, 1685-2009, 
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founded the town of  Holland, Michigan. Although religion was not the principal push factor for the 
1847 migrants, it was never far from the mind of  Van Raalte, a reverend. Much like his Puritan 
counterpart John Winthrop two centuries earlier, Van Raalte wanted to make Holland a model of  
proper Christian living, even going so far as to describe the community he was creating in western 
Michigan as a “city upon a hill.”  11
 Almost immediately upon settling in Holland, the Dutch started making their way into near-
by Grand Rapids, which had been incorporated in 1838. As the story goes, the very first Dutch mi-
grant was a woman who came hoping to unite with her fiancé — she thought that he lived in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, but it turned out that he actually resided in Grand Rapids, Wisconsin. Once again, 
economics was key: the Dutch were going to Grand Rapids primarily for work and for commerce. 
The Dutch were an important driver of  Grand Rapids’s growth across the remainder of  the nine-
teenth century. The city’s population increased from 1,510 in 1845 to 2,686 just five years later. It 
reached 8,085 by 1860, 16,507 by 1870, 32,016 by 1880, and 64,147 by 1890. About one-third of  the 
city’s 1870 population — 5,725 — was foreign-born. And much of  that was Dutch. In fact, by 1900, 
half  of  all immigrants living in Grand Rapids were Dutch. Taken together, Dutch-Americans consti-
tuted just over a quarter of  the city’s population.    12
 These Dutch settlers brought to their new homeland a rigorous brand of  Calvinism. Dutch 
Calvinism added to Grand Rapids’s diverse religious scene and, come the twentieth century, served 
as the foundation for the political conservatism of  the likes of  Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel. 
In a chapter in Albert Baxter’s voluminous History of  the City of  Grand Rapids, Michigan (1891), Peter 
Moerdyke wrote that “[f]rom its earliest settlement the churches have exerted a decided influence in 
 Vanderstel, “The Dutch of  Grand Rapids, Michigan,” 25-26, 103-109, 127-129. Portions reproduced in Mondom, 11
“Compassionate Capitalism,” 4.
 Gordon L. Olson, A Grand Rapids Sampler (Grand Rapids, MI: Grand Rapids Historical Commission, 1992), 33; Van12 -
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forming the character of  this community.” “In estimating the religious status of  our city,” he stated, 
“comparisons with that of  the leading cities of  the Union are largely in our favor.” The city’s reli-
gious pluralism, he declared, “should not escape the attention of  those who would recommend this 
as a place of  residence that combines with all other urban advantages exceptional religious privileges 
and moral influences.” “All of  our mixed population are provided with adequate church privileges,” 
Moerdyke insisted, “and, with a considerable diversity of  denominations represented here, sectarian-
ism is happily at a minimum among us.”   13
 Grand Rapids had a Reformed church prior to 1847, founded by a New Yorker named Rev-
erend Hart E. Waring in the summer of  1840. Surveying active churches in Grand Rapids near the 
close of  the nineteenth century, Moerdyke counted seventeen that fell under the Reformed umbrella. 
The proliferation of  Dutch Reformed churches in Grand Rapids across the mid- to late 1800s was 
due to a number of  factors. In some cases, it was simple population growth. The Third Reformed 
Church, for instance, was founded in 1875 because the Second Reformed Church could no longer 
handle its sizable congregation, which had swollen in excess of  seven hundred parishioners. In other 
instances, it was a function of  patterns of  residence. In 1886, a contingent belonging to the Second 
Reformed Church, complaining that the church was too far from where they lived, decided to found 
the Fifth Reformed Church.   14
 Arguably the most significant driver of  church growth was the issue of  assimilation. The 
split among settlers over the extent to which they should retain Dutch heritage sparked the first ma-
jor divide within the Dutch Reformed community, which occurred in 1857. Upon arriving in the 
United States, Van Raalte and his colonists had affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church of  
America, which was headquartered in New York. This move proved controversial among some 
 Baxter, History of  the City of  Grand Rapids, Michigan, 279. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate 13
Capitalism,” 4. 
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Dutch settlers because the church had broken with certain Dutch ecclesiastical customs. Over the 
course of  the first decade of  Dutch settlement in western Michigan, churches and parishioners 
steadily parted ways with the Dutch Reformed Church, until at last, in 1857, the Christian Reformed 
Church was born.  15
 The 1857 split by no means put the Americanization issue to bed, and it continued to shape 
the development of  Reformed churches over the rest of  the century. When the Dutch first arrived 
in western Michigan, they instinctively sought to preserve as many of  their Old World customs and 
traditions as possible As the decades wore on, though, some Dutch-Americans grew uncomfortable 
with idea of  an insular Dutch-American immigrant community cut off  from the larger society, and 
so they believed that some assimilation was appropriate. One area where this tension was most read-
ily apparent was language use. Reformed churches in Grand Rapids were frequently divided between 
those that conducted services in English versus those that used Dutch — Moerdyke wrote, for ex-
ample, that the Fourth Holland Church Reformed Church, formed in 1887, “has clung tenaciously 
to the Holland language.” The question of  culture also came into play when, in 1881, the Holland 
Christian Reformed Church split off  from the Fourth Reformed Church because the latter had al-
lowed Freemasons into its flock. This controversy, which first arose inside the First Reformed 
Church in 1879, had less to do with Masonry per se and more with anxieties about the cultural in-
tegrity of  the Dutch-American community. The Masons were an ideal target to project these anxi-
eties onto, since Masons were disproportionately native-born Americans. It is no coincidence that 
the most intensely anti-Masonic Dutch-Americans tended to be those who had not been in the 
country very long and thus retained Old World suspicions about secret societies.  16
 Vanderstel, “The Dutch in Grand Rapids, Michigan,” 482; Kara Hall VanDam, “A Study of  Language Identity and 15
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 Schools, like churches, also nurtured Dutch Calvinism in Grand Rapids. The first Dutch Re-
formed schools appeared in the mid-1850s, beginning with a school located inside the Second Re-
formed Church. The imperative to provide the immigrant community with religious instruction 
spurred the development of  Grand Rapids’s higher education system. In addition to his part in 
founding Holland, Van Raalte was also instrumental in establishing a Reformed seminary that served 
as the forerunner to Hope College. In the mid-1890s, the Christian Reformed Church put into mo-
tion plans for the creation of  what, two decades later, became Calvin College.   17
 As fewer Dutch migrants arrived in the early twentieth century, their dominance over other 
populations in Grand Rapids diminished. A sizable number of  African-Americans came into the city 
as a result of  the Great Migration. Additionally, a small wave of  Hispanic migrants arrived in the 
1940s, and the city took in some refugees from Eastern Europe following the rise of  Communism. 
Still, for many, Grand Rapids remained synonymous with the Dutch. In a February 1952 article for 
the magazine Holiday, John Tebbel wrote that “[t]he Dutch made Grand Rapids a solid, ultraconser-
vative city laid out on the strictest moral lines, an island of  Old World culture and resistance to 
change,” and that “though their way of  life is changing, slowly, stubbornly yielding to a world they 
never made, their influence is still felt.” He observed that although “Grand Rapids has some two 
hundred churches of  all denominations….the most powerful religious force is the Reformed 
Church,” which was “responsible for much of  Grand Rapids’ high moral character.”  18
 Dutch Calvinism profoundly shaped the upbringing of  both DeVos and Van Andel. DeVos 
wrote that “[w]e lived by a clear set of  rules: honor your parents, set aside money for the Lord’s 
work, give to others, be honest, work hard, and strive for good mental attitudes.” On Sundays he 
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attended two church services, and his parents insisted on making Sunday a day of  rest, so much so 
that they forbade him from attending Sunday baseball games. Additionally, apart from a brief  period 
in his teens, DeVos went to Christian schools throughout his childhood. Van Andel recalled in his 
memoir that he could not play with the neighborhood kids on Sundays because he spent the entire 
day dressed for church and that he “attended a neighborhood Sunday-school class taught by the very 
zealous Miss Goossens, where we were taught the essentials of  the Reformed faith.” He too attend-
ed Christian schools, which was how the two met. Like the DeVoses, the Van Andels were strict 
about adhering to Reformed teachings. Van Andel recounted a story about finding a dime on the 
street and his mother making him comb the neighborhood for its owner. Despite the fact that “[a] 
dime was quite a bit of  money in those days,” his mother insisted that he try and find its owner “to 
teach me the importance of  respecting other people’s property.” Van Andel declared in his memoir 
that “the sovereignty of  God and the responsibility of  man to live faithfully by God’s word in every 
part of  life,” which he identified as “[t]wo basic distinctives of  Reformed churches,” were the well-
springs of  “all my political, economic, and entrepreneurial beliefs[.]” As we will see in Chapter VI, 
Dutch Calvinist principles informed the cofounders’s political philosophy, particularly their perspec-
tives on the proper size and scope of  government.  19
 DeVos and Van Andel were also shaped by their experiences during the Great Depression. 
The Depression struck Grand Rapids hard. In response to its ravages, George Welsh, the City Man-
ager, launched an ambitious jobs program to find work for everyone who needed it. Welsh started 
with snow removal, but since that did not offer steady work, he eventually set out to find bigger, 
longer-term projects, and soon the city’s unemployed were performing all sorts of  cleaning, mainte-
nance, and construction work throughout Grand Rapids. Wages came in the form of  scrip issued by 
the city, which workers could use at stores that the city government owned and operated. The pro-
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gram was relatively inexpensive; in its first two years it cost around $650,000, which the city financed 
by levying a minuscule 0.25 percent property tax. In a January 1932 article for American magazine, a 
reporter named Neil M. Clark dubbed Grand Rapids “A City Where Every Man Has A Job.” By the 
time Clark filed his article, the program already had a number of  accomplishments to its name, in-
cluding clearing out the space where the city wanted to build a civic auditorium (which, incidentally, 
would be named after George Welsh), constructing a public pool, and sprucing up City Hall.   20
 There was resistance to Welsh, though, which took the form of  the Committee of  100, a 
body formed to evaluate how well his jobs program was working. In an August 1932 report, the 
Committee criticized several facets of  the program. They complained that the use of  scrip as com-
pensation “causes unemployment” because “[r]ecipients of  scrip are obliged to limit their purchases 
to wares offered by the city store,” which hurt storeowners that could not accept the scrip. They also 
contended that “[t]he manner in which the men work is very detrimental to their morale, and an ac-
tual waste of  time and money.” The Committee of  100’s findings led to Welsh’s departure, although 
he became mayor six years later. As mayor, Welsh continued looking for ways to put the city’s unem-
ployed back to work, spearheading the effort to install a water pipeline linking Grand Rapids to Lake 
Michigan, which cost $4.1 million and was partially financed by the federal government.  21
 Looking at the 1930 census offers a snapshot of  the living conditions of  the DeVos and Van 
Andel families at the outbreak of  the Depression. DeVos lived with his parents at a house on 
Wallinwood Avenue in the suburbs of  eastern Grand Rapids. In his memoir, DeVos recalled that 
“[t]he house had three bedrooms upstairs, and the only bathroom was downstairs, which was typical 
for houses in my neighborhood in those days.” The home was worth $6,500, which equates to just 
over $96,691 in 2018 dollars. DeVos’s father Simon identified his occupation on the census roll as a 
“salesman” of  “electrical supplies.” The Van Andels, meanwhile, also owned their own home, locat-
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ed at 1249 Dickinson Street in southeastern Grand Rapids, which was valued at $5,000 (approxi-
mately $74,377 in 2018). James Van Andel was listed as a “repair man” at an “auto garage.” Both 
families, in other words, were comfortably middle class, neither rich nor destitute.   22
 As DeVos and Van Andel told it, the Depression spared neither of  their families. Van Andel 
noted that the Depression cost one of  his grandfathers his small business, and as a result he had to 
move in with Van Andel and his parents. On a more personal note, Van Andel wrote that the col-
lapse of  the financial markets “t[ook] my small savings account with it,” with the minuscule consola-
tion that he eventually “got back five cents on the dollar[.]” According to DeVos, his father Simon 
was among the city’s unemployed. Unable to find a steady job and forced to take work wherever he 
could find it, the family moved in with his grandparents, although they held on to their home at 
Wallinwood Avenue, converting it into a rental property to bring some extra income. (The 1940 cen-
sus listed their address as 61 Wallinwood Avenue, so presumably they had moved back by then.) 
DeVos described his family as “poor but no poorer than most of  our neighbors,” and recalled an 
incident that illustrated the family’s tight economic circumstances: “I remember a teenager coming 
to our door selling magazines and crying because he couldn’t go home until he sold the last one. My 
father had to tell him honestly that we didn’t have a dime in the house.” According to DeVos, the 
Great Depression influenced his decision to become a businessman. He wrote that “[h]aving lost his 
job, my father encouraged me to go into business for myself.” His father’s bout of  unemployment 
had taught him that “he had no control over being employed or unemployed” and that “[h]is destiny 
was in the hands of  his employer.”   23
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 In order to help support the family, DeVos took a job as a newspaper delivery boy, which he 
said “essentially was my first business” and “taught me responsibility, accountability, and all the prin-
ciples of  the rewards of  hard work.” As of  1940, he was still delivering newspapers. Like the anec-
dote about his grandfather selling produce, the story of  his newspaper job also seems to foreshadow 
his future career in the direct sales industry. The thirties were not all bad for the DeVoses, as they 
welcomed two additions to the family, daughters Bernice and Jennet.  24
 DeVos and Van Andel began their friendship in 1940. Fitting for two men who went on to 
be pioneers in direct sales, their friendship began as a business transaction. Both attended Grand 
Rapids Christian High School, a private religious school. The fact that both went to high school — 
never mind a private high school — is significant. In 1940, a little over 1.2 million young people 
graduated high school, amounting to around half  of  all seventeen year-olds. A 1942 report from the 
Department of  Education indicated that “pupils in private secondary schools were found to account 
for 6.5 percent of  all pupils in public and private secondary schools in 1939-40[.]” At the time the 
report came out, there were 3,568 private high schools in the entire country. Accordingly, whatever 
hardships the DeVos and Van Andel families endured in the Depression, by the end of  it they were 
decidedly back in the ranks of  the middle class.  25
 Jay Van Andel was advantaged in one other way too. He was fortunate enough to get a car 
from his father, who had his own dealership. The car made him a standout at Grand Rapids Christ-
ian High School — in the school’s 1942 yearbook, the caption beside his photo read “his model A 
has infinite capacities!” DeVos did not have it quite as good. According to him, he would either walk 
to school, or he would get the occasional “free lift” aboard the city streetcar, or he would take a bus, 
which was inconvenient because it took a while for it to reach the high school. The two crossed 
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paths because Van Andel had decided to turn his gift into a business opportunity: for a quarter a 
week per passenger, he started driving fellow students to and from school, which, he wrote, “was my 
way of  paying for gas….and making a little extra spending money.” DeVos happened to spot Van 
Andel driving his car in and around the school. Being, as he described it, “an enterprising type,” he 
approached Van Andel — another “enterprising type” — and became one of  his customers. As 
David John Harris has pointed out, “[m]any features attributed to the success of  [Amway] and each 
of  its individual distributorships are implicit in this first encounter: boldness, trust, vision, reci-
procity and friendship.”   26
 Both DeVos and Van Andel said that their friendship was, in important respects, a union of  
opposites, an opinion shared by others who have written about them. DeVos wrote that “[w]hen I 
first met Jay he was a studious, quiet guy….I was outgoing and not a serious student. Jay was re-
served and a serious student who seemed to me to be able to get straight A’s in school without 
cracking a book.” Van Andel similarly remarked that “Rich was more gregarious than I was, more 
extroverted, always making a little more noise,” whereas he “was more of  a bookworm, quieter than 
Rich[.]” Their differences even extended to their appearance: DeVos wrote, “I was shorter and 
stockier with dark hair. Jay was tall and slighter with wavy blond hair.” Nevertheless, both said that 
their differences, rather than driving a wedge between them, were key to bringing them closer to-
gether. Van Andel said that “despite our differences I enjoyed his presence — it brought out the 
best in me,” while DeVos wrote that Van Andel “didn’t say much, wasn’t much for small talk, but he 
was interesting because he was curious about subjects beyond what was typical for kids in high 
school.” And besides, there was a lot they had in common. In his 1979 book on Amway titled The 
Winner’s Circle, Charles Conn complained that “[m]uch is made of  the dissimilarities of  the two 
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men[.]” According to him, “[t]heir contrasts are largely of  style,” whereas their commonalities lay in 
their attitudes: “each is extremely well disciplined; each is strongly committed to the other; each is 
supremely self-confident, even if  he expresses it differently.” DeVos similarly said that “we were so 
much alike in our worldview and philosophy.”  27
 With their friendship forged through a business transaction, DeVos and Van Andel’s first 
adventure together also involved business. The same year they met, Van Andel’s father asked the 
boys to take two pickup trucks to a customer of  his who lived in Bozeman, Montana. According to 
DeVos, his mother had reservations about them taking the trip, but ultimately they were allowed to 
go. Like other adventures that followed, DeVos and Van Andel both painted the trip to Bozeman as 
yet another building block for their future careers. They took every possible measure to cut costs 
along the way; Van Andel described how they “slept on hay in the back of  the trucks,” and both re-
called inflating their own tires rather than paying for air, which DeVos characterized as “another ear-
ly lesson in thrift and self-reliance.” DeVos wrote that because of  the trip, he and Van Andel gained 
“a firsthand look at America and an appreciation of  our country” and “received lessons in team-
work, self-reliance, responsibility, building trust, and the satisfaction in a job well done.”    28
 A year after DeVos and Van Andel became friends and took their trip to Bozeman, the Unit-
ed States formally entered World War II. As cities all across the country did, the local economy of  
Grand Rapids converted to meet wartime demands, though it had some difficulty at the outset. The 
staple industry of  Grand Rapids for many decades had been furniture, and since the city’s furniture 
manufacturers used wood rather than iron or steel, it was not immediately clear what they could con-
tribute to the American war machine. They eventually settled on making an assortment of  wood-
based parts and equipment, among them gliders. Grand Rapids Industries, Inc., a business consor-
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tium formed at the onset of  the war, boasted that the glider produced in the city, called the CG-4A, 
“is so tough that it can be literally wrapped around trees or slammed into barns with little or no 
damage to personnel and equipment.” The city partook in various staples of  wartime life, such as 
organizing efforts to collect scrap goods like cooking grease, paper, and rubber as well as conducting 
blackout drills to ready the population in the event of  an Axis air attack. In 1943, the Army Air 
Force hosted its Weather Training School in Grand Rapids, converting various sites throughout the 
city into venues for housing and training recruits in metrological surveying.  29
 The war put physical distance between DeVos and Van Andel. Van Andel joined the Army 
Air Reserve Corps in November 1942 and ended up training men to operate the B-17 and B-29 
bombers. DeVos enlisted two years later and worked on repairing and maintaining gliders. Despite 
the separation, the two remained in touch by mail. DeVos characterized their correspondence thusly: 
“I wrote him some rather mundane updates about my daily service, but Jay’s letters to me were more 
detailed and philosophical….His letters made me feel at home and reminded me of  the depth of  
our growing friendship.” Although the war ended in August of  1945, the pair were not reunited until 
a year later, when DeVos was officially discharged — he spent the intervening months working for 
the Army on the Pacific island of  Tinian. Even before the war’s end, though, the two were already 
planning their future together. Van Andel recounted this exchange they had while they were on leave 
during the war: 
We met back in Grand Rapids, and one night when we had returned from taking a couple of  girls 
out, Rich pulled the car into the garage at his parents’ house, and we got to talking. Rich said, “Well, 
Jay, when this is all over, what are we going to do? Go back to college?” Both of  us knew that wasn’t 
what we really wanted to do. The more we talked, the more we realized that we ought to form a 
partnership and go into business together. As would happen so many times in the future, all we 
needed to do was figure out what kind of  business we would start.  30
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 Amway was still about fifteen years away at this point. Before they went into direct sales, 
DeVos and Van Andel tried their hand at a variety of  other ventures. The first, founded while De-
Vos was still on Tinian, was Wolverine Air Service, which offered flying lessons and private flights 
around the Grand Rapids area. Wolverine Air Service tapped into a postwar civilian fascination with 
flight; Van Andel wrote that “[a]fter World War II there was a kind of  airplane craze. Many people 
thought every new house would be built near an airstrip and that there would be two airplanes in 
every garage so we could all commute to work by air.” The two purchased an airplane, a Piper Cub, 
and hired a pair of  instructors. At the time the business started, Grand Rapids did not even have an 
airstrip, so as a result they had to use the Grand River as their runway, which meant they had to out-
fit their plane with pontoons.   31
 In May 1947, while Wolverine Air Service was still in business, DeVos and Van Andel 
opened a drive-in restaurant called the Riverside Drive-Inn. In June 1949, the up-and-coming entre-
preneurs ran into some legal problems. The Michigan state government shut down a program run 
by Wolverine Air Service to train veterans to fly because some of  the participants had engaged in 
“buddy riding”: in other words, flying with friends onboard. Reporting at the time indicated that 
“[t]he practice came to light….when state police investigated the forced landing of  a student at the 
school” and that “the investigation uncovered several other minor flying violations at the school.” It 
would not be the last time that a business run by Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel attracted the 
attention of  law enforcement.  32
 Financially, the businesses were only marginally successful. According to DeVos, “[w]e prob-
ably cleared $100,000 over the four years in the aviation business, and we likely broke even on the 
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restaurant.” However, in the tale of  their lives, these first two businesses are less significant for the 
money they made — or, in the case of  the restaurant, did not — than for what they taught them 
about being businessmen. Van Andel wrote that he and DeVos learned three important lessons from 
these early ventures: (i) “running a business is a matter of  pressing on in spite of  an unending series 
of  unexpected problems” (the absence of  a proper airstrip was just one of  several obstacles they 
encountered over the course of  running Wolverine Air Service), (ii) “stay out of  the shop and let 
other people do what they do best” (as noted earlier, they hired experienced pilots to offer instruc-
tions), and (iii) “work hard, and work smart, when everyone else is asleep or watching TV” (the pair 
ran the Riverside Drive-Inn in the evenings after Wolverine Air Service was closed). DeVos pro-
claimed that Wolverine Air Service was a testament to the value of  “taking chances and doing, and 
moving ahead confidently….even though at times we should have looked before we leaped.”  33
 In 1948, three years into their business partnership, DeVos and Van Andel sold both Wolver-
ine Air Service and the Riverside Drive-Inn and decided to leave America. They had read a book 
called Caribbean Cruise, authored by a man named Richard Bertram, which documented his sailing 
expedition through the Caribbean, and they decided to do the same. They encountered many hic-
cups along their trip. For one, the boat they purchased, the Elizabeth, was junk. As DeVos described 
it, it “had been in dry dock for all the years of  the war” and “had been sitting on her keel without 
the bow or stern being supported,” but they bought it after assurances that it was still sailable.   34
 At the very outset of  their journey, DeVos accidentally steered the boat into a swamp in 
New Jersey, and the boat had to be pulled out by the Coast Guard. From there they went to North 
Carolina, followed by Miami, Key West, and then Havana. On March 27, 1949, as the pair sailed 
from Cuba to Puerto Rico, water began leaking into the Elizabeth. It was a problem they had en-
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countered frequently, only now they were unable to stop it. They sent out distress signals and were 
eventually discovered by a freighter, the Adabelle Lykes, which took them aboard and sank the Eliza-
beth. The Adabelle Lykes was going to Puerto Rico anyway, so it dropped them off  on the island. Af-
ter that they traveled to South America via a British ship, the Teakwood, which brought them down to 
Curaçao. They had originally planned on staying aboard until it reached its final destination, Ve-
nezuela, but got off  early because accommodations were poor. They were briefly held up in Curaçao 
because Dutch officials suspected that they were, of  all things, communist agents, mainly on account 
of  the fact that they were traveling with lots of  cash and that Van Andel could speak Dutch. They 
were eventually released, at which point they took a plane to Caracas and then to Barranquilla, 
Colombia, where they boarded a boat that took them down the Magdalena River. They eventually 
made their way through most of  South America and then made a pit stop back in the Caribbean be-
fore returning to the United States in July 1949.  35
 Much like the Bozeman trip, DeVos and Van Andel’s trek through South America and the 
Caribbean strengthened their belief  in American exceptionalism. DeVos wrote that “[a]s much as Jay 
and I found some of  these foreign lands exotic and charming, I also recall a feeling that stayed with 
me the rest of  my life — these countries simply lacked much of  the modern development, luxuries, 
and conveniences that we in America too often take for granted.” Similarly, referring to Argentina, 
which was ruled by Juan Perón at the time they were passing through, Van Andel said that “[s]eeing 
the way people live in countries where the government controls so much taught us the importance 
of  a free economy, and we never again took for granted the relative freedom of  U.S. society.” For 
DeVos, the trip was also a lesson in the value of  having confidence in oneself: “I had learned to take 
risks and to rise above defeat in order to achieve a goal and realize a dream. The sinking of  the Eliz-
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abeth had only heightened my sense of  ‘living in the moment,’ and it taught me to improvise in ways 
that made life more interesting and spontaneous.”  36
 In Rio de Janeiro, DeVos and Van Andel resolved to start a new business once they returned 
to the United States. Having no clear idea for what exactly they wanted to sell, they first tried wood-
en toys and organic baked goods. The baked goods proved, according to Van Andel, “a moderate 
success,” but the toys could not compete with their plastic counterparts.   37
 On August 29, 1949, they discovered direct sales. That day, Van Andel’s second cousin, Neil 
Maaskant, came to Grand Rapids to introduce Van Andel to Nutrilite, a company founded in the 
late 1930s by a physician named Carl Rehnborg specializing in vitamins and nutritional supplements. 
Van Andel balked. “At first, I wasn’t enthusiastic,” he wrote. “Pill peddling wasn’t the sort of  busi-
ness to make much money in, I thought….It turned out ‘peddling pills’ was making cousin Neil a 
thousand dollars a month, which in 1949 was quite a good income.” Impressed by how well 
Maaskant appeared to be doing in the business and the fact they did not need to put a lot of  money 
down, DeVos and Van Andel signed up.  38
 Nutrilite was an important company for two reasons. First, it was one of  the first to sell vit-
amin supplements as we know them today. An industry sprang up around vitamins not long after 
their discovery in the early twentieth century. Cod-liver oil was the first commercial vitamin, market-
ed as a preventative against conditions resulting from vitamin D deficiency such as rickets. In the 
mid-1930s, companies like Nutrilite started offering vitamins in tablet and capsule form. The story 
goes that Rehnborg got the idea while living in China in the 1920s, where he spent a year languishing 
in a Shanghai jail. To make sure he got the nutrients he needed, he added various plants and herbs to 
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his paltry rations. Upon his return to the United States, he settled in southern California and started 
developing a convenient nutritional supplement that people could consume with their meals. He had 
his breakthrough in 1934 with a product that he called Double X.   39
 Additionally, Nutrilite was a pioneer in multi-level marketing. In 1945, Rehnborg teamed up 
with a company called Mytinger & Casselberry, run by Lee Mytinger and William Casselberry. 
Mytinger & Casselberry developed a sales and distribution scheme similar to what Amway later 
adopted. Like Amway distributors, Nutrilite distributors earned money both through product sales 
and bonuses from sales made by those they sponsored into the business. Nutrilite also had its own 
version of  Direct distributors, in that after crossing a certain sales threshold, distributors dealt di-
rectly with the company rather than going through their sponsor.  40
 Mytinger & Casselberry’s plan helped Nutrilite grow into a significant player in the direct 
sales industry. By 1952, Nutrilite’s distributor force was thirteen thousand strong. The Long Beach In-
dependent reported in October 1955 that “[t]en years ago, retail sales of  Nutrilite Food Supplement 
were less than $50,000. In the past 12 months, consumers bought more than $24,000,000 worth of  
Nutrilite.” Newspaper advertisements for Nutrilite touted both the quality of  the supplements as 
well as their health benefits. One that ran in November 1952, for example, stated that Nutrilite “[i]s 
developed from composted soil and Nutrilite plant food and contains all of  the vitamins and miner-
als vitally necessary to diet” and stressed that the products were “delivered fresh[.]”  Sometimes the 
ads bordered on the dubious. An early Nutrilite ad from 1939, for example, asked rhetorically, “Why 
Suffer From Bodily Ailments Which Are Due To A Chemical Im-Balance of  the Body,” promising 
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that “NUTRILITE restores the body to a CHEMICAL BALANCE[.]” Such claims later put the 
company in hot water.  41
 As would happen in Amway, several Nutrilite distributors developed large networks and 
staged functions and rallies for their downlines. One of  these, put on by a Mr. and Mrs. H.G. Kobes, 
was held on August 13, 1955 in Sioux City, Iowa. A number of  successful Nutrilite distributors as 
well as an official from Mytinger & Casselberry were scheduled to appear. Among the speakers were 
Neil Maaskant and Richard DeVos. “Still in their twenties,” wrote the Sioux County Capital about De-
Vos and Van Andel, “these two young men have a sales volume of  more than $1,000,000 per year — 
and head a sales group of  more than 1,500 distributors.” The paper described DeVos as “an out-
standing speaker” and noted that “his recorded talks have been much in demand by sales organiza-
tions from coast to coast.”  42
 The story that DeVos and Van Andel told about their time in Nutrilite paralleled, in several 
respects, the accounts of  Amway distributors published in pro-Amway books and tapes, which are 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Like a lot of  those distributors, DeVos and Van Andel 
were initially hesitant about whether direct sales was worthwhile, but eventually they overcame their 
misgivings. An important reason why was that they relished the prospect of  working for themselves. 
Upon becoming Nutrilite salespeople, DeVos and Van Andel described various obstacles that pre-
sented themselves early on. Van Andel wrote that “[w]hen we talked to some of  our friends about 
our new business, they thought we were crazy. Many people in those days thought vitamins were a 
waste of  money. For two weeks, we couldn’t sell a single box, and our Nutrilite distributorship went 
absolutely nowhere.” DeVos recalled, “We invited a bunch of  friends over to our cottage, showed a 
short film describing the product, and enthusiastically expressed to the gathering how excited we 
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were about this wonderful opportunity. People started heading for the door. One guy stayed behind 
to sign up but quit soon after.”   43
 Their resolve was renewed after they went to a Nutrilite convention in Chicago on Neil’s in-
vitation, but even after that things were not easy. At one meeting they held in Lansing, only two 
people came. At another — this time in Grand Rapids — there were eight, all of  whom happened 
to be rival Nutrilite salespeople scoping out their competition. They stuck with it, though, and even-
tually they were able to move product and recruit distributors. According to Van Andel, “in the first 
year [the distributorship] had a group retail sales volume of  $85,000.” Van Andel attributed their 
eventual turnaround to “a few simple rules”: (i) “we had to believe in our product” (both DeVos and 
Van Andel said in their autobiographies that they used Nutrilite supplements themselves), (ii) they 
“ha[d] determination to succeed”, and (iii) they had “personal involvement in the business.” As we 
will see, many Amway distributor vignettes also stressed early challenges — skeptical friends and 
relatives, the struggle to find people interested in joining — and the need to persevere in order to 
achieve success.  44
********** 
 While DeVos and Van Andel were finding their footing in the business world, the United 
States underwent an astounding social and economic transformation that would lay the building 
blocks for both the Amway worldview and the cofounders’s small-business conservatism. Arguably 
the defining feature of  the immediate postwar years was rapid economic growth. The gross domes-
tic product of  the United States in 1945 (measured in 2009 dollars) stood at approximately $2.2 tril-
lion. After declining slightly over the next two years, GDP increased steadily. By 1953, it was at $2.5 
 Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 40; DeVos, Simply Rich, 75.43
 Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 40-44, DeVos, Simply Rich, 80, 8244
  !51
trillion, and then went to just over $2.7 trillion in 1955. By the end of  the decade, U.S. GDP had 
crossed the three trillion dollar threshold. Numerous factors were responsible for this explosive 
growth: the Second World War had wiped out America’s economic competitors, oil prices were low, 
government spending on the military remained high, and the baby boom stimulated demand for var-
ious consumer goods.  45
 This prosperity manifested itself  in several ways. College attendance, for example, increased 
significantly. In 1947, about 2.3 million people in the United States were enrolled in higher educa-
tion. After increasing in 1948 and 1949, the number of  collegiate Americans declined slightly over 
the next three years before rising once again in 1953. By mid-decade, 2.65 million Americans were in 
college, and that figure continued to grow over the rest of  the fifties, reaching 3.6 million in 1959. 
An important contributor to expanding enrollment was, of  course, the G.I. Bill, which became law a 
year before the end of  World War II. The G.I. Bill sent 2.2 million veterans college bound, with a 
little over four million more attending other educational institutions. Suburbanization was another 
marker of  plenty. James Patterson indicated that “[t]he number of  new single-family homes started 
in 1944 had been 114,000. This rose to 937,000 in 1946 and to nearly 1.7 million in 1950.” All told, 
“[b]y 1960, 60 percent of  American families owned their own homes, compared to slightly fewer 
than 50 percent in 1945.” Of  course, moving out to the suburbs would not have been possible with-
out automobiles, and accordingly this period also witnessed massive increases in car ownership. Be-
tween 1945 and 1955, purchases of  new automobiles rose approximately 11,366%, from 69,500 to 
7.9 million. In 1948, only 0.4% of  households boasted a television. By 1951 it was nearly one-quar-
ter, and around sixty-four percent had one in 1956.  46
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 Grand Rapids shared in this prosperity, which transformed the city’s economy, demography, 
and even its borders. The postwar years saw Grand Rapids shift away from what had long been its 
core industry, furniture manufacturing, which had lost its competitive advantage to other parts of  
the country, chiefly the South. That void was filled quickly, though. A September 1944 article in the 
Grand Rapids Press noted that the local economy had begun diversifying back in 1940, when the local 
Chamber of  Commerce spearheaded a push to attract new industries to the city. A report produced 
by the University of  Michigan in 1959 stated that “[t]here are now 73 furniture factories within the 
metropolitan area and the city is still a national leader in furniture making and design, but furniture 
manufacturing is no longer its major industry.” Instead, the report indicated that “[t]oday the most 
important manufactured products are metal trades” and that “[t]he area is also a leader in the pro-
duction of  business machines, office equipment, carpet sweepers, fiberboard containers, air craft and 
electronic devices.”  47
 Grand Rapids experienced all the symptoms of  postwar prosperity. The city’s population 
went from 164,292 in 1940 to 176,515 in 1950 to 189,172 in 1956, an increase of  about fifteen per-
cent. Metropolitan Grand Rapids, meanwhile, grew about thirty-six percent over that same period, 
from 213,749 in 1940 to 290,941 in 1956. Much of  that growth occurred in the surrounding sub-
urbs. The population of  suburban Grand Rapids grew from 49,457 in 1940 to 101,769 in 1956, and 
it came to represent an increasing share of  Grand Rapids’s population. Whereas around twenty-three 
percent of  those in metropolitan Grand Rapids were living in the suburbs in 1940, thirty-five per-
cent were by 1956. The aforementioned University of  Michigan report noted that “in a period of  36 
years [from 1920 to 1956], the central city’s proportion of  the area population had dropped 21 per-
centage points….even though the city increased its population by 51,538 (37.4%) over this period.” 
With increasing suburbanization came a boom in housing construction. An August 1948 article in 
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the Grand Rapids Press observed that “more single family homes were built last year and the year be-
fore than in any other year for which records are available” and that conversely, “the number of  
multi-family dwelling units constructed since 1945 represents less than one out of  every ten non-
farm dwelling units built in the postwar period[.]” Schools in Grand Rapids benefitted from the 
state-sponsored surge in college attendance. Between 1953 and 1954 alone, the number of  people in 
college in Grand Rapids rose from 3,860 to 4,450, a fifteen percent increase. In response to this 
growth, as well as expectations of  even higher levels of  attendance in the future, both Calvin Col-
lege and Aquinas College acquired new land and added new buildings to their campuses. And in 
1960, plans were set in motion for a new postsecondary institution in the area, Grand Valley State 
Colleges, now known as Grand Valley State University.   48
 Grand Rapids sought to address the shift of  its population to the suburbs through annexa-
tion. Annexation was an incredibly contentious issue that pitted the urbanites, who generally sup-
ported it, against the suburbanites, who did not: in a December 1959 referendum, suburban voters 
overwhelmingly torpedoed an effort to fuse Grand Rapids with five other surrounding localities. 
The following year, however, another round of  votes allowed annexation to proceed. On December 
30, 1960, the Grand Rapids Press reported that “Grand Rapids’ greatest growth in 35 years becomes 
official Saturday morning [January 2, 1960]….when vast suburban areas of  Grand Rapids and Walk-
er townships — including 13.72 square miles and 19,880 new citizens — join the city as a result of  
annexations Aug. 2 and Nov. 8.” The article characterized these additions as “the biggest annexation 
since 1925[.]”  49
 The postwar American economy was defined not only by growing prosperity, but also by 
important developments in the nature of  work and labor relations, not all of  which were positive 
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from the working person’s perspective. Union membership increased somewhat in the late 1940s and 
1950s, continuing a trend that began in the midst of  the Great Depression, when New Deal legisla-
tion created a more hospitable environment for organizing. In 1935, the year that the Wagner Act 
passed, approximately 3.6 million workers belonged to a union. After the federal government recog-
nized the right to bargain collectively, that number nearly doubled to seven million by 1937. The 
Second World War also saw union ranks swell, from 8.8 million in 1939 to 14.3 million in 1945. 
Membership totals fluctuated over the next fifteen years, but the general trajectory remained up-
wards, so that by 1960, a little over seventeen million workers were in unions.   50
 It is important to note, however, that union density changed little in this period. Between 1939 
and 1945, the percentage of  total workers who were in unions rose significantly, from 19.2% to 
27.1%, but after that it plateaued. Despite an increase in the total number of  unionized workers, 
they represented just 25.9% of  the total workforce in 1960, a slight decrease from 1945. This had in 
part to do with a shift in the sort of  work that Americans were doing. Between 1940 and 1960, the 
share of  American workers employed in manufacturing declined from one-third to one-quarter. 
James Patterson noted that “[g]rowth areas after 1945 were increasingly in white-collar work and 
service employment,” industries in which “[m]any were part-time employees” and “were scattered, 
often in relatively small companies,” making them harder to organize.   51
 The early stages of  the businessmen’s crusade were also to blame. In 1947, in response to a 
wave of  strikes that broke out across the country in 1945 and 1946, the Taft-Hartley Act became 
law. Taft-Hartley curtailed the ability to strike and to organize certain workers, in addition to requir-
ing unions to disavow any affinity for or affiliation with Communism or Communists. The fifties, 
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meanwhile, saw a push by businesses and business interest groups for “right-to-work” laws in several 
states.   52
 The case of  labor demonstrates that the postwar years were not a golden age for everyone. 
African-Americans continued to live — and die — under Jim Crow, although the middle of  the 
decade saw the start of  the so-called classical phase of  the civil rights movement following the 
Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling against public school segregation in Brown. A second Red Scare tram-
pled upon the civil liberties of  thousands who were persecuted for allegedly being Communists, of-
ten on little more than innuendo. And a parallel crusade, the Lavender Scare, led to the purging of  
many gay men and women from the federal government on account of  their sexual orientation, 
which supposedly made them national security threats.  53
 For women, the late 1940s and 1950s were a period of  regression. World War II created an 
unprecedented opportunity for women to work outside the home, twenty million in all by 1944. 
Since many of  those jobs were in wartime manufacturing, it meant that women had greater access to 
unions, not to mention that they were earning more relative to traditionally feminized sectors of  the 
economy. Those gains vanished after victory, though. Mary Schweitzer noted that “the return to 
peacetime conditions left women pretty much where they had been before 1941.” The civilian labor 
force participation rate for women hovered between thirty-three and thirty-five percent throughout 
the first half  of  the 1950s, with a spike around 1955 that brought it up to between thirty-six and 
thirty-seven percent for the rest of  the decade. Although significant numbers of  women continued 
working outside the home, they no longer had access to male-dominated jobs and found themselves 
relegated to “women’s work.” On the whole, the fifties represented an attempt to reinforce women’s 
traditional roles as wives and homemakers, often at the cost of  inflicting profound angst. Betty 
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Friedan’s landmark 1963 book The Feminine Mystique described housewives afflicted by “the problem 
that has no name,” the feeling that they could be doing more with their lives but were not: “As she 
made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with 
her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night — she was 
afraid to ask even of  herself  the silent question — ‘Is this all?’”  54
 It was not only historically marginalized groups, though, who found cause to complain about 
postwar society. In fact, unease was practically pandemic. The existential psychologist Rollo May 
wrote in 1950 that “[f]rom 1945 and the birth of  the atom bomb, anxiety shifted from a convert to 
an overt problem”: 
The alert citizens were then aware not only of  the more obvious anxiety-creating situations such as 
uncontrolled atomic warfare, radical political and economic upheaval, but also the less obvious, 
deeper, and more personal sources of  anxiety in themselves and their fellow-men. This latter in-
cludes the inner confusion, alienation, psychological disorientation, and uncertainty with respect to 
values and acceptable standards of  conduct. Hence to endeavor to “prove” the pervasiveness of  
anxiety in our day is as unnecessary as the proverbial carrying coals to Newcastle. 
According to May, there was in the postwar years a “change from anxiety as a matter of  ‘mood’ to a 
recognition that it is an urgent issue which we must at all costs try to define and clarify,” and as evi-
dence he cited examples from literature, politics, social science, and psychology, among other disci-
plines.   55
 Anxiety was one of  the buzzwords of  the age. Alan Watts’s 1951 book The Wisdom of  Insecuri-
ty opened with a chapter titled “The Age of  Anxiety.” In it, he wrote of  “the feeling that we live in a 
time of  unusual insecurity.” He blamed this largely on a declining collective belief  in an ultimate end. 
Science, according to him, had robbed many people of  the assurance that there was some intrinsic 
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meaning or purpose to their lives or to the universe. “Consequently,” he wrote, “our age is one of  
frustration, anxiety, agitation, and addiction to ‘dope.’ Somehow we must grab what we can while we 
can, and drown out the realization that the whole thing is futile and meaningless.” The “dope,” he 
said, was Americans’s “high standard of  living, a violent and complex stimulation of  the senses, 
which makes them progressively less sensitive and thus in need of  yet more violent stimulation.” 
Financing this distractive consumer culture, in turn, required people “to put up with lives that con-
sist largely in doing jobs that are a bore, earning the means to seek relief  from the tedium by inter-
vals of  hectic and expensive pleasure.” In a March 1953 sermon, the Reverend Elmer Hom-
righausen, who taught at Princeton Theological Seminary, described “a hollow feeling, a lack of  con-
fidence in the future” that he thought was widespread. “We may be well fed and doctored but we are 
dispirited,” he observed.   56
 Between August 31 and September 19, 1958, Dr. Walter Alvarez, a physician who had 
worked at the Mayo Clinic and wrote regularly on medicine for the Los Angeles Times, published an 
eighteen-part series of  articles called “How to Live at Peace With Your Mind,” based on a book he 
wrote with the same title. The topics covered included the effect of  psychological distress on physi-
cal health and vice-versa, psychosomatic aches and pains, mental breakdowns, migraines, anger man-
agement, stress relief, and hypochondria. The majority of  the articles were dedicated to anxiety, its 
sources, and how to alleviate it. Not everyone was a downer, though. In an article for the New York 
Times Magazine in May 1956, the anthropologist Margaret Mead interpreted the postwar wave of  anx-
iety as evidence of  progress. “On balance,” she wrote, “our age of  anxiety represents a large ad-
vance over savage and peasant cultures. Out of  a productive system of  technology drawing upon 
enormous resources, we have created a nation in which anxiety has replaced terror and despair, for 
all except the severely disturbed.” “The kind of  world that produces anxiety,” she explained, “is ac-
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tually a world of  relative safety, a world in which no one feels that he himself  is facing sudden 
death.”  57
 One of  the most poignant examples of  the pervasiveness of  anxiety in this period was the 
success of  the tranquilizer meprobamate, marketed under the brand name Miltown. Released by 
Carter Products in May 1955, Miltown proved wildly successful. In May and June of  1955, sales to-
taled just fifteen thousand dollars. By the end of  the year, though, Miltown brought in half  a million 
dollars in December alone. Sales continued to rise over the coming years — the journalist Scott 
Stossel wrote that “before long [Americans] were spending tens of  millions of  dollars a year on Mil-
town prescriptions.” Miltown was the first in a wave of  new drugs that promised to rid Americans 
of  their distress, as other companies, inspired by Miltown’s popularity, poured money into research 
and development. An article published in the Washington Post in March 1957 expressed trepidation 
over this craze, noting that “[t]he drugs….have a palliative effect upon the patients’ outward sign of  
their mental illness, but they do not remove the illness,” and so consequently “[i]t is a mistake to 
think of  tranquilizers as ‘cures.’” The author also worried about the potential downsides of  using 
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drugs like Miltown to try and eliminate feelings of  psychological discomfort, writing that they might 
actually serve as “helpful warnings, not to be muted but to be heeded.”   58
 The anxiety that inspired so much pontification and that fueled purchases of  Miltown had 
numerous roots. As Rollo May pointed out, the Cold War and the threat of  potential nuclear annihi-
lation was obviously a very significant contributor. There was a more existential dimension to this 
anxiety, however, which is typically framed in terms of  the deleterious effects of  “materialism” but 
was in fact something much more profound: namely, a perceived crisis of  autonomy. On a variety of  
fronts — from cookie-cutter suburban developments to large, anonymous white-collar corporations 
— many Americans, particularly those in the burgeoning middle classes, came to believe that the 
premise that they were individuals in charge of  their own lives was under attack. More and more 
people felt that they had become virtually indistinguishable from their neighbors and colleagues, that 
their lives were under the direction of  others, particularly in the sphere of  work.  59
 Numerous books attempted to diagnose the crisis of  autonomy. Perhaps the most common 
critique of  American society in the late 1940s and 1950s was its alleged obsession with conformity. 
David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950) is perhaps the most well-known study of  the problem of  
conformity with which many social critics of  the period concerned themselves. Riesman identified 
three types of  “social character” that, according to him, have existed throughout human history: 
“tradition-directed,” “inner-directed,” and “other-directed.” Tradition-directed people were usually 
found in developing countries, in which “the conformity of  the individual tends to be dictated to a 
very large degree by power relations among the various age and sex groups, the clans, castes, profes-
sions, and so forth” and “[t]he culture controls behavior minutely[.]” At a later stage of  develop-
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ment, inner-directed societies emerged; Riesman used Western Europe during the Renaissance and 
the Reformation as an example. In those cases, “the source of  direction for the individual is ‘inner’ 
in the sense that it is implanted early in life by the elders and directed toward generalized but none-
theless inescapably destined goals.”   60
 Finally, there were other-directed societies, which featured highly developed economies as 
well as declining birth and death rates. Riesman believed that the United States of  the 1950s was at 
this stage. For the other-directed, “their contemporaries are the source of  direction….either those 
known to him or those with whom he is indirectly acquainted, through friends and through the mass 
media.” The other-directed person “has learned, if  he is adjusted, to look like those others with 
whom he has been brought up, with whom he has learned cooperation, tolerance, and restraint of  
temper. In this process he has learned to forget aspects of  his character that are not ‘social,’ not oth-
er-directed.” In an other-directed society, it was paramount that an individual fit in. The other-direct-
ed society broadly resembled the tradition-directed one, in that both prized conformity to group 
norms. The key difference was that other-directed societies lacked the sort of  unifying culture that 
Riesman believed existed in tradition-directed societies. Consequently, those living in other-directed 
societies were acculturated through other means, chiefly mass media. Riesman pointed to self-help 
and positive thinking books — he specifically mentioned Daniel Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and 
Influence People — as examples of  “how popular culture is exploited for group-adjustment 
purposes[.]” Riesman believed that the solution to the problems of  other-directedness lay in foster-
ing “autonomy.” “The ‘autonomous,’” he wrote, “are those who on the whole are capable of  con-
forming to the behavioral norms of  their society….but are free to choose whether to conform or 
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not,” who “recognize and respect [their] own feelings, [their] own potentialities, [their] own limita-
tions.”  61
 Six years after Riesman published The Lonely Crowd, William Whyte released The Organization 
Man (1956), which painted a similar portrait of  postwar society. Whyte’s version of  other-directed-
ness was what he called the “Social Ethic,” which he believed had replaced the Protestant ethic. 
Against the Protestant ethic, according to which “pursuit of  individual salvation through hard work, 
thrift, and competitive struggle is the heart of  the American achievement,” the Social Ethic champi-
oned “a belief  in the group as the source of  creativity” and “a belief  in ‘belongingness’ as the ulti-
mate need of  the individual[.]” Along with Riesman, Whyte argued that American society at mid-
century had undergone a transition from individualism to a kind of  collectivism. The source of  this 
shift, for Whyte, was the spread of  “The Organization” — in other words, corporations. According 
to Whyte, the mandates of  the Organization increasingly conflicted with what the Protestant ethic 
proscribed. Thrift, for instance, would no longer do, since big businesses needed consumers willing 
to spend large amounts of  money on the products they made. More significantly, the individualist 
ethos of  the Protestant ethic did not mesh well with the new corporations, which were hierarchical 
and heavily bureaucratized. The Social Ethic, then, according to which “[m]an exists as a unit of  so-
ciety” and “only as he collaborates with others does he become worth while,” was more in tune with 
the typical working conditions of  the corporate employee.   62
 Whyte found evidence of  the Social Ethic throughout postwar society. Schooling, he wrote, 
“is more and more a training in the minutiae of  the organization skills,” and he devoted several 
chapters to illustrating how businesses were shaping the curricula and priorities of  postsecondary 
institutions, noting at one point that “[i]t is often the business school of  the college that sets the 
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dominant tone[.]” Like Riesman, Whyte also saw popular culture as a major promoter of  the Social 
Ethic, writing that “[s]ince 1900….the vision of  life presented in popular fare has been one in which 
conflict has slowly been giving way to adjustment.” Perhaps the ultimate symbol of  the Social Ethic 
for Whyte, the place where its values most manifested, were the suburbs. Whyte described the sub-
urbs as “the ultimate expression of  the interchangeability so sought by organization,” a place where 
people adopted the fashions and even the political and religious allegiances of  their neighbors al-
most as soon as they arrived. “[T]he teaching of  sociability,” he wrote, “is perhaps the greatest 
achievement of  suburban education.” In the suburbs, “[o]ne is made outgoing.”  63
 Both Riesman and Whyte identified economic changes — particularly the spread of  corpo-
rate capitalism — as an important source of  the crisis of  autonomy. In addition to encouraging con-
formity, postwar corporate capitalism was also blamed for fostering alienation. In White Collar 
(1951), the sociologist C. Wright Mills examined the state of  white-collar workers at mid-century. He 
justified his focus on this segment of  the working class by arguing that “it is to this white-collar 
world that one must look for much that is characteristic of  twentieth-century existence” and that 
“[t]he troubles that confront the white-collar people are the troubles of  all men and women living in 
the twentieth century.” White-collar workers emerged as part of  a larger set of  transformations in 
American capitalism that unfolded over the course of  the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
which saw the decline of  “the world of  the small entrepreneur” and the rise of  corporations. Mills 
pointed to several factors responsible for this shift, including the declining profitability of  farming, 
the emergence of  national markets, and monopolization.   64
 This new corporate capitalism translated into new relations of  production: specifically, a 
shift from “democratic property” to “class property.” Democratic property was property “which the 
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owner himself  works,” whereas class property was property “which others are hired to work and 
manage.” “The individual who owns democratic property has power over his work; he can manage 
his self  and his working day,” Mills wrote, whereas “[t]he individual who owns class property has 
power over those who do not own, but who must work for him; the owner manages the working life 
of  the non-owner.” Under a system of  class property, “[t]he right of  man ‘to be free and rooted in 
work that is his own’ is denied,” since “he cannot realize himself  in his work, for work is now a set 
of  skills sold to another, rather than something mixed with his own property.”   65
 By the turn of  the twentieth century, more and more people who once had — or could have 
had — the opportunity to work for themselves were, according to Mills, now working for others. He 
noted for example that “[i]n the established professions, the doctor, lawyer, engineer, once was free 
and named on his own shingle; in the new white-collar world, the salaried specialists of  the clinic, 
the junior partners in the law factory, the captive engineers of  the corporation have begun to chal-
lenge free professional leadership.” White-collar workers, in other words, were those who would 
have had a measure of  economic independence under the old order but were now undergoing a 
kind of  proletarianization. Mills wrote that “[i]n the case of  the white-collar man, the alienation of  
the wage-worker from the products of  his work is carried one step nearer to its Kafka-like comple-
tion.” He described white-collar workers as “[e]stranged from community and society in a context 
of  distrust and manipulation; alienated from work and, on the personality market, from self; expro-
priated of  individual rationality, and politically apathetic[.]” The white-collar worker was “bored at 
work and restless at play,” someone who “does not make anything, although he may handle much 
that he greatly desires but cannot have” and who “go[es] year after year through the same paper rou-
tine[.]”  66
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 Daniel Bell struck similar chords in his 1956 essay “Work and Its Discontents,” which fo-
cused on how efficiency had come to dominate the running of  American workplaces. Although this 
obsession had begun in the industrial sector with the work of  Frederick Winslow Taylor, Bell ob-
served that it had spread into white-collar workplaces as well: “the factory is archetypical because its 
rhythms, in subtle fashion, affect the general character of  work….[a]nd, equally, because the rhythms 
of  mechanization spill over into once individualized modes of  work.” According to Bell, the 
overemphasis on efficiency brewed discontent among workers, writing that “[i]f  ‘conspicuous con-
sumption’ was the badge of  a rising middle class, ‘conspicuous loafing’ is the hostile gesture of  a 
tired working class.” He described “the tendencies toward the evasion of  work” as something that 
“obsess[es] all workers,” and that “[t]he big lure of  escape remains the hope of  ‘being one’s own 
boss.’” For Bell, the remedy to dissatisfaction in the workplace involved “challenging the concept of  
efficiency,” specifically by “consider[ing] the worker as more than a part of  a ‘human relation’ in a 
factory.” “His job must not only feed his body,” Bell insisted, “it must sustain his spirit.”  67
 Though these authors were all academics, their books had a wide reach. The Lonely Crowd and 
The Organization Man made unquestionably the biggest splashes. When The Lonely Crowd first came 
out in 1950, only three thousand copies were available for purchase. The book proved so popular 
that it went through thirteen more print runs before a second abridged edition came out in 1961. The 
Organization Man, meanwhile, did even better, with sales reaching seven hundred thousand. Far from 
obscure eclectic treatises, then, these books had resonance: in their pages many Americans discov-
ered a world that seemed all too familiar. For these social critics, the postwar affluent society was 
turning middle-class Americans in particular into uniform, interchangeable cogs who lived unevent-
ful lives. Much of  the blame fell on work. American capitalism after World War II, which was be-
coming increasingly white-collar and corporate, was criticized for eroding the individuality and inde-
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pendence of  its employees and saddling them with work that bored them. Some, like Daniel Bell, 
hankered for an alternative. Amway would offer one.  68
  
********** 
 Pharmaceuticals were not the only recourse for Americans who felt psychologically strained 
by the pressure to conform or who found their work dissatisfying and disempowering. Along with 
drugs like Miltown, the postwar years saw an explosion of  interest in self-help and positive thinking. 
In a May 1954 article in the New Yorker, the social critic Dwight Macdonald wrote that “the country 
is in the grip of  a howto mania comparable to the dancing mania that swept over Europe in the 
fourteenth century.” He classified self-help and positive thinking books as “‘philosophical’ howtos,” 
works that “tell [the reader] how to cope with himself[.]” He attributed the postwar interest in self-
help and positive thinking — and, by extension, how-to books in general — to a certain sort of  ni-
hilism, writing that “as world issues appear increasingly hopeless of  solution, people console them-
selves with efforts in spheres where solutions are more manageable — the practical and the person-
al.” Although Macdonald’s analysis was bleak, it spoke to a larger truth about the postwar period. 
Overwhelmed by anxiety and the feeling that they had lost control over their lives (if  they ever had 
it), many Americans turned to whatever techniques seemed most likely to alleviate their distress and 
to give them that control back.  69
 Self-help and positive thinking have lengthy lineages in the United States. Steve Starker locat-
ed the first American self-help books in Puritan New England, while Mercé Mur Effing has written 
that “the whole history of  the US is impregnated with the message of  self-help and personal im-
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provement, the objective of  which is, in most cases, implicitly or explicitly, the achievement of  hap-
piness.” The roots of  positive thinking, meanwhile, go back to a mid-nineteenth century religiously-
inspired movement called mind cure. In 1881, the physician George Beard published a book called 
American Nervousness, wherein he popularized the term “neurasthenia” to describe a set of  psycholog-
ical and physiological disturbances that, according to him, were the consequences of  the rapid social 
and technological transformations wrought by the Second Industrial Revolution.      70
 This earlier age of  anxiety contributed to the emergence of  mind cure, the predecessor to 
positive thinking. The founder of  mind cure was Phineas Quimby, who lived in Maine in the 
mid-1800s and dabbled in many of  the social reform movements of  the period. Among the fads he 
explored was hypnotism, and it was during the course of  his work in that field that he discovered the 
power of  “mental suggestion” to relieve his patient’s maladies. Many of  those whom he treated went 
on to make key contributions to the mind cure movement. There was, for instance, Warren Evans, a 
reverend who wrote The Mental Cure, one of  the earliest works in mind cure. Arguably Quimby’s 
most well-known patient was Mary Baker Eddy, who visited him in 1862. Quimby’s ideas — and 
their supposed efficacy — inspired Eddy to write Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, the foun-
dational text of  the Church of  Christ, Scientist, formed in 1879. In Science and Health, Eddy claimed 
that “a man’s belief  produces disease and all its symptoms” and that “[h]ealth is not a condition of  
matter, but of  Mind.” According to her, the proper way to rid oneself  of  illness was through divine 
intervention, not medicine. She wrote that “[d]rugs….are stupid substitutes for the dignity and po-
tency of  divine Mind and its efficacy to heal” and pointed out that “God does not employ drugs or 
hygiene….else Jesus would have recommended and employed them in his healing.”   71
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 Quimby’s teachings also laid the foundations for the New Thought Alliance, a loose umbrel-
la organization formed at the close of  the nineteenth century that included churches and religious 
groups of  various denominations. In his book A History of  the New Thought Movement, Horatio Dress-
er, son of  Julius Dresser, whom Quimby had also treated, explained that whereas “[t]he ‘old 
thought’ was undeniably pessimistic, it dwelt on sin, emphasized the darkness and misery of  the 
world, the distress and the suffering,” New Thought “dwelt on life and light, pointing the way to the 
mastery of  all sorrow and suffering.” New Thought taught that “[m]an is by divine purpose, by 
birth, and his true human inheritance, free” and that “[h]e must come forth and ‘claim his freedom,’ 
the true freedom of  his inner or spiritual nature” and “should rely on himself, develop his inner 
powers, believe in his own experiences and intuitions.” According to New Thought, “man’s outward 
conditions express the inward life….To change or improve one’s conditions, one must then change 
the inner centre, adopt a different attitude, make other and better affirmations, look out on life with 
more optimistic expectations.” The logical conclusion of  this, then, was that “life is to a large extent 
what we make it by our attitude toward it….If  we fail in life, our own attitude is at fault. When we 
succeed, it is because our attitude was affirmative.” This insight was the essence of  what became 
positive thinking.  72
 Turn-of-the-century religious movements like Christian Science and New Thought helped 
lay the foundations for twentieth century self-help and positive thinking, but there were secular 
forces at work as well. Writing in 1966, Phillip Rieff  argued that “[t]he political man of  the Greeks, 
the religious man of  the Hebrews and Christians, the enlightened economic man of  eighteenth-cen-
tury Europe….has been superseded by a new model for the conduct of  life,” which he called “psy-
chological man.” According to him, the psychological man was an outgrowth of  the popularization 
of  Freudian psychoanalysis. Whereas individuals were once taught to find meaning and purpose in 
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something greater than themselves, the cultural emphasis had now shifted towards self-comprehen-
sion and self-actualization. Rieff  saw “[t]he revolution of  rising expectations” as a key catalyst for 
this transformation: as creature comforts became more prevalent and readily available, self-sacrifice 
lost out in favor of  self-indulgence.   73
 Warren Susman identified a similar cultural shift. A “culture of  character,” he wrote, domi-
nated in the period following the Enlightenment, with character defined as “a group of  traits be-
lieved to have social significance and moral quality,” examples of  which included “citizenship, duty, 
democracy, work, building, golden deeds, outdoor life, conquest, honor, reputation, morals, manners, integrity, and 
above all, manhood.” By the turn of  the twentieth century, though, the culture of  character began to 
give way to a “culture of  personality.” Whereas the old ethos had held that “the highest development 
of  self  ended in a version of  self-control or self-mastery, which often meant fulfillment through sac-
rifice in the name of  a higher law, ideals of  duty, honor, integrity,” the burgeoning culture of  charac-
ter “stressed self-fulfillment, self-expression, self-gratification[.]” Words associated with the culture 
of  personality included “fascinating, stunning, attractive, magnetic, glowing, masterful, creative, dominant, [and] 
forceful.” Just as Susman agreed with Rieff  about the turn towards individualism, he similarly con-
cluded that the principle cause of  this was economic changes, particularly the rise of  consumer cul-
ture.  74
 Twentieth century self-help and positive thinking was an amalgamation of  ideas from mind 
cure, psychoanalysis, and the culture of  personality. Arguably the most prominent self-help and posi-
tive thinking books published in the first half  of  the century were Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends 
and Influence People and Napoleon Hill’s Think and Grow Rich, which came out within a year of  one an-
other: Carnegie’s in 1936 and Hill’s in 1937. The fact that both came out in the midst of  the Great 
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Depression is significant. Mercé Effing explained that because of  the economic collapse, “people 
were more focused on avoiding poverty than on becoming wealthy,” and so consequently “[t]hey had 
to be shown the way to believe in themselves again[.]” More than probably anyone else who has 
written in the self-help and positive thinking tradition, Dale Carnegie epitomized the culture of  per-
sonality. Carnegie wrote that he was motivated to write How To Win Friends and Influence People due to 
the absence of  “a practical, working handbook on human relations.” “Dealing with people is proba-
bly the biggest problem you face, especially if  you are in business,” Carnegie told his readers. Ac-
cordingly, How to Win Friends and Influence People focused on making interpersonal relations easier to 
navigate. Each chapter centered on a single tip, thirty in all, for how to make oneself  more likable 
and agreeable.  75
 In addition to dispensing advice about getting along with others, Carnegie also alluded to 
certain notions of  the self  common throughout self-help and positive thinking writing. In his chap-
ter on making people feel important and appreciated, he wrote that “[s]ome authorities declare that 
people may actually go insane in order to find, in the dreamland of  insanity, the feeling of  impor-
tance that has been denied them in the harsh world of  reality.” He claimed that while “about one-
half  of  all mental diseases can be attributed to such physical causes as brain lesions, alcohol, toxins 
and injuries….the other half  of  the people who go insane apparently have nothing organically 
wrong with their brain cells.” The idea that individuals could literally think themselves into illness 
was advanced by some mind cure devotees — most notably Christian Scientists — and, as we will 
see, it also appeared in the works of  some postwar self-help and positive thinking authors. Later, in 
his chapter on the value of  smiling, Carnegie declared that “[h]appiness doesn’t depend on outward 
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conditions” but rather “on inner conditions”: “It isn’t what you have or who you are or where you 
are or what you are doing that makes you happy or unhappy. It is what you think about it.”  76
 Though it made passing references to the importance of  a person’s state of  mind, How to 
Win Friends and Influence People was mainly a self-help book. Think and Grow Rich, on the other hand, 
which purported to offer instructions on the art of  making money, fell squarely in the positive think-
ing camp. “Success comes to those who become success conscious,” Napoleon Hill told his readers, 
while “[f]ailure comes to those who indifferently allow themselves to become failure conscious.” 
“The object of  this book,” he wrote, “is to help all who seek it, to learn the art of  changing their 
minds from failure consciousness to success consciousness.” His advice for how to do this followed 
standard positive-thinking prescriptions that his postwar successors would also dispense. For Hill, 
making money required having the proper disposition and willpower. Good thoughts supposedly 
translated into good outcomes through a process that Hill called “auto-suggestion.” The idea behind 
auto-suggestion was that by repeating to themselves certain thoughts or ideas or phrases, a person 
could effectively rewire their brain, making it possible for them to achieve their goals. Along with 
auto-suggestion, Hill advised “[c]reat[ing] a definite plan for carrying out your desire,” since even 
“[t]he most intelligent man living cannot succeed in accumulating money — nor in any other under-
taking — without plans which are practical and workable.” Becoming rich also required getting rid 
of  negative thoughts: positivity must “constitute the dominating influence of  your mind” so that 
“the negatives cannot enter it.” If  obstacles to moneymaking appeared — which Hill believed was in-
evitable — he advised perseverance, writing that “[p]ersistence is an essential factor in the procedure 
of  transmuting desire into its monetary equivalent.”   77
 Although there were important pieces of  self-help and positive thinking literature authored 
before the Second World War, the genre really matured after 1945, when several of  its most notable 
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works were published, among them Norman Vincent Peale’s The Power of  Positive Thinking (1952), 
John Schindler’s How to Live 365 Days a Year (1954), David Schwartz’s The Magic of  Thinking Big 
(1959), and Maxwell Maltz’s Psycho-Cybernetics (1960). These works spoke directly to the crisis of  au-
tonomy confronting many postwar Americans. They sought to assure readers that they did indeed 
possess control over the trajectory of  their lives and proscribed various techniques for exercising or 
regaining that control.  78
 Although the aforementioned works varied in the extent to which they emphasized certain 
subjects over others, certain ideas appeared in virtually all of  them. Most significantly, all endorsed 
what is without question the central tenant of  the self-help and positive thinking genre: namely, that 
success or failure in one’s life goals is primarily the consequence of  one’s thoughts, beliefs, and atti-
tudes. Norman Vincent Peale wrote that “[m]any of  us manufacture our own unhappiness,” and 
while he acknowledged that “not all unhappiness is self-created, for social conditions are responsible 
for not a few of  our woes,” he nonetheless believed that “to a large extent by our thoughts and atti-
tudes we distill out of  the ingredients of  life either happiness or unhappiness for ourselves.” David 
Schwartz wrote that “[b]elief  in success is the one basic, absolutely essential ingredient in successful 
people.” “A person is a product of  his own thoughts,” he insisted, and he counseled readers to 
“[t]hink success, don’t think failure….Thinking success conditions your mind to create plans that 
produce success. Thinking failure does the exact opposite. Failure thinking conditions the mind to 
think other thoughts that produce failure.” Maxwell Maltz stated that “[y]ou act, and feel, not ac-
cording to what things are really like, but according to the image your mind holds of  what they are 
like. You have certain mental images of  yourself, your world, and the people around you, and you 
behave as though these images were the truth, the reality, rather than the things they represent.” 
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Rather than “‘find’ success or ‘come to’ failure,” Maltz claimed that people “carr[y] their seeds 
around in [their] personality and character.”  79
 Some of  these books claimed that thoughts also played a key role in affecting physical 
health. Peale devoted an entire chapter to the link between negative thoughts and poor health. “It 
has been variously computed,” he wrote, “that from 50 to 75 percent of  present-day people are ill 
because of  the influence of  improper mental states on their emotional and physical make-up.” John 
Schindler claimed that “[w]hen you, or I, or any one of  us, has a physical illness, the chances are bet-
ter than 50 per cent that our illness is emotionally induced.” “Emotionally-induced illness,” or E.I.I., 
as he termed it, took various forms, including but not limited to “pain in the back of  the neck, in the 
stomach, in the colon, in the scalp, in blood vessels, in skeletal muscles…ulcer-like pains, gall blad-
der-like pains, common headaches, migraine headaches,” “neurodermatitis,” and “gas.”   80
 Having placed so much emphasis on the role that thoughts played in shaping physiological 
and psychological well-being, these books then recommended how to go about acquiring the “right” 
thoughts and attitudes. Many of  these will sound familiar by this point. One technique involved pos-
itive visualization: for someone to get what they wanted, they needed to envision already having it. 
Peale advised readers to “[f]ormulate and stamp indelibly on your mind a mental picture of  yourself  
as succeeding” and to do so “no matter how badly things seem to be going at the moment.” Maltz 
identified imagination as “the first key to your success mechanism,” and, like Peale, counseled read-
ers to imagine themselves successful: “Picture to yourself  what you would like to be and have, and 
assume for the moment that such things might be possible. Arouse a deep desire for these things. 
Become enthusiastic about them. Dwell upon them — and keep going over them in your mind.” 
“Mental pictures,” he wrote, “offer us an opportunity to ‘practice’ new traits and attitudes, which 
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otherwise we could not do….If  we picture ourselves performing in a certain manner, it is nearly the 
same as the actual performance. Mental practice helps to make perfect.”   81
 Happiness and success also involved cleansing the mind of  negative thoughts, beliefs, and 
attitudes, as well as preventing any new negatives from entering. David Schwartz insisted that “it re-
ally is easy to forget the unpleasant if  we simply refuse to recall it. Withdraw only positive thoughts 
from your memory bank. Let the others fade away.” Peale similarly recommended that “[w]henever a 
negative thought concerning your personal powers comes to mind, deliberately voice a positive 
thought to cancel it out.” Peale also championed what he called “suggestive articulation,” which, like 
Napoleon Hill’s auto-suggestion, involved creating a positive mental attitude by saying positive 
words to oneself. “Words have profound suggestive power,” Peale wrote, “and there is healing in the 
very saying of  them.” In a similar vein, Schindler said that readers should “[c]arry this idea every 
minute of  every day: I am going to keep my attitude and thinking calm and cheerful — RIGHT NOW.” 
“That thought you are to have always with you,” he wrote, “repeating it over and over to yourself  
until it sticks there without conscious effort.” And when negative thoughts invariably cropped up, 
“[p]ractice thought control”: “When you catch yourself  starting a stressing emotion like worry, anxi-
ety, fear, apprehension, or discouragement, STOP IT. Substitute a healthy emotion like equanimity, 
courage, determination, resignation, or cheerfulness.” All three also believed that language had a 
powerful effect on attitude, which is why Peale wrote that “[i]t is important to eliminate from con-
versations all negative ideas, for they tend to produce tension and annoyance inwardly.” In their 
place, he advised “fill[ing] your personal and group conversations with positive, happy, optimistic, 
satisfying expressions.” Schwartz, too, suggested “eliminat[ing] ‘impossible,’ ‘won’t work,’ ‘can’t do,’ 
‘no use trying’ from your thinking and speaking vocabularies,” while Schindler counseled to “get the 
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habit of  saying the cheerful, pleasant thing,” reasoning that “[t]he more adept you become in pleas-
antries, cheerios, and humor, the easier it is to stay out of  despondency, frustration, and E.I.I.”   82
 In addition to monitoring one’s thoughts and words, these authors also urged their readers to 
pay attention to the people they associated with. Schindler identified “the people who live within our 
circle, those with whom we play, talk, visit, work, fight, love” as “[t]he second most important educa-
tional factor each of  us has[.]” (The most important, as he saw it, was the family.) “If  we are lucky,” 
he wrote, “some strong enlightened individual enters our circle and influences us in the development 
of  a healthy attitude or two,” but, unfortunately, he believed that “most of  the people who stream 
through our lives are mediocre and full of  educational stress.” Schwartz stated that “[p]rolonged as-
sociation with negative people makes us think negatively, close contact with petty individuals devel-
ops petty habits in us,” whereas “companionship with people with big ideas raises the level of  our 
thinking; close contact with ambitious people gives us ambition.” He told readers to be “extra, extra 
cautious” about not “let[ting] negative thinking people — ‘negators’ — destroy your plan to think 
yourself  to success,” and to “[d]evelop a defense against people who want to convince you that you 
can’t do it.” Peale advised to “[m]ake a list of  your friends to determine who is the most positive 
thinker among them and deliberately cultivate his society.” Rather than getting rid of  negative 
friends entirely, Peale suggested that readers should “get closer to those with a positive view for a 
while” and then “go back among your negative friends and give them your newly acquired thought 
pattern without taking on their negativism.”   83
 Of  course, regardless of  how well they conditioned their thinking or monitored their rela-
tionships, these authors recognized that their readers would invariably encounter obstacles to achiev-
ing their goals. In those instances, they, like Napoleon Hill, championed persistence. It was not 
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enough to visualize oneself  happy and successful: a person also had to be determined to succeed. 
Peale wrote that “[p]eople are defeated in life not because of  lack of  ability, but for lack of  whole-
heartedness.” “Results do not yield themselves to the person who refuses to give himself  to the de-
sired results,” and so therefore it was imperative to “throw all there is of  yourself  into your job or 
any project in which you are engaged.” Schwartz told readers to “[e]xpect future obstacles and diffi-
culties” and to “[m]eet problems and obstacles as they arise”: “The test of  a successful person is not 
the ability to eliminate all problems before he takes action, but rather the ability to find solutions to 
difficulties when he encounters them.” He offered several tips for overcoming adversity, which in-
cluded “[r]esearch[ing] each setback,” “[h]av[ing] the courage to be your own constructive critic,” 
and “[b]lend[ing] persistence with experimentation.”  84
 Like some of  the studies written by the postwar social critics, these books were hot com-
modities when they came out. Take The Power of  Positive Thinking. It went on sale in October 1952 — 
a review by an Episcopalian priest named George Stephenson published in the New York Times 
grumbled that in Peale’s world, the “problems seem too easily solved, the success a bit too automatic 
and immediate, the answers a little too pat, and the underlying theology a shade too utilitarian.” By 
November 16th, though, it was already no. 9 on the Times’s nonfiction best-seller list. It reached no. 4 
by December 7th, no. 3 by February 1, 1953, and no. 2 by February 22nd. On May 17, 1953, The 
Power of  Positive Thinking hit no. 1 in the nonfiction category, the first of  forty-eight weeks that it held 
the title. All told, The Power of  Positive Thinking was on the list for one hundred and eighty-six weeks.  85
 For some Americans, just buying a book was not enough, which was why the fifties also saw 
the emergence of  new religions and social movements centered on self-improvement and self-actu-
alization. Arguably the most quixotic was Dianetics, the “modern science of  mental health” devel-
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oped by the science fiction author L. Ron Hubbard. Hubbard spent much of  the 1930s churning out 
an absurd volume of  fiction, writing as much as a hundred thousand words in a single month. 1938, 
however, was when his interests began shifting towards religion. That was the year he wrote “Excal-
ibur,” which recounted a spiritual experience that he supposedly had while anesthetized. In 1948 he 
produced the first draft of  what became Dianetics: The Modern Science of  Mental Health. Two years later, 
in 1950, the magazine Astounding Science Fiction carried an essay-length introduction to Dianetics. The 
book was released that same year.   86
 Dianetics is difficult to classify. It embraces some of  the same principles found in the works 
of  Peale, Schwartz, and others, but it does not exactly fall under either self-help or positive thinking. 
Hubbard described Dianetics as “an organized science of  thought built on definite axioms” that 
“contains a therapeutic technique with which can be treated all inorganic mental ills and all organic 
psychosomatic ills, with assurance of  complete cure in unselected cases.” Like Freud, Hubbard di-
vided the human mind into three parts: the analytic, “which perceives and retains experience data to 
compose and resolve problems”; the reactive, “which files and retains physical pain and painful emo-
tion”; and the somatic, “which, directed by the analytical or reactive mind, places solutions into ef-
fect on the physical level.” The reactive mind was especially significant, since that was where en-
grams dwelled. Hubbard defined an engram as “a moment of  ‘unconsciousness’ containing physical 
pain or painful emotion and all perceptions[.]” He distinguished engrams from memories by writing 
that the former “are a complete recording, down to the last accurate detail, of  every perception 
present in a moment of  partial or full ‘unconsciousness,’” and that unlike memories, engrams were 
“a cellular trace of  recordings impinged deeply into the very structure of  the body itself.”     87
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 Like those self-help and positive thinking authors who blamed certain physical illnesses on 
negative thinking, Hubbard claimed that engrams were responsible for a wide array of  maladies, 
from “psychoses, neuroses, compulsions, repressions” to “arthritis, bursitis, asthma, allergies, sinusi-
tis, coronary trouble, high blood pressure,” among others. To relieve the physical and psychological 
ailments caused by engrams, Dianetics proposed a form of  therapy called auditing. During auditing, 
a person would describe some problem that they were struggling with in the present and then, with 
their auditor, work backwards to identify the primordial engram at the root of  that problem. The 
end goal of  auditing was to produce a “clear,” an “optimum individual” free of  any mental disorders 
or psychosomatic illnesses. In addition, the clear had an above-average IQ and “pursues existence 
with vigor and satisfaction.”     88
 Dianetics did well on the market, spending over half  of  1950 on the New York Times’s best-
seller list. Its success was, at least in part, a function of  the fact that it spoke to Cold War anxieties, 
particularly around nuclear war. Dianetics met with backlash from the mainstream medical commu-
nity. The American Psychological Association issued a statement in September 1950 that called Dia-
netics “not supported by empirical evidence of  the sort required for the establishment of  scientific 
generalizations,” while a medical doctor who reviewed Dianetics in the New Republic colorfully de-
scribed the book as “a bold and immodest mixture of  complete nonsense and perfectly reasonable 
common sense, taken from long-acknowledged findings and disguised and distorted by a crazy, new-
ly invented terminology.” Nevertheless, an ecosystem of  Dianetics groups and self-taught practition-
ers flourished in the wake of  the book’s publication, not just in the United States but also in 
Britain.  89
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 Dianetics became the foundation for the Church of  Scientology, which was formed in 1954. 
Beyond Dianetics, there were important overlaps between self-help and positive thinking and reli-
gion, both in the pre- and postwar periods. As noted earlier, positive thinking’s intellectual predeces-
sor, mind cure, originated in American Protestant circles, and though the foundational ideas were 
secularized as time went on, self-help and positive thinking authors continued to invoke religion — 
specifically Christianity — in their works. Indeed, Dwight Macdonald observed that when it came to 
self-help and positive thinking books, “the big sales are being rung up by the men of  God, perhaps 
because they can mix psychology — or what passes for it in the howto world — with religion[.]” 
The person who did this most explicitly was Norman Vincent Peale, who for many years headed up 
the Marble Collegiate Church in Manhattan. (Among his parishioners was a bumptious real estate 
developer named Donald John Trump.) Exhortations to believe in God and to pray appeared 
throughout The Power of  Positive Thinking. Peale advised readers to “[o]rganize your life on a spiritual 
basis so that God’s principles work within you.” When faced with adversity, Peale wrote, “[b]elieve 
that Almighty God has put in you the power to lift yourself  out of  the rough by keeping your eye 
firmly fixed on the source of  your power. Affirm to yourself  that through this power you can do 
anything you have to do.” He also recommended “spend[ing] fifteen minutes daily filling your mind 
full of  God” as a balm for anxiety. He even dedicated a chapter to faith healing, in which he argued 
that “[t]here is impressive evidence to support the belief  that God works through both the practi-
tioner of  science, the doctor, and the practitioner of  faith, the minister.” Napoleon Hill insisted that 
his book was “not a course on religion.” Nevertheless, early on he wrote that “Christianity is the 
greatest potential power in the world today, because its founder was an intense dreamer who had the 
vision and the imagination to see realities in their mental and spiritual form before they had been 
transmuted into physical form,” and he informed readers that “God seems to throw Himself  on the 
side of  the man who knows exactly what he wants, if  he is determined to get just that!” Appeals to reli-
gion were not universal, though. For instance, Maltz and Schwartz placed no emphasis on it. 
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Schindler, meanwhile, rejected any link between faith and mental tranquility, writing that “religion, 
per se, neither increases nor decreases the individual’s chances of  getting E.I.I.” and that “[t]he cler-
gy and strongly religious people have E.I.I. just as often as non-religious people.”  90
 Self-help and positive thinking have also been closely associated with American business. 
Self-help and positive thinking books championed many of  the values necessary for success in the 
business world. Think and Grow Rich, for example, was all about helping people make more money 
and promoted money-making as a virtue. In that book, Hill wrote that “the capitalists are the brains 
of  civilization, because they supply the entire fabric of  which all education, enlightenment and hu-
man progress consists” and “that neither riches nor opportunity would be available to us if  orga-
nized capital had not provided these benefits.” Self-help and positive thinking authors regularly held 
up businessmen as role models — Charles Schwab was a Dale Carnegie favorite — or else used ex-
amples from the business world as anecdotal evidence of  the utility of  their advice. Another favorite 
technique was to take ideas or phrases from the business world and apply them to everyday situa-
tions. For instance, Carnegie wrote that to persuade someone to do something, “[d]ramatize your 
ideas,” and he pointed to modern advertising as evidence: “This is the day of  dramatization. Merely 
stating a truth isn’t enough. The truth has to be made vivid, interesting, dramatic. You have to use 
showmanship. The movies do it. Television does it. And you will have to do it if  you want 
attention.” To improve their self-image, Schwartz counseled readers to “[b]uild a ‘sell-yourself-to-
yourself ’ commercial” and to “[r]emind yourself  at every opportunity that you’re a first-class 
person.” “Go first class in everything you do,” Schwartz wrote, telling readers that “[p]eople rate you 
for quality” and that therefore they had to “[d]evelop an instinct for quality” since “in the long run, 
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going first class actually costs you less than going second class.” Amway would deploy self-help and 
positive thinking even more overtly on behalf  of  business and free enterprise.  91
********** 
 The postwar years were good times for direct sales. The 1940s saw an important milestone 
in the industry with the introduction of  the party plan, an innovation of  Stanley Home Products. 
Thanks in part to that, direct sales grew healthily. In 1952 the Better Business Bureau estimated that 
one and a half  million Americans were in direct sales. A December 1954 article remarked that 
“[b]usiness is good right now with the doorbell pushers,” pointing out that a number of  famous 
Americans, among them the Reverend Billy Graham, had once worked as direct sellers. The Wall 
Street Journal reported in August 1958 that despite the fact that the country was in the midst of  a re-
cession, direct sales companies had seen their sales go up over the previous year. Total sales in 1957 
stood at two billion dollars, double what they were just four years earlier.  92
  Americans joined the ranks of  direct sellers for a number of  reasons. Housewives found it 
appealing as a way to bring in additional income in the event of  some unforeseen expense or to help 
purchase the latest consumer gadget. A 1955 article advised parents to encourage their teenage sons 
to pursue direct sales. According to the article, not only would it help them pay their way through 
college, but it would also teach them “how to get along with all kinds of  people[.]” For some, it 
promised better opportunities than a traditional salaried job. Take the case of  a housewife who 
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sought career advice from a reporter named Anne Helwood in 1953. She told Helwood that she 
wanted to go back to work now that her children were grown up, but worried that her lengthy ab-
sence from the workforce rendered her unemployable. Helwood told the woman to consider direct 
sales. The housewife balked but ultimately decided to give it a shot, figuring it might serve as a gate-
way into a more permanent, successful job. Writing in November 1960, Helwood reported that the 
former housewife was still “working for the same company, with several women under her, and her 
income is very large.” There was an even more basic attraction than money, though. In an age of  
anxiety over autonomy, direct sales seemed to offer a path to independence. A 1957 newspaper arti-
cle proclaimed that “[d]irect selling is one way to be your own boss,” noting that the direct seller’s 
“hours, methods and profits are up to him. How hard he works and how inventive he is in finding 
new ways to drum up business determine his ‘take.’”  93
 DeVos and Van Andel were part of  that success story. By the end of  the 1950s, they had 
become big-shot Nutrilite distributors, with a network of  thousands. However, there were growing 
problems with the company as a whole. Right around the time that the two men joined the business, 
Nutrilite came under fire from the FDA for claiming that its supplements had medicinal qualities. 
Nutrilite distributors were guilty of  this too, as with the case of  an ad that ran in the Waunakee Tri-
bune in September 1947. The ad’s headline rattled off  a number of  maladies — “Arthritis, Neuritis, 
Lumbago, Backaches, Severe Aches & Pains” — before alleging that “records for the 13 years show 
that most people using NUTRILITE get rid of  their ailments.” In May 1950, the FDA issued an or-
der barring Nutrilite from saying that its vitamins could cure or treat diseases. Nutrilite distributors 
were also prohibited from using certain company materials, among them How to Get Well and Stay 
Well, a booklet that DeVos described as “[a] key to our success[.]” In the aftermath of  the FDA’s 
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judgment, Nutrilite was much more careful about how it promoted the alleged benefits of  its prod-
ucts. A Nutrilite pamphlet from the mid-fifties, for example, clarified that Nutrilite “is sold and of-
fered for sale solely as a dietary food supplement to supplement or fortify the diet” and declared, in 
bold lettering, that “IT IS NOT REPRESENTED OR IMPLIED, either directly or indirectly, that 
Nutrilite Food Supplement will, or may, be effective to prevent or adequately treat or cure any of  
these diseases and conditions,” which was followed by a fairly chunky paragraph. Nutrilite was not 
alone in facing this kind of  regulatory scrutiny: back in 1940, Miles Laboratories ended up in a pro-
tracted back-and-forth with the FDA over its One-A-Day vitamins.  94
 In response to the FDA’s actions, Nutrilite decided that it wanted to branch out of  nutrition-
al supplements and into other products, including cosmetics. This brought the company into direct 
conflict with Mytinger & Casselberry. Although Mytinger & Casselberry supported expanding the 
Nutrilite product line, they did not want to offer all of  the new cosmetics that Nutrilite was propos-
ing. As tensions grew, distributors were forced to pick sides. DeVos and Van Andel found them-
selves pulled into the middle of  the affair when, in 1958, Van Andel chaired a study group convened 
to resolve the various disputes. By that point, Van Andel wrote, “our five thousand distributors were 
angry,” and he and DeVos sought to assuage them by shifting away from Nutrilite. So that summer, 
they met with some of  their distributors in Charlevoix, Michigan, where they decided to part ways 
with Nutrilite and form their own company: the American Way Association. Amway was born.  95
 Having declared their independence from Nutrilite, DeVos and Van Andel set out to develop 
a line of  products and an organizational structure unique to their company. The specter of  Nutrilite 
hung over both of  them: they were determined to avoid making the same mistakes that Nutrilite 
had. Van Andel’s chapter on the Nutrilite controversy was titled “Why Integrity Matters,” and in it 
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he chastised the company, saying that “[t]he leadership had violated some pretty basic principles, and 
in so doing had alienated its distributors.” In a similar vein, DeVos wrote that one of  their key prior-
ities when they formed Amway was “protect[ing] the distributor groups,” which had understandably 
been rattled by the war inside Nutrilite. Nutrilite and Mytinger & Casselberry continued fighting af-
ter DeVos and Van Andel departed. In April 1959, Nutrilite took Mytinger & Casselberry to court to 
try and get out of  their partnership. The two entities negotiated a new arrangement later that year, 
and in August 1960, Mytinger & Casselberry reorganized itself  as Mytinger Corp.  96
 When it came to selecting products for Amway, Nutrilite again was the example to avoid. 
Van Andel explained that their main criteria were that their products be “something anyone could 
sell,” “something everyone knew they needed,” and “something that was not highly regulated.” Nu-
trilite had fallen short on all three counts. Accordingly, they settled on household cleaning products. 
Additionally, the pair decided early on that, in order to forestall the possibility of  a Mytinger & Cas-
selberry-style dispute, they wanted to make all their products themselves. Take Liquid Organic 
Cleaner, or L.O.C., Amway’s very first product. L.O.C. was originally produced by Eckle Company 
under the brand name Frisk. Eckle, however, had poor quality control, so DeVos and Van Andel 
turned to a second firm, Atco Manufacturing Co.. To make sure that Atco was up to the task, they 
decided to acquire partial ownership of  the company. They then relocated Atco from Detroit to 
Amway’s headquarters, which were in a small town about fifteen minutes outside Grand Rapids 
called Ada, and rechristened it the Amway Manufacturing Corporation.  97
 And then there was the Plan. Officially the Amway Sales and Marketing Plan, the Plan 
marked an important milestone in the history of  direct sales — Katina Lee Manko has written that 
it represented the emergence of  multi-level marketing “in its full form[.]” Once again, they looked to 
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Nutrilite. The Sales and Marketing Plan was similar to Nutrilite, DeVos explained, but it was re-
worked “to better reward distributors based on their level of  achievement.” DeVos and Van Andel 
identified several aspects of  the Plan that they thought made it appealing to others. DeVos wrote 
that the Plan “fairly rewarded distributors for not only their individual sales volume and the volume 
for each distributor they personally sponsored, but also further down for the sales volume of  the 
people they sponsored and in turn sponsored.” Additionally, it “was designed to move commissions 
downward from one level to the next and keep the money moving to the two-hundredth level or to 
as many levels to which a business might grow.” Van Andel said that “[e]ach business owner, in the 
Sales and Marketing Plan, has an incentive to sell products and to build a sales organization of  his 
own that will sell even more products.” Furthermore, the Plan “made sure that the lines of  sponsor-
ship were well protected,” a necessity given the Nutrilite fiasco.  98
 The company that now earns billions of  dollars in revenue each year and has set up shop in 
dozens of  countries around the world started small. Van Andel’s basement became Amway’s first 
office, while DeVos converted his into the company’s warehouse. Van Andel recalled that “I spent 
many hours that year [1959] in my basement, as I wrote sales manuals, ran them off  on the mimeo-
graph machine, and collated them on the Ping-Pong table.” He wrote that he and DeVos “took 
hands-on approach with new product development,” testing prospective products themselves to see 
if/how they worked. They had mixed results early on. After L.O.C. came SA-8, a laundry detergent; 
both remain part of  Amway’s product line to this day. On the flip side, in a bid to cash in on the age 
of  anxiety, the company briefly offered nuclear fallout shelters. They bombed.   99
 In 1959-1960, Amway expanded beyond DeVos and Van Andel’s basements when the com-
pany bought two abandoned buildings, which allowed for additional office and warehousing space. 
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The following year, DeVos and Van Andel began constructing their own buildings in Ada. Within a 
few years, Amway was generating a lot of  buzz. The May 1963 issue of  the magazine Michigan 
Tradesman featured a profile of  Amway, which described the company as “the result of  the welding-
together of  ideas of  how to sell superior PRODUCTS for use in the home and industry, and the 
efforts of  an amazing SALES ORGANIZATION with fantastic growth, that is dedicated and loyal 
because it offers unlimited opportunity to ambitious people willing to work in the old fashioned, 
free enterprise way — selling useful products person to person.” The article described Amway dis-
tributors as “people who are desirous of  a dignified way to earn a better way of  life by distributing 
products everyone uses and frequently buys” and stated that “AMWAY’S opportunity plan shows 
them a pleasant way to work with rewards of  higher income and the independence of  being their 
own boss.” The magazine estimated that Amway’s distributor force numbered around thirty thou-
sand.  100
 An article in the Grand Rapids Press from February 1964 took stock of  Amway’s growth. The 
company was selling “[m]ore than 60 home care products….manufactured at Ada in 75,000 square 
feet of  buildings on an 80-acre site”; it had three hundred people working there, a fifty percent in-
crease from just the year before; it boasted “[m]ore than 50,000 sales representatives in the United 
States and Canada”; and it was selling more than ten million dollars in products annually. Moreover, 
Amway was “entering the thirteenth and fourteenth phases of  its building additions,” having “ex-
panded from 25,000 square feet to the 75,000 square feet at Ada in a year’s time.” In 1967, a book 
titled The Executive Breakthrough was released, which explored “the lives of  a group of  successful men 
and women” in order “to identify the factors that propelled these individuals into achievement.” 
DeVos and Van Andel were among those included. The book’s author, Auren Uris, attributed their 
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success to “a willingness to put the chips on the table and take a chance” as well as “a willingness to 
depend on others, to pick a man and to be willing to ride on the validity of  their judgment and the 
man’s capabilities.” According to Uris, DeVos and Van Andel were “a team combination of  unusual 
achievement” who “reinforced one another in thinking, planning, and in action.” The May 26, 1967, 
issue of  the Grand Rapids Press included a sixteen-page supplemental devoted entirely to Amway, de-
tailing the company’s manufacturing, marketing, and administrative infrastructure as well as high-
lighting several companies that Amway had partnered with. “Amway’s unusual progress,” the Press 
declared, “is a tribute to the free enterprise philosophy which has made both the United States and 
Canada so great.”   101
 Clever marketing played an important role in Amway’s early success. Since Amway products 
were sold person-to-person rather than in stores, distributors were able to do demonstrations for 
customers in their homes. Additionally, the company and its sales force stressed that Amway’s clean-
ing products used natural ingredients and were environmentally-friendly. The Traverse City Record-Ea-
gle noted in its November 5, 1963 issue that two Amway distributors, Elsie and Mary Kevwitch, had 
recently gone to “a training meeting conducted by sales representatives of  Amway” in the state capi-
tal that “studied detergent water pollution, its causes, and ways that Amway’s bio-degradable laundry 
compound and liquid organic cleaner will meet this problem.” An ad for L.O.C. that ran in the She-
boygan Press in April 1963 told readers that they could “STOP POLLUTION” by switching to L.O.C. 
Another — this one from a California newspaper in June 1963 — stressed that L.O.C. was “100% 
safe for all cleaning in your home[.]” On March 13, 1964, the Freeport Journal-Standard ran a letter to 
the editor from a Mrs. Kenneth Wheeler responding to an article from its March 6th issue about the 
impact of  commercial laundry detergents on water quality. “The problem with almost all the deter-
gents on the market today,” the March 6th article noted, “is that not [sic] ‘degradable,’” and as a con-
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sequence detergent was “enter[ing] the nation’s rivers, lakes and underground wells,” infecting the 
water supply. Mrs. Wheeler wrote to inform the paper “that there is a detergent and a liquid organic 
cleaner on the market now” that was “completely bio-degradable, guaranteed and tested.” She was, 
of  course, referring to Amway. (The letter offers no indication whether Mrs. Wheeler was an Amway 
distributor, a customer, or just someone who knew about the company.) The same month that Mrs. 
Wheeler’s letter was published, back in Michigan, L.O.C. was crowned Kent County’s Product of  the 
Year, which it won again in 1965.   102
 Amway was not just marketing the products, though. It was also selling salvation. DeVos 
wrote in his autobiography that “[w]e thought for a short while that our new Amway business was 
all about developing and selling products….but we learned that our distributors were energized by 
something more — the opportunity to succeed in a business of  their own through their own efforts, 
perseverance, and belief  in themselves.” Distributors stressed this to potential prospects. A classified 
ad in an East Liverpool, Ohio newspaper in February 1960, published when Amway was just 
months old, read, “Have you dreamed of  having your own buiness [sic]? Let AMWAY show you 
how in Sales….You can earn $1000.00 a month in the first year with possible early retirement.” An-
other in Austin, Minnesota’s Daily Herald from February 1963 promised “[o]pportunity unlimited for 
a person or couple in Amway full time.” An ad in the Oxnard Press-Courier in September 1963 en-
joined those reading to “[b]e your own boss — in business for yourself. Investigate the Amway op-
portunity that can change your life. Immediate profits.” Two ads in the January 28, 1964 issue of  the 
Des Moines Register declared that “AMWAY means a guaranteed future” and that Amway was the 
“best opp. in U.S.A.” In December 1966, a Mrs. De Prance, an Amway distributor, wrote to Cyrus 
Barrett, Jr.,, a business advice columnist at the Valparaiso Vidette-Messenger, asking him to write a col-
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umn on Amway on account of  “how my company gives young men responsibility and 
recognition[.]” Barrett obliged, indicating that he “ha[d] received many enthusiastic letters, praising 
the firm, by its representatives.” He then went on to offer some examples of  young men who had 
found success in the business. (It is unclear where or how he found these cases.) He also told the 
story of  a man named La Rue Durrwachter, an Amway employee. “Five years ago,” Barrett wrote, 
“he was a faceless man in a gray flannel suit, toiling in a Manhattan advertising agency….he now di-
rects the 30-man marketing department.” Even for those who were not distributors, Amway seemed 
to offer an escape from the drudgeries of  the Organization. From the outset, then, Amway was situ-
ating direct sales in response to the concerns over and critiques of  postwar corporate capitalism that 
fed the crisis of  autonomy of  the 1950s.   103
 In 1969, Amway marked ten years in business. More than ten thousand distributors flocked 
to Grand Rapids at the end of  April for three days of  celebrations, which ran from the twenty-
fourth to the twenty-sixth. Three months later, though, tragedy struck, in the form of  a fire that tore 
through a portion of  Amway’s headquarters on the night of  July 18th. The Grand Rapids Press re-
ported the following day that “[i]n the initial confusion, all the workers, 20 to 25, in the immediate 
blast area could not be accounted for,” that “[s]ome had been rushed to hospitals and others had 
wandered away, somewhat dazed” and that as a result “[f]ears arose that some may have been 
trapped in the blaze,” though that proved not to be the case. Fortunately, there were no fatalities, 
though seventeen were hurt, seven of  whom were sent to area hospitals. Van Andel wrote in his au-
tobiography that he heard an explosion from his home, and that upon looking out the window he 
“noticed an ominous orange glow above the trees,” at which point “my throat contracted in fear as I 
realized that the glow was likely from the Amway factory complex less than half  a mile away.” After 
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a telephone call confirmed his suspicions, he rushed down to the facility. (DeVos was out of  town at 
the time.) The condition of  the seven hospitalized steadily improved over the following days, and on 
July 21st, the first business day following the incident, DeVos announced that the company was al-
ready starting the process of  rebuilding. Not surprisingly, the fire has become part of  Amway lore. 
In Commitment to Excellence, Wilbur Cross and Gordon Olson wrote that “[c]atastrophic though the 
fire was, it served as a catalyst to bring Amway people together in a unique and dedicated effort to 
get the company back on its feet with as little disruption as possible,” and that their success in doing 
so was testament to “Amway’s unique style of  teamwork and coordination[.]”  104
********** 
 Amway was born at a tumultuous moment in American history. Despite America’s triumph 
in the Second World War and the prosperity that followed, unease characterized the fifteen years af-
ter the war. Social critics penned books that attacked mid-century American society, popular culture, 
and the economy. Although they differed in their terminology and their areas of  focus, these writers 
generally concurred that men and women were subject to institutions as well as social and cultural 
pressures that significantly undermined the quality of  their lives. The culprits included a “Social Eth-
ic” that insisted that individuals dissolve themselves into groups as well as workplaces that were 
alienating and insisted on ever greater productivity no matter the psychological costs to employees. 
These critiques testified to a crisis of  autonomy that gripped many Americans. Many have written 
about anxiety as a defining feature of  postwar America, about the interest in self-help and positive 
thinking, and the focus on conformity and alienation. By and large, though, these have been dealt 
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with as separate matters, when in reality they were different facets of  one phenomenon: a preoccu-
pation with declining autonomy and individualism. Americans dealt with the crisis of  autonomy in 
many ways. Some sought to medicate away their negative feelings with drugs like Miltown. Millions 
more turned to self-help and positive thinking books for reassurance that they were in fact in control 
of  their lives, or could be if  they followed a few simple steps. And some got into direct sales. 
 The crisis of  autonomy provided fertile ground for Amway. In the course of  investigating its 
causes, critics like William Whyte, C. Wright Mills, and Daniel Bell focused on the American econo-
my as a key culprit. After the war, the country experienced an economic boom that improved the 
standard of  living for many — though certainly not all — Americans. These critics, though, raised 
concerns about the potentially deleterious effects of  postwar capitalism. Growing numbers of  
Americans, they pointed out, were taking white-collar jobs in large, bureaucratic corporations, where 
they were just one employee among many, mindlessly doing paperwork. The days of  individual pro-
prietorship, it seemed, were fast slipping away. In these new workplaces, employees lacked any sort 
of  individuality or control over their own work. Moreover, in many cases, the work they were per-




Capitalism with a Human Face 
[Amway] is a movement of  people away from dependency on big government and big companies. 
It’s a movement that celebrates the potential of  the individual but at the same time nurtures that in-
dividual with support, training, friendship, and love. It’s a movement that has glued broken families 
back together and reassembled shattered dreams. It crosses continents and cultures with breath-tak-
ing ease. 
-James W. Robinson  1
 In the fifth chapter of  his 1993 book Compassionate Capitalism: People Helping People Help Them-
selves, Richard DeVos told the story of  Ron and Georgia Lee Puryear. Ron worked as an accountant 
at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, a private nuclear energy firm, in the 1960s. As Ron described it, 
his career up to that point had been a textbook example of  the virtues of  American economic meri-
tocracy: “I had advanced through the ranks and held a responsible middle-management position. All 
my life I had been taught that success and security would come if  I got a good education, found a 
good job, and worked hard at it….I was convinced that I had paid my dues and found the American 
dream.” Then, unexpectedly, he was laid off. Ron managed to become an accountant someplace else, 
but, compared to his old job, Ron found himself  working longer hours for significantly less pay.  2
 Ron’s sour fortunes forced his wife, Georgia Lee, to work as a waitress to support them and 
their two children. This shattered his vision of  the ideal family. Describing himself  as a “latchkey 
kid,” he stated that “[a]t the beginning of  my marriage to Georgia Lee, I swore that my children 
would never come home to an empty house.” Naturally, then, it was devastating to him when eco-
nomic circumstances made such domesticity unaffordable. The transition to a dual-earner household 
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weakened the family. Georgia Lee remarked, “we were making money, but in many ways it was cost-
ing us more than we were making,” pointing out that “[w]e hardly saw each other, let alone our chil-
dren,” and their work left both of  them exhausted. The worst part of  the arrangement, as she put it, 
was having to “go on day after day working at jobs that were unsatisfying at best and demeaning at 
worst.”  3
 Fortunes changed, Ron said, when, in the midst of  their malaise, “some old friends we 
hadn’t seen for five years called us out of  the blue.” (DeVos did not specify exactly when this hap-
pened.) These friends turned out to be Amway distributors. Ron joined, but kept his ambitions 
small, hoping to earn just enough so that Georgia Lee did not have to work. Ron’s Amway business, 
however, outgrew those modest goals. He not only managed to get his wife to leave her job, he also 
used their newfound earnings to eliminate their debts and to purchase luxuries like a Cadillac. These 
entrepreneurial successes, however, came to conflict with Ron’s job. At a certain point, George Lee 
recalled, “his boss made Ron choose between our new business and his job.” In response, Ron quit 
his job, characterizing his decision thusly: “I chose freedom.”  4
 As noted in the Introduction, Amway is a peculiar creature. On the one hand, it is a business 
that manufactures and markets products and tries to persuade people to sign up as distributors. On 
the other hand, it represents a set of  interrelated principles, ideals, and values that it tries to promote 
throughout its distributor force. As Amway grew from a small business operated out of  DeVos and 
Van Andel’s basements into a multi-billion dollar, worldwide enterprise, a cottage industry of  pro-
Amway media flourished in tandem. This included books authored by the cofounders and various 
Amway sympathizers as well as audiocassette tapes of  addresses given at distributor functions. These 
media items, called “tools” in Amway circles, have played an important role in drawing distributors 
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into the business and keeping them in, though they have also attracted a fair amount of  
controversy.  5
 An important element of  practically all of  these tools, particularly the books, has been the 
distributor vignette, or what former distributor Steve Butterfield called the “Personal Story.” The 
story of  Ron and Georgia Lee Puryear contains elements common to many distributor vignettes: the 
onset of  hard times, the dissatisfying job and its deleterious effects on the family, the discovery of  
Amway in a period of  dire straits, and the success that followed. Puryear’s quip that in quitting his 
non-Amway job he “chose freedom” reflects how many in the Amway universe have viewed both 
the promise of  the business as well as the downsides of  traditional salaried employment. David John 
Harris cleverly likened the narrative structure of  the official biographies of  DeVos and Van Andel to 
Joseph Campbell’s concept of  the “hero’s journey,” and, to an extent, the metaphor applies to dis-
tributor vignettes as well. As we will see, there is something akin to an Amway “monomyth,” a nar-
rative arc and set of  tropes common across many distributor accounts of  how and why they joined 
the business and how it changed their lives.   6
 There is, of  course, no way of  independently verifying the extent to which the vignettes pre-
sented in Amway tools are accurate. Nevertheless, they are useful in three key respects. First, they 
lend insight into the company’s perspective on an array of  subjects. Second, they testify to what par-
ticipation in Amway supposedly had to offer. And finally, the utility of  the vignettes depended, at 
least in part, on readers — or listeners — relating to them: people had to be able to imagine them-
selves as the people in the stories. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that Amway targeted for 
recruitment people with the same sort of  difficulties, anxieties, and aspirations as those expressed in 
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the vignettes, and that therefore the vignettes reflected the experiences and sentiments of  at least 
some segment of  those who became Amway distributors. 
 Analyzing these vignettes requires understanding some of  the basic elements of  Amway’s 
corporate philosophy. It was one constituent component of  DeVos and Van Andel’s small-business 
conservatism, an ideology that simultaneously critiqued government largesse and corporate capital-
ism, viewing both as threats to individual freedom. Amway’s corporate philosophy focused less on 
“big government” and more on how capitalism itself  could be disempowering. Employment came 
under particularly heavy scrutiny. Company boosters regularly argued that salaried work often did 
not pay enough, failed to be stimulating or interesting, and eroded independence, since it entailed 
working for someone else rather than for oneself.   7
 And although the cofounders opposed most government involvement in or oversight of  the 
economy — which Chapters V and VI explore in greater detail — they, DeVos especially, did not 
believe that markets should function wholly unchecked, that individuals and businesses should be 
free to act according to their own self-interest without any regard to others or to larger conse-
quences. Instead, they advocated what DeVos called “compassionate capitalism.” Compassionate 
capitalism allows us to see how self-help and positive thinking as well as the postwar crisis of  auton-
omy informed the Amway worldview, and how Amway positioned direct sales as a solution to the 
shortcomings of  real-world capitalism. Compassionate capitalism challenged some of  the basic as-
sumptions underlying the capitalist marketplace. It envisioned an economy in which people would 
cooperate for mutual advantage, lifting each other up and improving their lives together rather than 
going alone or seeking to undercut others for personal gain. In so doing, it downplayed self-interest-
ed motivations for economic activity, insisting instead that individuals should be driven by a desire to 
see others flourish.   8
 Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 8.7
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 Whereas capitalism has traditionally stressed profit-making and maximizing personal utility, 
the central imperative of  compassionate capitalism was dreambuilding. Achieving one’s dreams under 
compassionate capitalism required several ingredients, but for our purposes, three were especially 
important. First, it demanded a positive attitude. Compassionate capitalism lifted ideas from self-
help and positive thinking, chief  among them that one’s thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes are the pri-
mary determinants of  success or failure in life. Second, compassionate capitalism championed leav-
ing unrewarding jobs and stressed the benefits that come from owning one’s own business. And fi-
nally, compassionate capitalism saw dreambuilding as an activity that required the assistance of  oth-
ers, particularly a mentor. 
 Amway’s business model supposedly epitomized compassionate capitalism. Amway incorpo-
rated many of  the values and principles of  compassionate capitalism into direct sales. For instance, 
the company and its boosters have tied success in the business to a positive mindset. Amway also 
sought to reproduce compassionate capitalism’s humanistic, cooperative ethos. Amway has promot-
ed a kind of  mutual aid within its distributor force. Distributors were, for example, supposed to 
serve as mentors for those whom they recruited into the business, teaching them the basics of  how 
to run a successful distributorship, and then they, in turn, would pass down their wisdom onto 
someone else. Amway also sold direct sales as a family business, one in which spouses and children 
alike could participate and thereby strengthen family cohesion. Lastly, direct sales represented the 
epitome of  meaningful work. Amway reproduced many of  the attacks on postwar capitalism found 
in the works of  Riesman, Mills, Bell, and others, particularly with regard to the ways in which mod-
ern workplaces could be alienating, disempowering, and psychologically dissatisfying. By contrast, 
direct sales promised not just greater wealth, but also a range of  more intangible, immaterial bene-
fits, including more time to spend with one’s family, a more optimistic outlook on life, and, crucially, 
“freedom.”  9




 Amway resembles a medieval state. The highest authority is, of  course, the company. The 
company, through the Sales and Marketing Plan, sets out how its distributors are to conduct busi-
ness, and those distributors agree to abide by all rules and regulations as a condition of  belonging to 
Amway. Additionally, the company manufactures and supplies the products that distributors sell. 
Distributors are not, however, legally employees of  Amway. In the mid-1930s, the direct sales indus-
try managed to get distributors classified as “independent contractors” as a workaround to the New 
Deal. Though it freed companies like Amway from the costs and regulations that come with employ-
ing someone, the “independent contractor solution,” as Nicole Woolsey Biggart called it, also result-
ed in a looser relationship between the company and the distributor. As she put it, direct sellers are 
“legally constrained from using the control strategies available to employers[.]”  10
 This, along with the multi-level structure that Amway adopted, has meant that as Amway’s 
distributor networks grew, recruiting more and more individuals and creating more and more legs, 
they came to resemble semi-autonomous fiefdoms. Though nominally linked to the company, these 
giant networks, some of  which spanned the globe, effectively took on lives of  their own. A 2007 
lawsuit against Amway (discussed more in Chapter III) offered a sketch of  how these networks op-
erate: 
New distributors are assigned to an existing “line of  sponsorship” to which the recruiting distributor 
already belongs. The lines of  sponsorship include a hierarchy of  distributors that start with the new-
ly-recruited distributors and proceed by seniority up to a senior distributor who heads the line of  
sponsorship. The most senior distributor who heads a line of  sponsorship is known as a “Kingpin.” 
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Junior (or “downline”) distributors purchase products from more senior (or “upline”) distributors 
within their line of  sponsorship[.]    11
 At the time it was filed, the suit identified sixteen such lines of  sponsorship in operation. In 
addition to recruiting new distributors and moving products, these lines of  sponsorship also includ-
ed separate entities responsible for producing Amway tools and putting on distributor functions, 
which the suit called “Kingpin Corporations.” “The ‘tools and functions’ businesses,” it explained, 
“sell ‘tools’ that purport to help market and sell [Amway] products and ‘functions’ that consist of  
motivational meetings and events. The tools include tapes, CDs and videos, which contain informa-
tion that Kingpins and Kingpin Corporations, with [Amway’s] knowledge and consent, represent are 
[sic] essential to success as a distributor.” It laid out the sixteen networks and their associated King-
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 The functions get put on by the networks themselves. The provenance of  the tools has var-
ied. Some tools, particularly the books, were produced independent of  any of  the Kingpin Corpora-
tions and then sold to distributors throughout Amway. Probably the most prominent pro-Amway 
author was Charles Paul Conn, who wrote five books on the company and co-authored a sixth with 
Richard DeVos. “The aggressive, self-assured style of  Paul Conn makes him a likely candidate for an 
Amway Corporation salesman,” opened an August 1977 profile of  him in the Grand Rapids Press. 
When he was not singing Amway’s praises or writing biographies (another avocation of  his), Conn 
was a psychology professor at Lee College (now Lee University) in Cleveland, Tennessee. As for the 
Figure 3. Chart of  Amway lines of  sponsorship from Pokorny and Blenn v. Quixtar, Inc., 
et. al. complaint 
(Source: Complaint, Pokorny and Blenn v. Quixtar, Inc., et. al., 15-16)
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tapes, the Kingpin Corporations manufactured these for the most part, since they almost always 
consisted of  recordings of  talks delivered at network-run functions.  13
 Tools have long been an important — and controversial — part of  Amway. Shad Helmstet-
ter, a pro-Amway writer and motivational speaker, described tools as an “essential” component of  
an Amway distributorship, something to consume daily. Many Amway tapes recommended that dis-
tributors listen to one tape and read a positive-thinking book for at least fifteen minutes each day. 
Steve Butterfield wrote that “[e]very new distributor who joins Amway, in most lines, is routinely 
sold one or more copies of  these books [referring specifically to the works of  Charles Conn] by his 
or her sponsor in the business.” He also indicated that at a certain stage in the growth of  his busi-
ness, he “was manipulated not only to buy tapes and books for my own consumption, but to stock 
them for my people,” that “[i]ncreasing tape flow was considered a sign of  health” while “scanty or 
absent tape flow meant that your business was, or soon would be, sick.” As we will see in the follow-
ing chapter, critics like Butterfield alleged that the sale of  tools had eclipsed Amway products as the 
principal source of  revenue for the company’s “Kingpins.”   14
 Amway tools fall into two categories: introductory and motivational. Introductory tools, like 
the books that Steve Butterfield referenced, are given to people at the outset and are intended to 
provide information about what Amway is, its history, and, most importantly, what direct sales has 
to offer. Distributors get motivational tools, meanwhile, when they are already in the business. They 
offer tips on how to run a distributorship, but they also remind the person reading or listening what 
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they could achieve, they offer specific goals to strive for, and they showcase examples of  distributors 
who have “made it.” The same is true of  functions. Everett Hannan has written that “[b]ooks, tapes, 
and meetings are central to a process in which distributors are actively involved in reconstructing the 
meaning of  their economic activity,” that listening to tapes and attending functions “perpetuates the 
likelihood of  a distributor to continue engaging in the socioeconomic activity that sustains the MLM 
[multi-level marketing] system[.]”  15
 In an effort to get individuals to join and stay in the business, the tools and the functions 
have advanced a worldview that has presented participation in free enterprise through direct sales as 
the key to attaining autonomy, self-mastery, and economic independence. Direct sales, in turn, was 
the embodiment was the company’s own brand of  free enterprise, which Richard DeVos in 1993 
dubbed “compassionate capitalism.” Compassionate capitalism offered a sharp contrast to the pic-
ture of  postwar capitalism painted by mid-century social critics like William Whyte and C. Wright 
Mills. They had described a world in which the rise of  large corporations had eroded opportunities 
for economic independence and made work increasingly tiresome for many. Compassionate capital-
ism promised to remedy this. It imagined an economy in which the guiding principle was not maxi-
mizing profits or pursuing one’s own individual self-interest, but rather improving the welfare of  all. 
To that end, compassionate capitalism promoted entrepreneurship, the pursuit of  genuinely fulfilling 
work, and forms of  cooperation in which individuals would work together to make each other’s lives 
better. 
 DeVos’s book on compassionate capitalism did not give a single, easy-to-quote definition of  
the idea, although he did define each element. “The main characteristics of  capitalism,” he wrote, 
“are private ownership of  capital and freedom of  enterprise.” In its basic institutional outlay, then, compas-
sionate capitalism mirrored conventional understandings of  capitalism: the means of  production 
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were privately held, and the market mechanism determined the supply and demand of, as well as 
prices for, goods, services, and labor.   16
 Where a compassionate capitalist economy distinguished itself, however, was in the motiva-
tions of  its participants. DeVos declared that “compassion, not profit, is the ultimate goal of  capital-
ism,” and he defined compassion as “a feeling of  deep sympathy for another’s suffering or misfor-
tune, accompanied by a desire to alleviate the pain or remove its cause.” Compassion served two 
purposes in DeVos’s formulation. On the one hand, it represented an end: individuals should engage 
in economic activity so as to improve the wellbeing of  themselves and others. For DeVos, compas-
sion was not an obstacle to the market dictate to earn profits, but rather complemented it: “When 
compassion inspires and informs free enterprise, profits follow, the quality of  human life is ad-
vanced, and the earth is restored and renewed.” At the same time, compassion was a check on un-
scrupulous behavior. DeVos recognized that certain individuals and businesses might, in a free mar-
ket system, act according to an amoral utilitarianism, seeking profits without regard to any potential 
negative repercussions, and he unambiguously condemned such behavior. “‘Profit’ that demeans and 
dehumanizes our brothers and sisters or depletes and destroys the earth will lead eventually to the 
death of  us all,” he wrote, and he suggested that compassion could curb such impulses: “Compas-
sionate capitalism distinguishes real profit from fool’s gold. It cares about setting people free to 
dream great dreams for themselves and for the planet, and then gives them the means to see that 
their dreams come true.” By bringing compassion front and center, DeVos, in effect, called for a 
reconceptualization of  the capitalist economy. Profit-making was obviously still important under 
compassionate capitalism, but it transformed from an end in itself  to merely a means to an end. For 
DeVos, all economic activity should have the common goal of  promoting human flourishing and 
self-actualization. DeVos, then, was not unlike Daniel Bell in thinking that modern capitalism needed 
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a more humanistic orientation, although the two would no doubt have disagreed over what exactly 
that entailed.  17
 DeVos identified sixteen “credos” of  compassionate capitalism. There is obviously insuffi-
cient space here to give attention to each of  the sixteen, though several are worth highlighting.  18
 The keystone of  compassionate capitalism, without question, was dreambuilding. Nearly 
half  of  DeVos’s book on compassionate capitalism dealt with offering tips for how readers could go 
about identifying and achieving their dreams. Credo 1 declared that “every man, woman, and child is 
created in God’s image, and because of  that each has worth, dignity, and unique potential.” DeVos 
wrote that “[w]e are created to dream,” and the dreams that a person had for themselves were “cre-
ated in the image of  God’s dreams.” Therefore, a person who pursued and fulfilled their dreams 
was, according to DeVos, acting in accordance with God’s plans for them. This was true of  every-
one, which meant that a person could not focus simply on their own dreams, but also had an obliga-
tion to extend a hand to other people and help them with their goals.  19
 Positive thinking was a prerequisite for dreambuilding. Credo 9 of  compassionate capitalism 
said as much: “We believe that developing a positive, hopeful attitude is necessary to reach our 
goals.” DeVos rejected the notion that anything outside of  a person’s control had any real impact on 
whether or not they achieved their dreams: for him, it was all about a person’s beliefs and habits of  
thought. He pointed to three factors that shaped a person’s mindset, which he called “heredity,” 
“diet,” and “exercise.” Sometimes, he wrote, people inherit negative ways of  thinking from their par-
ents or guardians or those they grew up with, but he believed that such influences could be over-
come: “we’ve all inherited good and bad from family and friends, but we must not be satisfied with 
what we’ve been given. Build on it. If  you’ve inherited a low view of  your potential, fight back. Say 
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to yourself, I’m not a loser, I can and I will succeed. The circumstances that have held back my par-
ents or grandparents are not going to limit me.”   20
 A positive attitude also depended on a steady diet of  positivity. DeVos recommended con-
suming positive-thinking media like books and tapes, as well as keeping a close eye on one’s friends, 
lest any of  them poison one’s mind with negative thinking. “The people we hang around with have 
more influence on our attitudes than we imagine,” he wrote, and his advice on dealing with naysay-
ers was simple: “Change your friends.” Finally, DeVos believed that being a positive thinker required 
practicing positivity regularly in one’s day-to-day life. That was especially important when going 
through tough times: “You may not win every race. In fact, you might go from failure to failure. But 
getting out and exercising will help you develop your talents — it will get you ‘in shape.’”  21
 In addition to the proper mindset, dreambuilding also required work. But not just any sort 
of  work. Along with redefining the ultimate ends of  economic activity, compassionate capitalism 
also had its own interpretation of  the value of  work. For DeVos, it was important not only that peo-
ple worked, but also that work be meaningful. Using language that could just as easily have appeared 
in Daniel Bell’s essay on work, Credo 5 of  compassionate capitalism declared that “work is good 
only if  it leads the worker to freedom, reward, recognition, and hope….if  our work is not satisfying 
(financially, spiritually, psychologically), we need to end that work as quickly as we can and begin 
work that is.” According to compassionate capitalism, work should not merely provision individuals 
with the basic necessities; it should also be existentially rewarding.  22
 Probably the most meaningful kind of  work that a person could do, according to compas-
sionate capitalism, was working for oneself. The eighth credo stated that “owning our own business 
(to supplement or replace our current income) is the best way to guarantee our personal freedom 
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and our family’s financial future.” In fairness, DeVos never explicitly denigrated employment. In the 
eighth chapter of  Compassionate Capitalism, he devoted a section to what he called “intrapreneurs”: 
people who are employees but who nonetheless exhibit “entrepreneurial spirit.” Intrapreneurs were 
people who, according to DeVos, “do more than punch their time card” and who “see work every 
day as an opportunity to grow, create, discover, challenge old ideas and come up with new and better 
ones.” While DeVos did not think that being an entrepreneur was synonymous with business owner-
ship, he clearly saw business ownership as offering a unique opportunity to achieve financial inde-
pendence and security as well as greater control over one’s life. He described the decision to start a 
business as “one of  the most exciting, worthwhile steps a woman or man can take.”   23
 Successful dreambuilding was not an individual undertaking. Compassionate capitalism did 
not embrace an “up by your own bootstraps” philosophy. Although he certainly praised self-reliance, 
DeVos also emphasized that achieving it required the assistance of  others: “Each of  us can trace our 
self-reliance to someone in our past. Don’t ever think we got here on our own. Not only is it arro-
gant, it’s dangerous and misleading to believe even for a moment that we don’t need each other.” 
Accordingly, compassionate capitalism required a sustained program of  mentorship. “[B]efore we 
can succeed as a compassionate capitalist,” the tenth credo asserted, “we must have an experienced 
mentor to guide us.” A mentor helped individuals construct the psychological and emotional foun-
dations for dreambuilding. “[W]ith our mentor’s help,” DeVos declared, “we should design a pro-
gram (using books, tapes, special meetings and events, associations with friends and co-workers, 
recreation, and worship) that will help us develop a positive, hopeful, productive attitude about our 
life and its potential.”  24
 Being a mentor was as important as having one, instructed another credo. Compassionate capi-
talism cast mentorship as a duty of  those who had themselves been mentored. “When we share our 
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time and money to help guide, teach, or encourage someone else,” DeVos explained, “we are only 
giving back a part of  what has already been given to us.” Mentees gained “new hope, new freedom, 
and new joy,” while for the mentors, “seeing another person’s dreams come true is far more reward-
ing to their own sense of  self-worth and to their own personal fulfillment than the money they may 
make in the process.”  25
 Although DeVos did not believe that self-reliance occurred on its own, he believed it should 
be the ultimate goal of  mentorship. “In a truly compassionate system,” he wrote, “all effort is di-
rected toward making people independent and capable of  standing on their own two feet.” A sup-
porter of  certain kinds of  philanthropy, DeVos believed in “helping others who cannot help them-
selves.” But he cautioned strongly against “charity,” alleging that if  it extended beyond “short-term 
relief,” it “may send people down a road of  diminished self-worth” and “leav[e] people without the 
ability or incentive to solve their own problems.”   26
 DeVos’s statements about why people should serve as mentors touch on the question of  
what exactly the motivations of  economic actors under compassionate capitalism should be. The 
emphasis on the need for compassion suggests that self-interest would not be the sole driver. DeVos 
certainly downplayed self-interest when he wrote that “the real joy of  compassionate capitalism is 
not just finding your own personal fulfillment and financial security.” Rather, it lay in “helping other 
people to find personal fulfillment and financial security for themselves.” Indeed, the cofounders 
believed that, in certain circumstances, moral considerations ought to outweigh individual economic 
interest. For example, Van Andel stressed in his autobiography that “[m]oral people should not pro-
duce things that clearly bring dishonor to God, even if  people express a desire for such things,” and 
he gave as examples “the production of  pornography, the provision of  abortions, prostitution, or 
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even the production of  literature or media ventures that undermine the family.” And mentorship 
certainly had a streak of  altruism running through it.  27
 Self-interest came up a lot, though. As we have seen, even when mentoring had no financial 
upside, DeVos thought that mentors still stood to gain a better self-image. According to compas-
sionate capitalism, all of  the good that people did for others, even if  there was no obvious immedi-
ate payout, redounded to them one way or another, as illustrated by the final credo, which counseled, 
“whenever you grow weary of  well doing, remember the Law of  Compensation,” according to 
which “[i]n the long haul, every gift of  time, money, or energy that you give will return to benefit 
you.”  28
********** 
 Unsurprisingly, DeVos believed that the Amway business model mirrored the ideals of  com-
passionate capitalism. First there was the emphasis on dreambuilding. David John Harris has charac-
terized dreambuilding as “the primary objective of  Amway sponsors[.]” Shad Helmstetter summa-
rized dreambuilding accordingly: “The basic idea is to focus on specific goals, visualize them, see 
yourself  working hard to get them, and one day — owning them yourself.” A booklet produced by 
Amway titled Passport to Success opened by asking, “What are some of  your dreams?,” before listing 
off  some possibilities: “A new home? A new car? Travel? A college education for your children? The 
extra income you need to make ends meet every month?” Steve Butterfield wrote that all presenta-
tions of  the Plan began with an exercise that he called “Building the Dream,” during which the pre-
senter would learn about the wants and needs of  his prospective recruits while also attempting to 
rev up their imaginations about what was possible through Amway. “A skillful Dreamer,” he said, 
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“might pass around Cadillac and Mercedes booklets, travel brochures, better homes and fashion 
magazines, letting his audience savor the images of  wealth and status.” Cultivating dreams — of  
money, luxury goods, an early retirement, debt-free living — was an integral part of  the Amway 
pitch.  29
 With dreambuilding so central to Amway, all the elements of  successful dreambuilding under 
compassionate capitalism were also part of  the business. Amway stressed positive thinking as an es-
sential ingredient in any successful distributorship. Linda Oldham Lester has aptly described positive 
thinking as Amway’s “ideological charter[.]” Self-help and positive thinking have long been deeply 
intertwined with Amway. Many who have written in defense of  Amway — including Charles Conn, 
Shad Helmstetter, James Robinson, and Ron Ball — contributed to the larger popular literature on 
self-help and positive thinking. The closing pages of  many pro-Amway books contained advertise-
ments for self-help and positive thinking works either written by that same author or published by 
the same company. Even Richard DeVos got into the business, contributing two books to the genre: 
Hope From My Heart: Ten Lessons for Life (2000) and Ten Powerful Phrases for Positive People (2008).   30
 Self-help and positive thinking books have also circulated freely amongst Amway distribu-
tors. In 1973, for example, Amway issued an audiobook cassette of  Russell H. Conwell’s famous 
speech “Acres of  Diamonds,” in which he declared, among other things, that “it is your duty to get 
rich.” The tape was produced by Success Unlimited, a company founded by W. Clement Stone, a 
prominent positive thinking peddler who co-authored a book with Napoleon Hill titled Success 
Through a Positive Mental Attitude. Steve Butterfield wrote that when he and his wife were introduced 
to Amway, they “were primed with a positive-attitude book, The Magic of  Thinking Big” prior to see-
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ing the Plan. Another ex-distributor, Ruth Carter, said she was taught that “[a] distributor should 
only read books which will contribute to his success,” which included “books by motivational au-
thors like Zig Ziglar, Norman Vincent Peale or Dennis Waitley[.]” Like Butterfield, she recalled re-
ceiving a copy of  The Magic of  Thinking Big upon her introduction to Amway.  31
 Apart from just hawking their books, the company and its allies also liberally appropriated 
many of  the ideas and advice offered up by different self-help and positive thinking authors. Like 
Norman Vincent Peale, David Schwartz, and John Schindler, Shad Helmstetter thought that positive 
words were important to cultivating a good mental attitude. His book included a set of  “self-talk 
scripts,” short (generally one to three sentence) positive phrases, which he advised Amway distribu-
tors to internalize. “Self-Talk,” he wrote, “is the name we use for the process of  creating positive 
new programs in the brain.” By repeating these phrases to oneself  on a regular basis, he alleged that 
distributors could gradually diminish — and eventually eliminate — the negative thoughts that were 
the basis of  low self-esteem.  32
 As we already know, positive thinking involves more than just taking in wholesome ideas and 
messages. As Wilbur Cross wrote, “the pursuit of  excellence can be achieved only when [distribu-
tors] discipline themselves to tune in the positive dialogues and tune out the negative ones.” In the 
Amway system, negative thoughts and ideas came from a variety of  sources. In an amusingly hyper-
bolic chapter, Helmstetter identified television as “the problem that destroys lives — and countless 
Amway businesses,” a “thief  of  the most dangerous kind” that bombards viewers with negative im-
ages, undermines family cohesion, and discourages productivity. Friends and acquaintances could 
also be harbingers of  negativity, which was why, like Schindler, Schwartz, and (to a lesser degree) 
Peale, Helmstetter recommended dissociating from such individuals if  they were present in one’s 
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life. He advised doing what one could to assist negative individuals in acquiring a more positive out-
look on life, particularly if  the person was someone close (a relative, a significant other, etc.). Ulti-
mately, though, he erred towards caution and keeping a distance from such people. “The most im-
portant thing you can do when you run into someone who is truly negative,” he wrote, “is to protect 
your own attitude from theirs.” And if, after a genuine attempt to help, the negative person in ques-
tion showed no improvement, then “don’t invest any more time trying to persuade them to change.” 
Addressing distributors at an Amway function, distributor Dawana Zecher gave similar advice, in-
structing listeners to “[m]ake a commitment to guard who you associate with and what’s going into 
your mind as far as newspapers and magazines and the books you read and just watching 
television.”      33
 The admonition to avoid negativity also applied to how a person should run their distribu-
torship. Zecher stressed always maintaining a positive attitude when in the presence of  one’s down-
line, telling distributors that “[o]ur group should never know if  we’re down or something’s going on 
in our life.” Marge Lewis, meanwhile, discouraged any criticism of  the company, its products, or fel-
low distributors: 
Just think of  Negative as pieces of  kindling. You just say a little, you share a little Negative with, you 
know, someone downline as, “Man, I think these products are too expensive, I’m not gonna use 
that,” instead of  taking the position that you could share with them the cost per usage and get excit-
ed about the fact that the most expensive product you have in your home is a Brand X product, one 
that you haven’t bought from your business, and that that is not going to help you find your free-
dom….Perhaps you’ve got someone in your upline that you don’t really even like, and you think 
they’re a real jerk and so you’re downplaying them and de-edifying them. You are destroying your 
business.  34
 In keeping with the self-help and positive thinking perspective, Amway’s cofounders and 
company sympathizers attributed success or failure to an individual’s attitudes and initiative. DeVos 
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wrote in his 1975 book Believe! — which he co-authored with Charles Conn — that “almost anyone 
can do whatever he really believes he can do.” In another book, DeVos acknowledged that “[t]he 
playing field isn’t always level, and those in dire circumstances may face great temptations and even 
greater obstacles,” but then went on to contend that “[e]ven in the worst of  situations, on the most 
uneven playing field, countless people make good decisions, hold themselves accountable, and 
achieve their goals.” Wilbur Cross similarly said that “[i]f  you are properly motivated, you can do 
almost anything you honestly believe in,” while James Robinson stated that “[t]he essence of  the 
Amway business is to insist that no matter how long the odds, people can find the inner power to do 
great things.” Company boosters insisted that more or less anyone could succeed in Amway. Charles 
Conn dismissed the idea that there was an “Amway ‘type,’” giving examples of  individuals with a 
wide variety of  personalities and dispositions who had nonetheless done well in the business, and 
ultimately chalking up their accomplishments to “inner drive.” Cross declared that “[d]efining the 
‘typical’ distributor who has made it is like trying to grasp the fabled ‘greased pig.’”  35
 That said, no one built a successful distributorship alone. DeVos wrote in Ten Powerful Phrases 
for Positive People that “Amway is a ‘we’ business” that subscribes to the belief  that “[e]ach person’s 
success is to varying degrees dependent on the success of  every other person.” A 1979 tape that 
came as part of  a distributor starter kit made this point as well, stating, “Amway was built by reach-
ing to help other people reach their goals. Because when you reach your goal, we’ll make ours auto-
matically, and you help your sponsor too. And when you help those you sponsor arrive at their goals, 
you also share in the benefits.” Just as under compassionate capitalism, Amway stressed that achiev-
ing one’s dreams required relying on others.  36
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 Two types of  interpersonal relationships were especially important in the Amway system: the 
mentor-mentee relationship and the family. In Amway, a distributor’s upline played the role of  men-
tor. David John Harris has written that the relationship between a distributor and her sponsor is akin 
to “that of  master and apprentice,” whereby the sponsor instructs the distributor in the best prac-
tices of  running an Amway business, with the distributor gaining greater independence over time. 
This required obedience to one’s upline. As Shad Helmstetter explained, “[y]our own Amway Dia-
monds and your other leaders are among the most successful business people in the world….All 
they ask is that you be willing to listen carefully, and have a sincere desire to learn and practice what 
they’re sharing with you.”  37
 The duty to obey those above oneself  in the Amway hierarchy took the form of  duplication. 
Duplication involved faithfully reproducing the actions of  one’s upline. At Amway functions, speak-
ers regularly identified duplication as an essential element of  the business. Distributor Tim Kline 
described Amway as “a business of  duplication” and advised distributors that “to build this thing 
fast what you have to keep in the back of  your mind all the time is duplication. Is what I’m doing 
duplicatable?” Steve Butterfield wrote that “without Duplication there is no Amway system.” Ac-
cording to Butterfield, duplication went beyond business practices to include appearance and behav-
ior as well. He wrote that “[d]istributors tend to copy the walk, mannerisms, voice inflections, body 
language and cliches of  their Directs” and that “[d]uplication sometimes extends all the way down to 
the brand of  shoes, and all the way up to the hairstyle.” Ruth Carter made this point as well: “You 
must do everything the way winners do! You have to learn to walk like a winner….and talk like a 
winner….dress like a winner and rush around like a winner.”   38
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 Butterfield suggested that duplication was such an article of  faith among Amway distributors 
that downlines would even reproduce their upline’s errors: “Whatever I do wrong inadvertently 
shows up magnified in my business: if  I don’t retail products, nobody in my group will retail prod-
ucts. If  I criticize my leadership, people in my group will develop a negative attitude toward the lead-
ership and lose their motivation.” Duplication, then, demanded not only that downlines mimic cer-
tain practices and behaviors, but also that their uplines act as correct models. At one Amway func-
tion, distributor Patsy Lizardi made precisely that point: “People are gonna duplicate 100% of  the 
things we do wrong and only 50% of  the things we do right, so we need to do more of  the right 
things[.]”  39
 In addition to a good mentor, the family was also important for the successful Amway dis-
tributor. “Family” has had two connotations in the Amway system. On the one hand, there was fam-
ily in the “real” sense: blood relatives, one’s spouse or partner, children, and so on. For DeVos, the 
family was the bedrock upon which American society rested. “[W]ithout strong families in America,” 
he wrote in Believe!, “none of  the values which we love and live for will survive — or, for that matter, 
will be worth preserving.” Additionally, the Amway distributor force itself  has been thought to con-
stitute a kind of  “virtual” family.   40
 This was not unique to Amway. As Nicole Woolsey Biggart has pointed out, the direct sales 
industry places tremendous emphasis on family, which represents a key point of  departure from 
capitalism proper, which historically has tried to atomize individuals in the name of  greater produc-
tivity. She wrote that “[b]y integrating the family into business activity, direct selling organizations 
use existing social ties for economic purposes. The industry also does the reverse, making the eco-
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nomic ties of  sponsorship the basis for familylike social relations. DSOs are ‘metaphorical 
families.’”   41
 Richard DeVos outlined the contrast between Amway and other businesses on a company-
issued tape from 1977. He pointed out how jobs separated husbands and wives and hurt the family, 
saying, “[t]he guy goes to work here and the gal goes to work over here. Your lives tend to drive 
apart because of  economic situations: you have a job here, he has a job there. You have your buddies 
that you went out with from work and she’s got the girls she goes out with over here. And you tend 
to find your family kind of  floating in the middle.” Amway, on the other hand, brought families to-
gether, and he claimed that the company’s emphasis on the family was “an exclusive Amway 
thing.” (As Biggart’s research shows, this is not the case.) In Commitment to Excellence, Wilbur Cross 
and Gordon Olson declared that “[t]here is almost no way to describe Amway other than as an 
enormous worldwide family.”  42
 Historically, the overwhelmingly majority of  Amway distributorships — as many as three-
quarters — have consisted of  married couples. Company boosters have tried to walk a fine line 
when it comes to the family. While acknowledging that “[t]he prototype of  the Amway distributor-
ship is that of  the married couple,” Charles Conn wrote in his 1982 book An Uncommon Freedom that 
single distributors “are now becoming almost commonplace,” citing two examples. James Robinson, 
too, dismissed the notion that there was no place for single people within Amway. Still, he conceded 
that “the entire Amway organization — from founders to distributors — is imbued with a special 
devotion to family.”  43
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 And indeed it was, and is. Amway has encouraged distributors to treat the business as a fami-
ly enterprise. DeVos advised distributors to involve their children, writing that their active participa-
tion “is so important to their growth and understanding,” and that failure to start them early might 
mean that “they may never have the interest or the ability to join you, let alone to find their own way 
in the world of  business.”  44
 Company boosters have held up the founding families as templates. James Robinson has de-
scribed an Amway distributorship as “a business that families can build together and pass on to fu-
ture generations,” which applies just as aptly to the company itself. Since its founding, the DeVos 
and Van Andel families have been the sole owners of  Amway. Many pro-Amway books contained at 
least one chapter that looked at the contributions of  DeVos and Van Andel’s wives and children to 
the company. Writing about the children, Charles Conn said in 1985 that “among the eight of  them 
there would seem to reside ample brainpower, technical skill, and personal charisma to lead Amway 
into the twenty-first century[.]” Several of  the children have spent virtually their entire adult lives 
inside Amway. For example, Jay Van Andel’s daughter Nan began working for Amway as soon as she 
finished college. Beginning in the mid-1980s, several of  DeVos and Van Andel’s children moved up 
the company ladder. Both Nan Van Andel and Dick DeVos received vice presidential appointments 
in 1984. Four years later, in December 1988, Steve Van Andel and Dan DeVos also became compa-
ny vice presidents. And in August 1992, a few months before Richard DeVos’s retirement, the com-
pany created a “policy board” that included all four of  Van Andel’s children, three of  DeVos’s, and 
the cofounders. The Grand Rapids Press reported that “the second-generation of  executives will now 
sit with their fathers around the corporate table when it comes to decisions regarding sales, products 
and international markets.”   45
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 Still, the cofounders and Amway sympathizers took pains to stress that nothing about the 
DeVos and Van Andel children’s status within the company was inevitable. For one, they have insist-
ed that not all of  the children necessarily wanted to be involved in Amway full-time. As a contrast to 
Nan Van Andel, Wilbur Cross cited Jay’s son Steve, who spent part of  his working years out of  the 
family business. Additionally, they assured readers that the children’s upward ascent to their respec-
tive leadership positions occurred meritocratically. There was the training program, for example, that 
the cofounders created for their children in the late 1970s, which involved them taking part in all of  
the various aspects of  the business, from manufacturing to actually becoming distributors them-
selves. DeVos wrote that his son and eventual successor Dick “pushed a broom and learned what it 
was like to work on an assembly line.” And far from being advantaged, Van Andel argued that his 
and DeVos’s children actually faced unique adversities, that “they were scrutinized more closely than 
any of  the other employees” and that they “have had to work twice as hard as anyone else, and often 
they don’t receive the credit due them.” Amway sympathizers have backed up the cofounders’s asser-
tions. In contrast to the stereotypical “second-generation playboys and playgirls” who “expect to 
come sailing right into the CEO’s chair as soon as Daddy retires,” Robinson insisted that DeVos and 
Van Andel’s children “all had to work hard in the business.” Charles Conn too wrote that “Dick 
DeVos and Nan Van Andel did not exactly wake up one Christmas morning to find vice presiden-
cies under the tree.”  46
 Company boosters have credited Amway with fostering real and virtual family cohesion. 
DeVos wrote that “[a]t Amway we believe in the family enough to attempt to make involvement in 
our business something which strengthens family ties rather than threatening them.” As we will see, 
in a number of  vignettes, distributors testified that before Amway, they had little time to be with 
their spouses or children, mainly on account of  their demanding work schedules, and that the 
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greater economic independence afforded to them by the business brought their families closer to-
gether. James Robinson declared that Amway “has prevented divorce and promoted touching recon-
ciliations of  parents and children after decades of  estrangement.” In addition to bolstering and re-
forging family bonds, Amway could also provide a family for those who did not have one. Robinson, 
for instance, asserted that one of  the potential advantages of  joining Amway for single people was 
that “his or her group will eagerly assume the role of  a ‘surrogate’ family, providing the love and 
support the individual may not find elsewhere.”   47
 The question of  whether Amway has promoted a particular ideal of  the family is complicat-
ed. Nicole Woolsey Biggart has written that “[a]lthough women distributors have been empowered 
personally and economically by direct selling,” generally speaking the industry “does not challenge 
existing social arrangements in which women are subordinate.” Gender difference and gender hier-
archies have both existed within Amway. Once again, the template came from the cofounders them-
selves. Commenting on the early days of  the business, Wilbur Cross and Gordon Olson wrote that 
“even with their growing duties at home, Betty Van Andel and Helen DeVos [Jay and Richard’s 
wives, respectively] found time to host business meetings, entertain visiting distributors and suppli-
ers, and pitch in when extra hands were needed to fill product orders on time.” They recounted sto-
ries of  the wives messing up reward dinners they had prepared for some of  Amway’s earliest distrib-
utors. On one occasion, their spaghetti was inedible, and another time, they made way too much chili 
and were stuck with leftovers that lasted them a year. Whenever company boosters brought up the 
cofounders’s wives, they stressed their roles as homemakers. Charles Conn wrote that “[b]oth wives 
had the task of  maintaining a normal home life for young children, while their husbands conducted 
the bustling distributor activity literally under their feet.” In other words, their contributions to the 
business were part and parcel of  their broader domestic duties. In addition to having responsibilities 
separate and distinct from their husbands, DeVos and Van Andel’s wives were also cast as sub-
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servient. In a rather jarring line from his autobiography, DeVos recalled how he and Van Andel had, 
prior to getting married, purchased land in Ada on which they could build adjacent homes. Their 
wives, he said, “generously accepted the fact that they never really had a choice about where they 
would live.”  48
 As Charles Conn himself  acknowledged, husband and wife distributors have typically con-
formed to conventional gender dynamics, in that the husband has tended to be the primary, active 
partner, while the wife has acted more as an assistant. Steve Butterfield has corroborated this, writ-
ing that in “[t]he ideal distributorship…[t]he role of  the wife is to retail and handle products, do the 
paperwork, manage the children, handle telephone orders and messages, keep the husband’s suits 
and shirts clean,” while the husband “develop[s] prospects, show[s] the Plan, sponsor[s] new distrib-
utors, work[s] depth and [is] the leader of  his group by being a faithful follower of  his upline.” This 
gendered division of  labor did not emerge organically. Rather, in many cases, it was imposed upon 
distributors. Ruth Carter, for instance, wrote that “[w]hen I was a single distributor, I showed many 
plans. The minute I married, my upline strongly discouraged me from doing this. It was my hus-
band’s job, and he needed to do it in order to enhance his self-respect, we were told.” Steve Butter-
field recalled an Amway distributor event at which at a certain point “the wives and husbands were 
divided and addressed separately in different rooms.” There have even been gendered dress codes: 
wives who have addressed assembled distributors will typically wear dresses, while their husbands 
wear suits and ties, and men and women in the audience have been expected to follow along.  49
 Amway sympathizers have tried to quash the idea that family distributorships must conform 
to a certain mold, particularly as regards gender roles. On a company-issued tape from 1978, distrib-
utor Dorothy Garman stressed that there was no gender discrimination inside Amway, saying that “it 
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doesn’t matter whether you’re a woman or a man, you get exactly the same money for what you pro-
duce….with Amway it doesn’t say ‘female’ and ‘male,’ it just says ‘this is the bonus schedule and this 
is when you make Direct,’ and it doesn’t say a thing about married, divorced, single or anything.” 
Garman presented direct sales as a boon to women, saying, “I have a hard time feeling sorry for the 
equal rights for women, because I’ve always had equal rights for women, being in the direct selling 
field.” After conceding that husbands tend to be the dominant party in married distributorships, 
Charles Conn went on to say that “there are so many exceptions to that model that the model itself  
can be misleading.” To prove this, he gave the example of  the Yamada family, a husband-and-wife 
distributorship out of  California in which the wife, Karen, took the commanding role. Additionally, 
he pointed to instances of  the wife learning about the business first and having to convince a skepti-
cal husband to join.  50
 Amway’s careful, complicated, and at times contradictory messaging around gender and the 
family reflects the fraught politics around the subject in the latter half  of  the twentieth century. 
Amway came of  age in the aftermath of  second-wave feminism and the sexual revolution, which 
itself  was born, at least in part, out of  a response to attempts to limit women’s prospects and rein-
force traditional gender roles after World War II. As noted in Chapter I, with the exception of  a 
mid-decade jump, the labor force participation rate for women remained relatively flat across the 
1950s, in the mid- to high thirties. Over the next two decades, however, it steadily increased, so that 
by 1980, just over half  of  all women were in the workforce. Enovid, the world’s first oral birth con-
trol medication, more commonly known as “the Pill,” became commercially available in 1960, offer-
ing women new means of  exercising bodily autonomy — in just two years, millions of  American 
women were taking it. Groups like the National Organization for Women sprang up nationally and 
locally on college campuses and engaged in, among other things, “consciousness-raising,” working 
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to make women aware of  the structural sexism holding them back. This social activism triggered 
important developments in the law and in government. In 1964, the Supreme Court curtailed at-
tempts to restrict pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio. The following year, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the 
Court ruled that the Constitution protected access to contraceptives. In 1968, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission changed course and announced that it would start taking sex dis-
crimination cases directly rather than waiting for them to wind their way through the courts. In 1972, 
the Equal Rights Amendment, an ambition of  women’s rights activists since the 1920s, made it out 
of  Congress and went to the states for ratification. That same year, Title IX went into effect, pro-
tecting women from discrimination at any school that received federal dollars. And in 1973, the 
Supreme Court, citing its finding in Griswold that Americans had a constitutional right to privacy, le-
galized abortion in Roe v. Wade.   51
 The legal, political, and cultural changes wrought by the women’s movement inspired signifi-
cant backlash, however. Many, including some women, saw feminism as threatening the family and 
men and women’s proper stations in society. One worrying trend for such detractors was the grow-
ing commonality of  divorce, which doubled from twenty-five percent to fifty percent between the 
mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, a consequence of  liberalizing divorce laws, women’s growing pres-
ence in the workplace, which afforded them the means to leave unsatisfying marriages, and a more 
individualistic mindset. The spike in abortions after Roe — in 1983 there were an estimated 436 
abortions for every 1,000 live births — horrified many; the reverend Jerry Falwell described abortion 
in 1980 as “an indictment of  murder against America for killing unwanted babies.” Some also re-
sented feminists for what they perceived as their disdain towards women who chose to stay in the 
home and raise a family. These latent critiques came to the fore during the fight to ratify the ERA. 
Phyllis Schlafly, a housewife turned conservative activist, formed STOP ERA and argued that the 
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amendment would destroy the American family and result in such horrors as gender-neutral bath-
rooms and women becoming eligible for the draft. Her attacks were successful in sinking the ERA’s 
ratification. Along with STOP ERA, Concerned Women of  America, another highly influential 
right-leaning group critical of  feminism, also formed in this period.  52
 Amway tried to forge a middle path in between these diametrically opposing currents. On 
the one hand, it could not afford to ignore the repercussions of  the women’s movement completely. 
Accordingly, in attempting to appeal to women, Amway necessarily had to couch the benefits of  di-
rect sales in the language of  women’s empowerment. Indeed, as we have seen, some company 
boosters, like Dorothy Garman, went so far as to suggest that direct sales was a more effective vehicle 
for uplifting women than movement activism. That being said, the forces that attacked feminism and 
sought to uphold the family and the roles of  men and women within it were powerful as well. Ac-
cordingly, at the same time that it drew attention to the opportunities it provided to women, Amway 
also positioned itself  as the defender of  a certain sort of  socio-cultural status quo. Perhaps the best 
way to summarize Amway’s stance on gender, then, is that it aimed to increase women’s economic 
participation within the “traditional” family paradigm. Whether that was in fact what it accomplished 
is another question entirely. 
  
********** 
 In addition to emphasizing dreambuilding, positive thinking, and mutual aid, Amway also 
supposedly provided individuals with meaningful work alongside the concrete means to realize their 
dreams. Understanding how requires looking at Amway distributor vignettes. Amway distributor vi-
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gnettes served two functions. First, they illustrated the virtues of  the company’s business model, 
which Butterfield summarized accordingly: “Amway saves. There is hope with soap. You can do it 
too.” Second, they were a vehicle for spreading the company’s value system. The distributors in these 
stories succeeded because they had the “right” qualities: they were persistent in the face of  adversity, 
they did not doubt their own potential, and so on. Moreover, these success stories occurred within 
the context of  a world in which the only real limit to a person’s success — allegedly — was their 
mindset and determination. Accordingly, analyzing distributor vignettes allows us to see how the 
company has defined success, how it has tailored its appeal to specific demographic groups, its atti-
tudes toward employment, and more. The distributor vignettes illustrate how Amway presented its 
business model as a way of  attaining the autonomy, self-mastery, and economic independence that 
postwar social critics saw as in decline after 1945, as well as how Amway positioned direct sales as an 
antidote to the flaws of  actually-existing capitalism.  53
 As others have noted, Amway distributor vignettes have tended to be rather formulaic, orga-
nized and told in very similar fashions. Notwithstanding differences in the specifics of  each distribu-
tor’s life story, distributor vignettes have generally had three basic components: adversity, opportuni-
ty, and the reversal of  fortunes. Not every testimonial presented in Amway tools has necessarily had 
all three parts: sometimes only adversity was highlighted, or the reversal of  fortunes. That said, as 
the Ron Puryear example that opened this chapter illustrates, a fully fleshed-out vignette almost al-
ways featured all three parts.   54
 Adversity is the gateway into Amway. While it is certainly true that, as one distributor put it, 
“[i]t’s not a requirement to have hated your life to be in the Amway business,” many in these stories 
joined in order to resolve some problem or problems in their lives. Accordingly, many vignettes be-
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gin with a description of  the future distributor’s difficulties. The Puryear story is an example of  
probably the most common predicament that distributors identified as the reason — or a reason — 
they joined Amway: the dissatisfying job. Nancy Sue Ammerman has written that “the major appeal 
of  Amway for most distributors is that through it they are able to feel that they are actually in busi-
ness for themselves,” and she argued that working for others is denigrated within Amway circles. 
Ruth Carter corroborated this, alleging that “[t]he business had taught me to have a total contempt 
for honest gainful employment[.]” Butterfield wrote that in addition to dreambuilding, “a graphic 
evocation of  the Rut” is also an important part of  the Amway pitch. After a distributor described to 
his audience of  potential recruits everything they could achieve through Amway, he then went on to 
contrast direct selling with its alternative: the ordinary, nine-to-five job. The job, he would tell them, 
reduces a person’s life to a monotonous bore in which they end up devoting most of  their existence 
to working for someone else and, in Butterfield’s words, “[w]e give up dreaming and learn to live, or 
rather die, within our means.” At the job, work is not about fulfilling a dream or doing something 
personally rewarding or helping others, all qualities of  genuinely meaningful work according to 
compassionate capitalism. Rather, it is simply a way to stay alive.  55
 And indeed, Amway boosters have often promoted the business by casting it as superior to 
traditional salaried employment. Charles Conn wrote that “[f]or all the talk about fulfillment, sense 
of  ‘calling,’ and love of  one’s profession, few people stay at a job after the financial need to be there 
is removed.” Conn described a job as “a forty-hour chore between weekends.” In a speech to dis-
tributors, motivational speaker Bob McEwen presented the contrast between employment and direct 
sales rather evocatively, evoking the theme of  alienation found in Mills: 
Every adult at sometime during their life, when they begin to care for themselves, say at age eighteen 
or twenty-one or twenty-five, faces two choices. One choice would be to go into work for someone 
else. Let me describe that by saying they will go into personal service. That is, that they will simply 
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sell themselves, go up and down the street, knock on the door, and say, “I am for sale, will you hire 
me?,” and place themselves at the mercy of  someone else. Nothing wrong with that, except that it’s 
inferior to what the other option is. The other option is to go into business for oneself.  56
 In their vignettes, distributors offered a variety of  reasons why they did not like their pre-
Amway jobs. In some cases, the work was taxing and/or time-consuming. For Dave Taylor, a former 
professional football player, a combination of  injuries and the strain of  being in an environment as 
cutthroat as the NFL led him to look for a way out, despite the good pay. In his words, “I was mak-
ing a good living,” but “I wasn’t a husband to my wife” or “a father to my children,” and “I was be-
ginning to drink more because I was always uptight.” Lee Waters, a Michigan pediatrician, worked as 
many as ninety hours a week and regularly had to pull all-nighters. His wife testified that he “looked 
dreadful” and she worried that “he wasn’t going to live to be fifty years old[.]” Jim Nealis also 
worked in medicine (as a neurologist), and had many of  the same complaints as Lee Waters: he said 
that he “worked a hundred hours many weeks” and was “always living by my beeper.” Indeed, his 
practice was so consuming that, according to him, for the first five years of  his son’s life, he never 
attended a single birthday party. Chuck and Charlene Harrison were a dual-income household — he 
worked at a textile mill, she at a post office — and although it was enough to support themselves 
and their children, the two had almost no time to spend together.  57
 In many instances, distributors said that their jobs simply did not provide an adequate in-
come. Lee Besser became a police officer in the city of  Chicago in the 1970s, but after he got mar-
ried, he concluded that he could not support a family on his salary. He said that his colleagues were 
“killing themselves to pay the bills” and “were putting in sixty to eighty hours a week to support the 
kids and never had time to be with them.” Charlie Marsh was a cop as well, in Rome, New York, and 
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had the same problem as Lee Besser, complaining that he “owned one suit and a few sports shirts 
and my police shoes” and had “[n]othing in the bank.” Bo Short stated that he and his wife Sandy 
“had a six-figure income when I was twenty-eight years old,” but nonetheless, “I was working sixty-
five hours a week….I had $250,000 worth of  debt to go along with it. I had a $2,500 house payment 
to go along with it.” Bert and Terri Gulick indicated that, despite the fact that both of  them worked, 
they “didn’t own anything”: “The bank owned our cars, Sears owned the dishes and the kitchen ap-
pliances, Montgomery Ward owned the bedroom suite, Thorp Credit owned Terri’s engagement di-
amond, and VISA and MasterCard owned everything else.” Rex Renfrow worked as a typist for the 
federal government and was frustrated by the lack of  opportunity for upward mobility, saying, “I 
imagined that if  I worked hard enough and long enough….I would make enough money so that I 
could afford to start a little business of  my own.” By the time he turned forty, though, he found that 
he did not have anywhere near the income to do that, and he was forced to take a second job as a 
part-time gas station attendant to support his children and stay-at-home wife. Dennis Beecher also 
complained that he was stuck in a workplace hierarchy. He worked as a mortician, and after several 
years in the business, he concluded that “it was never going to work out for me to become president 
of  that company and really control the thing[.]” For Tom Payne, who worked as a dentist in Gun-
tersville, Alabama, a hospitalization in 1970 led him to realize that his practice provided few assures 
of  financial security. As he put it, “As long as I am there — and healthy — I can make lots of  mon-
ey; but when I stop pulling teeth, the money stops.”   58
 It was not only distributors with salaried jobs, though, who dealt with financial insecurity. It 
was also a problem for those who owned their own businesses. Art and Ollie Charlton purchased an 
ice cream store in Phoenix, Arizona in the early 1960s, only to subsequently discover that they had 
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bought a lemon, that the business was unprofitable and in poor fiscal shape. This forced Art to get a 
second job and decimated the couple’s finances. Mel and Bea Behnke owned their own farm in Kan-
sas, and although they liked it, they found it difficult to support themselves. Mel said that “every year 
I had to risk my entire net worth just to make a profit. And the profit then went right back into the 
farm.” Craig Holiday operated a construction company, but he did not enjoy the work. In addition, 
he had made several real estate investments that flopped, and so ultimately he and his wife had to 
sell off  much of  what they owned to make ends meet.  59
 The fact that a job or business failed to provide enough income also had gendered repercus-
sions. In addition to being materially insufficient, several of  these vignettes portrayed the dissatisfy-
ing job as a challenge to masculinity and to traditional gender roles. Recall the story of  Ron Puryear, 
who was devastated when his wife had to leave the home to bring in a second income, or Dave Tay-
lor lamenting that football made him an absentee husband and father. Craig Holiday’s account began 
with him discovering a note from his wife after he had gone out drinking. The note read, “I’ve de-
cided to leave you. Until you change your life, I won’t come back.” After a series of  jobs left him 
dissatisfied, Bill Childers also took up drinking, describing himself  as “the Pabst Blue Ribbon Kid.” 
Drinking became such a problem that, according to him, “the night my daughter Beth was born, my 
wife had to wake me up so I could get her to the hospital[.]” Ken Stewart found himself  so deeply 
in debt due to his small business that his wife once recalled “walk[ing] into the bedroom one night, 
and he was sitting on the bed crying like a baby.” When his children were still little, Rex Renfrow had 
to work two jobs because he and his wife wanted her to stay home and care for them. Another dis-
tributor couple, Joe and Norma Folgio, described how fraught their home environment was before 
Amway: they fought frequently, and Norma confessed that things got so heated at one point that she 
took their shotgun and fired it at him. (Fortunately, he was not hurt.) Joe said that during that period 
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of  his life, “I was afraid that I was about to lose my wife and family, and depression was growing like 
a great, dark cloud inside my head.” For these Amway men and others like them, their jobs prevent-
ed them from serving as the family breadwinner, which, in turn, led to problems like alcoholism and 
domestic violence. The example of  Ken Stewart sobbing hysterically also suggests that the dissatis-
fying job could be not only emasculating, but also effehminizing. The wives felt the impact as well. 
In much the same way that dire economic straits could make a husband less of  a man, it could also 
make a wife less of  a woman, because the wives were sometimes compelled to compromise their 
childrearing duties by seeking work outside the home.  60
 The dissatisfying job was not the only form of  adversity that came up in these vignettes. Un-
expected and burdensome healthcare costs also made a regular appearance. Several woes befell 
Frank and Rita Delisle, including Frank losing his job as a printer and large medical debts. Jim and 
Nancy Dornan were already in the business when their son was born. He was diagnosed with spina 
bifida and had to undergo numerous hospitalizations and surgeries while in infancy. The Dornans 
credited their distributorship with helping them through this period, with Nancy saying that “[w]e 
didn’t have to worry about paying the bills or keeping things going.” John and Jennie Crowe had a 
similar experience. They were also already Amway distributors when confronted with two medical 
maladies. First, Jennie gave birth to a child who had complications, and then, a few months after 
that, John was shot during a home invasion and had to have surgery. Gay Schoepf  also relied on 
Amway to support her and her husband when a stroke incapacitated him, as did Chum Stockwell 
after his heart attack.  61
 And then there were adversities not so much personal as sociological. Amway has made a 
special point of  stressing the opportunities it provides to historically marginalized groups. The dis-
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abled were one touted demographic. Dick Ossinger had degrees in communications and sociology, 
yet was forced to take a menial assembly job because he was blind and no one would take a chance 
on him. Robinson cited additional examples, such as the Lambeths, who were deaf. Related are those 
distributors who struggled with mental illness. John Herren served in Vietnam and subsequently ex-
perienced post-traumatic stress, which he treated by self-medicating. After finding success in Amway, 
he described the business as “a wonderful way for veterans to come back into society in a positive 
way instead of  wallowing in self-pity.”   62
 African-Americans were another key constituency that Amway targeted. David John Harris 
has pointed out that African-American distributors have had a unique interpretation of  the promise 
of  Amway. He wrote that many have viewed Amway as a means for “the realization and fulfilment 
— rather than renewal or restoration — of  the American dream.” An article in the October 1981 
issue of  the magazine Black Enterprise posed the question “Is Amway The Black Way?” The article 
did not directly answer the question, but in profiling a handful of  successful African-American dis-
tributors left little to the imagination. Charles Prince struggled against racial discrimination early in 
his life. When he worked at a supermarket, he observed that the cashier jobs were reserved exclu-
sively for white employees. Meanwhile, he was stuck as a bagger, which paid significantly less. Fur-
thermore, although he was an excellent student in high school, he could not get into medical school 
on account of  his race. Before Amway, George Halsey, too, experienced discrimination. He said that 
despite “those signs on some of  those doors that said EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER,” he 
came to discover that “when you go in there to try to get the job, you stay right where you started — 
at the end of  the line.” In contrast to the everyday racism that African-Americans encountered, the 
world of  Amway promised a chance for upward mobility for all, regardless of  color.  63
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 The way that Amway sought to appeal to African-Americans reflects important shifts that 
occurred in the post-civil rights period. Just as compassionate capitalism acknowledged the flaws of  
real-world capitalism, so too did Amway concede that African-Americans continued to face discrim-
ination even after the victories of  the civil rights movement. But in offering a colorblind, class-based 
solution to racism, Amway embodied a backlash to race-conscious policymaking that began in the 
late 1960s and grew over the course of  the 1970s and 1980s. No single issue arguably provoked 
more of  a firestorm than busing. The prospect of  African-American children being bussed into pre-
dominantly white school districts met with intense opposition from many whites, which right-wing 
politicians like Richard Nixon used to great effect, and even triggered violence, most infamously in 
Boston. The Supreme Court dealt two significant blows to efforts to achieve integration and equity 
in education when it recognized the right of  localities to finance schools using property taxes in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) and when it struck down a plan to fuse Detroit’s 
urban and suburban school districts in Milliken v. Bradley (1974). Affirmative action, too, proved an-
other hot-button issue. Reacting to the reverberations from these fights, Amway urged African-
Americans to overcome adversity through self-improvement and entrepreneurship rather than di-
rectly challenging and dismantling structural racism.  64
 This attitude, though unquestionably informed by white resistance to civil rights, also tapped 
into a strain of  black conservative thought that stressed business ownership as essential to racial 
progress. Booker T. Washington most famously articulated this notion. In the early 1900s, Washing-
ton urged African-Americans to make peace with Jim Crow and to concentrate on uplifting their 
families and communities through, among other things, starting small businesses, effectively creating 
a flourishing black economy that ran parallel to the broader white one. Washington’s ideas had sig-
nificant ripple effects. Even ostensibly radical groups and movements, such as Marcus Garvey’s Uni-
versal Negro Improvement Association and the Nation of  Islam, parroted Washingtonian ideas — 
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instead of  attempting to integrate into white society, they advocated using business ownership to do 
an end run around segregation. Earl G. Graves, the founder of  Black Enterprise, fit very much in this 
tradition. In his 1997 book How to Succeed in Business Without Being White, he wrote that the objective 
of  Black Enterprise was “to encourage as many African Americans as possible to one day control 
their own fates by owning their own successful businesses. Ownership is where the true power and 
wealth lie.” Though he acknowledged the challenges that enduring racism posed, he insisted that it 
was “more of  a nuisance than a major obstacle” that “can be dealt with if  you use your wits and de-
termination.” He believed African-Americans could improve their circumstances through mutual aid 
and investments of  time, effort, and resources into their communities, writing that “only by leverag-
ing our collective strength can we achieve the only true equality — economic equality,” by which he 
did not mean an equal distribution of  income or wealth, but rather equality of  opportunity. Over the 
course of  the twentieth century, beginning first with the New Deal and then the Great Society, black 
conservatism also became increasingly defined by its opposition to the welfare state. Government 
“handouts” were blamed for encouraging “dependency” among African-Americans and rendering 
them captive to the Democratic Party. Many African-Americans on the Right instead championed 
“black capitalism” as an alternative that promised real independence and advancement. Amway 
sought to draw in those African-Americans who believed in the transformative power of  entrepre-
neurship and who saw it as a superior tool to the liberal state.   65
 It was on account of  racism and other woes that, as the tools told it, these individuals and 
couples became involved in Amway. This brings us to the second element of  the distributor vi-
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gnette: opportunity. At a certain point in their lives, the would-be distributors were introduced to 
Amway. In some cases it occurred by happenstance. For example, Mike Apele, a flight attendant, 
heard about it from some distributors who were on board an airplane, while Roy Bulmer, a police 
officer, was introduced to it by a man who was in a car accident that he had responded to. For most 
distributors, however, the gateway was a friend or a relative. Rex Renfrow got into Amway in 1972 
thanks to Bill Britt, who, along with his wife Peggy, built one of  the largest and most successful dis-
tributorships in the company’s history. The two couples had been friends since the 1950s, when they 
both lived in Raleigh, North Carolina. Willie Bass lived next door to his sponsor, Ron Hale, who 
would occasionally see him leaving for and coming home from his welding job. The work had 
caused Willie to develop significant lung problems. Ron was purportedly moved to show Willie 
Amway so that he could leave his unsafe job once and for all.  66
 Not everyone introduced to Amway was immediately taken with the business and signed up, 
though. Many distributors vignettes noted an initial skepticism and hesitancy. Chum Stockwell re-
called that “[i]n 1962, our sponsor stopped at the restaurant, I threw him out. We’d started this 
restaurant on a wing and a prayer back in the olden days, and I just couldn’t see myself, a deal like 
that.” Bubba Pratt said that he and his wife Sandy backed out of  the business twice before finally 
committing to it. Lisa Mitts stated that after she and her husband David were first shown the Plan, 
they shied away from the business, worrying about potential financial commitments they might have 
to make: “We still avoided him [i.e., their sponsor] for a little while though, because we thought that 
he was rich, he lived on the river, you know, he was a real doctor, you know what I’m saying, and we 
thought that, my goodness, if  he’s gonna ask us to look at an income opportunity, it means that 
we’re gonna have to put some money out, and we don’t have anything.” Brain Hays described his 
sponsor, a trucker, as “a poor little guy, making a few extra bucks,” and said that because of  that, he 
came close to passing on the opportunity. Glen and Joya Baker indicated that, when an old friend of  
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Glen’s first tried to sell them on Amway, they were “completely uninterested” and “blew him off  
four separate times.”   67
 Some said they received negative feedback from those close to them when they expressed a 
desire to join Amway. Bert Gulick told an audience of  distributors that after he tried to explain the 
business to his father, “My dad proceeded to tell me that I shouldn’t be in the Amway business, that 
it was just a rinky-dink business, how could I put my career as a restaurant manager on the line, how 
could I sacrifice smelling like a pepperoni [he worked at a pizza shop] for this silly soap business.” 
George and Rush Halsey, one of  Amway’s most successful African-American distributors, doubted 
the business at first, with Ruth confessing that she “just didn’t believe that the Plan had much prom-
ise[.]” When Lee Besser’s wife Jane was introduced to Amway, she was enthusiastic but he was not. 
She said, “I showed him the circles. He got mad. We fought. We screamed and fought for three days. 
I wanted him to go with me to a meeting and see it for himself, and he wanted nothing to do with 
it.” Fred Harteis, who worked as a schoolteacher, said, “I got a lot of  free advice, especially from 
some of  my fellow teachers, and all of  it was negative. The main objection was simply that it 
wouldn’t work, that I wouldn’t be able to make any money at it.” His father even bet him fifty dollars 
that he would fail at the venture. Jim Nealis’s colleagues were also unsupportive. According to 
Charles Conn, their “skepticism sometimes bordered on outright ridicule.” Kay Beecher initially 
worked by herself  because her husband, Dennis, did not buy into Amway. He finally relented, he 
said, after “[t]hings kept adding up.” Carl Reardon admitted that “after seven months in this busi-
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ness, I hated it and I wished I had never heard of  it and I wished I hadn’t gotten into it and I wished 
I could quit.”  68
 Even when distributors overcame their initial doubts, or had few or no misgivings to begin 
with, the opportunity did not necessarily translate into quick or easy success. Some vignettes told of  
difficulties distributors had in getting their businesses off  the ground. Charlie Marsh said that for 
thirty-one nights straight he held meetings at his home to show the Plan and no one showed. Louie 
Carrillo, who was an air traffic controller, reached out to five hundred of  his colleagues and was re-
jected by all of  them. Chris Cherest recalled, “I went out for almost eight months, night after night, 
house after house and no one said yes.” The Bessers, according to Conn, “had ten meetings in a row 
when nobody joined, tried to sponsor almost a hundred people without success.” Bill Britt confessed 
that “the first nineteen people I tried to sponsor turned it down flat.” Tim and Sherry Bryan invited 
twenty-three couples to their first presentation of  the Plan and none came. Their next two meetings 
were equally deserted.  69
 At first glance, such stories might appear to count against Amway. Between the distributors 
who were initially wary of  joining to the tales of  rejection after rejection, they would seem to paint 
Amway as a suspicious, potentially risky venture. Of  course, that was not how the tools presented 
them. Rather, such obstacles were testimony to the power of  persistence. In keeping with the advice 
given by self-help and positive thinking writers like Napoleon Hill, Norman Vincent Peale, John 
Schindler, and David Schwartz, Amway’s boosters believed that individuals had to power through 
whatever hurdles lay in the way of  achieving their goals. Ron Ball wrote that accepting “delayed grat-
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ification” was essential to success, while distributor Cindy Grabill, speaking at an Amway function, 
identified “unrealistic expectations” as one of  the “destroyers of  the business.”   70
 Numerous tapes concentrated, in whole or in part, on encouraging distributors to continue 
in the business when they encountered difficulties or were not seeing any apparent gains. One com-
pany tape from 1974 contained a recording of  one of  Richard DeVos’s most well-known talks, the 
“Four Winds,” which he first delivered in 1958. Using sailing metaphors, DeVos described various 
obstacles that distributors might encounter. Loved ones who questioned one’s ability to succeed, or 
who cast aspersions on the company, were a “north wind.” Macroeconomic conditions like inflation 
or recession were an “east wind.” When distributors gave up on expanding and decided to settle for 
what they had, they were riding a “southern wind.” DeVos counseled readers to avoid these and to 
instead catch the western wind. The western wind represented the many success stories throughout 
the world of  Amway, which offered “reassurance” to wavering distributors and reminded them that 
“there’s gotta be something to it.” “200,000 people can’t be wrong,” DeVos said, referring to the size 
of  the company’s distributor force at the time. Speaking at a function, distributor Tim Foley told the 
audience that “there’s going to be times in the business when you work real hard and nothing hap-
pens, you think nothing’s happening, but something’s happening inside of  you, don’t worry about it, 
you’re getting tougher, you’re getting stronger, something’s happening inside of  you, but on the out-
side it appears as though nothing’s changing. But things are changing.” According to distributor 
David Lewis, the promise of  Amway was so powerful that it demanded staying in the business, be-
cause life was essentially meaningless otherwise: “I would rather be in Amway and be frustrated and 
not have it work as fast as I want it to work and know that I have to change and have hope than to 
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be out in this world just living each day, existing each day, and knowing that the light at the end of  
the tunnel is a train.”  71
 The recounting of  early hardships served to reinforce the positive thinking component of  
the company’s philosophy: namely, that success was contingent upon believing in yourself  and your 
potential as well as tuning out negativity (such as the unsupportive friends who insist that Amway 
will never work). Distributors Bo Short and Terry McEwen both told audiences that success or fail-
ure in Amway was largely — if  not entirely — a matter of  individual commitment. Bo Short stated 
that “[i]t’s not that it’s not working out for you, you’re just not working it enough,” while Terry 
McEwen put it somewhat blunter: “People don’t quit the business, people don’t fail in the business, 
people fail themselves, on themselves.” Boosters often interpreted rejection — whether by loved 
ones or by potential recruits — as a failure of  imagination, as opposed to evidence of  the system’s 
impracticality or lack of  appeal. Distributor Jim Nealis told an audience at an Amway function, 
“maybe some of  the people in your family will be negative…and that’s when it really hurts, cause it’s 
coming from people you love — but they don’t understand[.]”  72
 Of  course, what made such initial missteps and difficulties bearable was eventual success in 
the business. The reversal of  fortunes is the third major trope of  the Amway distributor vignette. 
After dedicating themselves to the business and refusing to let obstacles along the way deter them, 
the distributors in these vignettes reported a substantial transformation in the quality of  their lives. 
In many cases, success was practically meteoric. It took Willie Bass just over a year to qualify as Di-
rect, which allowed him to leave his welding job, get his lung condition treated, and become more 
financially secure. Conn wrote about Art and Ollie Charlton that “[w]ithin six months, their distribu-
torship was providing a decent living for them, and within two years it had become highly 
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profitable.” Charlie Marsh quit his job as a police officer three months after he joined Amway, and 
six years later, he and his wife had reached Crown level. Clare and Shirley Gunnett went Direct in 
just two months. The Beechers reached Ruby level two years after joining the business in 1971, and 
only continued climbing higher up Amway’s jewel hierarchy: “Pearl, Emerald, and Diamond in 1974; 
Double in ’76; Triple in ’77; Crown in ’78.” Conn recounted an exchange he had with the Beechers 
about their financial situation post-Amway: 
“Okay. You’re making money,” I say. “But are you making a lot of  money?” 
Dennis Beecher isn’t embarrassed by the question. (People with lots of  money rarely are.) “Look 
around you,” he smiles back to me, “and answer that question for yourself.” 
So I looked around me. We are in Rancho Santa Fe, San Diego’s most exclusive residential area. I 
have read somewhere that homes start at about three hundred thousand dollars here. Bob Hope has 
a home here; Robert Mitchum has one; so does Dennis Beecher. I look around the house: fifty-two 
hundred square feet, soaring ceilings, indoor pool. Outside is a horse ring and stable area, right next 
to where the tennis court is going in. I had seen a 1931 classic Ford Phaeton in the driveway, right 
next to that new Lincoln Continental. I remembered how hard it had been to schedule the interview, 
what with the Beechers on vacation in places like Europe and Lake Tahoe and their mountain cot-
tage so much of  the time.   73
 In reality, very few distributors have ever become as wealthy as the Beechers, or anywhere 
near it, for that matter. Following the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation of  Amway in the 
1970s (more on that in Chapter III), the company was required to provide information regarding the 
average earnings of  its distributors. A 1986 copy of  the Sales and Marketing Plan indicated that, on 
average, “active” distributors earned about seventy-six dollars a month. Studies of  Amway in later 
years have noted similarly low earnings for distributors on the whole.   74
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 Nevertheless, the vignettes in Amway tools have consistently highlighted ultra-rich distribu-
tors who achieved great wealth and financial independence through the business. Charles Conn re-
ported that Robert Echols earned $41,000 his first year in the business, while Mel and Bea Behnke 
earned $10,000 a month in performance bonuses within a year and $24,000 a month within two. Pat 
Kaufmann, a metallurgist before he joined Amway, claimed that he once earned more money in one 
week than he and his wife did in one year at their old jobs. Clare Gunnett took in around $7,800 in 
wages in 1963. The following year, upon joining Amway, his earnings rocketed up to over $36,400, 
an increase of  nearly 462%. Stan and Ruth Evans said that thanks to Amway, “[w]e fly from one end 
of  the world to the other, whereas in the past our vacations were limited to once-a-year trips to visit 
relatives in the mountains some 200 miles away [they lived in Wray, Colorado].” DeVos wrote that 
because of  Amway, Bill and Hona Childers “live in a beautiful home with a mounted five-hundred-
pound blue marlin on one wall of  their trophy room and a thousand-pound elk that Bill shot in Col-
orado on another.” In addition, “their future and their children’s financial future is guaranteed[.]”   75
 Not only have company boosters routinely touted such exceptional cases, but, crucially, they 
have also presented them as relatively attainable. Frank Zecher told an audience of  distributors, 
“When somebody wanted to go Diamond, they went Diamond. I ask people, or I get the question, I 
don’t know how many times in the course of  this business, you know, ‘What’s your chances of  going 
Diamond?’ And I always tell them it’s excellent of  whoever wants to be.” Bo Short likewise said, 
“You don’t have to do the impossible to go Diamond. You have to do what every other Diamond in 
the history of  this business has done. You just have to do it.” Pedro Lazari, meanwhile, assured dis-
tributors that “you can live for the rest of  your life out of  this business.” In keeping with Amway’s 
emphasis on positive thinking, all that a person supposedly needed to attain such vast wealth was 
personal conviction, as distributor Bubba Pratt explained: “Everybody here is one belief  away from 
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going Diamond and accomplishing in your life what you want to accomplish. The only thing that is 
holding all of  us back is our belief, but we’re one belief  away.”  76
 The reversal of  fortunes touches upon a heretofore undiscussed aspect of  the Amway 
worldview: namely, how the company and its boosters have defined success. Money has always been 
important both as a motivation for joining as well as a barometer of  success, a fact that other studies 
of  Amway have noted. In a number of  ways, though, the cofounders and Amway sympathizers have 
attempted to downplay the role of  money, as well as to scrub money and materialism of  its negative 
connotations. DeVos, for example, wrote that “[m]aterial is the stuff  of  life, and there is absolutely 
nothing wrong with wanting to have a decent share of  material to make life easier, fuller, richer.”  77
 Amway’s defenders positioned money as only one of  several benefits of  the business, even 
suggesting that the non-material gains were more significant. For one, they argued, not everyone 
who was in the business mainly — or even only — for money was necessarily engaged in the single-
minded pursuit of  vast riches. Van Andel acknowledged in his autobiography that “[m]any of  our 
Amway distributor meetings and rallies feature distributors who have made it big,” but that they 
were not “the really big success story[.]” That distinction belonged to “the millions of  people all 
over the world who have a little better piece of  life’s goodness today because they put some of  their 
spare time every week into Amway.” James Robinson echoed this. Regarding the material motiva-
tions of  distributors, he wrote that “[f]or some, it’s [about] becoming a millionaire” while “[f]or oth-
ers, it’s [about] being able to earn enough extra income to pay off  bills or make that special purchase 
of  a car, boat, or home.” He went on to argue that “the critics who seek to evaluate Amway simply 
in terms of  how many people strike it rich are missing the entire point of  the business,” saying that 
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individuals joined the business not just to earn money, but also to gain camaraderie and to bring 
their families closer together, among other reasons. Charles Conn wrote that when he first began 
studying Amway, he believed “that the whole thing could be reduced to money” and “that Amway 
people were just like everyone else, only perhaps a bit more greedy.” Over time, though, he discov-
ered, in his estimation, that “that jaundiced view was clearly an inaccurate one.”  78
 In the reversal of  fortunes we find examples of  this more expansive definition of  success. In 
keeping with compassionate capitalism’s definition of  meaningful work, direct sales offered rewards 
above and beyond money. Mike and Carla Wilson stated that while “[w]e have received many of  the 
finest material blessings” as a consequence of  joining Amway, their most precious reward was “the 
freedom to have complete control over our lives[.]” Billy and Peggy Florence similarly said that, in 
their estimation, “the greatest parts of  this business are unseen [i.e., immaterial] things,” which for 
them included “the opportunity to be full-time parents for our children.” Roxanne Parks told an au-
dience of  distributors that “[t]his business has made me a better mom and a better wife and a better 
parent[.]” Rick and Sue Lynn Setzer said that, along with providing them fancy homes and luxury 
automobiles, Amway also improved the wellbeing of  their children, with Sue Lynn stating, “I can see 
a difference in my kids since they have a full-time father and mother.” In addition, they said, they 
made better, more positive friends through the business. Gary and Diane Reasons said that they be-
came more optimistic about other people as a consequence of  doing Amway. And, like the Setzers, 
they saw their social circle improve, with Gary saying that “[b]efore Amway, we could count our 
close friends on one hand,” whereas now they had far more.  79
 In some cases, Amway was credited with triggering profound changes in people’s personali-
ties and behaviors. One oft-touted example was Dan Williams, who struggled with an intense stutter 
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for much of  his life. After he joined Amway, his stutter gradually diminished, explaining that 
“[b]efore I got involved in Amway, stuttering took up most of  my thoughts,” but upon joining, “I 
got so deeply involved in this business, and in the lives of  the people we sponsored, that it got to 
where it didn’t matter much to me how they reacted, or how I was coming off  to them, and before I 
realized it, I wasn’t stuttering anymore.” After developing a penchant for drinking while a police of-
ficer, Lee Besser reportedly cut alcohol after becoming a distributor. David Mitts said that because 
of  Amway, he and his wife “stopped being so self-centered and began to become God-centered and 
other people-centered, and that was a powerful change.” Amway also supposedly helped people be-
come more extroverted, as with George Rudd, who before the business was shy and kept to himself, 
but who nevertheless managed to become a Diamond distributor who gave talks in front of  large 
audiences. When Tim Bryan first started out in the business, Charles Conn wrote, “getting up in 
front of  a group of  adults scared him almost to the point of  paralysis,” but after a while, “his natur-
al ability to persuade and talk effectively kicked in, and things got better.”  80
 And then there’s “freedom.” Amway routinely equated success in the business with attaining 
freedom. Distributor Marsha Reardon, for example, said that acquiring “freedom for myself  and my 
family” motivated her to get into the business. Luronda Joye, meanwhile, characterized the early tra-
vails of  her and her husband’s distributorship as a period of  “fighting for our freedom.” Recall also 
the statement quoted earlier from Marge Lewis, in which she told distributors that purchasing their 
own Amway products was key to “find[ing] your freedom.” They described liberty in nonmaterial 
terms: for instance, the freedom to spend more time with one’s family. Freedom also took the form 
of  self-mastery and self-actualization. Charles Conn opened one of  his pro-Amway books by distin-
guishing between what he termed “common” and “uncommon” freedoms. Common freedoms are 
the sort found in the Bill of  Rights: they “are automatically granted, at birth, to every man and 
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woman in a free land.” In addition to those, there are uncommon freedoms, which he defined as 
“the freedom to be what ones wishes to be, to live where one wishes to live, to support the causes 
one believes in, to explore the full and exciting range of  one’s potential.” Unlike common freedoms, 
uncommon freedoms “cannot be granted by government decree.” Rather, people had to earn them, 
and he held out Amway as the means to attaining them.  81
 The primary form of  self-mastery to gain through Amway has been the ability to work for 
oneself. Dorothy Garman had worked in retail before she became an Amway distributor. The big 
difference, according to her, was that direct sales offered independence. At her old sales job, she was 
“an employee of  the company. As long as you could work you were building a business for them. If  
something happens, you couldn’t work, why they just said goodbye and nothing that you had ever 
built was yours.” In Amway, on the other hand, whatever she built was hers. When she learned about 
the Plan, she said, “the main thing I could see that was to me very important was the fact that here 
was something in sales that you were building for yourself, not for another company.” Distributor 
Jim Nealis told an audience at a function that Amway cultivated a “spirit of  independence,” which 
involved rejecting salaried employment as beneath oneself. “A spirit of  independence,” he declared, 
“is the kind of  person who says, ‘I’m sorry, I just will not work nine to five for the rest of  my life so 
I can retire broke at some age whenever my boss is tired of  looking at me.’” Many of  the distribu-
tors who appeared in these vignettes wound up leaving their old jobs and committing themselves 
completely to their distributorships, although there were also examples of  individuals who continued 
to work, albeit at reduced hours. Even in those cases, though, the implication was that those distrib-
utors earned enough in Amway that they could walk away if  they so chose: they worked for pleasure, 
rather than need. By joining Amway, then, distributors had the opportunity to fulfill the desire to 
“evade” stultifying work environments that Daniel Bell saw as so pervasive among workers in the 
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postwar period. Moreover, the Amway distributorship promised to satisfy what Bell identified as the 
twin qualities of  genuinely fulfilling work. Through Amway, the individual could “feed his 
body” (earn enough money to quit his job, pay off  debts, purchase luxuries, etc.) as well as “sustain 
his spirit” (make new friends, spend more quality time with the family, become more hopeful and 
optimistic, etc.).  82
 Of  course, Amway’s vision of  freedom ultimately rested upon a material foundation. It was 
the money they earned through the business that gave certain distributors the liberty, say, to be at 
home with their children. In An Uncommon Freedom, Conn wrote that “[t]rue liberty requires not just 
the political right to pursue happiness, but the material means to do so.” Consequently, “[t]ens of  mil-
lions of  Americans, though politically free, are functionally not at all free to pursue life as they 
dream of  it.” Conn could also put the point more bluntly: “Money is freedom.”  83
 As with the other elements of  the distributor vignette, the tools presented the reversal of  
fortunes in ways that strategically benefitted Amway. One might reasonably conclude that it was 
risky to shine so much light on distributors who hit it big in Amway. After all, distributors who failed 
to emulate these models either in how much they earned or how quickly they earned it could be-
come discouraged and quit. And to an extent, the data bears this out. In the late seventies, an esti-
mated three-quarters of  all Amway distributors quit after their first year in the business. More re-
 Gay Schoepf, Ira Trosper, Dorothy Garman, Chum Stockwell, “It’s Never Too Late”; Jim & Grace Nealis, “How the 82
West Was Won”; Conn, The Winner’s Circle, 89-93. For additional vignettes of  distributors who left their jobs, see Conn, 
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cently, a 1997 lawsuit filed against Amway cited an annual turnover rate of  fifty percent. Presumably 
some portion of  those people left because reality failed to meet expectations.   84
 However, when we consider the reversal of  fortunes in the context of  the narrative arc of  
distributor vignettes and the Amway worldview as a whole, we find numerous ways that the tools 
attempted to forestall such disillusionment. For one, the focus on ultra-successful distributors not-
withstanding, the cofounders routinely stressed that such outcomes were not guaranteed. At the 
same time, because Amway had appropriated assumptions from self-help and positive thinking 
about what individuals were capable of, it meant that entering the ranks of  the well-to-do always 
seemed like a realistic possibility, even if  the vast majority of  distributors never in fact achieved it. 
James Robinson went out of  his way to argue that even if  distributors did not become rich, the po-
tential financial returns on Amway were still sufficient to justify being in the business. He offered 
several examples of  how “even modest sums of  additional income — if  handled responsibly — can, 
with patience and perseverance, lead to a more secure and bountiful life.” He pointed out that saving 
a seemingly paltry amount of  money, like twenty-five dollars, every month eventually added up to 
large sums. In his twenty-five dollar example, he noted that an individual would have over $11,000 
after twenty years. By Robinson’s logic, then, even a distributor earning the 1986 average of  seventy-
six dollars a month could eventually wind up doing pretty well for themselves. In addition, the im-
material benefits of  the business, apart from supplementing any financial gains, could also substitute 
for them. In other words, they were a reason for being and staying in the business in and of  them-
selves, even after a person failed to strike it rich. An example of  this comes in the vignette of  Gary 
and Diane Reasons. Gary recalled:  
 Initial Decision, In the Matter of  Amway Corporation, Inc., et. al., 93 F.T.C 618, 636; Complaint, The Procter & Gamble Com84 -
pany and the Procter & Gamble Distributing Company v. Amway Corporation, The Amway Distributors Association Council, Ja-Ri 
Corporation, Donald R. Wilson, WOW International Inc., Wilson Enterprises, Inc., Ronald A. Rummel, individually, and d/b/a Rum-
mel Enterprises, Roger D. Patton, Jeffrey G. Musgrove, individually, and d/b/a Musgrove Enterprises, Kevin Shinn, Randy Haugen, Free-
dom Associates, Inc., Freedom Tools, Inc., Randy Walker, Walker International Network, Gene Shaw, Robert Schmanski, individually, 
and d/b/a Schmanski Enteprises, Mark Pruitt, William Bredemeyer, John and Jane Does, 1-5, individuals, and John and Jane Does, 
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At our first rally, I heard a guy say, “If  there were no money in Amway, I would still do this for 
friendship.” I looked at Diane and told her, “That I don’t believe!” Now I understand. Amway gave 
me a new faith in other people. I had been burned, and I was bitter. Amway brought me out of  that. 
I believe I could call any one of  thousands of  other distributors and say, “Hey, I need you,” and that 
person would be there — no questions asked. How can you put a price on that?  85
  
 The wide definition of  success used in the reversal of  fortunes was part of  a larger effort to 
make Amway a worthwhile pursuit. Everett Hannan wrote that “books, tapes, and meetings are cen-
tral to the basic problem posed by the socioeconomic realities of  multi-level marketing”: namely, the 
fact that, as noted earlier, very few distributors actually sell enough products or recruit enough peo-
ple to allow them to leave their jobs or vacation in Europe or buy a mansion. He noted that “[i]n 
light of  the minimal economic return, and the social costs involved, it is unlikely that a distributor 
would be successful without continually reconstructing meaning for such activities.” Accordingly, he 
posited that “books, tapes, and meetings, and their ideology of  success, serve to restrict alternative 
meanings attached to a distributor’s social and economic activities.” Another way, then, of  interpret-
ing the success smorgasbord offered up by Amway boosters is that they were trying to give distribu-
tors as many ways as possible to not see themselves as failures. Thus there was a continual moving of  
the goal posts: even if  you did not become rich, you could earn enough to pay for a vacation or 
cover some bills, and if  you were still not satisfied with that, then at least you got to make some new 
friends or perhaps become a more confident public speaker.   86
********** 
 The distributor vignettes tell us a lot about the Amway worldview. A common theme run-
ning through many of  these stories was a frustration with the shortcomings of  employment. Work-
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ing for someone else was portrayed as insecure (one could be out of  a job at any time and suddenly 
be unable to provide for oneself  and one’s family), inadequate (the pay often could not support a 
single-earner household, forcing both the husband and wife to work and to “abandon” their chil-
dren, families had to take on debt to make ends meet, etc.), emotionally and psychologically draining 
(the hours were too long, the work was not fulfilling, the schedule cut in on family time, etc.), and 
disempowering (opportunities for upward advancement were limited or nonexistent, one had to 
work according to another person’s timetable, etc.). 
 The attacks on employment compel us to complicate our understanding of  the nature of  
postwar free enterprise ideology. Within the Amway universe, it was capitalism, not “big govern-
ment,” that came in for the heaviest scrutiny. It was capitalism, not “big government,” that was the 
threat to individualism. Direct sales held out the promise that people could participate in the market 
in ways that were more liberating and remunerative than what the standard nine-to-five job had to 
offer. 
 This suggests that, although animosity directed towards New Deal-style liberalism was im-
portant, we should look for the roots of  free-market conservatism in other places as well, including 
in the crisis of  autonomy of  the late 1940s and 1950s. When Dennis Beecher complained about not 
being able to become his own boss, or when Bert and Terri Gulick described being “owned” by 
banks and credit card companies, they were echoing the likes of  C. Wright Mills, William Whyte, and 
Daniel Bell, all of  whom described a population that felt increasingly constrained, that they had little 
or no control over their own lives. And one significant source of  that constraint, identified both in 
the immediate postwar period and in these vignettes, was the job. 
 The unrewarding job, however, was really just a symptom of  a much larger problem. When 
William Whyte railed against “The Organization,” or Mills described the eclipse of  democratic 
property by class property, they were critiquing an entire set of  economic institutions and relation-
ships that had the effect of  placing some people in subordinate, subservient positions and limiting 
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their potential. This insight also became incorporated into Amway’s corporate philosophy. Indepen-
dent business ownership was part and parcel of  a new, different, more “compassionate capitalism.” 
Compassionate capitalism promised to fix, of  all things, capitalism itself. Instead of  atomized indi-
viduals each pursuing their own interests and looking out only for themselves, compassionate capi-
talism imagined an economy in which people’s economic pursuits were guided by a desire to im-
prove the material and spiritual well-being of  themselves and those around them, one in which peo-
ple would work together to help one another achieve their dreams. Compassionate capitalism en-
couraged individuals to reject mundane, stultifying work that left them economically insecure as well 
as unhappy.   87
 The cofounders intended Amway to exemplify this economic system. Amway sought to 
model the cooperative aspects of  compassionate capitalism by having uplines act as mentors for 
their downlines and by promoting direct sales as pro-family. By becoming an Amway distributor, 
individuals were promised the opportunity to attain much of  what was unavailable to them in tradi-
tional salaried jobs. They had the chance to become their own bosses, to set their own schedules, to 
get out of  debt and then some, to spend more time with their spouses and children, to improve their 
self-confidence, and more.  88
 The crisis of  autonomy, as we saw in Chapter I, sparked a heightened interest in self-help 
and positive thinking. It should come as no surprise, then, that both genres found their way into 
compassionate capitalism and the Amway business itself. Compassionate capitalism held that a posi-
tive mental attitude was essential to realizing one’s dreams. Since direct sales supposedly held the key 
to achieving all sorts of  dreams, positivity was also important to being an Amway distributor. In-
deed, the company and its allies argued that a person’s mental state was the one true determinant of  
how well or how poorly they did in the business. Birth or background did not matter: if  a person 
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had the right mindset, they could get everything they wanted and lead a satisfying life. The distribu-
tor vignettes reflected this belief. Many of  the distributors profiled in Amway tools struggled with 
various sorts of  hardships: a difficult or unrewarding job, debt, a broken marriage, discrimination 
based on race or ability. Even when they joined, they continued facing difficulties, whether in the 
form of  personal doubts they nursed about the business, dismissive comments from friends, rela-
tives, or colleagues, or a lack of  customers or recruits. All of  those obstacles proved surmountable, 
though: they stuck with it and eventually became a success. The implication, of  course, was if  a per-
son was not doing well in life, if  they joined Amway and did not succeed, they had only themselves to 
blame. 
 Everything presented so far has come mainly from the perspective of  the cofounders, com-
pany boosters, or those minority of  distributors who managed to hit it big. But not everyone has 
bought into the Amway line that it represents a kinder, gentler capitalism or that vast riches await 
those who go into direct sales. And not everyone who has done Amway managed to achieve their 




At its best, Amway harnesses middle class dissatisfaction for the purposes of  hawking soap, enrich-
ing a tiny fraction of  the sellers who buy in. At its worst, the company hijacks dreams born of  des-
peration and bankrupts people with the very products promising them deliverance. 
-Erik German  1
 Amway is a joke. On one episode of  The X-Files, agents Mulder and Scully pursue a man 
who kills overweight women and feeds on their body fat. When a citywide, door-to-door manhunt 
fails to locate him, Mulder quips that he “wouldn’t have made a good Amway salesman.” In the 
opening scene of  an episode of  Sabrina the Teenage Witch, the witch-turned-feline Salem Saberhagen 
is seen chatting online with another witch who, according to him, had once done Amway and had 
since been transformed into a camel. When asked why, he replies, “He used to be an Amway sales-
man.” On an episode of  Friends, Phoebe and Mike decide that they want to find better uses for the 
money that they have set aside for their wedding. “You could buy a ton of  Amway products,” Ross 
suggests. When they reject that, Ross grumbles under his breath, “How am I gonna unload all those 
Amway products?” In May 2001, the satirical newspaper The Onion published an article headlined 
“Russia Acquires Amway Distributorship.” According to the article, “[s]hortly after ordering 
147,700,000 ‘opportunity kits’ from the Amway home office in Ada, MI, Russia began embracing 
the Amway lifestyle, removing all other brands from its store shelves and stocking only Amway 
products, such as Active-8, a juice drink, and FA-8, a laundry detergent.” The piece also included 
words of  warning from Tajikistan’s president, whose country had tried and failed to succeed in the 
business: “After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, all the other republics seemed to be doing so 
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much better than us. Amway waved a golden carrot in front of  us, and we reached out for it. But 
after two years, we found ourselves in debt to Amway.”  2
 For many, though, Amway has been no laughing matter. For over four decades former dis-
tributors and outside observers have subjected the company to an extensive battery of  criticism. In 
addition, governments and state agencies both in the United States and abroad have opened investi-
gations into Amway. (The foreign dimension will be taken up in Chapter IV.) “Scamway” — the title 
of  this chapter — is a pejorative used by those with negative opinions of  the company. An Internet 
search for the term yields thousands of  websites airing complaints about Amway and direct selling 
more generally.  
 It is no coincidence that the first salvos against Amway were fired in the mid-seventies. The 
late 1960s and 1970s were a golden age of  popular activism. In addition to the host of  social prob-
lems that fueled the “movement of  movements” — racism, sexism, homophobia, war — Americans 
in this period also agitated against two other perceived scourges: unscrupulous businesses and 
“cults.” The consumer movement and the anti-cult movement both attracted nationwide attention 
and shared a concern with manipulation and deception, whether by a company trying to cover up 
the dangers associated with one of  its products or by a religious group looking to recruit and retain 
members. Although the two movements are not typically thought of  as related in any way, they did 
in fact occasionally intersect.  3
 Amway deepens our understanding of  both movements by providing an example of  one 
such place of  overlap. The attacks on Amway that began percolating in this period developed along 
two lines. One, drawing from the consumer movement, focused on the nuts and bolts of  Amway’s 
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business model and questioned the economic viability of  direct sales. The other, meanwhile, in-
formed by anti-cult activism, looked at the techniques that the company and its allies used to recruit 
and keep people in the business and whether the ecosystem created inside Amway’s distributor net-
works represented a form of  indoctrination. Amway was not alone in facing this sort of  double-bar-
reled assault. 
 This chapter looks at three avenues used to express criticism of  Amway: (i) anti-Amway ex-
posés authored by former distributors; (ii) reporting conducted by news media outlets; (iii) and legal 
actions targeting the company’s business practices, both the Sales and Marketing Plan as well as 
Amway’s dealings with its competitors. Through books, newspaper articles, the internet, television 
segments, and the courtroom, those skeptical of  or downright hostile towards Amway have chal-
lenged the company’s self-image. Amway’s critics have focused on everything from the quality of  its 
products to whether the Amway opportunity is real at all. Without question, the one allegation that 
has dogged Amway the longest and has most hurt its reputation is that the company is a pyramid 
scheme. In pyramid schemes, the principle source of  income for those participating comes not from 
the sale of  products, but rather from the mere act of  recruiting others as well as from “inventory 
loading,” whereby individuals who have entered the scheme are required to purchase a large stock of  
product upfront. The products serve as a facade of  legitimacy, obscuring where the money really gets 
made: recruitment.   4
 Amway and its boosters have dedicated tremendous effort over the years to defending the 
company against this attack. In his book Promises to Keep, Charles Conn wrote that “[t]here seems to 
be little doubt about Amway’s non-pyramid status in the legal community, even though that word 
has not reached some parts of  the general public.” Today, on the “Amway Answers” section of  the 
company’s website, the company dedicates an entire page to addressing the question “Is Amway a 
pyramid scheme?,” complete with a nearly three-minute long video explaining what pyramid 
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schemes are and why Amway is not one. The pyramid scheme charge has been so dangerous precise-
ly because if  true, it would undermine the entire operation, rendering all of  Amway’s promises 
false.  5
 And indeed, taken together, Amway’s critics represent a point-by-point rebuttal of  nearly all 
of  the claims made on behalf  of  the company. Against the idea that Amway embodied “compas-
sionate capitalism,” former distributors have alleged that the Amway system is predatory and ex-
ploitative and that uplines exsanguinate their downlines through the sale of  tools. Amway’s competi-
tors, meanwhile, have portrayed the company as ruthlessly amoral, willing and able to use whatever 
tactics necessary to increase its market share. Instead of  representing a path for upward mobility, 
attorneys and ex-distributors have argued that Amway pushes many into debt, that the cost of  run-
ning the business far outpaces whatever money a person earns through sales or sponsorships, and 
that those who do succeed represent only a microscopic minority. And rather than bringing families 
together, fostering friendships, and making people more content and satisfied with their lives, the 
critics instead tell of  the exhaustion and frustration that results from trying but failing to make the 
business work, and of  the alienation that comes as people invest more and more into Amway and in 
the process drive away their friends and family.   6
 Amway’s detractors, no less than its boosters, have played a significant role in shaping public 
perceptions of  the company. These days, many people are as likely to associate Amway with pyramid 
scheme as they are with direct sales. Beyond optics, though, they have also influenced how the company 
operates. Over the years, Amway has made a number of  changes to the Sales and Marketing Plan as 
well as to its recruitment efforts in order to placate its critics. Whether that has satisfied them is, of  
course, an entirely separate matter. 
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********** 
 Richard DeVos wrote that it “threatened the very future of  Amway.” Jay Van Andel thought 
that “[t]he whole situation could have been resolved in a thirty-minute meeting if  we had been deal-
ing with reasonable people, but regulatory agencies are not known for their reasonableness or effi-
ciency.” They were referring to a complaint filed on March 25, 1975 by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion against Amway. The FTC charged Amway with five violations of  Section 5 of  the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of  competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce[.]”  7
 The first count alleged that Amway was engaged in price-fixing. At the time of  the com-
plaint, Amway required its distributors to charge specific prices for retail sales to consumers as well 
as wholesale sales to other distributors. Count II claimed that the company was illegally limiting the 
ability of  distributors to resell Amway products as well as who distributors could purchase their in-
ventory from. Distributors could only get their inventory from one of  two sources: their sponsoring 
upline or — for those Direct and above — the company itself. Once in possession of  their invento-
ry, additional restrictions applied. Distributors could not offer wholesale prices to consumers, and 
they also could not sell Amway products through a third party (a brick-and-mortar store, for exam-
ple). Count III charged the company with “restrict[ing] the advertising and promotional activities in 
which distributors and dealers may or would otherwise engage,” by limiting, for example, which dis-
tributors could post advertisements for Amway, the types of  advertisement that they could post, and 
where.   8
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 The fourth count stated that Amway was misrepresenting both the number of  individuals a 
distributor could sponsor into his or her network as well as the amount of  money that distributors 
could earn in the business. According to the FTC, Amway promotional literature claimed that 
“[s]ubstantial income or profit as a result of  wholesale or retail sales activities from ‘multiplication,’ 
‘duplication’ or geometrical increases in the number of  distributors at lower functional levels of  dis-
tribution is likely” and that “[s]ubstantial income or profit as a result of  wholesale or retail sales ac-
tivities from unlimited recruiting activities or endless chain recruiting activities is likely.” The Com-
mission argued that that there were only so many people available for sponsoring in any given area. 
As the supply of  prospective recruits declined, not only would there be fewer people available to 
join the business, but also, crucially, there would also be fewer people to sell products to. According-
ly, Amway distributorships were unsustainable in the long run. The final count alleged additional 
misrepresentation, specifically that those recruited into the business were told that “[i]t is easy for 
distributors or dealers to recruit and/or retain persons to participate in the program as distributors, 
dealers or sales personnel” and that “[d]istributors or dealers in the program can anticipate receiving 
or will receive substantial profits or earnings.” According to the Commission, neither of  these claims 
were true.  9
 The FTC’s complaint kicked off  a period of  heightened scrutiny of  Amway that eventually 
extended far beyond the courtroom, into the media and popular culture. Three factors explain why 
this began in the mid-seventies. One had to do with the company itself, while the other two involved 
larger political and cultural developments occurring in the nation at that time.  
 First and foremost, there was Amway’s burgeoning profile. The FTC’s investigation came a 
little more than fifteen years after Amway’s founding. During this time, the company saw robust ex-
pansion. The headline of  a May 1972 article about Amway in the magazine The Interpreter boasted 
that “The Village of  Ada, Michigan Is Now Known World-Wide.” That September, in a mark of  
 Complaint, In the Matter of  Amway Corporation, Inc., et. al., 624-629.9
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how far the two had come in such a short time, DeVos and Van Andel became the owners of  Nu-
trilite, the company that had introduced them to the world of  direct sales. From 1963 to 1976, 
Amway went from doing $4.3 million in business domestically to $169.1 million. That, of  course, 
did not factor in Amway’s foreign earnings, which totaled nearly thirty-six million dollars in 1976: by 
the mid-seventies, the company had spread to several countries, including Canada, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom. There were a total of  320,738 active distributors at the beginning of  1972. That 
number fluctuated over the next few years but stayed fairly steady: 306,002 in 1973, 298,561 in 1974, 
and 294,328 in 1975. Amway’s distributor force had a degree of  turnover that, although high on its 
face, was actually well within industry standards. For example, Amway ended 1975 with 549,516 total 
distributors and began 1976 with 315,187. The difference reflects those who dropped out before the 
start of  the new year. Not all the figures were boast-worthy, though. As has been the case through-
out the company’s life, average monthly earnings by distributors were low, only in the ballpark of  
twenty to thirty dollars, although some Direct distributors brought in annual incomes in the tens or 
even hundreds of  thousands of  dollars.   10
 Amway’s growth coincided with macroeconomic changes that made direct sales appealing to 
increasing numbers of  people. The 1970s marked the beginning of  the end of  postwar prosperity. 
High government spending during the 1960s — partially a function of  the Great Society but driven 
principally by the Vietnam War — and two oil embargoes resulted in stagflation, a devastating com-
bination of  high inflation and economic sluggishness. As a consequence, the unemployment rate 
spiked, from 4.6% in October 1973 to a high of  nine percent in May 1975. In addition to short-run 
pain, the 1970s also saw growing deindustrialization, automation, and offshoring/outsourcing, which 
threatened long-term economic security for many. Thanks in part to such developments, wages and 
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incomes began to stagnate and then fall. David Bromley noted that “[t]he median annual incomes of  
workers increased from $15,000 to $24,000 between 1955 and 1973, but income then declined by 19 
percent to just under $20,000 by 1987” and that “[b]etween 1972 and 1988 real wages for middle 
and low income workers actually dropped by 12 percent[.]” Jefferson Cowie has pointed out that 
although the seventies opened with a flurry of  strikes that seemingly injected new life into organized 
labor, direct action by workers ultimately failed to stem the tide of  change or to forestall union de-
cline. “The hope and possibility marbled through the confusion of  the early part of  the decade,” he 
wrote, “began to fade into the despair of  the new order emerging in the second half.”   11
 This sort of  despair benefitted Amway. Addressing distributors at a function in 1975, Jay 
Van Andel, referring to findings from a Gallup poll, said that “[a] world in which three-quarters of  
the people are pessimistic about the future” was one “very receptive to the story of  the world of  
Amway.” According to him, “people have told me, people who are actively recruiting today, that re-
cruiting has never been easier in the history of  our business, that you put an ad in the paper and the 
phone literally comes off  the wall,” which was “quite different from what it was a few years ago, 
where sometimes you put an ad in the paper and you didn’t know you put it in because nothing hap-
pened.” Van Andel told his audience that there was “[a] huge potential for adding to the ranks of  
Amway distributors, better than we’ve ever had in all of  our history, with literally millions of  people 
out there who are willing now to listen to your story about money, extra money.”  12
 The second key factor was the consumer movement. Consumer activism was nothing new. It 
first emerged during the Progressive Era — some prominent examples included McClure’s articles on 
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Standard Oil in 1902 and Upton Sinclair’s book The Jungle four years later — and reappeared during 
the Great Depression. The consumer movement underwent yet another revival in the 1960s. In 
March 1962, John F. Kennedy outlined the so-called Consumer Bill of  Rights, which identified four 
basic rights to which all consumers were entitled: the “right to safety,” the “right to be informed,” 
the “right to choose,” and the “right to be heard.” The individual most closely associated with the 
postwar consumer movement was Ralph Nader. He rose to prominence in 1965, when he published 
his book Unsafe at Any Speed, detailing the dangers posed by automobiles. After that, he and a team 
of  students, who came to be known as “Nader’s Raiders,” launched a crusade against a number of  
federal regulatory bodies, including the FTC and the FDA, arguing that they were failing to provide 
adequate oversight of  industry. Arguably the most significant outcome of  this period of  consumer 
activism was the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which was formed in 1972. The Carter 
years saw a push to go even further and to create a new Department of  Consumers — which Nader, 
among others, supported — but a bill to that end failed to pass Congress.  13
 In this moment when the government and the general public were both taking greater inter-
est in harmful products and deceptive business practices, one particular type of  shady enterprise 
drew a lot of  attention: the pyramid scheme. A December 1971 article in the Los Angeles Times re-
ported that “dozens of  states” were or had recently been involved in litigation against various multi-
level marketing companies that allegedly ran pyramid schemes. Over the course of  three years, sena-
tor and future vice president Walter Mondale introduced three different bills meant to crack down 
on pyramid schemes. On the floor of  the Senate, he declared that pyramid schemes were “rapidly 
becoming the ‘consumer fraud of  the 1970s’” and that “[t]here exists a definite need for effective 
Federal legislation to alleviate this problem.” His first bill, S. 4043, proposed in September 1972, 
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made it illegal to recruit someone into a pyramid scheme. The bill was never voted on and wound up 
dying in a Senate committee. His next two efforts fared somewhat better. On June 4, 1973, he intro-
duced an amended version of  S. 4043, now titled S. 1939, which managed to get through the Senate 
but was then shelved in the House. In April 1975, Mondale submitted yet another version, S. 1509, 
which suffered the same fate as its predecessor.   14
 Mondale was not alone. The FTC doggedly pursued alleged pyramid schemes in the years 
leading up to the Amway case. In the absence of  federal legislation criminalizing such enterprises, 
Section 5 was their weapon of  choice. On January 18, 1971, the FTC filed charges against Holiday 
Magic, a multi-level marketing company specializing in cosmetics and personal care items based out 
of  California and started by a man named William Penn Patrick. Holiday Magic had a dizzyingly 
convoluted system that featured four levels of  distributors: Holiday Girls, Organizers, Masters, and 
Generals. A number of  different features distinguished the levels, including the discount rate dis-
tributors received when purchasing inventory, the initial investment they needed to make to be at 
that level, and the types of  bonuses they were eligible for. The FTC issued a ruling in October 1974, 
sixteen months after William Penn Patrick was killed in a plane crash. The FTC concluded that “the 
Holiday Magic marketing plan is little more than an elaborate, modern-day version of  the chain let-
ter, with the capacity to part a slightly more sophisticated, and more ambitious victim from his or 
her money” and ordered it to end its multi-level scheme.   15
 Holiday Magic kicked off  a string of  cases against pyramids. In the span of  less than a year 
and a half, three different multi-level marketing companies settled with the FTC: Bestline Products 
Corporation, which sold cleaning products, in July 1971; International Safe-T-Trac, which marketed 
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an “auto-stabilizer” that purportedly provided cars greater traction and kept them from slipping and 
sliding on roads, in September 1971; and Devour Chemical Company, another peddler of  cleaners, 
in October 1972. In November 1971 the FTC went after Ger-Ro-Mar, a purveyor of  undergar-
ments. And in May 1972, the Commission targeted Koscot Interplanetary, founded by Glenn Turn-
er, who had actually started out in Holiday Magic. With the exception of  Devour Chemical, all of  
these businesses ran a version of  the Holiday Magic model. The outcomes were mixed. Koscot de-
clared bankruptcy while the investigation into it was still taking place. International Safe-T-Trac had 
already shut down by the time it reached its settlement. Bestline Products Corporation petitioned the 
FTC in December 1974 to alter the terms of  its settlement, which it did the following March. Ger-
Ro-Mar challenged the FTC’s July 1974 ruling against it in federal court and managed to get it 
amended in October 1975.  16
 The third development that explains the attention Amway received was the cult panic. “Cult” 
is a notoriously fraught term, defined and used in many different ways. James T. Richardson de-
scribed a cult as “a small informal group lacking a definite authority structure, somewhat sponta-
neous in its development (although often possessing a somewhat charismatic leader or group of  
leaders), transitory, somewhat mystical and individualistically oriented, and deriving its inspiration 
and ideology from outside the predominant religious culture.” As this definition indicates, the cult 
label is applied primarily to religious movements, though, as we will see with Amway, that is not al-
ways necessarily the case. It is also typically a term of  disparagement, particularly in its popular con-
notations, which is why scholars have tended to shy away from using it.  17
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 The cult panic that began in the late sixties was a response, first, to growing interest, particu-
larly among young people, in new religious movements like Hare Krishna, the Unification Church, 
and Scientology and, second, to crimes attributed to groups identified as cults. In December 1969, 
members of  the Manson family, which the Los Angeles Times described as “an occult band of  
hippies,” murdered Sharon Tate and Leno and Rosemary LaBianca. The Tate-LaBianca killings were 
arguably more responsible than anything else for bringing cults to the national attention. In March 
1970, a “cult” led by an African-American man named Michael Ardrey, who also went by Enoch, 
was blamed for the slaying of  a sixteen year-old white teenager in Detroit. In July 1971, two teens in 
Vineland, New Jersey, Richard Williams and Wayne Sweikert, were accused of  drowning a twenty 
year-old man named Michael Newell. Reporting at the time stated that Newell allegedly belonged to 
a Satanic cult and had asked the boys to kill him as part of  a ritual. In October 1972, authorities at-
tributed the shooting of  two men in Pasadena to a “black religious cult” called Al Colestran. In June 
1978, the San Diego district attorney charged Thomas Jones, a member of  a fundamentalist Mor-
mon church called the Church of  the First Born in the Fullness of  Time, along with a number of  
his wives, with defrauding Aid to Families with Dependent Children out of  more than two hundred 
and fifty thousand dollars. As it happened, the leader of  the Church of  the First Born in the Full-
ness of  Time had a brother who ran his own Mormon “cult” and stood accused of  orchestrating 
the murder of  an attempted apostate. The decade ended with the most infamous cult-related crime 
of  them all: the deaths at Jonestown in November 1978.  18
 The cult panic inspired a cottage industry of  anti-cult organizations. The most prominent 
was the Citizens Freedom Foundation, which rebranded itself  the Cult Awareness Network in 1986. 
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These groups employed a variety of  strategies against cults. In some cases, they took particular cults 
or leaders to court. They also provided assistance to individuals who had left cults. In some cases, 
they offered former cult members a platform from which to tell their stories and to reach out to 
those either still in cults or who had recently left. Other times, help took the form of  deprogram-
ming. Deprogramming was premised on the idea that cults maintained a hold on their members 
through “brainwashing.” Deprogramming intended to undo this brainwashing, allowing the former 
cult member to rejoin mainstream society. Deprogramming was popular for a few years but fell into 
disrepute in the mid-1980s in the wake of  allegations that some deprogrammers engaged in coercion 
and other unseemly behavior. An alternative paradigm, exit counseling, ultimately replaced it.  19
 Rather than separate and unrelated phenomena that happened to unfold at the same time, 
the concerns underlying the cult panic actually overlapped with those that fueled the consumer 
movement. For proof, look no further than the Church of  Scientology — the scrutiny it underwent 
from the 1960s through the 1980s represents arguably the closest contemporaneous parallel to 
Amway. The c-word had dogged Scientology since the days of  Dianetics. Like Amway, Scientology 
had a founder whose narrative blurred the lines between biography and mythology, along with its 
own array of  practices and lexicon incomprehensible to outsiders. And, also like Amway, it was very 
lucrative, which was what attracted the attention of  the federal government. Scientology was contro-
versial since its inception, raising questions over whether it was truly a religion or just a vehicle to 
enrich L. Ron Hubbard. Those worries increased as Scientology matured, and its program of  books 
and courses grew larger — and more expensive. By the 1970s, practicing Scientologists had to shell 
out thousands of  dollars to make their way up “The Bridge to Total Freedom.”  20
 The IRS had recognized the Church of  Scientology as a tax-exempt religious group since 
1956. In 1967, though, the IRS rescinded the church’s tax exemption, arguing that L. Ron Hubbard 
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was personally pocketing much of  the money that Scientologists were paying into the Church. In 
response, the Church declared war on the IRS. In the mid-seventies, in the midst of  a four-year audit 
that the IRS launched in 1970, the Church’s Guardian’s Office orchestrated Operation Snow White, 
which involved a number of  Scientologists burgling and installing audio surveillance equipment in-
side IRS offices. Those responsible for the break-ins were eventually arrested in 1977, and the back-
and-forth between the Church and the IRS continued until 1993, when the IRS finally relented and 
restored the Church’s tax exemptions.  21
**********  
  
 The FTC’s investigation of  Amway came at a moment of  growing popular attention to 
business ethics as well as anxieties about opaque groups that seemed to isolate and exercise extensive 
psychological control over their members. Amway was just one of  a number of  questionable enter-
prises that the federal government went after in this period. Just as it had with MLMs like Holiday 
Magic and Koscot Interplanetary — and, in a different though related way, the Church of  Scientol-
ogy — the federal government accused Amway of  running a fraudulent operation. Had the FTC 
proven its case, the company would not only have had to fundamentally alter its business model, but 
its entire self-image would have been tarnished. The fourth and fifth counts, in particular, took di-
rect aim at the heart of  the Amway promise: that direct sales offered a realistic opportunity to earn 
fortunes. If  that were called into question, the entire business might have collapsed.  
 Fortunately for Amway, the blow did not fall nearly as hard as it could have. On June 23, 
1978, administrative law judge James Timony made his initial ruling. On the first count of  price fix-
ing, Judge Timony found that although Amway did not have an explicit policy mandating that distrib-
utors charge certain prices for their products, there were a number of  mechanisms in place that al-
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lowed Amway to effectively engage in price fixing. For instance, distributors who charged less than 
what the company dictated risked losing their distributorships. Additionally, he alleged that Amway 
used its “buy-back rule,” whereby either the company or an upline would purchase unsold inventory 
back from distributors, as a way of  preventing distributors from unloading excess goods at marked-
down prices. Accordingly, Timony found the company guilty on this charge.  22
 The other counts, though, he dismissed entirely. Timony ruled that the restrictions on the 
sale and purchase of  Amway products (Count II) as well as on advertising (Count III) were accept-
able. Prohibiting Amway products from selling in stores, he wrote, “gives Amway distributors an in-
centive to provide services to consumers [such as offering product demonstrations] and to create a 
consumer demand which would dissipate if  Amway products were sold in retail stores.” In short, the 
restriction “preserved Amway’s direct selling organization[.]” Timony found that the rule limiting 
who distributors could purchase their inventory from “provides the structure by which products, 
information and compensation flow from Amway to the Direct Distributors and down to the dis-
tributors engaged in making the retail sale,” and it “gives sponsoring distributors an incentive to re-
cruit, train, motivate and supply other distributors in order to gain a reward based on the sponsored 
distributors’ sales volume.” Once again, these restrictions were considered essential to the business 
model. When it came to advertising, Timony pointed out that Amway was well within its rights to 
regulate how distributors used its own trademarks.  23
 Finally, he found the misrepresentation charges unsubstantiated as well. Timony ruled that 
Amway lacked many of  the qualities typically associated with pyramid schemes, such as inventory 
loading or compensating distributors solely on the basis of  recruitment. He also noted that the Sales 
and Marketing Plan had two mechanisms built into it to try and ensure that products actually 
reached consumers: the 70% rule and the ten customer rule. These stated that, in order to qualify for a 
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bonus, distributors had to sell seventy percent of  their inventory to at least ten customers each 
month. These were crucial to ensuring the legitimacy of  Amway’s business model. (Recall that under 
pyramid schemes products typically only circulate among distributors.) Timony disputed the FTC’s 
conclusion that there was an upper limit on either sales or recruitment, pointing out, among other 
things, that population was never static, that people were always coming into or leaving any particu-
lar area, and also that not everyone in Amway was necessarily trying to sponsor new salespeople. 
This meant that there would always be new people who could join the business or buy products. 
Amway also was not guilty of  promising unrealistic success in the business, since although “the 
Amway Sales and Marketing Plan is designed to catch the interest of  a prospective recruit by appeal-
ing to material interests,” it “also makes clear the idea that work will be involved, and that the mater-
ial rewards to be gained will directly depend on the amount and quality of  work done.”  24
 Having dismissed all the other charges, Judge Timony’s order only required Amway to stop 
setting prices and punishing distributors on account of  the prices they charged. The final ruling 
from the FTC came down on May 8, 1979. In it, Commissioner Robert Pitofsky, writing for the 
FTC, by and large agreed with Judge Timony that the Commission had not proved its case with re-
spect to Counts II-V, but he did deviate slightly on the question of  misrepresentation. While he con-
cluded that “[t]he ‘non-earnings’ claims made by Amway — which generally consist of  vague refer-
ences to the achievement of  one’s dreams, having everything one always wanted, etc.….are primarily 
inspirational and motivational” and “are accompanied by appropriate qualifiers,” he objected to 
statements made in some Amway literature regarding a distributor’s hypothetical income potential. 
Pitofsky wrote that “the claims of  incomes of  $100 to $1,000 per month….constitute misstatements 
of  the amount of  money a distributor is likely to earn” and were therefore deceptive. The final or-
der, then, in addition to seconding the changes around price fixing, also required that whenever 
Amway used hypothetical earnings figures in any literature, it had to specify “average profits, earn-
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ings, or sales….or the percent of  all distributors who actually achieved such stated profits, earnings, 
or sales[.]”  25
 The cofounders breathed sighs of  relief. But the whole episode left them frustrated. Al-
though the company did not challenge the FTC’s findings and agreed to make the changes it de-
manded, Jay Van Andel nonetheless fumed in his autobiography that the investigation was “another 
attack on the free-enterprise system.” What to the FTC was price fixing to Van Andel represented 
“freedom to contract”: “This country was founded upon the idea that two people ought to be able 
to write a contract of  nearly any type and follow its terms without interference from the govern-
ment. If, then, a condition of  holding a distributorship or franchise or the like is to sell products at a 
certain price, no one is being defrauded, cheated, or robbed, and the contract should be allowed to 
stand.” DeVos lamented that “[d]espite the ruling in our favor, the FTC’s original misleading argu-
ment against us became a standard criticism in the years following for anyone who misunderstood 
our business or for former distributors who claimed they in some way were misled or that our busi-
ness plan simply didn’t work.”  26
 Still, the investigation — which lasted four years and generated a gargantuan case file that 
stretched into the thousands of  pages — turned out to have a silver lining. What once threatened to 
ruin Amway had instead become a de jure seal of  approval, one that the company and its boosters 
have leaned on ever since. DeVos wrote in his memoir that “[i]n the end, the FTC case proved to be 
helpful in proving our legitimacy,” that “[a]s a result of  the FTC’s decision, the Amway Sales Plan 
became the model for a legitimate direct-selling business.” In a chapter of  his book Promises to Keep 
called “Three Dozen and Two Questions about Amway,” Charles Paul Conn wrote that “[t]he ques-
tion of  whether Amway is a pyramid can be answered as a matter of  legal definition backed up by 
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court rulings. Yes, pyramids are illegal. No, Amway is not a pyramid. That is not just the personal 
opinion of  Amway people; it is a matter of  legal record.” Wilbur Cross said that the FTC case 
“cleared the air and was an excellent argument later against those detractors who, from time to time, 
cried ‘pyramid’ and tried to discredit the Sales and Marketing Plan, whether for competitive reasons 
or personal grievances.”  27
 That said, the case haunted Amway for some time. On August 25, 1982, as a result of  litiga-
tion then underway in Wisconsin (about which more presently), the Grand Rapids Press reported that 
Amway had been in a back-and-forth with the FTC since late June over the content of  some of  its 
literature. Six days earlier, Lee Loevinger, an attorney for the company, received a letter from Selig 
Merber, Deputy Assistant Director of  the Commission’s Bureau of  Competition, regarding a 
brochure titled A Business of  Your Own. Merber informed Loevinger that A Business of  Your Own was 
in violation of  the 1979 ruling. He pointed to a number of  problems. On some occasions, the 
brochure failed to make the required income disclosures. Other times, when disclosures did appear, 
Merber quibbled with how the company had computed the numbers or how the brochure presented 
them. He also claimed that the Bureau lacked the information needed to determine whether certain 
disclosures were accurate at all. In his letter, Merber complained that Amway had failed to turn over 
to the FTC “all audio-visual materials, training manuals, course materials for seminars, and anything 
else Amway uses to recruit or train others to recruit new distributors” and that without those mate-
rials, “we cannot recommend that Amway has complied with the order.” In May 1986, the company 
was fined one hundred thousand dollars after the FTC found that newspaper ads taken out three 
years earlier had lacked the necessary income disclosures.  28
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 Those problems would all come later, though. For the time being, the investigation was in 
the past and Amway looked strong. The company’s annual report for 1979 — the same year that the 
FTC’s decision came down, which also happened to be the year that Amway turned twenty — 
boasted that the company had sold eight hundred million dollars’ worth of  products that year. Sales 
officially crossed the billion dollar threshold in the middle of  1980: the company’s annual report for 
that year dubbed it “the year of  the billion.” In March 1982, the company laid out plans for a new 
facility at their World Headquarters in Ada to manufacture cosmetics, with an estimated cost of  $9.7 
million. In the 1982 annual report the cofounders noted that despite the fact that the economy was 
in a recession, Amway had continued to thrive, bragging that the company’s sales over the previous 
year were more than $1.2 billion. The report then went on to give a month-by-month breakdown of  
major company-related events between September 1981 and the end of  1982, including the opening 
of  the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel, the airing of  a TV special starring Bob Hope that the company 
had co-sponsored, the publication of  Charles Conn’s book An Uncommon Freedom, and a twenty 
thousand dollar donation the company made to Howard University, among many others.  29
 But as it turned out, the eighties proved to be arguably the darkest decade in the company’s 
history. Although Amway managed to ride out the economic downturn of  the early eighties at first, 
it ultimately proved inescapable. In March 1983, the company reduced the workforce at Amway 
World Headquarters for the first time ever, firing fifty workers. Though by no means a drastic mea-
sure, locals interpreted the move as a harbinger of  things to come. The Grand Rapids Press’s business 
editor Tom LaBelle pointed out that “[t]he layoff  announcement included a note from company of-
ficials saying the Ada operation is in a state of  ‘transition’ because of  changes in the world economy 
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and in the company’s way of  doing business.” Based on this, he concluded ominously that “some-
thing is happening.”   30
 It was. That November, Amway dropped a bombshell: it was firing another two hundred and 
thirty employees. Sales for 1983 fell by seventy million dollars, while 1984 saw a twenty percent 
slump in revenue in the United States and a fifteen percent drop in the company’s foreign markets. 
In response to the downturn, Amway started placing greater emphasis on selling products rather 
than sponsoring more people into the business. The contraction also put a dent in the cofounders’s 
personal fortunes, with Forbes estimating that DeVos and Van Andel collectively lost a hundred mil-
lion dollars between 1983 and 1984.   31
 Compounding the sales slump were a raft of  legal cases and a sweltering media spotlight. 
1982 was an especially brutal year. That April, Jay Van Andel testified at a congressional hearing 
about direct sellers claiming questionable business deductions on their taxes, insisting that Amway 
was doing everything within its power to encourage compliance with the law within its distributor 
force. In conjunction with its coverage of  the hearing, the Grand Rapids Press published portions of  a 
tape — produced by a third party, not the company — that instructed Amway distributors on how 
they could lower their tax bill and what sorts of  deductions they could supposedly claim. Later that 
year, in September, IRS officials in Detroit launched investigations into distributors of  a number of  
direct sales companies, among them Amway, looking for improper deductions. The issue of  tax 
compliance among Amway distributors was part of  a blockbuster series of  articles that the Detroit 
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Free Press published across the summer and fall of  1982 that looked into some of  the more unsavory 
sides of  the business (more on that later).    32
 That year, though, the IRS was the least of  Amway’s problems. In early July the Canadian 
government launched a civil investigation into Amway over unpaid import duties. (Chapter IV dis-
cusses this in greater detail.) At the end of  July, the company was slapped with yet another suit. On 
July 27th, summonses went out in the case of  State of  Wisconsin v. Amway Corporation, Inc., et. al. In-
cluded in the suit alongside Amway were Wayland Behnke, a Diamond distributor based out of  Fox 
Point, Wisconsin, as well as three other distributors who belonged to his network: Dean Fliss (also a 
Diamond), John Haugner, and Benedetto Lanza (both Directs).   33
 The charges that the state of  Wisconsin brought centered on claims of  various sorts of  mis-
representation on the part of  both Amway and the individual distributors. Count I stated that 
Behnke and his downlines exaggerated how much they and other distributors were making in 
Amway. In addition, they did not “adequately distinguish between gross, adjusted gross and net in-
comes,” “disclose the duration of  the income experience,” or alert prospective distributors to the 
costs associated with doing Amway.   34
 Just like the FTC, Wisconsin also accused the defendants of  making false claims about how 
well individuals could do in the business. The four men had allegedly claimed “that a new Amway 
Distributorship has a reasonable chance, within three to nine months and working six to twelve 
hours a week, of  earning in excess of  $12,000 a year,” and also “that higher incomes, up to $55,000, 
are available in three to five years.” According to the state, this was grossly at odds with the actual 
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experience of  Wisconsin distributors, who on average were only making about $267 a year. As for 
Direct distributors, the state pointed out that, once the costs of  running the distributorship were 
factored in, they lost $918 a year on average. The tens of  thousands of  dollars that the defendants 
claimed were possible were “achievable by less than seven of  every 1,000 Amway Distributorships” 
and “fail to reflect business expenses[.]” The third count concerned an issue that the FTC had ad-
dressed in its ruling three years earlier: the use of  hypotheticals. The state took umbrage with some 
of  the figures that appeared in Amway literature, and included the following chart as an example: 
  
 The distributor in this hypothetical earned $14,760 a year. The state noted that that “exceeds 
the average (1979-1980) annual adjusted gross income of  all Wisconsin Direct Distributorships 
($14,349), which constitute less than 1% of  all Wisconsin Amway Distributorships.” The final count 
Figure 4. Amway figure reproduced in State of  Wisconsin v. Amway Corporation Inc., et al. 
complaint 
(Source: Complaint, State of  Wisconsin v. Amway Corporation, Inc., et. al., 7)
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alleged that, in the course of  recruiting, the defendants did not disclose to prospects that they were 
pitching Amway.  35
 The relevant statute in the Wisconsin case — cited in all four counts — was 100.18(1). Since 
the defendants attacked the wording of  the statute and its applicability to their case, it is worth quot-
ing in full: 
No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employee thereof, with intent to sell, dis-
tribute, increase the consumption of  or in any wise dispose of  any real estate, merchandise, securi-
ties, employment, service, or anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, or 
agent or employee thereof, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale, hire, use or other distribution, 
or with intent to induce the public in any manner to enter into any contract or obligation relating to 
the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of  any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment or ser-
vice, shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or indi-
rectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in this state, in a 
newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of  a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill, 
circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio or television station, or in any 
other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, an advertisement, announcement, statement or rep-
resentation of  any kind to the public relating to such purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of  such real 
estate, merchandise, securities, service or employment or to the terms or conditions thereof, which 
advertisement, announcement, statement or representation contains any assertion, representation or 
statement of  fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.  36
 Jay Van Andel described the Wisconsin suit in his autobiography as “a less serious attack” 
than the FTC investigation since, unlike the latter, “it did not threaten the very existence of  Amway.” 
Though technically true, it still posed a public relations problem. For the second time in less than a 
decade, the company — along with, in this instance, a handful of  distributors — had to defend it-
self  in the legal arena against allegations that it was hoodwinking people, either through outlandish 
promises of  huge fortunes or by not being forthright about the expenses associated with the busi-
ness or by having distributors hide their affiliation with Amway during pitches. Combined with its 
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problems north of  the border, Amway increasingly looked like a company flirting perilously with the 
line between a legitimate business and a racket.  37
 On September 23rd, Amway submitted its answers to the state’s complaint. The company 
offered no comments regarding Counts I, II, and IV, on the grounds that the charges did not apply 
to any of  its conduct. It did, however, push back against Count III, which dealt with the content of  
company literature. Amway insisted that there was nothing wrong with its material, writing that the 
income figures used were “only a hypothetical example of  the operation of  the Amway plan of  
compensation and that, as such,” they were “a completely true and correct representation of  the op-
eration of  that plan of  compensation which is not deceptive or misleading in any respect whatsoev-
er.” The company also disputed the state’s insinuation that its hypotheticals were at odds with reality. 
The company offered up several defenses for itself, arguing, for instance, that a guilty verdict against 
Amway would infringe on the company’s right to free speech because “every assertion, representa-
tion or statement of  fact which the complaint alleges Amway made is absolutely true and correct 
and/or, if  not a statement of  fact, is a true and honest statement of  Amway’s opinion and belief.” 
The company also raised a jurisdictional issue: namely, the fact that the FTC had ruled on and made 
recommendations regarding some of  the very same issues that the state of  Wisconsin was looking 
into, such as the income figures used in Amway literature.  38
 The other defendants, meanwhile, sought to get the case tossed. On September 23rd, the 
same day that Amway formally responded to the complaint, Wayland Behnke, Benedetto Lanza, and 
Dean Fliss and John Haugner all filed motions to dismiss. Their respective attorneys presented an 
array of  arguments for why the charges should be thrown out. Peter Brusky, who represented Way-
land Behnke, argued that section 100.18(1) did not apply to his client’s conduct. Brusky pointed out 
 Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 78.37
 Answer of  Amway Corporation, State of  Wisconsin v. Amway Corporation, Inc., a Michigan corporation, and Wayland C. 38
Behnke, Dean M. Fliss, Benedetto Lanza, John C. Haugner, Jr., all Amway Direct Distributors, d/b/a World Wide Diamond, Circuit 
Court of  Milwaukee, case number 589806, September 23, 1982, 4-12.
  !171
that the law cited by the state in its complaint “contains an intent element which must be present in 
order for there to be a violation of  said statute.” Specifically, “either (1) an intent to sell or any wise 
dispose of  an asset, service, or anything offered, or, (2) an intent to induce entry into a contract to 
dispose of  an asset or service.” In the case of  Behnke and his co-defendants, all they were doing was 
trying to persuade people to become Amway distributors, so their activities failed to clear this 
threshold. Additionally, 100.18(1) “requires that the act complained of  relate to the sale or other dis-
position of  an asset or service.” But again, the men were only recruiting and not actually selling any-
thing. So, on those two scores, Behnke’s attorney insisted that his client had not violated that particu-
lar statute.  39
 In addition to endorsing all of  Peter Brusky’s arguments, Benedetto Lanza’s attorney, 
Thomas Knoll, came up with a few more. Like Brusky, Knoll pointed to the language of  100.18(1) 
and said that it did not apply in this situation, claiming that “Mr. Lanza’s activities, statements and 
representations do not fall under the definitions of  ‘sell,’ ‘distribute,’ ‘increase the consumption of ’ 
or ‘dispose of ’[.]” In addition, he argued that 100.18(1) violated Lanza’s constitutionally-protected 
right of  free speech because it failed to clearly specify exactly what he could and could not say when 
presenting the Plan. Finally, Brusky pushed back against the state’s characterization of  what Lanza 
was doing when he attempted to recruit individuals into Amway, saying that his actions constituted 
“puffery.” In other words, what Lanza said was so blatantly over-the-top that any person in their 
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right mind would recognize that he was embellishing. Accordingly, he had not actually lied or tricked 
anyone.  40
 Finally, Steven Epstein, who represented both Dean Fliss and John Haugner, by and large 
used the same legal strategy as Brusky and Knoll. In criticizing the state’s use of  100.18(1), Epstein 
focused in particular on the words “employment,” “hire,” and “sell.” According to Epstein, the de-
fendants were not offering anyone employment, while “‘hire’ refers to attempts to convince the lis-
tener to hire the speaker for a given job, service, or employment,” but not “attempts by a recruiter to 
himself  ‘hire’ the listener,” as happened in an Amway pitch. In addition, the statute had traditionally 
applied to situations involving sales, and, once again, Fliss and Haugner were not selling anything. 
Epstein also argued that his clients had not received “fair notice” of  precisely how they had broken 
the law, that the state in its complaint had not said anything about when or where or to whom Fliss 
and Haugner had made the unlawful statements, or even which specific statements were problemat-
ic. And Epstein, like Knoll, also cried puffery, saying that “[a]ny rational person knows that stated 
dollar amounts earnable by commission or direct sales are subject to large variances dependent upon 
effort, the economy, and any number of  other intangible factors.”  41
 The court chose not to dismiss the charges. But on February 21, 1983, the state settled sepa-
rately with the distributors and with Amway. In the case of  the four distributors, they were required 
to be more transparent when making income claims. Whenever they brought up income potentials, 
they had to be specific about what type of  income they were referring to (gross, net, etc.) and how 
long they earned that income. They also had to alert prospects that they might incur expenses over 
the course of  building up their distributorships. They also had to stop hiding the fact that they were 
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pitching Amway. Furthermore, all four defendants were fined: Behnke $560, Lanza $280, Fliss $448, 
and Haugner $280. The terms of  Amway’s settlement were similar. The company was ordered to 
stop using unrealistic figures in its literature, which technically it was supposed to do after 1979. 
Whenever it did include figures — whether real or hypothetical — over and above what the average 
distributor was earning, it needed to indicate how many distributors actually earned those amounts. 
It also had to make prospects aware of  the potential costs of  the business. Amway’s settlement also 
came with a fine of  $17,500, pocket change for a billion-dollar company. The distributors and the 
company agreed to these terms without admitting that they had broken the law.  42
********** 
 As if  two lawsuits dropping more or less simultaneously was not bad enough, 1982 also saw 
the release of  Phil Kerns’s book Fake It Til You Make it!. In the early eighties, former distributors 
started stepping into the spotlight and detailing their time in Amway. As in the anti-cult movement, 
the accounts of  “apostates” like Kerns became integral to an emerging grassroots opposition to 
Amway, in which ordinary people, some of  whom had once been in the business and some who 
never were, used whatever forums were available to them to express their concerns and complaints 
about the company. A number of  books similar to Kerns’s were published over the next three 
decades: Steve Butterfield’s Amway: The Cult of  Free Enterprise in 1986, Ruth Carter’s Amway Motiva-
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tional Organizations: Behind the Smoke and Mirrors in 1999, Eric Scheibeler’s Merchants of  Deception in 
2004, and Erik German’s My Father’s Dream in 2011, which is mostly a second-hand account of  his 
father’s experiences as a distributor. These books offer a window into distributor grievances across a 
wide time range. It is worth pointing out that, although these authors had criticisms of  the company 
as a whole, a lot of  what they said was about the specific networks they belonged to. Butterfield, 
Scheibeler, and German’s father were all part of  the group headed by Dexter Yager, who built one 
of  the largest and most successful distributorships in Amway history, while Kerns was in Crown Di-
rect Lester Canon’s group. Ruth Carter, meanwhile, never indicated the line that she was sponsored 
into, instead focusing more generally on what she called “Amway Motivational Organizations,” her 
version of  Kingpin Corporations. Consequently, some of  their experiences may not be completely 
representative, since we cannot say for sure that all networks necessarily operated the same way. That 
said, their accounts overlap significantly.  43
 Although all four eventually became disillusioned with Amway and turned into fierce critics, 
they joined because they found the message of  self-mastery, material well-being, and economic in-
dependence compelling.  Accordingly, their stories of  how they became distributors lend insight 44
into how the company’s message resonated with real-world needs and desires. Steve Butterfield, an 
English professor at a college in Vermont who had no interest in becoming a distributor when he 
and his wife were first introduced to Amway in 1971, changed his tune following the economic 
downturn in 1973. Suddenly, he wrote, “along with other college faculty nationwide, I took drastic 
salary cuts and considered myself  lucky to have a job.” Under these circumstances, the Amway 
promise became more appealing: “I wanted income security. I liked the idea of  making money, lots 
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of  it, without having to show up for work….I wanted to be plucking the fruit from the money tree, 
not sitting on the outside of  the circle chewing pits while others feasted.” By 1978, he was on board, 
sponsored by a colleague who had tried to sell him a smoke detector.  45
  Ruth Carter similarly joined Amway when faced with financial difficulties shortly after she 
separated from her husband and was left to raise her children on her own. Her living conditions at 
the time were arduous: “My house was heated with wood. I had an oil-fired furnace, but it was just 
used as emergency backup since we couldn’t afford to run it full-time. My house on the hill, which 
during the summer showed me stunning mountain views, in the winter was difficult to get in and out 
of.” Her small business languished as she struggled to run a household as a single parent. First thing 
in the morning, she wrote, “I would take my oldest child to school and do errands or stop for gro-
ceries on the way home.” Once she finally got back home, “I attempted to do some work, phone 
clients, and so on, but I accomplished little and my business was falling away fast.” On top of  all 
that, she wrote that “I didn’t want to leave my infant with anyone else,” so she was saddled with 
childcare duties as well. It was “[a]fter a couple of  months of  this logistical nightmare” that a neigh-
bor introduced her to Amway. At her neighbor’s home, Carter, along with a handful of  other 
prospects, heard a pitch from a distributor whom she called Steve Silver. Silver, she recounted, “talks 
about cars, homes, vacations, sending children to private school, money in the bank….He talks 
about retiring from our jobs within two to five years, and having time to spend with our families.” 
After hearing his spiel, she said that she was “starting to get excited about the Amway business.”      46
 Erik German’s family had also hit a rough patch at the time that his father decided to join 
Amway in the 1980s. Erik’s father had been a poorly paid magazine journalist who discovered, after 
his first payday, that he did not have enough money for “rent, student loan payments, the car, gas, 
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utilities and food. Everything was just costing more than expected.” Unable to heat their home, 
German’s mother had to wait tables at a diner. His father was not happy about that. According to 
Erik, he “grew up in a household where a father’s highest duty was the care of  his family.” For Erik’s 
father, economic adversity represented a direct threat to conventional gender roles and the division 
of  labor within the family. “Poverty,” Erik wrote, “was stealing his manhood away.” What’s worse, 
his mother suffered a manager’s sexual harassment, which they had to tolerate because they desper-
ately needed her to bring in that second income.  47
 Amid all this hardship, German’s uncle approached his father with what seemed to be the 
solution to all of  their problems: “It would only take up an evening or two per week. It would make 
them an extra hundred dollars a month, possibly more. It was called Amway and in two to five years, 
it seemed, some people had even made this thing churn out six-figure incomes.” Erik remembered 
that his uncle “couldn’t have pitched Amway to my father at a more perfect time”: the family was 
sinking deeper into debt and had barely enough to eat.  48
 In contrast to Ruth Carter and Erik German’s father (and, to a lesser degree, Steve Butter-
field), Eric Scheibeler was not in a financial bind when he and his wife Patty joined Amway in the 
late eighties. He indicated that his family struggled growing up: “Too many of  the decisions seemed 
to revolve around what we could afford, not what was the most important to us.” These early diffi-
culties influenced his later decision to join Amway: “As far back as I can remember, I wanted to suc-
ceed and to be in a position to help the people that I loved.” He later became an auditor at the De-
partment of  Energy. He did not enjoy the job, since he “found the daily routine of  auditing rather 
boring,” and the constant need to travel kept him away from his wife. As a result, he left to become 
an insurance underwriter, which allowed him and his wife to settle down. A couple living in their 
neighborhood showed them Amway. While Scheibeler and his wife were doing well enough, they 
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found the prospect of  earning more money appealing, particularly in a business that was theirs: 
“Perhaps the greatest selling factor for both Patty and me….was the ‘fact’ that we could create on-
going, residual, ‘will-able’ income….Our business would grow as we helped other independent busi-
ness owners succeed in owning their own business. We would all be very motivated to work hard 
and would never ‘fire ourselves’ or ‘lay ourselves off,’ since we owned The Business….The larger our 
income became, the more free time we would have to spend with our families.”     49
 Butterfield, Carter, Kerns, Scheibeler, and German criticized various elements of  the Amway 
system. High on that list, naturally, was what they saw as the false promise of  the business. Erik 
German observed that, according to information that the company was legally obligated to provide, 
“two thirds of  the people registered with the organization make, on average, $115 per month.” The 
mega-wealthy distributors of  the sort featured in Amway tools were only a minuscule sliver of  all 
individuals in the business: “In the $45,000 range, it’s about .1457 percent. At the $700,000 level, 
that number shrinks to .0024 percent. Adding up everything in between yields a little over .6 
percent.” Phil Kerns, meanwhile, claimed that “[t]he evidence shows that the vast majority of  
Amway distributors really earn very little, while a very small percentage of  the entire [at the time] 
one million distributors enjoy enormous profits.” Doing some back-of-the-envelope math, he point-
ed out that even going Direct required thousands of  dollars of  product sales every month, never 
mind attaining any of  the higher pin levels.  50
 Ruth Carter argued that not only did very few Amway distributors become wealthy, but also 
that purchasing tickets to Amway events as well as tools, along with the costs associated with re-
cruitment (e.g., travel), ate up much of  what they earned. Kerns, Butterfield, and Scheibeler corrobo-
rated this. Phil Kerns wrote that “the high cost of  participating in this business” was a “common 
complaint” from those whom he and his wife had sponsored: “There was, at rallies and meetings, a 
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constant emphasis on the purchase of  non-Amway produced motivational tools such as books and 
tapes. In addition, the monthly expenditures for rallies were outrageous.” Kerns said that he “was 
spending a fortune for gas, telephone bills and airfare,” and that one month he earned a mere $7.78 
after accounting for such expenses. Butterfield indicated that “[t]he profit margin in retail sales is 
supposed to be an average 30 percent,” but that “[f]or me, every penny was eaten up in costs, not 
counting the hours spent securing the customers and persuading them to buy. For the few months 
when the account book actually showed a profit in retail selling, if  I counted the value of  my own 
time I made about a dollar an hour.” The costs he referred to came mainly in the form of  inventory 
and tools. Scheibeler wrote that when he and his wife went Direct, they “had been expecting to 
make around $2,000 a month” — instead, “we were making a net income after system expenses [e.g., 
books, tapes, seminars] of  closer to $600 dollars a month[.]” Likewise, when they reached Pearl level, 
“we had anticipated making $80,000-$100,000,” but instead they found themselves earning a mere 
twenty thousand “for a superhuman, all-consuming effort.”   51
 Both Scheibeler and Erik German alleged that rather than leading their families to secure 
and substantial incomes, Amway actually bankrupted them. Despite the fact that their actual income 
fell far short of  expectations, Scheibeler and his wife did see their financial circumstances improve 
initially. He said that by the time the nineties came around, they had paid off  all their major debts, 
with the exception of  their home. That changed, however, as they climbed Amway’s achievement 
ladder. Sometime after they became Ruby-level distributors, Scheibeler wrote that they “started to 
accumulate small and then larger amounts of  credit card debt.” According to him, this change was 
the result of  the increasing cost of  Amway tools. “There were more and more mandatory leadership 
seminars and trips to attend,” he said. Additionally, “[t]he tape-of-the-week that we all religiously 
purchased went from $5.00 to $6.00 a week plus tax and shipping.” An additional weekly tape was 
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added as well, along with the introduction of  monthly books and videos. By the time they became 
Emeralds, their financial situation was dire: “Patty and I now had massive debts. We had cars that 
looked great on the surface, but were barely running. We owed back property and income taxes and 
all our credit cards were maxed out.” Scheibeler insisted that his situation was by no means atypical, 
and that he came across other distributors who had also lost substantial sums while in the business.  52
 Erik German said that Amway also plunged his father into deep debt. According to him, his 
father purchased a large quantity of  motivational tapes to sell to his downlines, as his uplines had 
instructed him to do, but that he became disenchanted after discovering that the sale of  tools, rather 
than products, was the main source of  income for his uplines. Erik wrote that after a while, “Dad 
began borrowing money from friends, relatives, and the local bank to keep up with the expense of  
running his business,” and despite devoting virtually every minute of  his free time to the business, 
he could not seem to make it work. He stated that “after six months of  this maniacal, crushing rou-
tine….the debt had mounted to $25,000.” Ultimately, the family was forced to go and live with 
Erik’s grandparents.  53
 Amway tools — marketed as aids to help distributors build up their businesses — were 
blamed for causing some to not make any money and become indebted. This was not the only criti-
cism leveled against the tools. Ruth Carter claimed that it was very difficult for distributors to receive 
a refund on tools if  they were dissatisfied or decided to leave the business, and that the tools became 
a business unto themselves, with many high-level distributors earning more money from selling tools 
than from selling Amway products. In fact, Carter claimed that her own upline Diamond was al-
legedly earning ninety-five percent of  his income by selling tools and tickets to distributor functions 
and hardly moved any products. Carter characterized the tool business as a kind of  pyramid scheme. 
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According to her, very few actually provided distributors with concrete instructions on how to run 
their businesses, whereas the majority merely “promote the use of  tools and plugging into the sys-
tem[.]”   54
 Scheibeler said that he left the business in large part because he discovered that the wealthi-
est distributors supported themselves almost entirely through the sale of  tools. He described Amway 
and its tool market in particular as “the largest, ongoing, most well-coordinated, well-orchestrated 
theft by deception in the history of  business,” writing, “[m]any of  the fortunes of  the super-rich 
Diamond-level distributors were culled from the financial losses of  their loving, trusting flock. The 
more the group lost financially in money to support the system, the richer they became. The wealthier 
they became, the more cars, homes, jets, and yachts they purchased. The more luxuries they pos-
sessed, the more people were recruited into Amway, based upon this illusion of  their success in the 
Amway business.” Erik German stated that “[p]rofit margins on these materials [referring specifical-
ly to motivational tapes] were much higher than on actual Amway products.” At one point, he wrote, 
“my father and Jack started duplicating a few of  the tapes and distributing them for free to their 
downline, hoping [to] save everyone a little money,” at which point their uplines “went ballistic” and 
“threatened legal action.” It was then that German’s father came to understand “that the upline Di-
amonds were funding their lavish lifestyles with profits from motivational tools and functions.” In 
the course of  writing his book, German interviewed a Diamond distributor named Jean Valerio. 
When he asked her how much money she made from tools, she grew evasive, telling him, “That’s 
very hard to say,” and that “it changes.”   55
 One of  the selling points of  Amway, as we saw in Chapter II, was that through the business 
people could make new friends, strengthen family ties, and become part of  a new “family” of  dis-
 Carter, Amway Motivational Organizations, 39-49, 136. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 54
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tributors. Rather than fostering community and bringing people closer together, these detractors 
claimed that Amway sought to sequester its distributors and cut them off  from those outside the 
business. Here the attacks on Amway most clearly paralleled charges leveled by cult opponents. The 
anti-cult movement of  the seventies and eighties had focused almost exclusively on religious move-
ments. Amway critics, however, drew on ideas and terminology from the movement to attack the 
practices of  a secular corporation.  
 One technique by which Amway purportedly isolated distributors was by prohibiting interac-
tions with “crosslines”: that is, distributors who belonged to different legs. Butterfield recalled hear-
ing an upline in his network tell distributors at a function, “You meet other distributors at these 
functions. And it’s nice to say hello, but don’t crossline. When you travel to functions, go with your 
own upline, if  you have to ride with someone, but the best thing is to go by yourselves. When you 
go out to eat after the Seminar, don’t sit with people from different lines. It won’t do your business 
any good to wonder what someone else on a different line is doing.” At one point, Butterfield orga-
nized a meeting of  distributors at his home and was promptly told by his uplines to cancel it because 
he was crosslining — supposedly this kind of  mingling threatened to undermine everyone’s progress 
in the business.   56
 Butterfield wrote that “the ban on crosslining makes sense as a means for achieving com-
plete control over a distributor force,” alleging that it was part and parcel of  Amway’s effort “to sell, 
and reinforce, a competitive class system, with a status hierarchy[.]” According to Butterfield, distribu-
tors were taught to see those on other legs first and foremost as competitors and therefore obstacles 
to their own success. “The ban on crosslining, if  properly duplicated,” he claimed, “would limit 
most human contacts to upline, downline and prospects.” Butterfield, in other words, directly con-
tradicted the claim that Amway represented a more “compassionate capitalism” in which looking out 
for the welfare of  others was more important than competition. Scheibeler also talked about a ban 
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on crosslining, calling it a “core principle” and explaining that “[t]he reasoning was that this could 
cause confusion and inadvertently damage both of  your businesses.”  57
 In addition to crosslines, these ex-distributors alleged that distributors were also told to 
avoid any individuals or media critical of  Amway. Butterfield argued that the imperative to weed out 
negative influences from one’s life — discussed in significant detail in Chapter II — served to isolate 
individuals from their pre-Amway social circles and to compel them to radically alter their personali-
ties. According to Butterfield, uplines taught that negativity was everywhere and a constant threat to 
one’s success in the business: 
Whatever influence weakens your belief  and commitment in the business is Negative. The brother-
in-law who laughs at you is Negative. The “friend” who says it won’t work is Negative. Expressions 
like “I’ll try,” and “I’ll never own a nice home,” and “Maybe I’ll see if  this works, and if  it doesn’t, 
I’ll quit,” are all Negative. Argument and criticism are Negative. Any product which competes with 
an Amway product is Negative. Failure to attend any function put on by your upline, or to follow all 
of  their instructions, is Negative. Refusal to buy a tape when recommended by the upline is Nega-
tive. It is Negative to complain about the expense of  functions, or find fault with the speakers, or 
make the excuse that you can’t go to Seminar and Rally because you can’t afford a babysitter.  58
 Butterfield claimed that negativity was used as a catch-all to steer distributors away from any-
thing that could potentially undermine their commitment to Amway and the Plan, writing that dis-
tributors were from the outset “being prepared for the parting of  the ways with anyone who might 
hold them back in Amway,” with the business making up for those lost relationships. Distributors, in 
his telling, were supposed to gradually purge from their lives everyone who did not fully support 
their involvement in the business.   59
 Ruth Carter, meanwhile, maintained that the taboo on negativity was used to repress criti-
cism of  the company and to cover up ugly parts of  distributors’s lives. Writing about Amway func-
tions, she said, 
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Speakers are allowed to discuss some of  the negative things that happened to them “before the 
business,” and they’re allowed to talk about the struggles they’ve had with negative (former) friends 
and family. They are not allowed to discuss anything negative about the business, their line of  spon-
sorship, or their downline. They can discuss their accomplishments in the business, but they can’t tell 
the audience that when they were recognized as new Direct Distributors, they had $50,000 charged 
to their credit cards for business-related travel and tools, and that they have no idea how they’ll pay it 
off. They can discuss all the wonderful friendships they’ve developed in the business, but they can’t 
admit that their teenager is skipping school, drinking, and has cracked up the car three times in the 
past year.  60
 As a person moved further along in the business, these former distributors claimed, they 
were increasingly cut off  from anyone or anything not connected to the business. “Once you acquire 
a group, it is more than imperative to use nothing but Amway,” Butterfield wrote. At functions, 
speakers told distributors to ditch any Amway substitutes that they had at home, on the grounds that 
any downline who saw their upline not using Amway products would become demoralized. Eric 
Scheibeler, too, wrote that he and his wife were instructed that “[i]t would be financial suicide to do 
anything other than use all our own products,” and that failure to do so would “show tremendous 
disrespect to your upline[.]”   61
 Additionally, several of  them said that they ended up pouring all of  their time and energy 
into the business at the expense of  non-Amway pursuits and interests. Erik German wrote that “[a]s 
his first year in the business drew to a close, Dad’s growing dedication to Amway began to threaten 
his position at the magazine.” Instead of  reporting, he was “spending all his free moments prospect-
ing for Amway recruits.” At one point, his father was offered the position of  editor of  his magazine, 
but only on the condition that he reduce his commitment to Amway. The increase in pay that came 
with the job, however, was minuscule given the family’s financial needs, so he left the magazine and 
went to work at a used car dealership, which “paid better than journalism and allowed him to devote 
free time to Amway.” Scheibeler wrote that after he and his wife became Emeralds, “[t]he Amway 
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business and its related system had by now completely taken ownership of  nearly every aspect of  
our lives,” explaining, “[w]e had surrendered our life, all of  our money, our careers, and our family 
time to what we believed was ‘our’ business. We had lost touch with most of  our extended family 
members and any friends outside of  The Business. We no longer seemed to have much in common 
with them. We maintained a few relationships, but spent very little time with non-Amway people.” 
Ruth Carter also said that her work and social lives suffered under Amway. She wrote that she was 
constantly leaving one job for another because “[t]he business had taught me to have a total con-
tempt for honest gainful employment, so if  anything about a job wasn’t to my liking, I would leave. 
Or my bosses would tire of  my lack of  commitment to their goals, and send me packing.” Perhaps 
more significantly, the business also undermined her relationships with others, writing, “I had no 
social life. My friends were all in the business, and most of  them lived several hundred miles away 
from me….I cried myself  to sleep a lot.”  62
 For these reasons, several of  these ex-distributors likened Amway to a cult. As noted earlier, 
“cult” typically denotes a religious movement. And while Amway is of  course not a religion, several 
scholars have described it as “quasi-religious.” David Bromley pointed to a number of  features of  
the business, including distributor events, the veneration of  the cofounders, and the emphasis on 
family, to argue that “Amway combines transformative social movement and corporate/economic 
organizational forms that create innovative combinations of  religion and business[.]” Justin Green 
and Joan D’Aiuto have similarly contended that “Amway’s rallies, seminars, and conventions func-
tion as religious rites and rituals.” So whereas Scientology — to return to a case study discussed ear-
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lier — is a religion with business characteristics, Amway can be described as a business with religious 
characteristics. This, in turn, made the company vulnerable to the “cult” label.   63
 Prior to joining Amway, Phil Kerns had, for a time, actually been a member of  the People’s 
Temple, and wrote a book about his experiences in the group called People’s Temple, People’s Tomb. 
Though he did not dwell on the comparison much in his Amway book, he did pepper in references 
to cults throughout Fake It Til You Make It!. Steve Butterfield, on the other hand, was much more 
overt, putting the word “cult” right in the subtitle of  his book. He identified a number of  alleged 
similarities between Amway and religious cults, including that Amway engaged in “indoctrination” 
through the use of  tools and functions, that it “provide[d] a substitute for the extended family,” and 
that it deployed “thought control.” He pointed to duplication as one example of  Amway’s cultic 
characteristics, declaring that duplication “withers the growth of  human wisdom.” According to 
him, the company “diminishes awareness and narrows the perceptions by wrapping brains up in 
box-size flags and spitting them off  the end of  a production line.” Ruth Carter dedicated several 
chapters to the cult comparison. After defining what a cult was and detailing techniques of  cultic 
“mind control,” she argued that many of  Amway’s practices fell under that umbrella. The process of  
recruiting prospects into Amway — particularly the way that sponsors nudged prospects to talk 
about their dreams and then pitched Amway as a means of  fulfilling unmet needs and desires, as 
well as the fact that sponsors often tried to disguise their association with Amway — was, she said, 
similar to how cults attracted new members. She also claimed that distributor functions exercised 
“mind control” through “peer pressure,” “emotional manipulation,” and making false promises 
about the business.   64
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 Books are not the only medium that aggrieved former distributors — and those critical of  
Amway more broadly — have used to tell their stories. In 1997, the magazine The Baffler published 
an article by a man named Matt Roth in which he documented both his personal frustrations with 
the company as well as his uplines’s declining faith in their ability to succeed in the business. Begin-
ning in the 1990s, the Internet became an increasingly important space for Amway critics. One of  
the most influential anti-Amway websites was Amway: The Untold Story, set up by a man named Sid-
ney Schwartz. The website served as a clearinghouse for information on various aspects of  the busi-
ness, including the relative cost of  Amway versus non-Amway products, success rates, lawsuits pend-
ing against the company, and what it dubbed “The Tools Scam.” Ruth Carter, too, created a website 
in conjunction with the publication of  her book. Eric Scheibeler wrote that the Internet was impor-
tant in his transformation into an Amway critic. Back when he was still dedicated to the business, he 
said that he heard from prospects about Schwartz’s website as well as the website of  former distribu-
tor Ashley Wilkes, called Amway Motivational Organizations: The Nightmare Builders. At the time, he 
wrote, he thought of  them as “the enemy,” “evil,” and “a threat to my family’s future.” Later on, 
however, he perused Schwartz’s website and did general Internet searches about Amway, which led 
him to become disillusioned with how the business operated. He even got in touch with Ashley 
Wilkes, who he said “became a close friend, mentor, and confidant.”  65
********** 
 The publication of  the first anti-Amway exposé in 1982 also coincided with heightened me-
dia interest in the company. In October 1982, the Detroit Free Press ran a three-part series of  articles 
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documenting difficulties that some had had in the business along with allegations of  wrongdoing on 
the part of  some distributors. In the first, titled “A few get rich in Amway, but many just get frus-
trated,” which came out on October 24th, the Press noted the vast disparities in success among dis-
tributors, writing that “like an oil-rich sheikhdom [sic], Amway has its royalty….who occupy the top 
of  a pyramid of  wealth and enjoy generous bonus checks, paid vacations to glamor resorts and 
cruises aboard the Amway yacht, ‘Enterprise.’ But mostly, it has its workers, the people who carry 
their dreams in a small kit filled with furniture polish, shoe spray, and laundry detergent.” The article 
went on to reference both the FTC’s investigation as well as the state of  Wisconsin’s lawsuit, and 
included accounts from former distributors who claimed that the business undermined the quality 
of  their lives and that they were unable, even after putting in earnest effort, to achieve the incomes 
promised to them. One couple profiled was Bill and Julie Greenwood, whose experiences paralleled 
those of  other ex-distributors. According to the article, “in the 2 1/2 years they ran an Amway dis-
tributorship, first in Appleton, then in Kaukauna [both in Wisconsin], they lost $8,000, all their free 
time and almost their marriage, which they saved by getting out.” Julie recalled, “We quit every-
thing….our bowling league….our baseball teams. We quit seeing our friends….All we did was work, 
work, work, work, work.” Even so, and even after sometimes spending a combined total of  sixty to 
eighty hours a week doing Amway, the couple never earned more than five hundred dollars a month. 
Not only that, they actually lost money in the business because of  the high cost of  buying tools and 
attending functions.  66
 The second Press article, published the following day, explored allegations investigated by the 
IRS that some distributors had turned their Amway businesses into tax shelters. The article reported 
that although distributors were perfectly within their rights to write off  any “ordinary and neces-
sary” expenses related to running their businesses, “IRS auditors found Amway distributors deduct-
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ing food for their pet dogs, dinners with their wives, trips to visit their mothers in Florida, birthday 
presents for their children, foreign vacations, luxury cars, mortgage payments, utility bills, baby-sit-
ters, clothes, jewelry, laundry, televisions, microwave ovens and even parking tickets.” Not only that, 
some distributor circles apparently promoted this kind of  fraud. Despite the fact that Amway offi-
cially discouraged such shady behavior, the article noted that “[t]ape recordings on tax 
schemes….are a subsidiary business among Amway distributors — although not the corporation 
itself  — and sell for as much as $15 each. Specialized Amway-related tax advice has also become a 
business in itself.” The final article in the Press’s series, released on the twenty-sixth, examined the 
tool market, which it described as “a pyramid inside a pyramid” in which “low-level distributors buy 
packaged inspiration from those at the top.” The article said that “Amway distributors who drop out 
of  the business speak ruefully of  spending hundreds of  dollars on attending motivational seminars 
and hundreds of  hours listening to tape-recorded advice without ever making any money from sell-
ing Amway products.” Some of  the former distributors quoted in the piece suggested that many of  
the mega-wealthy distributors made most of  their money from these tools. The article also offered 
readers an inside look at a rally held in Pittsburgh by Fred and Linda Harteis, who at the time were 
Double Diamond distributors, which featured musical performances along with speeches by well-to-
do distributor couples extolling both their personal success and the potential for those in the audi-
ence to become just like them.  67
 These articles were not the first time that the Press had aimed its guns at Amway that year. 
Two months earlier, on August 22nd, they ran an article headlined “Amway’s plot to bilk Canada of  
billions,” which detailed the tax evasion claims that the Canadian government was investigating and 
outlined how the company had gone about avoiding taxes. The Press’s salvos did not escape the at-
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tention of  the cofounders. In his autobiography, Van Andel slammed the Press as a “left-leaning pa-
per” whose articles on the company “reeked of  political smear tactics.” He also accused the news-
paper of  cherry-picking and possibly even misrepresenting the firsthand accounts it presented, writ-
ing that “Amway dropouts with family or financial problems were sought out and their troubles 
blamed on Amway,” thus ignoring “the thousands of  ordinary people who gained family unity and 
enjoyed success through Amway.” DeVos went so far as to ban the sale of  the Press at the Amway 
Grand Plaza Hotel in downtown Grand Rapids. On August 23, 1982, Amway announced that it 
would sue the Press for half  a billion dollars for its “Amway’s plot to bilk Canada of  billions” article. 
Ultimately, though, the company did not pursue the case because, according to Van Andel, “it might 
have affected the ongoing court case with Revenue Canada[.]” Three years later, on January 26, 
1985, in what it described as “a quiet burial of  the hatchet,” the Grand Rapids Press reported that the 
Detroit Free Press had rejoined the ranks of  newspapers available for purchase at the Grand Plaza.   68
 Three months after the Press articles, on January 9, 1983, 60 Minutes ran a segment on 
Amway titled “Soap and Hope.” The feature included an array of  perspectives. The 60 Minutes crew 
shot footage at various rallies and interviewed not just ex-distributors but also Dexter and Birdie 
Yager as well as DeVos and Van Andel. The cofounders prepared in advance for their interviews 
with host Mike Wallace, undergoing coaching to steel themselves for Wallace’s confrontational style 
of  questioning. Additionally, DeVos wrote that “instead of  waiting for Wallace to show up and catch 
us off  guard we invited him to Amway and welcomed him and his crew.” Even so, the corporation 
was not sure exactly how it would come off. The Grand Rapids Press reported on the day that the 
segment aired that “[s]ince the network [i.e., CBS] considers ‘60 Minutes’ a news program, no pre-
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screenings are made available” and as a result “Amway officials really have no way of  knowing what 
direction the segment will take.”   69
 Ultimately, though, the cofounders were largely satisfied with how the show portrayed the 
company. DeVos complained about “footage of  speakers at Amway conventions that were taken out 
of  context and may not have best reflected all distributors,” but nevertheless he believed that “the 
piece was balanced.” Van Andel likewise described the segment as “fair and balanced.” This was also 
the impression that the Grand Rapids Press found when it sought out the opinions of  people living in 
the Grand Rapids area, although it noted that many “expressed disappointment with the coverage 
because it told them little, if  anything, new about the home products manufacturer.”   70
 As it turned out, the cofounders were so pleased with the segment that they invited Mike 
Wallace to attend the grand opening of  the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel that October. While there, 
Wallace indicated that the segment changed how he thought about the company. Covering his re-
marks, the Grand Rapids Press wrote that “when he started his investigation of  Amway last summer 
he had several ‘preconceived misconceptions’ that he later discovered were not true.” Wallace insist-
ed that “their products are good, and they’re not a pyramid operation,” and called those in the 
Amway organization who participated in the segment “classy people” who “opened up to us a cer-
tain amount and took their lumps.”  71
 The 60 Minutes segment and the response to it stood in sharp contrast to Richard DeVos’s 
appearance on The Phil Donahue Show four months later, in April. Both of  the cofounders were invit-
ed, but Van Andel declined, explaining in his autobiography that “[i]n my opinion, Donahue and 
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people like him are not after the truth — they’re after something with which to entertain their listen-
ers, and the entertainment is often at the expense of  the guest on the show.” On the other hand, 
DeVos accepted because, as he put it, “I’d rather screw up than be absent and not able to speak for 
our position.” The show, however, did not go as originally planned. Donahue had promised to begin 
the segment with a brief  interview with DeVos before turning to a Q&A with the audience, which 
included both current and former distributors. But when showtime came, Donahue jettisoned the 
interview altogether and just did the Q&A. A review of  the episode in the Grand Rapids Press praised 
the show for “providing a voice for both detractors and supporters of  Amway” but criticized the 
format, writing, “[a]fter starting the program with a brief  introductory comments [sic] about 
Amway, Donahue allows it to degenerate into a shouting match as he fails to exercise any 
control….Emotions explode during the show as Donahue, for no apparent reason, makes no effort 
to direct the line of  questioning to DeV os nor allow adequate time for response.”   72
 The cofounders were not happy. Van Andel complained that “[w]hat could have been an in-
telligent discussion soon turned into a circus,” while DeVos wrote that “[b]ecause at the last minute 
[Donahue] refused to open the show with any kind of  introduction that would have provided con-
text, viewers had no idea what was going on.” Nevertheless, the cofounders both thought that the 
episode had been, on net, a plus for them and their company, with Van Andel saying that “Amway 
had come out looking good simply because the anti-Amway side had behaved so poorly.” DeVos, 
meanwhile, wrote that “[l]ater that week I got a postcard from First Lady Barbara Bush with the 
message: ‘DeVos 10, Donahue 0.’”   73
 By the end of  1983, Amway was left battered. A year-in-review published in the Grand Rapids 
Press on New Year’s Day 1984 noted that although the company had had some accomplishments, 
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ultimately, “1983 was a year Amway might be glad to forget[.]” After weathering the cacophony of  
storms of  the early eighties, things gradually improved for Amway over the rest of  the decade. The 
slump of  1983-84 turned out to be the worst of  it. In its retrospective on the year 1984, the compa-
ny alluded to the hard times, acknowledging that “the direct sales industry this past year finally faced 
its own belated recession and began building toward its own belated recovery,” though it insisted 
that “the recessionary storm is dwindling, dying away.” Amway’s sales were $1.189 billion in 1985. 
The following year that number went to $1.3 billion, then $1.5 billion in 1987 — at which point 
Amway’s revenues had more or less returned to pre-slump levels — and in June 1988 the company 
estimated that it would bring in two billion dollars that year.   74
 Amway’s turnaround was attributed to strong overseas sales, particularly in Japan, as well as a 
raft of  new products that the company introduced in rapid-fire succession. In January 1986 Amway 
said that it would start offering travel packages, so that customers could subscribe to get discounts 
on flights, hotels, cruises, and more. In March it unveiled the successor to its Amgard home security 
system, which first appeared in 1982, the Amgard II, along with an at-home exercise videotape. In 
April it announced two new programs, one that would allow distributors to receive a discount on 
broker commissions when buying or selling real estate and another for discounts on buying a new 
car. That May it expanded its Artistry cosmetics brand to also include clothing. In February 1987 
came another exercise tape. In March Amway entered the satellite TV market with its own dishes. In 
May the company introduced trim packages for owners of  Chevy sedans to customize their vehicles, 
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and a trim package for vans came in December. And in January 1988 Amway unveiled a multi-func-
tional vacuum cleaner along with Grow Wise, educational toys for young children.   75
  
********** 
 Beginning with the FTC investigation in 1975 and concluding with the Phil Donahue kerfuffle 
in mid-1983, Amway endured eight years of  scrutiny and attack on multiple fronts over its business 
practices, particularly on the question of  whether or not the company and some of  its distributors 
were luring people into the business on false pretenses. Following a brief  respite, the late 1980s and 
1990s saw Amway’s behavior in the spotlight once again, only this time it involved the company’s 
relationship with its competitors. On May 3, 1989, news broke that Amway, working in concert with 
a firm called Jacobs Management Corp. and its owner, Irwin L. Jacobs, had bought half  a million 
shares in Avon. Avon was the reigning king of  direct sales. First known as Union Publishing when 
David H. McConnell acquired it in 1886, it subsequently became the California Perfume Company 
in 1892. The name was only half-accurate: it did sell perfume, but it had no association whatsoever 
with the state of  California. In the late 1930s, the company changed its name again to reflect the 
success of  its cosmetics brand. Avon brought in a little north of  three billion dollars in 1988 and 
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claimed a distributor force of  one and a half  million. Acquiring Avon would have turned Amway 
into a behemoth.   76
 Unfortunately for Amway, Avon was not interested. On the day of  the stock purchase, 
Avon’s CEO declared that “Avon is not for sale.” Despite its seemingly secure position atop the di-
rect sales pyramid, reporting in the wake of  Amway and Jacobs’s move indicated that Avon was an 
ideal candidate for a takeover, that the company was struggling with significant structural problems. 
At the time of  the takeover attempt, Avon was indebted to the tune of  $1.1 billion thanks to acquisi-
tions it made in the healthcare sector back in 1984 that had failed to pan out. Still, Avon’s leadership 
was recalcitrant. On May 8th, Avon filed two lawsuits in New York, one in state court and another in 
federal court, seeking to put a stop to the takeover. Reaction to the takeover bid among Avon dis-
tributors was mixed. On May 12th, five of  them showed up at Amway World Headquarters to 
demonstrate against a potential takeover. The Grand Rapids Press reported that “the group’s primary 
objection to an Amway takeover is the difference in business philosophy,” that “Amway representa-
tives have never knocked on any doors[.]” The Press wrote that one of  the demonstrators, Gloria 
Gitchell, “accused the Ada firm of  being more interested in recruiting more representatives than in 
selling.” On the other hand, the Associated Press interviewed a woman named Rhunetta Crumel, a dis-
tributor for both companies, who welcomed the prospect of  the two merging, believing (in the AP’s 
words) that “Amway distributors would benefit by adding Avon to their product line, while Avon 
could learn from Amway’s rah-rah approach to recruiting and caring for its distributors.” Avon sur-
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veyed five hundred of  its American distributors and found that just over a quarter would leave the 
business in the event of  a takeover.  77
 Though Amway’s stock purchase initially had the appearance of  a hostile takeover, the com-
pany elected not to go in that direction. On May 10th, it announced that it was prepared to pay $2.1 
billion for Avon. Per share, it would be paying slightly higher than market rate ($39 versus $36.125 
on the day the offer was made). Though the company remained uninterested in merging, Avon did 
not immediately reject the offer, indicating instead that it would think it over. On May 11th, the 
Grand Rapids Press reported that “Amway’s offer has a good chance of  being accepted,” but that it 
“may have to be raised before Avon’s board will be forced to accept it on behalf  of  their sharehold-
ers[.]” While Amway waited for a reply, it outlined its plans for Avon if  the takeover occurred, saying 
that it would dump Avon’s perfume lines. On May 17th, Amway told Avon that it was open to pay-
ing more than $2.1 billion for the company if  that was what it took for the merger to happen.   78
 But Avon refused. The following day, Avon officially declined, issuing a heated statement 
that attacked Amway for its past legal problems as well as some of  its business practices. Avon said 
that Amway was an “admitted criminal” plagued by “numerous allegations of  fraud and 
misconduct.” The statement directly referenced the Canada case and said that Amway had a “high-
pressure way of  doing business” that “clashes with the friendly, caring and gracious manner of  our 
representatives.” Rather than present a counteroffer, Amway capitulated, announcing that same day 
that it would give up on its takeover attempt. Amway’s official reason for walking away was that 
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Avon’s highly critical statement signaled that the company had no interest in accepting any offer re-
gardless of  the amount. The Wall Street Journal, however, suggested something else. It reported on 
May 25th that “[i]n an effort to ward off  the attack, investigators working for New York-based Avon 
dug up information that has thrown Amway’s executive suite into turmoil.” It explained that “Avon’s 
defensive effort in part focused on William W. Nicholson, Amway’s chief  operating officer and one 
of  the principal engineers of  the bid,” that “Avon investigators uncovered several lawsuits challeng-
ing Mr. Nicholson’s business practices.” For its part, Amway denied any link between the two.  79
 The story did not end there, though. On May 19th, the day after Avon turned down Amway, 
Michigan congressman John Dingell alleged that members of  Amway’s management had engaged in 
insider trading by buying shares in Avon in advance of  the May 10th offer. Dingell brought those 
claims to the attention of  the Securities and Exchange Commission, which said that it would look 
into the matter. The next day, the House Energy and Commerce Committee also became involved in 
investigating the takeover. And while Avon managed to fend off  Amway, it turned out that Amway 
was not the only company with its eye on them. Despite the company’s insistence that it wanted to 
remain independent, the Amway episode sent the signal that Avon was up for grabs. About a week 
after Amway abandoned its plans, another direct sales firm, Mary Kay, indicated that it was consider-
ing potentially pursuing a takeover. Avon proved no more open to their entreats than it was to 
Amway’s, formally turning them down on May 31st. In the midst of  all that, news broke on the 
twenty-fourth that Irwin Jacobs was interested in pursuing Avon himself. (Though he had worked 
with Amway on the May 3rd stock purchase, he did not participate in the company’s subsequent 
bid.) Jacobs made his move on August 1st, offering $2.85 billion for the company. Avon declined 
two days later. In November, Avon was again targeted for acquisition, this time by a company called 
Chartwell Associates. Chartwell, incidentally, ended up purchasing Jacobs and Amway’s Avon shares 
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in July 1990 in its effort to seize control of  the company, which dragged on until April 1991, when it 
gave up its bid.   80
 Amway was defiant in the wake of  its unsuccessful move against Avon. On June 10th, a few 
weeks after the bid failed, Richard DeVos, speaking to distributors in Grand Rapids, declared, “I 
don’t think we’ll have to buy Avon. We’ll just beat them. Our new slogan will be ‘Sponsor an Avon 
Lady today.’” Amway eventually got its revenge in 2012, when its sales officially eclipsed Avon’s. In 
the meantime, the company’s post-1983 bounce-back continued into the 1990s. By 1990, Amway 
was selling $2.2 billion in products. The Grand Rapids Press reported that September that the compa-
ny was in the midst of  a hiring spree and planned on expanding its World Headquarters. The follow-
ing year, sales were at $3.1 billion. By 1993, they would be $4.5 billion.   81
 Before too long, though, Amway became embroiled in yet another controversy regarding 
another of  its competitors: Procter & Gamble. Like Avon, Procter & Gamble, founded in 1837, was 
a titan in its field: in this case, personal care and cleaning products. Amway had tried to eliminate 
Avon as a rival by absorbing it. When it came to Procter & Gamble, the facts were much weirder.    82
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 In August 1995, Procter & Gamble sued an Amway distributor based in Utah named Randy 
Haugen, claiming that Haugen, “[i]n or about April and May 1995….with actual knowledge of  their 
falsity or with malicious and reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, circulated and published in 
the States of  Utah and Nevada, through the Amvox communication systems and through other me-
dia, completely false and defamatory written and oral statements.” Amvox was a network that 
Amway had set up for distributors to send voice messages to one another. And the defamatory 
statements that Haugen had allegedly sent through Amvox claimed that Procter & Gamble was a 
front of  Satanism.    83
 Exactly when or where or with whom this peculiar innuendo emerged is unclear, though it 
appears to date back to the early 1980s. One of  the earliest stories on the subject was published in 
January 1982 in the Los Angeles Times, which described the crux of  the allegation accordingly: 
The rumor has taken a variety of  forms but basically involves a Procter & Gamble executive appear-
ing on a talk show — “The Merv Griffin Show” and “The Phil Donahue Show” are the two most 
often mentioned. There, the executive supposedly said that the corporate symbol, a crescent moon 
with the outline of  a man’s face looking at a group of  13 stars, represents the firm’s connection with 
demonic worship.  84
Satanism was all the rage in the eighties. What began as a curiosity in the 1960s exploded into a full-
blown moral panic two decades later, as allegations of  satanic ritual abuse spread throughout popu-
lar culture and the media, reaching its crescendo with the infamous McMartin preschool trial in Los 
Angeles. The pandemonium over Satanism was an offshoot of  the larger cult panic that had roiled 
since the late sixties. Procter & Gamble unfortunately found itself  in the line of  fire.   85
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 The Satanism rumor dogged the company throughout the 1980s. In November 1984, the 
Wall Street Journal reported that, after peaking in 1982 and receding following a public relations cam-
paign by Procter & Gamble, whispers about the company had reemerged. In an effort to dissociate 
itself  from Satanism once and for all, Procter & Gamble dropped the offending logo in the spring 
of  1985. It also sued those responsible for spreading the malicious gossip, including two couples in 
Florida and Tennessee, two Georgians, and a man living in New Mexico, all in July 1982, four more 
people in May 1985, and the producers of  “[a] newsletter that circulates among 140 residents of  a 
mobile home park” in Los Angeles in August of  1986.  86
 Amway distributors were in Procter & Gamble’s legal crosshairs almost from the get-go. The 
New Mexico man sued in 1982, Elma Ed Pruitt, belonged to Amway. In August 1990, Procter & 
Gamble went after distributors James and Linda Newton, who lived in Kansas. Their slander ended 
up costing them seventy-five thousand dollars. The case against Randy Haugen was Procter & Gam-
ble’s fifteenth in about as many years and its sixth against an Amway distributor. This one, however, 
stands out for the fact that it kicked off  a dozen years of  litigation that involved not just individual 
distributors, but the company itself.  87
 Haugen, along with ten unnamed Amway distributors, was charged on August 25th with five 
counts in connection with the Satanism claims. The first, naturally, was that Haugen had “knowingly 
and intentionally slandered, libeled and defamed Plaintiffs [i.e., Procter & Gamble]” and in so doing 
“caused harm and damages to Plaintiffs’ reputation, prestige and standing as well as Plaintiffs’ busi-
ness and products.” The defendants were also accused of  engaging in “unfair competition and de-
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ceptive trade practices,” in violation of  both state and federal law. Lastly, according to Procter & 
Gamble, Haugen had “tortiously and intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs’ business relationships 
and expectancies with consumers in Utah and Nevada.”  88
 At first, the Haugen suit did not include Amway. That changed in April 1996, however, when 
Procter & Gamble decided to go after the company as well, alleging that Amway was not doing 
enough to combat the defamation of  Procter & Gamble within its distributor force. This went along 
with an expansion of  the charges, which ultimately reached eleven. In September 1998, the District 
Court of  Utah dismissed a charge alleging that the defendants had violated the federal Lanham Act, 
which, in part, outlaws “false or misleading description[s] of  fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion[s] of  fact” that “misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin 
of….goods, services, or commercial activities[.]” A statement put out by Amway afterwards declared 
that “[t]he ruling by the Utah federal court is the latest in a long line of  blows to P&G’s case since 
the company first filed its lawsuit in 1995,” boasting that “[e]ight of  P&G’s 11 claims have now been 
rejected by the Court[.]” The case against Haugen and Amway was tossed in March of  1999, only to 
be resurrected by the Tenth Circuit Court of  Appeals in August 2000. The Circuit Court brought 
back the Lanham Act and tortious interference charges, but it kept Amway out of  the suit. Procter 
& Gamble attempted to challenge Amway’s exclusion from the suit, but the district court in Utah 
declared in June 2001 that Amway was no longer part of  the suit, which the Tenth Circuit reaf-
firmed in January 2003.  89
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 The Randy Haugen case in Utah was not the only front on which Procter & Gamble and 
Amway fought their legal battle. Procter & Gamble brought a second suit against the company, plus 
a handful of  distributors in Texas and Utah, among them Randy Haugen, in July 1997 down in the 
District Court for the Southern District of  Texas. The suit focused not just on the Satanism rumor, 
but also on allegations that Amway and the accused distributors were defaming certain Procter & 
Gamble products, describing various woes that supposedly befell customers who used them. Twelve 
charges in total were leveled.   90
 Procter & Gamble’s legal strategy was to link the Satanism controversy to the larger universe 
of  criticisms leveled against Amway, painting it as just one facet of  a fundamentally illegitimate 
company. Accordingly, it resurrected the most damning charge of  all, the one from which the FTC 
had exonerated Amway back in 1979. “The Amway enterprise,” the suit declared, “is in reality an 
elaborate, illegal pyramid scheme” that “entice[s] consumers out of  the retail marketplace by con-
vincing them that purchasing Amway products will make them rich.” In reality, “[o]f  those who in-
vest the time, money, and personal sacrifice to become Amway distributors, only a select few ever 
break even” while “[e]ven fewer realize the profits touted by Amway in its sales pitch — and they do 
so by siphoning money from the victims at the bottom.” The fact that the Amway business rested, 
by Procter & Gamble’s reckoning, on pillars of  false promises meant that “the pressure to keep 
Amway’s pyramid going with new recruits is enormous, because the Amway Pyramid is in a constant 
state of  collapse and renewal.” As proof, the suit pointed to data indicating that “[i]n 1996, the aver-
age Amway distributor earns just $36.08 per month before expenses” and that Amway had an annual 
dropout rate of  fifty percent. Amway needed some way to bring in and hold on to as many cus-
tomers and distributors as possible.  91
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 Enter the Satanism rumor. “The principal purpose of  Amway,” the lawsuit alleged, “is not to 
sell consumer goods at retail in fair competition with Procter & Gamble,” but rather “to divert con-
sumers from the retail marketplace, creating a captive audience which buys Amway products to the 
exclusion of  all others in the false hope that doing so will lead to riches.” According to Procter & 
Gamble, Amway and (some of) its distributors exploited the rumors about Satanism to accomplish 
just that, “to coerce Amway distributors to purchase Amway products that they otherwise would not 
purchase, in lieu of  the Procter & Gamble products that they previously purchased and otherwise 
would be likely to continue to purchase.” In doing so they were “preventing the collapse of  the 
Amway Pyramid.” “Amway distributors attempt to use religious faith as a recruiting device, and also 
to mask the fraudulent nature of  their illegal pyramid,” the suit claimed, and the Satanism rumor fit 
right into that: “Amway distributors state that Procter & Gamble is satanic in order to buttress their 
false assertions that Amway is Godly.”  92
 Along with denying that Amway was running a legal business, Procter & Gamble used to suit 
to try and undermine another sacred tenant of  the Amway faith: the supposed independence of  its 
distributors. Rejecting the idea that they were “independent business owners,” Procter & Gamble 
claimed that “Amway’s distributors are the employees and agents of  Amway,” that they “must follow 
an extensive set of  rules and regulations controlling the means and manner in which the distributors 
market Amway products.” Accordingly, “Amway and its distributors collectively constitute a single 
business enterprise, and are dependent upon each other.” Procter & Gamble used this to argue that 
Amway was just as liable for the defamatory statements as its distributors were. “Certain of  the De-
fendants conduct business under the fiction that they are independent corporate entities,” the suit 
stated, when really “Amway was at all material times, and is, engaged in a single business enterprise 
with its distributors” and “[t]he conduct alleged herein of  Amway’s distributors….took place within 
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the scope of  their conduct as a single business enterprise with Amway.” Therefore, “[d]efendants are 
collectively liable as a single business enterprise for damages proximately caused thereby.”  93
  A year and a half  after the Texas suit was filed, Amway fired back with a case of  its own. In 
October 1998, the company sued Procter & Gamble in Michigan for allegedly assisting Sidney 
Schwartz, the creator of  Amway: The Untold Story, which it claimed “foments hate rhetoric about 
Amway, its employees and its distributors.” Specifically, Amway accused Procter & Gamble of  
“provid[ing] Schwartz with several boxes of  documents, knowing Schwartz would use them in a 
misleading fashion on his Web site to unfairly attack Amway,” as well as “[p]rovid[ing] financial sup-
port to Schwartz by retaining him as a consultant and paying him a fee.” Amway said that it discov-
ered the supposed backchannel between Procter & Gamble and Schwartz in the course of  preparing 
for the Utah and Texas cases. In March 1999, the Orlando Sentinel reported that Amway had filed 
subpoenas for the electronic records of  a number of  individuals who were running anti-Amway 
websites, which led to accusations that the company was attempting to intimidate them. One of  
those targeted, John Hoagland, insisted that Amway was “trying to silence us,” that “[t]hey don’t 
want the information to get out to other people.” The lawsuit eventually led Schwartz to terminate 
Amway: An Untold Story.   94
 In May 1999, two months after the Utah suit was dismissed and only two weeks after the 
trial actually began, the case in Texas was also tossed. But as in Utah, that was not the end. In March 
2001, the Fifth Circuit Court of  Appeals brought back the suit. However, after the Tenth Circuit 
definitively removed Amway as a defendant from the Utah case, the Texas case was again quashed. 
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In April 2004, Procter & Gamble went back before the Fifth Circuit Court of  Appeals and argued 
for another retrial, but this time it was unsuccessful, with the court ruling against its appeal in July.   95
 The suit against Randy Haugen in Utah ultimately became the site of  Procter & Gamble’s 
triumph, though it would take a couple more years. In August 2003, three years after the Tenth Cir-
cuit had revived it, the case was tossed for a second time. Procter & Gamble appealed, however, and 
unlike in Texas it was successful in having the case brought back before the district court for a third 
time. In March 2007, Randy Haugen and three other distributors were ordered to pay Procter & 
Gamble $19.25 million. The defendants challenged the ruling, claiming that the jury had improperly 
calculated the award amount, and in part on that basis moved for a retrial. Procter & Gamble, 
meanwhile, insisted that the award was not enough and asked instead for $57.75 million. In June 
2008, the distributors lost their motion for a retrial, at which time Procter & Gamble’s call for a larg-
er award was also rejected. That December, the defendants declined to pursue the matter any fur-
ther. Procter & Gamble’s war with Amway and its distributors was over.   96
********** 
 On January 10, 2007, two former Amway distributors, Jeff  Pokorny and Larry Blenn, filed a 
class-action lawsuit against Amway — then called Quixtar, a change that took place at the turn of  
the millennium — along with Ron and Georgia Lee Puryear (who headed the distributor network to 
which they belonged), their uplines, Bill and Peggy Britt, and several companies involved in the pro-
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duction and sale of  Amway tools. “Quixtar, the Kingpin Companies, and the individual defendants 
operate a fraudulent pyramid scheme,” the suit claimed. “The defendant companies and individuals 
recruit people to become Quixtar distributors, entice them to purchase Quixtar products and related 
‘tools and functions’ through material false statements and omissions, and then distribute the pro-
ceeds of  product sales to new recruits based almost exclusively on participants’ recruitment of  new 
victims, rather than on the sale of  products to retail users of  Quixtar’s products. As a result of  in-
vesting in the scheme, plaintiffs and the class have suffered millions of  dollars in losses.”  97
 The complaint offered a sketch of  how Amway/Quixtar’s pyramid scheme purportedly op-
erated. “The first part of  the illegal pyramid scheme consists of  a multi-level marketing business run 
by Quixtar,” the suit explained. Rank-and-file distributors constituted “the bottom rung of  the oper-
ation,” and according to the suit “Quixtar induces new recruits to join the Quixtar program through 
material false representations that such recruits will be able to re-sell Quixtar products for a profit,” 
when really “95% of  Quixtar’s products are not sold to retail consumers, but rather to the IBOs [in-
dependent business owners]” and “[t]he prices IBOs pay for Quixtar’s products (and associated 
costs) are so high that any profit on retail sales is virtually impossible.” In addition to the networks 
themselves, there were the Kingpin Corporations, “a group of  businesses that sell ‘tools and func-
tions’ purportedly to help downline distributors sell the Quixtar products.” This, however, was not 
how the plaintiffs saw them. “These ‘tools and functions’ do not help the distributors sell Quixtar 
products to end consumers at retail,” they claimed, but instead it “teaches them how to recruit new 
distributors, to whom they can sell Quixtar products and, thus, from whom they can earn 
‘bonuses.’”  98
 Of  course, any lawsuit claiming that Amway represented an illegal pyramid scheme had to 
reckon with what the FTC had concluded in 1979. The suit alleged that the company was violating 
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the FTC’s ruling, that “its rules and policies are a sham, meant to give the appearance that Quixtar 
complies with the rules described in Amway, but which are routinely ignored in practice.” The com-
plaint pointed to four elements of  the Amway Sales and Marketing Plan that the FTC had cited as 
proof  that the company was not operating a pyramid scheme: the fact that joining required no large 
upfront investment, the fact that distributors could get refunds on products if  they chose to leave, 
and the seventy percent and ten customer rules. On the first point, the complaint alleged that 
“[w]hile Quixtar’s initial sign up fee is $117.00, in practice, defendants require an initial investment 
by a new distributor in an average amount of  between $2000 and $4000 in the first twelve months, 
through the purchase of  products and the ‘tools and functions’ materials.” The FTC’s ruling, in oth-
er words, did not take into account the sprawling empire of  secondary materials that had grown up 
alongside the company.   99
 The other provisions, it claimed, did not really function as allegedly claimed. Regarding re-
funds, it stated that “in practice the lower level distributor is at the mercy of  whatever price its up-
line distributor decides to pay for the returned inventory, which is typically a fraction of  the original 
price paid by the distributor” and that “distributors are uniformly discouraged from asking for a 
buyback,” which was also true of  any tools that a distributor might have purchased. The seventy 
percent rule, meanwhile, was meaningless because “Quixtar….allows product purchases for self-
consumption by IBOs and sales to the downline distributors to count toward the 70% retail sales.” 
Ditto with the ten customer rule. According to the suit, “Quixtar’s business plan….does not require 
distributors to sell products to any true unaffiliated retail customers,” and it relies upon “a ‘self-re-
porting’ system for distributors to certify that they comply with this policy,” which it claimed was 
regularly forged.  100
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 The parties reached a settlement on November 3, 2010. In exchange for not admitting any 
guilt, Amway agreed to make certain tweaks to its business model, such as allowing distributors who 
leave the business within ninety days of  joining to get their sign-up fee refunded, as well as setting 
aside fifty-five million dollars for the aggrieved distributors. Of  that, thirty-four million was for 
those who left the business after one year as well as those who “suffered special hardships resulting 
from their recruitment and service as an IBO,” which was defined as “a demonstrable loss of  $2,500 
or greater resulting from recruitment and service as a Quixtar IBO,” along with various legal costs. 
The remaining twenty-one million, meanwhile, went to those who had left the business and had 
spent a minimum of  one hundred dollars on tools and functions. In a statement released after the 
settlement was filed, Doug DeVos and Steve Van Andel said that while they believed that “[t]he suit 
contains strong and disagreeable allegations and language that we categorically reject,” they conced-
ed that “in past years, our North American business did not always train and support IBOs well 
enough, and as a result, best business practices were not always followed when promoting the busi-
ness.” They insisted that “the company and its IBO leaders take responsibility for all past issues, and 
we take responsibility for fixing them.”  101
 Since the mid-1970s, Amway has been subjected to scrutiny and attack from a number of  
corners: government agencies, courts, media outlets, and outspoken former distributors. That it be-
gan when it did was a function of  changes in the macroeconomy, Amway’s growing stature within 
the direct sales industry, and the confluence of  consumer and anti-cult activism. Everything from 
how the company treated its competitors to the very legitimacy of  the entire enterprise has been dis-
sected and analyzed. For their part, the cofounders were sanguine about all the attention. In his au-
 Class Action Settlement Agreement, Jeff  Pokorny, Larry Blenn, and Kenneth Busiere on behalf  of  themselves and those similarly 101
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tobiography, Richard DeVos wrote that “[a]ll of  these government and media experiences, mostly 
negative, became just some of  the challenges we had to overcome for the survival of  Amway.” He 
thought that “the heightened attention from news media actually was beneficial in helping us see 
ourselves as others see us,” which, he said, allowed the company “to zero in on making some 
changes by addressing the isolated incidents that contributed to misperceptions.” Referring to the 
FTC and Wisconsin cases, Jay Van Andel said that “these early challenges to our business practices 
drove home to Rich and me the importance of  understanding and participating in the political 
process.” In the end, DeVos shrugged it all off: “Anyone who rises high enough above the crowd 
will sooner or later draw the attention of  critics. We weathered the storms and moved on.”   102
 Although Amway managed to become a multi-billion dollar company despite the many as-
saults on its reputation, the fact that courts were still adjudicating the question of  whether or not 
Amway was a pyramid scheme in the late 2000s demonstrates that these attacks have had significant 
staying power. Collectively, the FTC investigation, the Wisconsin case, the Avon takeover bid, the 
Procter & Gamble defamation saga, and the anti-Amway exposés offer a perspective on Amway’s 
business model and its corporate philosophy that diverges from what the cofounders and company 
boosters have presented over the years. Pro-Amway forces have portrayed the company as a liberat-
ing alternative to salaried employment, the embodiment of  a more cooperative, compassionate capi-
talism, a way to attain vast riches, a uniter of  families, and a source of  community and friendship. By 
contrast, the image painted by investigators, plaintiffs, attorneys, and ex-distributors is of  a company 
that preys on vulnerable people and uses false promises to part them from their money, that has cre-
ated a system of  organized exploitation in which a handful of  distributors at the top get very rich 
while those beneath them are left saddled with debt and broken dreams, that makes people miser-
able and alienates them from friends and family, and that has sought to eliminate its competition in 
ways that are shady at best and illegal at worst. In several instances, particularly the legal cases, the 
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attacks have proven strong enough to compel Amway to make key changes to its business model, 
though obviously that has not put the accusations to bed. 
 In addition to challenging the company’s self-image, the critiques and the investigations raise 
important questions about the line between legitimate and illegitimate tactics in the world of  direct 
sales, and, more fundamentally, about the nature and promise of  direct sales itself. When do claims 
about the amount of  money a distributor can make go from puffery — the defense used in the Wis-
consin case — to outright deception? Just how many people have to succeed in something like 
Amway for it to not be a scam? Does the fact that some have struck it rich mean that anyone can, and 
that therefore the promises are not in fact hollow? When someone does fail, is it because that person 
did not try hard enough, or their sponsor was not involved enough, or because the business itself  is 
somehow fatally flawed? And what counts as success or failure anyway? 
 As these controversies raged in the United States, Amway was expanding its global footprint, 
transforming from a purely American enterprise to a multinational one. And as it turned out, the 
company’s business model and practices had enemies beyond America’s borders. 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IV 
A Cosmopolitan Character 
It requires considerable imagination to picture the walls of  the Van Andel and DeVos basements 
that defined the world of  Amway less than three decades ago and see this cramped space magically 
expanding into facilities serving some 40 countries and territories. Yet it does not stretch credulity 
quite so much to picture circles of  people reaching out to more and more circles of  people until 
eventually their legions encompass the globe. The people-to-people image, by contrast to the image 
of  physical expansion, is more like an arithmetical progression. Yet the numbers are secondary to 
the philosophy and concept that nurtured the growth and made it possible. 
-Wilbur Cross and Gordon Olson  1
 On August 9, 1976, the Grand Rapids Press reported on a group of  college students from Yu-
goslavia who had taken a tour of  Amway World Headquarters the week prior. They were visiting 
students at Grand Valley State Colleges (now Grand Valley State University). As the Press told it, the 
tour did not seem to sell the students on the virtues of  free enterprise. One, Alma Sarajlic, contrast-
ed American-style capitalism with Yugoslavia’s system of  worker self-management, saying that 
“[y]our decisions here go from top to bottom” whereas “[o]urs go from bottom to top.” Meanwhile, 
another, Neven Kvlenovic, complained that “[w]e didn’t talk to any workers” and instead they had to 
“take management’s word on things.” The article’s author, Mary Kramer, summarized the students’s 
attitudes this way: “Given the choice between the Yugoslavian economic system and the United 
States’ gross national product, the students chose home.”  2
 These Yugoslavs were by no means the first foreigners exposed to Amway. By the time they 
toured Amway’s headquarters, the company was already in Canada, Australia, Ireland, the United 
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Kingdom, and West Germany. In fact, that same year saw the company expand into Malaysia as well. 
And the fact that the Yugoslavs were unimpressed by Amway was not out of  the ordinary for for-
eigners who have encountered the company.  3
 This chapter chronicles Amway’s overseas expansion. Although Amway continues to remain 
headquartered in Ada, Michigan and to manufacture much of  its product line there, it is, for all in-
tents and purposes, transnational. The company’s website declares that “Amway is a global commu-
nity, operating in more than 100 countries and territories[.]” Furthermore, the vast majority of  
Amway’s sales — ninety percent in 2009 — now occur in overseas markets. Accordingly, one cannot 
understand how Amway became one of  the largest and most profitable direct sales companies in the 
world without surveying its growth outside of  the United States.   4
 Amway offers a useful case study in understanding the relationship between globalization 
and homogenization. Scholars have debated whether and to what extent a global monoculture has 
emerged as a result of  the spread of  (Western) businesses and their associated brands and products 
around the world. John Tomlinson accepted the reality of  homogenization, writing that “it is fairly 
clear that a broad process of  convergence seems to be occurring in the cultures of  the world.” 
Christophe Germann pointed to the global movie industry as an example of  homogenization.   5
 Others have been more skeptical. Arjun Appadurai believed that claims about a trend toward 
homogenization failed to appreciate that “at least as rapidly as forces from various metropolises are 
brought into new societies they tend to become indigenized in one or other way[.]” Anthony Smith, 
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while pointing out some examples of  emerging regional/supra-national “culture areas,” nevertheless 
concluded that “we are still far from even mapping out the kind of  global culture and cosmopolitan 
ideal that can truly supersede a world of  nations[.]” Surveying the global architecture scene, Anthony 
King believed that “there is indeed a world or global culture which is largely the product of  a world 
political economy of  capitalism,” although “it is not necessarily….a homogenizing one.” Marjorie 
Ferguson identified “global cultural homogeneity” as one of  the “seven myths about globalization.” 
According to her, this myth assumed “the existence of  a global cultural economy that ignores the 
counter pull of  localism and the rich traditions of  variance[.]” Roland Robertson thought that the 
homogenization argument created a false binary between “global” and “local.” Rather than globaliza-
tion, he preferred the concept of  “glocalisation,” which described an economic system characterized 
by “the tailoring and advertising of  goods and services on a global or near-global basis to increasing-
ly differentiated local and particular markets.” Benjamin Barber posited that globalization was simul-
taneously generating two antagonistic but interconnected realities: Jihad and McWorld. “Jihad and 
McWorld,” he wrote, “operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial 
hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic bor-
ders from within, the other making national borders porous from without.” Surveying the literature 
on globalization and culture, Douglas Goodman summarized its findings thusly: “To the extent that 
a global culture is emerging, it does not appear to be eliminating diversity, instead it is providing a 
common framework for heterogeneity.”  6
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 Amway illustrates the compatibility between particularism and universalism — to borrow 
Robertson’s terms — in the modern-day global economy. In order to be successful in so many dif-
ferent overseas markets, Amway has had to engage in glocalisation, making changes, large and small, 
to its business model, depending on local circumstances. One of  the most obvious, of  course, has 
involved language. A March 1980 article in the Grand Rapids Press profiled the company’s translation 
department, which at the time employed thirteen linguists who were tasked with translating adver-
tisements, packaging, and more from English into the languages of  the various countries in which 
Amway operated at the time. Amway has also had to modify its product line to suit the tastes and 
preferences of  consumers in certain countries. In their semi-official history of  the company, Wilbur 
Cross and Gordon Olson wrote that “[l]aundry compounds have to be modified, for example, for 
use in Malaysia where many women wash clothes in cool river water or (at the opposite end of  the 
scale) for Europe, where the conventional washing machine heats its water to the boiling point” and 
“[i]nsect sprays bound for Australia have to be specially formulated to counterattack the unique 
species of  household pests that live there.” And in the case of  its biggest national market, China, 
Amway had to break with direct selling altogether, at least for a time. At the same time that Amway 
has localized its products and sales practices, the company and its boosters have made explicitly uni-
versalist claims about the business, touting Amway’s success on the international stage as proof  that 
the company’s principles — free enterprise, self-reliance, individualism — transcend cultures and 
borders and in fact represent shared human values.   7
 Of  course, corporate messaging is one thing, reality another. The reaction to Amway in the 
various countries that it has expanded into has been decidedly mixed. Obviously, Amway would not 
have been able to make ninety percent of  its sales abroad without some enthusiasm for it and its 
products in these markets. But Amway has also attracted significant suspicion and scrutiny overseas 
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of  the sort that has occurred in the United States. In several countries, Amway’s business model has 
been looked upon as inherently deceptive, a get-rich-quick scheme meant to dupe people out of  
their money, which in some cases triggered significant grassroots opposition to the company. A 
number of  governments have also investigated Amway for allegations that it engaged in fraudulent 
activity, most notably in Canada, South Korea, and India. In China, concern about the pernicious 
social consequences of  direct selling reached such a fever pitch that, in 1998, the government out-
lawed the practice entirely.  
 Although it aims to offer a comprehensive overview of  Amway’s expansion into various 
non-U.S. markets from the early 1960s to the 2000s, much of  this chapter focuses on an in-depth 
look at a sample of  national and regional case studies: Canada, Japan, Eastern Europe, China, South 
Korea, and India. These examples were chosen both because Amway’s activities in these countries/
regions are well-documented and because each occupies a place of  special significance in the history 
of  Amway’s global growth. 
********** 
 Amway wasted no time setting its sights beyond the United States. In 1962, only three years 
after the company was started, DeVos and Van Andel claimed their first “foreign” market: Canada. 
Amway Canada was a logical extension of  a transnational network that had started forming organi-
cally in Detroit, where American Amway distributors had discovered that Canadians were interested 
in buying from them and were itching to tap into that market. Four years later, Canada accounted for 
five percent of  the company’s sales.   8
 Amway Canada was a trial run for some of  the challenges that Amway would face in other 
countries. For one, Canada presented certain logistical hurdles. One involved language. When 
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Amway Canada first started off, everything from copies of  the Plan to product labels was in English, 
so the company had to become bilingual in order to accommodate French Canadians. Additionally, 
Amway needed to create an infrastructure for getting its goods into Canada, as well as to familiarize 
itself  with all the rules and regulations that went along with that. As we will see, the way Amway 
went about exporting its products was at the center of  a decade-long case that the government of  
Canada brought against the corporation.       9
 The nitty-gritty of  operating a foreign subsidiary was not the only challenge that Amway 
confronted in Canada. It also faced controversy over its business practices and the actions of  some 
of  its distributors that foreshadowed trouble it would confront elsewhere. In the winter of  1982 and 
spring of  1983, at the same time that the criminal tax evasion case against the corporation was un-
folding (more on that presently), concerns arose over attempts by Amway distributors to influence 
Canadian politics, specifically through the country’s Progressive Conservative Party, a predecessor to 
the modern-day Conservative Party. The Associated Press reported in December that “Amway distrib-
utors are prominent among new members in at least three southern Ontario ridings (districts) and 
have voted as a bloc to elect delegates to decide Joe Clark’s future as leader of  the party at its January 
convention.” Tory politicians were divided about how to treat this growing force within their coali-
tion. According to the AP, “[s]ome MPs say the party should be happy to attract free-enterprise 
apostles,” while others — the article specifically referenced a member of  Parliament from Manitoba 
named Jake Epp — worried that “the new converts are being organized to push the party farther to 
the right and perhaps to get rid of  Clark.”   10
 Within the party, distributors were particularly close to Peter Pocklington, the billionaire 
owner of  the Edmunton Oilers hockey team who, in 1983, hoped to displace Pierre Trudeau as 
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prime minister. Pocklington believed that Trudeau was “trying to take Canada to state socialism” and 
was “pushing American companies out” as well as “nationalizing the companies here.” Van Andel 
brought up the connection between Pocklington and Canadian Amway distributors in his autobiog-
raphy, insinuating that it was the reason that the Canadian government harassed the company. The 
Associated Press reported that “[i]n September [of  1982], Pocklington addressed two ‘free-enterprise 
rallies’ sponsored by local Amway distributors [in Ottawa] and urged his audiences to get involved in 
politics by joining the Tories.” And indeed, Amway distributors made their presence felt in local 
Tory politics. At a delegate election in Brantford, Ontario in April 1983, for example, “[t]he four se-
nior delegates elected were all well-known local Conservatives — the Establishment — but two were 
listed on the New Right slate and a third won only through a last-ballot swing of  Amway-directed 
votes. Two of  the four alternates were Amway distributors.” That same month, at a delegate race in 
British Columbia, an Amway distributor named Ross Phelps signed up two hundred and fifty new 
party members in order to tip the scales in favor of  his preferred candidates. The Associated Press re-
ported at the time that “a number of  the local party’s executive members are threatening to resign in 
protest over the tactics” and that the head of  the local party “collapsed and required hospital treat-
ment after the controversial meeting.”   11
 Canada is most known in Amway’s history for the tax evasion case brought against it by the 
Canadian government in the early 1980s. The episode began in July 1982, when Revenue Canada — 
the country’s equivalent of  the IRS — filed four civil suits claiming that between 1977 and 1980, 
Amway had deliberately lowballed the dollar value of  its products in an attempt to lower the amount 
of  import duties it had to pay. Revenue Canada wanted the company to pay $150 million. Amway 
attempted to settle the cases, but after it refused an offer from Revenue Canada in November, the 
 “Some Canadian Politicians Warn Of  ‘Infiltration’ by Amway People”; Pocklington quoted in Dave Anderson, “Peter 11
Puck’s Campaign,” New York Times, May 15, 1983, 205; Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 84; Peter Calamai, “Tories con-
cerned about Amway connection,” Medicine Hat News, June 9, 1983, 32; “Not the Canadian Way!: Amway Distributor’s 
‘Instant Tories’ Prevail in Controversial Vote,” The Grand Rapids Press, April 8, 1983, 1A, 2A, GRPC.
  !217
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which had also been looking into Amway since 1979, opened a 
criminal case, charging DeVos, Van Andel, and two company vice presidents, C. Dale Discher and 
William Halliday, with fraud. The RCMP’s case covered a much longer time period than Revenue 
Canada’s, stretching all the way back to 1965, although the amount of  money they were after was 
only $28 million.   12
 Using internal company documents that it obtained, the Detroit Free Press detailed how this 
fraud occurred: 
Under Canadian law, imports are valued for Customs duties according to the price of  the first “arm’s 
length transaction,” meaning the first sale to an independent company or distributor. 
In Amway’s case, the Canadian government decided in February 1965, an arm’s length transaction 
would mean the sale of  goods by Amway to its distributors…. 
  
The scheme was to first persuade the Canadian authorities that Amway’s initial sales were made to 
warehouses, not individuals. Amway could then set an artificially low price for the phony sales to the 
warehouses, and then pay duty on those lower artificial prices. 
Amway used what internal Amway memos refer to as “dummy invoices” from two Amway-leased 
warehouses in Denver, Colo., and Portland, Ore., to demonstrate that sales by Amway in the United 
States were to warehouses, not distributors. 
By the mid-1970s, Amway, fearing that the Canadians might catch on to its scheme, decided to in-
clude an additional layer of  obfuscation: 
Amway built a warehouse in Hawaii to handle its goods shipped there. Amway also formed a com-
pany, the Hawaiian Distribution Corp. 
Next, Amway established a foundation, the Amway Corporation Charitable Trust. 
  
Then, Amway donated all 20,000 shares of  the Hawaii Distribution Corp. to the foundation.  
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It is a close relationship. Three of  the top officers of  the warehouse company also direct the opera-
tions of  the foundation. The president of  the Hawaii warehouse company is a former Amway em-
ploye. And the Hawaii firm uses Amway’s sales and marketing plans and even its warehouse manual. 
  
But on the papers submitted by Amway to Canadian Customs authorities, it appeared as if  Amway 
were selling goods to a completely independent warehouse and that this “arm’s length” transaction 
was typical of  Amway’s business dealings in the United States.  13
 On November 17th, the company released a statement declaring that “Amway Corp. and its 
executives are totally innocent of  any wrongdoing and owe the Canadian government nothing,” call-
ing the charges “totally unjustified[.]” At a press conference held that same day, the cofounders in-
sisted that the Canadian government was aware of  how the company had been importing goods into 
the country. They also claimed that the Canadian government had signed off  on the arrangement 
back in 1965, which the Canadians disputed.   14
 DeVos, Van Andel, Discher, and Halliday were scheduled to appear in court in Ottawa on 
November 30th to answer the charges. They did not. A statement issued by the company on the 
twenty-ninth and reprinted in several major newspapers declared that the four men “refuse to give 
up their rights as Americans” and “hav[e] elected to have their rights vindicated in U.S. courts[.]” In 
response, prosecutors in Canada announced that they would open extradition proceedings, which 
they did officially on December 1st. At the next court date, which was on April 18, 1983, the Amway 
executives, predictably, failed to appear. Instead, DeVos gave a speech before the Economic Club of  
Grand Rapids in which he drummed up support for a new arena in downtown Grand Rapids. It was 
not until September 2, 1983 that the Canadian government officially asked the U.S. State Depart-
ment to extradite the four men. As a result, a court proceeding scheduled for the ninth was moved 
to February 17th while prosecutors waited for the request to be processed. As it happened, a month 
after that request was submitted, Congress considered legislation that would have made it easier for 
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 “Amway says it is innocent of  charges,” Detroit Free Press, November 17, 1982, 1A, GRPC; Ed Hoogterp, “Old Agree14 -
ment Key to Amway Defense,” The Grand Rapids Press, November 18, 1982, 2A, GRPC.
  !219
individuals to challenge attempts to extradite them to other countries, although reporting at the time 
indicated that, if  passed, it would probably have no impact on the Amway case.  15
 Ultimately, none of  it mattered. On November 10, 1983, Amway reached an agreement with 
the Canadian government in which the corporation pled guilty to fraud and, in return, charges 
against DeVos and the others were dropped. As part of  its plea, Amway was slapped with a twenty 
million dollar fine. Three days later, Amway ran a full-page ad in the Grand Rapids Press as well as 
other newspapers titled “One Settlement Lawyers Didn’t Recommend.” The company explained that 
it took the deal because the suit had become a burden on the business and promised “to rededicate 
[itself] to keep building upon the firm principles that made this company one of  North America’s 
great success stories.” Amway distributors by and large shrugged off  the news. Tim Moore, a dis-
tributor from Northville, Michigan, described the plea and fine to the Detroit News as “part of  the 
cost of  doing business,” while Carolyn Boots of  Oxford, Michigan said that “[t]he people that buy 
from me believe in the product and my people will continue to believe in it.” On the other side of  
the border, Toronto distributor Donald Parsons echoed the sentiment, saying that “[w]ithin three to 
four months, the people who like the products will reorder them,” adding that he thought that the 
case only happened in the first place because “[t]he Canadian government is broke now, so they are 
after everybody.” On February 26, 1984, the Grand Rapids Press ran an article on DeVos’s appearance 
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at a distributor rally in Montreal three days earlier. According to the Press, distributors gave DeVos “a 
hero’s welcome,” and “[t]ears well[ed] in their eyes” when he took the stage.   16
 Unfortunately for Amway, settling the criminal case was just the beginning. There was, after 
all, still the civil case filed by Revenue Canada. In August 1984, Revenue Canada said it would go 
after Amway for $105 million. Amway challenged the amount, arguing, in the words of  general 
counsel Otto Stolz, that “the maximum exposure you can have is the whole worth of  the Canadian 
company,” which he estimated at around seven million dollars, and that “[t]here is absolutely no 
question that there is no liability on behalf  of  the U.S. company.” Once again, the question of  
whether or not the cofounders would be called to testify came up. In November 1985, Stolz argued 
that the cofounders knew little about the nitty-gritty of  the import arrangement that the company 
had with the Canadian government and that therefore they should not have to come to court. In 
addition, the attorney representing Amway in Canada, Marc Noel, insisted that the cofounders had a 
right against self-incrimination that protected them from testifying against their will. The prosecu-
tion, meanwhile, argued that self-incrimination did not apply since this was a civil matter. A judge 
ruled in June 1986 that the cofounders could be compelled to testify. Amway managed to get the 
ruling overturned before the Federal Court of  Appeals, at which point Revenue Canada took the 
case to the Canadian Supreme Court, which ruled against the cofounders in January 1989. Just as in 
the criminal case, though, the cofounders never ended up appearing in court. In September 1989, 
Amway and Revenue Canada agreed to a thirty-eight million dollar settlement. Stolz said that the 
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company took the settlement because it “wanted to finally and completely resolve this matter” and 
that the amount “has a minimal impact on the financial condition of  Amway.”  17
 Both of  the cofounders addressed the Canada affair in their autobiographies — Van Andel 
even devoted an entire chapter to it. DeVos stressed how the cases undermined Amway’s image, 
writing, “I was reluctant to visit our Amway Grand Plaza Hotel in downtown Grand Rapids at that 
time because of  the feeling that people would have bad things to say.” The episode apparently 
weighed on him and his family. “I lost sleep over the Canadian suit,” he recalled, and “I remember 
the kids expressing their concerns about the case at the dinner table and it being a major topic in our 
family prayers — including some tearful ones.” Both he and Van Andel believed that the suits were 
proof  that the Canadian government had it out for Amway, with DeVos saying that “[a]s time went 
on, it became evident to me that they didn’t like our promotion of  free enterprise” and Van Andel 
similarly writing that “we began to suspect that the animosity Canadian prime minister Pierre 
Trudeau had toward business, and American business in particular, might be filtering through to this 
situation.” Both stressed the loyalty that many Canadian distributors displayed throughout the or-
deal. Van Andel recalled “[s]upportive letters and phone calls from distributors, friends, suppliers, 
and customers pour[ing] into corporate headquarters in Ada,” while DeVos pointed out that al-
though some left the business, they were nonetheless “grateful for the many who stuck with us and 
continued to build their businesses.”  18
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 Canada was not the only country that Amway set up in in the 1960s. There was also Puerto 
Rico, which, like Canada, was not exactly a foreign market, since the island was a U.S. territory, 
though it did raise its own logistical difficulties, both with respect to language as well as delivering 
inventory from the mainland. The 1970s saw Amway enter its first bona fide foreign market, Australia, 
in 1971. Amway came to Australia by an unusual route. An Australian man trademarked the Amway 
name — DeVos pointed out in his autobiography that “[a] common practice among Australians was 
registering the names of  U.S. companies that they figured might one day open in their country” — 
and when DeVos purchased it from him so that Amway could actually operate there, he subsequent-
ly signed up to be the country’s first distributor. DeVos wrote that initially “[w]e thought Aussies 
might object to the name AMWAY because it was American,” only to discover that “[t]hey loved the 
‘American’ idea”: “We tried to manufacture in Australia, but found that Australians were much hap-
pier to have our products made in Ada.” In February 1972, the Grand Rapids Press ran a profile of  
Bill and Kathy Hemmer, an American couple who moved to Australia to recruit people into Amway. 
The Press reported that “[b]y December [1971], the Hemmers had set up 1,500 independent distribu-
tors for Amway, had the office running in Sydney and were on their way back to the States.” After 
Australia came the United Kingdom in 1973, followed by Hong Kong (1974), West Germany (1975), 
and Malaysia (1976).  19
 Amway’s most important move of  the 1970s happened at the very end of  the decade, when, 
in 1979, it came to Japan. Amway quickly became one of  the best-performing companies in the 
country. In January 1990, the Chicago Tribune reported that “Amway is the seventh-fastest-growing 
company of  all companies in Japan — foreign or domestic — and ranks as the 166th-largest of  
90,000 corporations in Japan” and that “[b]etween 1983 and 1987, Amway’s growth rate in Japan 
was a record-setting 142.1 percent, outperforming in Japan such giants as E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
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& Co., Dow Corning Corp., International Business Machines Corp., Coca-Cola Co., NCR Corp., 
Johnson & Johnson and Mobil Corp.” In April 1991, Amway Japan made a major break with com-
pany tradition when it went public, putting eight percent of  its shares up for sale on the Japanese 
stock market to raise money for further global expansion. The stock’s debut beat investor expecta-
tions. In an article published two days before they became available, the Grand Rapids Press reported 
that the stocks were estimated to trade somewhere between 4,870 and 6,430 yen — $36.07 and 
$47.62, respectively — and that “Amway’s stock price would climb to 8,000 yen a share during the 
first week.” The stock wound up hitting 9,000 yen on the first day of  trading. Unfortunately for 
Amway, the combination of  macroeconomic problems in Japan and a resulting slump in sales hurt 
its stock. After peaking at 14,200 yen in June 1991, it was down to a mere 2,550 yen by late April 
1992. Nevertheless, Amway decided to sell off  another ten million shares in May 1994; of  these, 
6.25 million were “American Depository Shares” available to buyers in the United States.   20
 Amway succeeded in Japan because it managed at once to embrace and overcome elements 
of  local society and culture. On the one hand, much like in the United States, Amway provided an 
outlet for those who felt dissatisfied in conventional jobs. The Wall Street Journal noted in September 
1990 that “[m]any of  the distributors are refugees from the stultifying, hierarchical world of  Ja-
panese big business” who “want to work for themselves, and be paid according to their perfor-
mance, not according to their seniority.” As a result, Amway’s distributor force in Japan tended to be 
young, comprised of  individuals who would ordinarily just be starting out at the bottom of  a corpo-
rate ladder. The Amway opportunity proved especially alluring to Japanese women. An article in the 
Grand Rapids Press indicated that “Amway’s business style, where anyone regardless of  gender has the 
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same opportunity, has struck a responsive chord among women in this very traditional — read very 
male-dominated — nation[.]” Amway additionally benefitted from Japan’s cultural stress on social 
ties. The Wall Street Journal argued that “the real secret of  the distributors’ success lies in the way 
Amway’s cultish corporate culture plays to Japan’s unchanged emphasis on close personal relation-
ships and group mentality.”   21
 That said, Amway did encounter some institutional roadblocks in Japan. In a May 1994 in-
terview, Amway Japan’s president Richard Johnson said that the company struggled at first because 
“[t]he bureaucracy that had to approve the various activities that we engage in was reluctant, because 
they didn’t understand exactly what we meant by bonuses, multiple levels, et cetera.” In addition, the 
Japanese economy at the time was dominated by what were known as keiretsu. Under this system, 
businesses were contracted to sell or distribute goods only from a specific set of  companies, with 
the consequence that foreign corporations like Amway sometimes found themselves effectively 
locked out of  certain markets. Because of  this, Amway had to devote considerable resources to cre-
ating an infrastructure that circumvented the keiretsu. Another, albeit minor, example of  the impact 
of  Japanese culture on Amway’s business came in September 1989, when the New York Times report-
ed that the company saw a seven percent drop in sales over the preceding twelve months on account 
of  the passing of  Emperor Hirohito.  22
 After impressive growth throughout the 1980s and the first half  of  the 1990s, Amway Japan 
ran into trouble beginning in the mid-nineties. As in other Asian markets at around the same time 
(see below), Amway’s public image came under fire. The Grand Rapids Business Journal reported in 
February 1999 that “the Japanese Consumer Information Center Kokumin Seikatu Center, a gov-
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ernment-run ‘Better Business Bureau,’ complained to the Japanese national legislature that Amway 
was the only company that generated more than 1,000 ‘inquiries and claims’ each year for four years 
running.” While Amway Japan insisted that that figure misrepresented the actual extent of  problems 
that people had with the company, it nevertheless opened the floodgates for attacks on the company 
in the Japanese media. Minor controversies also arose around government employees doing Amway 
on the job. One such case occurred in May 1998, when around two dozen Japanese soldiers were 
reprimanded for selling Amway products on base on the grounds that it was undermining 
discipline.   23
 Amway Japan also found itself  the victim of  a regional economic downturn. In a February 
1999 article, the Grand Rapids Business Journal declared that “[i]n 1998, the Asian recession caught up 
with Amway,” noting that that year saw a 42.6 percent decline in the price of  Amway Japan’s stock. 
The recession contributed to an increase in the price of  the yen against the dollar, which, combined 
with the general state of  the economy, led Japanese consumers to substitute away from Amway 
products. A piece that ran in the Grand Rapids Business Journal in July 1999 captured the precarious 
state of  the company’s finances. It reported that “[n]et sales for the third quarter, ended May 31, 
plunged 29.8 percent from the same period a year earlier, to $274.3 million” and that “[t]hird quarter 
operating income declined 35.9 percent while net income was down 19.5 percent.” More specifically, 
“[s]ales of  personal care products, the company’s largest market segment, have declined 29.7 per-
cent” while “the largest product line decline was 42.3 percent, which occurred in housewares.”  24
********** 
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 The 1980s saw Amway enter ten new countries, among them Taiwan in 1982. The 1990s, 
however, were arguably the most consequential decade in Amway’s global expansion, on account of  
three major developments: Amway’s penetration into Eastern Europe following the collapse of  
Communist rule; its arrival in the world’s two most populous nations, India and China; and a virulent 
case of  anti-Amway pushback in South Korea.  25
 The end of  the Cold War provided Amway the opportunity to set up shop in Eastern as well 
as Western Europe. The company wasted no time. In July 1990, Amway was already making inroads 
into East Germany following the country’s de facto reunification. Amway’s chief  operating officer Bill 
Nicholson said at the time that “[e]very morning when our people come to work, they say there are 
40 to 60 people in line at the the [sic] Berlin pick up center.” The company’s first bona fide eastern 
market was Hungary, which started up in June 1991 but had been in the works since 1988, when 
Hungary was still a Communist state. Two years after opening, there were ninety-four thousand dis-
tributors in Hungary, and sales in 1993 hit thirty-nine million dollars. The Washington Post wrote in 
August 1994 that although other American direct sales firms, including Avon and Tupperware, were 
also in Hungary, Amway was “the heavyweight champion[.]”   26
 The Post pointed to several factors to explain Amway’s success in Hungary, which no doubt 
also applied in varying degrees to other former East Bloc states. For one, the years immediately fol-
lowing the end of  Communist rule in Hungary were characterized by economic deprivation: the Post 
noted that “[p]rice increases and currency devaluations have crippled buying ability, while earnings 
have remained fixed and pensions have steadily lost value.” Additionally, “[t]he promises of  privati-
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zation have yielded immediate wealth for a select few, and the country has the highest suicide rate in 
the world.” Against this, companies like Amway “offer[ed] strong structure, corporate polish, mas-
sive motivational support and an opportunity at residual income and relative wealth.” Along with the 
promise of  money, Tamas Volgyes, an Amway distributor in Hungary, said that Amway was also ap-
pealing because it was “the only business a person can start in Hungary without significant capital.” 
All one needed was the equivalent of  seventy-five U.S. dollars, which, according to the Chicago Tri-
bune, was “roughly half  an average month’s wages” at that time.  27
 After Hungary, Amway had wanted to go into Yugoslavia, but the outbreak of  civil war in 
1991 made that impossible. (Amway eventually established a foothold in the former Yugoslavia four 
years later, when it came to Slovenia.) Instead, its next market was Poland in December 1992: the 
company projected thirty million dollars in sales over the first twelve months. In 1998, Amway 
Poland was at the center of  a minor controversy on account of  a documentary called Welcome to Life, 
which depicted the corporation as well as distributor rallies in a negative light. In response, Amway 
sued to prevent the distribution of  the film. That, in turn, resulted in fifty Polish writers and journal-
ists sending a letter to the country’s president arguing that Amway’s actions were antithetical to free-
dom of  expression. As of  2009, the film was still tied up in litigation.   28
 After Poland, Amway migrated to the recently-separated Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
March and November of  1994, respectively. In just two weeks, Amway managed to sign up twenty 
thousand Czechs as distributors, and the company anticipated another fifty-five thousand over the 
next year. By this point, Amway had an estimated quarter-million distributors across the former East 
Bloc. Notably, it took Amway a long time to enter Russia. In February 1994, the Grand Rapids Busi-
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ness Journal reported that “Amway officials have made two fact-finding trips to Russia in the past 
year” but that they were hesitant about opening a subsidiary due to concerns about internal stability. 
Amway’s vice president of  new market development, James Payne, said at the time that while he 
thought Russia would eventually “be a positive market,” in the immediate future “you have crime 
over there that’s very frightening, in terms of  the black market activities that are taking place” and 
“[t]he political environment — it’s kind of  wait-and-see these last few months to see what’s happen-
ing.” Because of  that, the article indicated that Amway preferred to direct its attention and resources 
elsewhere, particularly Asia. Amway ultimately came to Russia in March 2005.  29
 As Amway expanded its presence in the former East Bloc, on the other side of  the planet, 
the company was making further inroads into key Asian markets. Amway’s South Korea division of-
ficially came to life on May 1, 1991. Setting up shop in the Republic of  Korea required compromise 
on the part of  both Amway and the South Korean government. It took Amway four years longer 
than anticipated to get into Korea because South Korean law required the company to have a factory 
in the country, which cost twelve million dollars to build. While Amway was compelled to comply 
with Korean economic regulations in this instance, it got a reprieve from other rules. “Korean laws 
originally barred Amway from retailing U.S.-made goods,” the Grand Rapids Press reported, “but they 
have been changed to accommodate Amway’s system of  retailing[.]” Amway’s expectations for 
South Korea were high. Bill Nicholson posited that “[o]ur success in the Pacific Rim — especially in 
Japan, where Amway has been the fastest growing U.S. company — indicates similar success in Ko-
rea.” Predictions were that Amway Korea would sign up as many as thirty-five thousand people in 
1991.   30
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 Amway Korea started off  well enough. Two years in, the Grand Rapids Press reported that it 
was co-sponsoring “an exhibit centered on the themes of  technology, space, the earth and recycling” 
that would represent the United States at Taejon Expo ’93. In June 1993, however, Amway Korea 
became embroiled in its first major controversy when, at the very end of  the month, two company 
executives, David Ussery and Terence Beckering, were arrested for allegedly violating the Door-to-
Door Sales Act, an anti-pyramid scheme law that had been adopted the year before. The law had 
attracted the attention of  American politicians back in 1991, when it was just a bill, due to worries 
that it would shut companies like Amway out of  the country: among those who reached out to the 
Korean government about the law were the Secretary of  Commerce and the majority leader of  the 
House of  Representatives. As in China (more about it presently), there were suspicions in South Ko-
rea about the legitimacy of  direct sales companies. The prosecutor in charge of  the case against the 
Amway officials alleged that overseas companies like Amway were “mak[ing] large profits in a short 
period….and then leav[ing] Korea.” Moreover, he said, they had the potential to “greatly affect do-
mestic industries” and thereby cause “serious social disorder.” The arrests caused a bit of  an in-
ternational stir, since they came a little over a week before President Clinton was due to visit the 
country. The company was eventually fined for failing to comply with the law.  31
 The arrest of  Amway Korea’s top officials, though dramatic, paled in comparison to the 
popular furor that erupted just four years later. In the spring of  1997, an organization called the 
Anti-Amway Committee was formed. It, along with other public interest groups, trained its sights on 
Amway’s detergent, Dish Drops, which they attacked for having pollutants among its ingredients. 
Additionally, they alleged that Dish Drops were overpriced compared to Korean-made detergents. 
They also criticized the company for running ads touting the superiority of  Dish Drops to its alter-
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natives, as South Korean law prohibited companies from making such claims in their advertisements. 
An anti-Amway advertising campaign was launched, complete with banners emblazoned with the 
message “It was all a lie, Amway detergent is not superior[.]” In addition to these groups, the Korea 
Soap and Detergent Association, an industry trade group, also went after Amway, claiming that 
“[f]amilies, friendships and even communities” were being “destroyed” by the company because dis-
tributors were “pressure[d] to sell to friends and associates.”  The Association also blamed Amway 
for the country’s trade deficit, despite the fact that fewer than 0.1% of  goods imported into South 
Korea were Amway products. All of  these attacks dramatically undermined Amway Korea’s bottom 
line. One regular Dish Drops consumer, a woman named Suh Myung Ja, said that she stopped pur-
chasing them because she “was afraid of  what other people might think if  I bought from Amway.” 
By August, monthly sales had declined sixty-four percent from the start of  the year, and half  of  the 
distributor force was no longer active.  32
 In the aftermath of  the Dish Drops drama, Amway concentrated on rebuilding its brand in 
Korea. In April 1998, Amway Korea started a program called One for One, which, the Korea Times 
explained, focused on “help[ing] small and medium-sized Korean businesses hit hard by the eco-
nomic recession.” Under One for One, Amway Korea included a new locally-produced product in 
its catalog whenever the company introduced a new item. By September 1998, thirty-eight percent 
of  Amway Korea’s products came from Korean companies. Amway Korea managed to rebound 
from the hit it took during the Dish Drops controversy and became a thriving division. The Korea 
Herald noted in May 2015 that “Korea currently boasts the highest per capita sales out of  all of  
Amway’s global branches,” and it quoted Sam Rehnborg, head of  Amway’s Nutrilite Health Institute, 
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describing Korea as the company’s “No. 1 market[.]” Sales in 2015 were 261 times higher than they 
were back in 1991.  33
 The crowning achievement of  Amway’s global expansion in the 1990s was, without question, 
its arrival in China in 1995. Amway spent several years laying the foundation for entering the Chi-
nese market. As with Korea, the company began by constructing a factory in the country, which was 
located in the province of  Guangdong and cost twenty-nine million dollars. The deal for that factory 
was struck in the fall of  1992, and the project overseen by Amway Asia Pacific, a branch of  Amway 
Japan formed expressly for that purpose. At the time, the Wall Street Journal reported that Amway’s 
“Canton [i.e., Guangdong] factory and warehouse are expected to begin operations in early 1994” 
and that “its initial sales launch will be in the Pearl River Delta area, where the company aims to re-
cruit at least 100,000 distributors in Canton, Foshan, Zhuhai and Shenzen in the first two years.” In 
November 1993, in order to raise capital for its China endeavor, Amway announced that it would 
sell 7.9 million shares in Amway Asia Pacific. The following year, the company announced plans to 
expand its presence beyond Guangdong into neighboring Fujian province.   34
 Amway China opened for business in April 1995. In an interview with the Grand Rapids Busi-
ness Journal, company chairman Steve Van Andel explained some of  the challenges associated with 
the Chinese market, as well as some of  the compromises that the company had to make to make the 
subsidiary possible. He pointed out, for instance, that Amway was “doing a fair amount of  manufac-
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turing there,” the same accommodation the company had had to make four years earlier when it en-
tered Korea. Rather than purchasing the land that its factories sat on, which was not an option for it, 
the company had had to lease land. He also noted differences in some of  the products, saying that 
“[t]he products we manufacture in China are primarily water-based as opposed to here [i.e., the 
United States], where they are liquid-based and powder-based.” That all said, Amway was optimistic, 
with the Journal indicating that “Amway China’s initial sales projections for the remainder of  fiscal 
1995 range between $25 million and $35 million.”  35
 The Chinese embraced Amway quickly. By late 1997, China Daily reported that Amway 
“ha[d] expanded to China’s four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing) and 33 
major cities in 13 provinces, representing a potential market of  175 million people.” That year, its 
distributor force numbered around eighty thousand and sales hit $178 million. The appetite for 
Amway products was so voracious that that November, Amway announced that it would commit 
thirty million dollars to building another plant in Pudong. Several factors contributed to Amway’s 
popularity. In some cases, social pressure played a role. One woman, Jiang Baoren, said that she once 
bought some Amway products because the distributor selling them lived next door and consequently 
she “was too embarrassed not to buy anything.” Another woman, Tan Rui, said that although she 
was generally against buying anything from Amway, “[i]f  it were my father-in-law, for example, I 
would have to buy it,” observing that “[t]he closer the relationship, the harder it is to refuse.” Many 
Chinese also saw in Amway an opportunity for self-improvement, as the St. Petersburg Times noted: 
“In a country that preaches social equality but is known for bureaucracy and back doors, those who 
sell Amway find its direct-marketing approach both fair and promising: Work hard, help each other 
and you, too, can become rich.”   36
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 Not everyone who looked to make money off  of  Amway did so legitimately, though. An 
August 1997 article in the Wall Street Journal detailed the ways that some were trying to exploit 
Amway’s “satisfaction-guaranteed” return policy, reporting that “some people [were] repackaging the 
soap, selling it and then turning in the containers for a refund” while “[o]thers dispensed with selling 
altogether and scoured garbage bins instead — showing up at Amway’s Shanghai offices with bags 
full of  bottles to be redeemed.” In response, Amway tweaked the rules for how products could be 
returned, which triggered outrage among some customers.   37
 That some tried to hoodwink Amway into giving them undeserved refunds spoke to a larger 
concern within China about the legitimacy of  direct sales. In addition to reputable foreign entities 
like Amway, China also played host to many indigenous direct selling companies that turned out to 
be scams. In one case detailed by the New York Times, a man named Fu Yanbing became involved 
with a company that sold ankle massagers. Contrary to claims made by the company producing them 
that demand was high, those who joined found themselves unable to offload their inventory. As a 
consequence, Fu Yanbing said, “I lost my own money, my wife’s money, my parents’ money, my 
brother’s money, my friends’ money.” Not only that, his wife threatened to leave him if  he was un-
able to recoup his losses. As in South Korea, a significant number of  Chinese believed that direct 
selling was nefarious. The St. Petersburg Times reported in March 1998 on a poll taken in China that 
found that “more than 30 percent of  those polled said they did not like direct-marketing methods; 
22 percent said direct marketers in general were out to cheat people; and 7 percent agreed with the 
statement that direct marketers sha shu, which literally means ‘kill acquaintances.’” One prospective 
Amway distributor, Zheng Yi, told the South China Morning Post in July 1997 that “[m]y family is 
against my doing direct selling because they think it is a kind of  fraud[.]”  38
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 And just as in South Korea, Amway found itself  hamstrung by this cloud of  skepticism. In 
November 1995, only seven months after Amway started up in China, the Chinese government 
launched an investigation into illegitimate direct sales companies, forcing all of  them, including 
Amway, to temporarily suspend operations. The suspension lasted only a few months and Amway 
was given the all-clear, but the investigation shrank the industry significantly: three-quarters of  all 
direct sales companies in the country were shut down for good.   39
 But even that was just a prelude to a much bigger blow that came three years later. On April 
21, 1998, the Chinese government banned all direct selling in the country. The sweeping move was 
in part an attempt to eliminate the many dubious direct sales companies still active in the country, 
but political motivations were also at play. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Chinese govern-
ment had come to believe that companies like Amway “have grown too fast, building ideologically 
charged sales networks.” The Los Angeles Times, meanwhile, said that “[m]otivational meetings, in 
which salespeople gathered to sing company songs and shout slogans, drew official suspicion in a 
country where most gatherings of  more than a dozen people are banned.”  40
 Reaction to the ban was swift. Some distributors, like May Feng of  Xian, immediately tried 
to return as many of  their Amway products as possible for a refund before the ban went into effect. 
She told the South China Morning Post that despite the decent money she managed to earn from sell-
ing Amway, “I don’t think I would do this kind of  thing again,” explaining, “It’s too much trouble.” 
U.S. officials went to bat on behalf  of  American-based direct sales companies. The Wall Street Journal 
reported that “U.S. Commerce Department officials have warned that banning direct sales could be-
come another obstacle in China’s oft-stymied efforts to join the World Trade Organization.” On 
April 25th, four days after the ban was announced, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky 
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requested that the ban not apply to American direct sellers, which she said “have invested over $120 
million in China and provide income to more than 2 million Chinese.”   41
 Fortunately for Amway, it — along with companies like Avon and Mary Kay, which also had 
footholds in China — managed to hammer out a compromise with the Chinese government that 
allowed it to resume business three months after the ban was imposed. The compromise, however, 
required probably the most substantial concessions the company has had to make in an overseas 
market. In exchange for operating legitimately again, Amway had to start selling its products in 
brick-and-mortar stores rather than through distributors. As the Los Angeles Times explained, “[s]ales 
agents can still take orders and deliver products door-to-door, but under a government measure de-
signed to keep salespeople from being saddled with unsold wares, they no longer have to buy the 
goods from the company before trying to resell them.” Companies like Amway were permitted “to 
use ‘non-employee’ sales representatives to bolster retail-outlet operations” who could “promote 
products door-to-door from which they can earn commissions on sales,” but they “cannot receive 
salaries or any benefits.” These restrictions amounted to an overhaul of  Amway’s business in China, 
as the division’s chairwoman at the time, Eva Cheng, explained. “We are no longer a direct-selling 
company,” she declared in July 1998, “we are a manufacturing and marketing enterprise.”   42
 Although it was able to get back into business fairly quickly, Amway was still hurt by the ban 
in the short run. The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2003 that “[i]n the months after the ban, 
the company bled $120,000 a day; sales for all of  1998 were $36 million, one-fifth the previous 
year’s.” Ultimately, though, Amway China managed to rebound. By March 2003, the company had 
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around a hundred brick-and-mortar stores in operation, and approximately fourteen percent of  
Amway’s total worldwide sales took place in China. According to the Wall Street Journal, while Amway 
did have to modify its business model on paper to appease the concerns of  the Chinese govern-
ment, in practice it retained many of  its essential features. The Journal noted, for instance, that 
Amway’s stores “double as convenient distribution centers for the company’s sales force” and that 
“two-thirds of  store sales are not to customers but to its own sales representatives.” Additionally, 
Amway sponsored “Leadership Training” courses for its salespeople, in which they were taught how 
to manage a “small group,” which “operates in similar fashion to the now-banned recruiting net-
works: The bulk of  the income for many group leaders comes from commissions and other bonuses 
based on all their partners’ sales.” In 2003, China’s share of  Amway’s total sales hit twenty percent, 
making China the company’s single biggest national market, a distinction it retains to this day. Chi-
na’s ban on direct selling officially came to an end in December 2006, and although Amway was now 
able to legally operate according to its traditional business model, the stores remained in place.  43
 Although it did see its business model banned in China, 1998 was not all bad news for 
Amway. It was also the year that Amway made it to India. In February, the Wall Street Journal report-
ed that “[t]he company has invested $20 million following India’s investment approval in 1995” and 
that “Amway India plans a simultaneous launch of  its products in almost 150 cities nationwide, 
through its five regional distribution centers in New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Bangalore and 
Madras.” Company president Dick DeVos predicted that “India can rival China and Japan, challeng-
ing these two countries for the top three in Asia” and that “India will be among the top 10 markets 
[for Amway] world-wide, if  not in the top five.” Amway’s foray into India was so hotly anticipated 
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that, according to the Vancouver, British Columbia paper The Province, Canadians of  Indian descent 
enlisted as distributors in Canada before Amway India was even up and running, so that they could 
sponsor family members back home when the time came.  44
 Amway India launched on May 5, 1998. As with many of  its other overseas markets, Amway 
India had some unique characteristics. For example, Indian distributors have by and large preferred 
going directly to distribution centers to pick up inventory rather than having it delivered to them. A 
July 2010 article in the Indian Express noted that “[u]nlike other nations, where bulk of  the sales hap-
pen through online orders, in India, 80 per cent of  sales happen from pick up centers.” Amway In-
dia’s manager of  corporate communications, S. Viswanath, explained that the “Indian customer still 
likes to see and feel the product on the shop shelf  before he makes a purchase. He likes to go to a 
store, make comparisons with other products and then make his decision.” In this respect, India is 
not unlike China, where the brick-and-mortar stores also made the experience realer for consumers. 
Amway India also developed a line of  products unique to its market. For instance, there was Per-
sona, Amway India’s personal care line, which “was the first product that was locally manufactured 
by an Amway affiliate for that particular market,” according to the Economic Times. And in June 2003, 
Amway India announced that it would release a local line of  cosmetics that would retail for eighty 
percent less than Artistry. Amway India also adopted new, smaller packaging for its standard prod-
ucts.   45
 Amway India has become one of  the company’s most important markets. In an interview 
with The Times of  India in June 2012, Amway vice president Maud Pansing said that “India is current-
ly the seventh largest market for Amway” and that “[w]e registered a 19% annual growth last year, 
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making India the fastest growing market among the 80 countries we are present in.” And in Feb-
ruary 2016, company president Doug DeVos declared that the “[p]otential of  the Indian market is 
dramatic.”   46
 That said, Amway India has not been without its troubles. In August 2011, acting on suspi-
cions that the company was engaged in fraudulent activity, police in Kerala conducted a series of  
raids on Amway facilities in the state. Two years later, in May 2013, in an incident reminiscent of  
South Korea, the subsidiary’s CEO William Pinckney and two other top Amway officials were ar-
rested in Kerala for allegedly violating the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) 
Act of  1978. PA Valsan, a Keralan police official, explained that Amway’s system of  compensating 
distributors for the sales of  their downlines was illegal under that law. Additionally, the Times of  India 
reported that “[t]he company was also charged with steeply hiking up the prices of  its products,” 
which “amounted to cheating the consumer.” In the wake of  the arrests, distributors expressed con-
cern that the company might pull back from the country, and although nothing quite so dramatic 
happened, it did negatively impact business at the local level. The Economic Times reported in October 
that “[d]irect selling firms such as Amway, Modicare, K-Link and DXN are cutting down their oper-
ations in Kerala significantly due to police harassment since the arrest of  Amway India CEO in 
May[.]”   47
 Exactly one year later, Pinckney was arrested again, this time in New Delhi, over questions 
around whether or not Amway India had broken the 1978 law. At issue was whether Amway and 
businesses like it constituted a “money circulation scheme.” As the Indian Express explained, “Section 
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2C [of] the Act defines ‘money circulation schemes’ as ‘any scheme…for the making of  quick or 
easy money, or for the receipt of  any money or valuable thing as the consideration for a promise to 
pay money, on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of  members into the 
scheme….’” The Express indicated that Amway had come in for scrutiny because “[t]he clause ‘on 
any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of  members etc’ does not make a 
clear distinction on whether it can be applied to multilevel marketing schemes used by direct sellers.” 
Following the arrest, Samir Behl, the company’s regional president for Europe, India, and South 
Africa, complained to the Economic Times that “Amway has not been subjected to harassment of  this 
magnitude in any other country, as it has been in India. We have had our share of  challenges in many 
markets and those challenges are to do with local laws….But what’s happening here is baffling.” The 
arrest also led trade groups like the American Chamber of  Commerce in India to lobby for changes 
to the 1978 law so that direct sales companies would no longer be lumped in with blatantly fraudu-
lent schemes.  48
 In addition to Eastern Europe and Asia, the 1990s also saw Amway solidify its foothold in 
South and Central America. In June 1990, Amway opened a subsidiary in Mexico. By November it 
had signed up fifty thousand distributors in what the Grand Rapids Press called “the fastest start ever 
for one of  Amway’s foreign operations.” Amway came to Brazil the following November, at which 
time the company also announced plans to move into Argentina, which it did in 1993. This was fol-
lowed by Colombia in 1996, Paraguay in 1997, and Venezuela in 1998.   49
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 In November 2004, Grand Rapids magazine ran an article by a writer named Kate Der-
nocoeur about the flag poles, fifty-six in all, that grace the exterior of  Amway’s headquarters in Ada. 
“Day and night, rain and shine, the flags are on their 30-foot poles, often waving to their full 5-foot 
by 8-foot extent. Impressive, and somehow reassuring, the flag promenade is a colorful celebration 
of  the wider world.” As the company grew, so did the number of  flags on display. By 2004, she 
wrote, “although the company has a presence in 80 countries and territories, the flag promenade 
holds just 56 flags,” which “fly in alphabetical order according to U.S. State Department protocol.”  50
 That Amway’s foreign markets have been essential to the company’s bottom line is beyond 
dispute. The Grand Rapids Press reported in April 1988 that “Amway is one of  many West Michigan 
companies, large and small, that are thriving in the international market these days” and that “[p]er-
haps no West Michigan company has been more successful in its export expansion than Amway[.]” 
As noted earlier, by the late 2000s, only about ten percent of  Amway’s sales were made in the United 
States. Amway has largely managed to weather various crises of  legitimacy and become successful 
even in countries where it faced significant hostility at the outset.  51
 As the article on Amway’s flagpoles illustrates, that success has become crucial to Amway’s 
identity. It is no coincidence, for example, that the company’s home base in Ada is called Amway 
World Headquarters: a large metal globe stands just outside the visitor’s center, halfway between the 
flagpoles. In the company’s worldview, its accomplishments abroad have served to further validate 
the promise of  the business as well as its underlying principles. Recall the epigraph that opens this 
chapter, in which Cross and Olson declared that, when it came to Amway’s overseas expansion, “the 
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numbers are secondary to the philosophy and concept that nurtured the growth and made it possi-
ble.” In June 1993 Dan DeVos, who at the time was the company’s director of  Far East markets, 
declared that Amway had tapped into a set of  universal aspirations, saying that “[p]eople basically 
want the same things out of  life” and that “[t]he real secret of  Amway is the simplicity of  it.”   52
 Dan DeVos’s remarks echo the attitude of  both the cofounders and company boosters. In a 
chapter of  his autobiography titled “Exporting the American Way Worldwide,” Richard DeVos 
wrote that “[w]hether people live in the Far East communist country of  China, south of  the equator 
in the emerging country of  Guatemala, or in the established democratic South Pacific country of  
Australia, our experience has been that people around the world share one thing in common: they all 
dream of  better lives” and that “wherever we go in the world today, we continue to be reminded that 
all the world’s people hunger for freedom and an opportunity to succeed through their own talents 
and efforts.” “Our simple message of  a business opportunity for all,” he declared, “has become an 
international language.” Jay Van Andel said that “Amway’s international expansion provided the op-
portunity for Rich and me to extend the principles of  American-style wealth creation into other 
countries worldwide.” He believed that “[m]ultinational firms act as ambassadors of  economic free-
dom wherever they do business,” explaining that “[w]hen U.S. companies share some of  the benefits 
of  American-style capitalism with consumers in other nations, an advertisement for freedom is in-
evitably carried along with the goods.”  53
 Many books written by Amway sympathizers dedicated at least one chapter to the company’s 
overseas growth. Like the cofounders, they too portrayed Amway as bringing opportunity to people 
around the world and hailed its global success as proof  of  the universal appeal of  the company’s 
values. Charles Conn proclaimed in The Possible Dream that “the spread of  Amway into foreign mar-
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kets is impressive because Amway is exporting more than just a line of  household products. It is 
spreading a way of  life which emphasizes free enterprise, a point of  view, an approach to one’s indi-
vidual condition in life and what he can do about it.” According to Conn, “[t]he success of  Amway 
in foreign markets is important because it demonstrates that, for all the Americanism that pervades 
the rhetoric of  the company back home, the basic principles of  Amway are not so much American 
as they are common to all men everywhere.” These “basic principles” included “[h]ard work, sacri-
fice for a later reward, a dollar’s worth of  product for a dollar’s price, [and] personal service to cus-
tomers[.]” In another book, Conn wrote that “[o]ne gets a striking impression of  the similarity, 
rather than the dissimilarity, of  foreign distributors to their American counterparts.” Wilbur Cross 
declared that “[o]ne of  the surprising facets of  the Amway history and the story of  the company’s 
founding, development, and growth is that there seems to be almost no pocket of  the world where 
the free enterprise system….cannot thrive.” And James Robinson wrote that “Amway has inspired 
the creation of  an international family of  doers and dreamers whose collective efforts are helping to 
advance free enterprise and economic progress even in the poorest of  countries. It is a family active-
ly enhancing the prospects of  world peace.” Discussions of  Amway’s international business typically 
included vignettes of  distributors in different countries who had found success through Amway, 
which often featured the same adversity, opportunity, and reversal of  fortunes motifs discussed in 
Chapter II. The major difference between those vignettes and the ones profiled earlier is that the 
former spoke more directly to Amway’s capacity to transcend diverse cultures and societies.   54
 Charles Conn’s assertion that American and foreign distributors are more alike than different 
speaks to a larger truth about the nature of  Amway’s overseas expansion. Whether it was Canada or 
Eastern Europe or East and South Asia, the reaction of  governments and ordinary citizens to the 
arrival of  Amway has had broad similarities to what has occurred in the United States. On the one 
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hand, millions across the globe have embraced the company, its products, and its business model. 
Amway’s steady accumulation of  foreign subsidiaries over the past five decades testifies both to the 
determination of  the company’s leadership to penetrate even very formidable markets as well as to 
the success of  the company’s branding efforts. Amway has proven willing and able to accommodate 
itself  to local conditions when needed, even when that has required going against long-standing 
company norms. 
 On the other hand, just as in the United States, many have responded to Amway negatively. 
Amway’s success overseas required it to accommodate and overcome numerous hurdles, including 
local economic regulations as well as questions about the legitimacy of  its business model and the 
perceived negative social impacts of  direct selling. In the U.S., such suspicions took the form of  crit-
ical exposés from former distributors, media investigations, and legal actions undertaken by the 
FTC, the state of  Wisconsin, and others. Overseas, anti-Amway sentiment has led to popular 
protest, as with the Dish Drops controversy in South Korea, as well as to government action, such 
as China’s nearly decade-long ban on direct selling and the arrest of  Amway officials in South Korea 
and India. Moreover, the criticisms of  Amway overseas, and the allegations that have made it subject 
to investigation by foreign governments — namely, that the company’s business model is inherently 
duplicitous, that it entices people with false promises, that its products are not what they are chalked 
up to be — parallel accusations that have also circulated in the U.S. for decades. Company boosters 
have insisted that Amway’s foreign expansion is proof  that all people desire freedom and indepen-
dence and that its brand of  free enterprise works anywhere. But as we have seen, it has also shown 




Today, when people moving to Grand Rapids ask me, “How do I meet people?” I say, “Just go to 
the nearest fundraiser and buy a seat. Let people know you’re a giver, and you’ll suddenly have a 
tableful of  new friends.” I’m kidding, of  course, but the message is clear: if  you want your life to be 
enriched, you need to learn to give — money, time, help. Everyone has something to give. Giving can 
be a joy and givers are players, not just observers. 
-Richard DeVos  1
 Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel never liked to talk about money. With the exception of  
stock offerings for foreign subsidiaries like Amway Japan, Amway has since its founding been in the 
sole ownership of  the DeVos and Van Andel families. Consequently, it has not needed to be as 
transparent as publicly-traded companies. The fact that it has been subject to so much public scru-
tiny and legal action over the decades has also made the company inclined to secrecy (which, one 
could reasonably argue, has only further heightened people’s suspicions that it has something to 
hide). For instance, the company does not publish any aggregate data on its distributor force, nor 
will it divulge such information if  asked. So although, for example, the terms of  the FTC’s 1979 rul-
ing require Amway to indicate on its recruiting literature how much the average distributor makes in 
a month, if  one wants to know, say, how many women or African-Americans or people under thirty 
are distributors, it is virtually impossible. 
 That same opacity extends to the cofounders’s fortunes. Richard DeVos claimed in his 
memoir that “I really have no idea of  when I became a millionaire, probably because Jay and I put a 
lot of  money back into the business — especially in the early years — and gave ourselves minimum 
incomes.” He said that “[w]e never considered ourselves or present ourselves as being wealthy and 
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superior” and that “[w]e became millionaires because of  our concern to help our distributors make 
money.” A few pages later, he reiterated the claim that “[w]e kept reinvesting in the company, so for 
a long time we had modest incomes,” and he insisted that “we were conservative about taking any 
money out of  the business.” Van Andel noted in his autobiography that “[s]ince the late 1980s Forbes 
and other magazines have been including Rich and me on their vaunted billionaire lists,” but that 
“[n]either Rich nor I have ever confirmed or denied such estimates — the magazines are free to 
speculate all they wish, but we will not give credence to their opinions by responding.” He said that 
“[o]ften the magazine figures are off  by a wide margin, and sometimes they’re simply laughable.”  2
 Although the cofounders refused to comment on their wealth, different media outlets have, 
as Van Andel pointed out, made estimates over the years. And while we cannot be certain of  their 
exact accuracy, Amway clearly made its cofounders and their families extremely rich. In February 
1979, Fortune magazine pegged the combined net worth of  the cofounders somewhere in the range 
of  six hundred million to a billion dollars. In September 1984, Forbes estimated that each man was 
worth around a quarter of  a billion dollars. In October 1990, the magazine had them at $1.3 billion 
each, a fourfold increase from the year before. They were reportedly worth two and a half  billion in 
1992, three billion in 1993, and four and a half  billion in 1994. In October 1991, Jim Harger, the 
business editor of  the Grand Rapids Press, spoke to an editor at Forbes to learn exactly how the maga-
zine made its estimates. In the case of  the Amway cofounders, he reported that Forbes used “annual 
sales figures, annual reports which are filed with the state for tax purposes and appraisals of  their 
holdings,” as well as the estimated value of  the company’s publicly-traded shares. The person Harger 
spoke with, Forbes’s senior editor Harry Seneker, indicated at the time that the actual net worth of  
 DeVos, Simply Rich, 181-184; Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 119-120; Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 8.2
  !246
the cofounders likely exceeded their calculations. More recently, Forbes estimated the net worth of  
the DeVos family at $5.4 billion in March 2018 and the Van Andels at six billion in July 2015.  3
 The founding families have used the wealth accrued from the success of  Amway — and the 
social standing that has come with it — for a variety of  purposes. Perhaps most significantly, it has 
allowed them to play a major role in the Republican Party and the conservative movement, which 
the final chapter explores in greater detail. They have also made substantial investments in their 
hometown. Over the past three decades, the DeVoses and Van Andels have contributed to a number 
of  projects that have aided in the turnaround of  Grand Rapids, building a luxury hotel and donating 
money to the construction of  entertainment venues, hospitals, a medical research institute, and the 
expansion of  Grand Valley State University. A July 2007 article in the New York Times about Grand 
Rapids’s medical industry stated, “[l]ed by Rich and Helen DeVos and Jay and Betty Van 
Andel….the city’s wealthy invested more than $1 billion since 1990 in various urban projects[.]” As a 
consequence, “Grand Rapids was one of  just two major Michigan cities (Ann Arbor being the other) 
to gain population in the 1990s. In the last decade, its income tax revenues more than doubled, to 
$59 million annually.” Many of  Grand Rapids’s most prominent landmarks bear the names of  the 
founding families or their company: the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel, DeVos Place, Van Andel Arena, 
the Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital, DeVos Center, the Van Andel Museum Center. These and 
other sites that the founding families helped to finance have delivered tangible benefits to the city 
over the years, providing essential services like medical care for the local population, shoring up the 
city’s arts and entertainment scene, and attracting tourists to the area.  4
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 The founding families’s investments in Grand Rapids are part of  their larger political work 
and an important vehicle for their ideological worldview. In a chapter of  his autobiography titled 
“The Responsibilities of  Wealth,” Jay Van Andel wrote that “the greatest pleasure comes not from 
the endless acquisition of  material things but from creating wealth and giving it away.” “Each indi-
vidual is required to use his wealth to do good,” he explained. “Sometimes that means giving away 
money; other times it means building something useful with it.” He described the investments that 
he and DeVos had made in Grand Rapids as a “free-enterprise approach to urban renewal,” saying 
that “[t]hough some projects have made use of  available municipal, state, and federal funds, private 
investments have been the driving force behind the Grand Rapids downtown revival.” Furthermore, 
he explained that “[e]ach project we conducted has been evaluated for community impact and con-
sistency with our Christian principles.” Van Andel believed that his religious faith mandated philan-
thropy, declaring that “[t]he task of  every person on earth is to use everything he is given, every abil-
ity he has, to the ultimate glory of  God.” Writing about the DeVoses in Rolling Stone, the journalist 
Janet Reitman described the family’s investments in Grand Rapids as “a microcosmic example” of  
their political philosophy, according to which “[p]rivate interests….would take over the role of  mod-
eling good behavior.” The founding families’s contributions to the revitalization of  Grand Rapids, 
then, should not be understood merely as attempts to boost their public profiles or — in cases like 
their hotel — to find new sources of  revenue. Rather, it amounts to them practicing what they have 
preached, a manifestation of  their small-government, free enterprise worldview, which favors mini-
mal state involvement in the economy and society and reliance on private benevolence over state 
spending.   5
 This chapter marks a turning point. In exploring the small-business conservatism of  DeVos 
and Van Andel, we have so far focused almost exclusively on how the cofounders went after corpo-
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rate capitalism and cast compassionate capitalism and “independent business ownership” as an al-
ternative economic paradigm, as well as the roots of  that critique in the midcentury crisis of  auton-
omy. These last two chapters focus on the second pillar of  their small-business conservatism: the 
attack on “big government.” 
********** 
 Grand Rapids took a trajectory common to many big and medium-sized cities throughout 
the northeastern and midwestern United States: it rode the wave of  prosperity over the roughly fif-
teen years following the end of  the Second World War, and then beginning in the sixties and early 
seventies it entered a period of  decline. A key driver of  decline in Grand Rapids, as elsewhere, was 
suburbanization. Though the annexations of  the late fifties and early sixties had expanded the popu-
lation and territory of  Grand Rapids, it could not stem the tide of  people and resources flowing out 
from the city into the suburbs. A January 1962 piece in Harper’s Magazine featuring John Paul Jones, 
the Grand Rapids city planner, highlights both the ambitions of  revitalizers at the time and also the 
scope of  the problem on their hands. The article summarized Jones’s plans for the city thusly: “Forty 
acres of  ‘blight’ (including the City Hall) would give way to the wrecking ball and the bulldozer, and 
a civic center would open like a flower on plazas leading down to the river. ‘Parking and alternate 
uses’ would surround the commercial district of  the city, and a cultural and educational area would 
gradually emerge from what is now a combination of  houses and schools and museums and what 
seem to be called ‘miscellaneous occupancies.’” These plans, though no doubt well-intentioned, 
nonetheless stirred controversy, particularly when it came to tearing down City Hall. Some residents, 
along with groups like the Kent County Council for Historic Preservation, opposed the move, be-
lieving that the building had historical significance and should be maintained. A letter to the editor 
published in the Grand Rapids Press on August 23, 1969 declared that “[d]emolition of  old City Hall 
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would deprive the Grand Rapids community of  one of  its richest and most irreplaceable heritages,” 
which, to the writer, constituted “an injustice on the community which can never be corrected.” A 
week later, another letter writer struck an altogether different tone, saying of  City Hall, “Let’s get rid 
of  it — and soon. Get on with the beautification of  our city.” On demolition day in November 
1969, a woman named Mary Stiles protested by scaling and sitting on the wrecking ball. While atten-
tion-grabbing, her direct action failed to prevent the building’s destruction.   6
 The sixties saw a number of  new structures rise up in the city, including buildings for busi-
nesses like Old Kent Bank, Union Bank, and the Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, as well as 
the Hall of  Justice and a new headquarters for the Grand Rapids Press. However, despite initiatives to 
demolish and replace decrepit structures in the city, the trends were not encouraging. The macro-
economic downturn of  the seventies, with its combination of  high energy prices and inflation, hit 
Grand Rapids hard, and unemployment reached as high as the mid-teens. Richard DeVos wrote in 
his autobiography that by the seventies, “[a] few buses still hummed through the city, but nothing 
exciting was happening downtown. The hub of  activity had moved to suburban neighborhoods and 
shopping malls.” In an interview he gave in 2009, he recalled that when President Gerald Ford came 
to the city to campaign during the 1976 presidential election, “the Secret Service would not allow the 
parade down Monroe Avenue because all the stores were closed and it would be such an opportunity 
for people to sit and get lined up to shoot him and they didn’t want a parade because of  the vacant 
stores in our community.” After increasing approximately thirteen percent between 1960 and 1970, 
the population of  the city of  Grand Rapids fell over the next decade, from 197,649 in 1970 to 
181,843 in 1980, an eight percent loss.  7
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 Responding to this decline, the Amway Corporation and the founding families began what 
became a decades-long effort to invest in revitalizing Grand Rapids, which continues up to the 
present. The cofounders saw this as their duty, both as area residents and as successful businesspeo-
ple. DeVos wrote that “a community benefits from a sense of  ownership by its citizens. If  we are 
proud of  our city and want to see it prosper, we can make a positive change where we live.” Van 
Andel, meanwhile, insisted that “[t]he dispersal of  personal wealth is not a choice.” For the co-
founders, their giving was tied to a political worldview that saw private individuals, rather than the 
state, as the best engines of  social betterment. When it came to community development, Van Andel 
believed that the best course of  action was “allow[ing] private corporations and individuals to search 
out the needs of  the community and fill those needs appropriately. Government planners, blinded to 
the real needs of  the community by political motives and incapacitated by poor information, are not 
nearly as good at serving people as private firms and community-minded individuals.”  8
 Although the state of  Grand Rapids was certainly not ideal at the start of  the 1980s, there 
was some cause for optimism. 1980, for one, saw the opening of  Monroe Center, a shopping mall 
located near the George Welsh Civic Auditorium, which had been in the works since 1975. A June 
10, 1980 article in the Grand Rapids Press quipped that “Grand Rapids no longer will be a dime-store 
downtown,” predicting that the ongoing efforts to rejuvenate the city would draw in new, higher-end 
businesses selling pricey wares. “City planners, downtown businessmen and developers agree it’s go-
ing to cost more to get a drink, a necktie or a hotel room in the downtown of  the 1980s,” the article 
reported. The article also referred directly to the role that the cofounders were playing in this trans-
formation, declaring that “Amway money has been the major catalyst of  the change.” Five days later, 
another article in the Press focused in greater detail on the company and the cofounders’s work in the 
city. The article observed that “[i]n less than two years, Amway Corp. has bought $6 million worth 
of  downtown land and buildings and started construction projects with price tags equal to more 
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than half  the present tax base of  the entire downtown district.” It also noted that “[b]ecause Amway 
has the cash available, it is becoming the first place city officials turn when they need a private in-
vestor for a project.” That said, the article noted reservations both within city officialdom as well as 
the broader public about Amway’s influence. In fact it observed that “[c]oncern about Amway’s 
plans is becoming so widespread among local citizens that Amway has commissioned a private sur-
vey to find out which residents are critical of  the firm and why.”   9
 Without a doubt the biggest project that the company took on in this moment was the 
Amway Grand Plaza Hotel. In August 1978, Amway acquired the Pantlind Hotel, which had been 
around since 1915, with the intention of  refurbishing and reopening it under a new name. DeVos 
wrote that by the time Amway had purchased it, “[t]he once-bustling Pantlind Hotel had become 
seedy.” On July 29, 1979, the Pantlind was officially shuttered, with plans to open its replacement, 
now dubbed the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel, in a year and a half. Expectations were high that the 
new hotel would provide a welcome economic boost to the city. In July 1981, on the eve of  the 
Grand Plaza’s opening, the Grand Rapids Press reported that “[i]n the first year, gross receipts are an-
ticipated to exceed $10 million, and more than $4.5 million is expected to be pumped into the local 
economy through payroll[.]” On July 29, 1981, three hundred and eighty-six people turned up at the 
city’s convention center looking for work at the hotel. The Amway Grand Plaza Hotel was dedicated 
on September 15, 1981: among those at the celebration was none other than former President Ger-
ald Ford.   10
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 By this point, the company had invested twenty-four million dollars into the hotel, although 
work was still not complete. The company next proceeded to construct a tower that was added onto 
the original hotel, which almost doubled the number of  available rooms at the Grand Plaza from 
four hundred to nearly seven hundred. DeVos and Van Andel laid the cornerstone for the addition 
on June 22, 1982, a symbolic act more than anything else, since at this point most of  the exterior 
was already complete. The tower was “topped” on September 15th, and the entire Grand Plaza 
opened about a year later, on October 13, 1983. Once again, President Ford was on hand to assist 
the cofounders in the ribbon-cutting ceremony and to speak afterwards. All total, the Grand Plaza 
wound up costing sixty-five million dollars, and its construction won an award from the Michigan 
Society of  Professional Engineers in February 1983. The Grand Rapids Press reported that the project 
was singled out because “the renovation was of  an outdated hotel in a declining area of  town and 
was accomplished within budget and in less than two years.”  11
 The hotel did well. In February 1984, the Michigan Commission for the Blind designated the 
Grand Plaza an “Employer of  the Year” for hiring disabled workers. An April 1984 article that ran 
in the Grand Rapids Press called the new hotel “[t]he centerpiece of  the city’s growing attraction to 
national and international organizations,” listing a number of  groups that were coming to the city 
that year and using the hotel for lodging. AAA awarded the Grand Plaza five diamonds that No-
vember, a first for a Michigan hotel. They wound up losing the distinction in January 1986, when 
AAA downgraded them to four diamonds.  12
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 For all the accolades it accrued, however, the Grand Plaza also found itself  in the crosshairs 
on account of  the politics of  its owners. In the fall of  1981 and winter of  1982, a number of  school 
boards cancelled gatherings they had planned at the hotel on account of  Van Andel’s ties to an or-
ganization that promoted vouchers. In early February 1984, the Michigan State Board of  Education 
announced that, because the Grand Plaza did not employ unionized workers, it would not serve as a 
cosponsor for the Michigan Education Fair that the hotel was hosting that May. An editorial in the 
Grand Rapids Press castigated the move, arguing that the board, which was controlled by Democrats, 
was simply playing politics: “The non-union talk is flim-flam to cover a simple refusal to stay at a 
hotel owned by Jay Van Andel and Richard DeVos, two men who are vocal in their support of  Re-
publican causes and whose unfriendliness to organized labor is well known.”   13
 The board’s decision led to the fair’s cancellation at the end of  February, which, by one esti-
mate, represented a quarter-million dollar loss for the city’s economy, although the possibility of  
holding it at another venue or later in the year was still on the table. Another editorial in the Press 
published on March 2nd called on the state’s Democratic governor, James Blanchard, to intervene 
and “drop a few words in the ears of  the board’s four Democrats to keep their priorities in proper 
order.” On March 6th, under fire from various corners, including the mayor of  Grand Rapids, the 
Board of  Education decided to rejoin the fair. The fair ended up taking place in May as originally 
planned, albeit with some changes. Most significantly, it was no longer held at the Grand Plaza, but 
at the city’s convention center, the Grand Center. Additionally, the fair, now called the Compensato-
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ry Education Conference, ran for just two days instead of  three and had a much smaller turnout, 
two hundred and thirty instead of  the projected one thousand.  14
 Though the most prominent, the Grand Plaza was not the only project that the cofounders 
invested in in the eighties. In April 1980, the Grand Rapids City Commission announced that the 
city’s new performing arts center would bear the DeVos name after a million dollar donation from 
the Amway president. Private individuals and entities donated a total of  five and a half  million dol-
lars for the center, and DeVos’s was the largest single contribution. The decision to name the hall 
after DeVos met some backlash in the local press, reflecting larger anxieties about the role that 
Amway was playing in city development. In an op-ed published in the Grand Rapids Press on March 
2nd, when rumors first circulated about the name choice, David Nicolette wrote that although 
“[m]uch of  what the Ada-based firm is doing….certainly will benefit the community,” he observed 
that “[s]ome in the community already have expressed uneasiness with Amway’s growing impact in 
downtown Grand Rapids,” implying that naming the hall after DeVos would only make that worse. 
He believed that “the commercial should be kept apart from the nonprofit artistic,” that “[a]s a 
community auditorium, it should carry a designation not related to anyone in particular, especially 
someone living, just because he or she gave a lot of  money. Some of  the smaller donors made much 
greater sacrifices than those who certainly were not hurt by giving large sums.”    15
 The new hall would be part of  the Grand Center, which also included the George W. Welsh 
Civic Auditorium, then nearly fifty years old. Its fate was a pressing issue for city developers at 
around the turn of  the decade. In January 1981, the city considered a proposal to turn it into a 
sports arena. Amway stepped forward at the end of  the month and declared that it would help raise 
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three million dollars towards the project. This was not the first commitment that the company had 
made to an arena in the city. Almost a decade earlier, in July 1972, Amway had pledged to put up one 
million dollars for an arena then under consideration. Amway also partnered with city leadership in 
May 1980 to push for an arena, declaring that it would finance it itself  if  no one else wanted to. That 
plan met with lukewarm reception, though. The Grand Rapids Press reported at the time that “[s]ome 
commissioners are worried that a privately-owned arena — whether located in the suburbs or down-
town — could compete with the civic auditorium.”   16
 The January 1981 proposal should have alleviated the unease that had tanked Amway’s May 
1980 bid, since it did not involve constructing a separate facility. Still, on February 17th, the Grand 
Rapids Press reported that the plan for the Welsh auditorium was getting significant public pushback, 
noting that “[t]he chief  complaint appears to be the welding of  public and private interests to build 
an arena that would largely benefit Amway Corp.[.]” Since November 1979, Amway had been the 
official concessions vendor at the convention center, thanks to a deal it struck with the city govern-
ment, so concerns about a private entity unduly benefitting from a public facility were understand-
able.       17
 After the plan to convert the Welsh Auditorium fell through, the city decided to revisit the 
idea of  a second facility. On October 16, 1983, the Grand Rapids Press reported that “[t]he Greater 
Grand Rapids Convention Bureau has endorsed plans for renovating the George W. Welsh Civic 
Auditorium and building a new, 8,000-seat arena elsewhere downtown.” The city was set to spend 
five and a half  million dollars on the Welsh auditorium. As for the arena, which would cost eleven 
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million dollars, the city turned to Amway. As it happened, the city’s plan came out almost one month 
before the company had to shell out twenty million dollars as part of  its plea deal with the Canadian 
government in its tax evasion case. After the announcement of  that deal, the company issued a 
statement insisting that the fine would not impact its potential involvement with the new arena 
project. The company was supposed to report back to the city by December 20th but did not. In 
May 1984, citing a fall in sales, cutbacks at its Ada plant, and an inflated price tag, Amway an-
nounced that the arena was “on hold” until the company’s situation had improved. By February 
1985, Amway’s position was that it remained open to providing money, but it wanted the city to 
specify exactly how it would raise the full amount needed.   18
 Although the company backtracked on supporting the construction of  a new arena, it did 
make other, smaller investments around that time. In August 1984, the city announced that Amway 
would assist in the construction of  Lyon Plaza, located directly in front of  the Civic Auditorium, 
splitting the cost of  the project, which totaled nearly six hundred thousand dollars, evenly with the 
Downtown Development Authority. Amway’s involvement was essential: city developers had origi-
nally scrapped plans for the plaza following higher-than-expected costs on work done on the audito-
rium. The Grand Rapids Press reported that “[b]enches, planters and lighting will be installed on Lyon 
Plaza and a small amphitheater will be constructed on the riverfront,” which “will have seating and 
might eventually be used for small events or concerts.”    19
 Another way that the cofounders sought to stimulate development in Grand Rapids in the 
eighties was through The Right Place, an organization that Jay Van Andel helped create in 1985 and 
that he chaired from its founding until June 1993. The Right Place — which still exists — describes 
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itself  on its website as “a regional economic development organization funded through investments 
from the private and public sectors” that “drives regional Economic Development initiatives to 
stimulate economic growth, wealth creation, and operational excellence by focusing on productivity, 
innovation, and the retention, expansion and creation of  quality employment and companies in the 
West Michigan region.” In April 1985, Jay Van Andel said that The Right Place aimed to create fif-
teen thousand jobs in the Grand Rapids area between 1985 and 1990, which would result in “$400 
million of  effective buying income injected into the local economy,” he told the Grand Rapids Press. 
Historian Gordon Olson has written that “a total of  25,000 new jobs was created during the period, 
making Grand Rapids the only metropolitan area in the Midwest to regain all the manufacturing jobs 
that had been lost in the early 1980s” and that “[a]lthough the Right Place could not take direct cred-
it for the jobs, Amway’s Jay Van Andel….credited the program with centralizing local economic de-
velopment efforts.” In 1995, in a move very much in line with Van Andel’s view that private actors 
should take over certain functions performed by the government, the city of  Grand Rapids formed 
a partnership with The Right Place and incorporated it into its official economic development pro-
gram.  20
********** 
 Grand Rapids entered the 1990s with renewed vigor. In April 1988, the city celebrated the 
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of  its incorporation. An article in the Grand Rapids Press on 
April 3rd captured the reflective mood that the revelry inspired. “Cheap land, lots of  woods and 
running water [for transportation or power] may explain why there is a town here,” it said, “but it 
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doesn’t explain why Grand Rapids turned out to be the biggest and most prosperous city on this 
side of  the state.” The article attributed this to “the leadership of  the community,” specifically “[t]he 
families making the big money in this community” who “gave a lot back,” and then proceeded to 
rattle off  some of  the biggest names: “Anyone who has lived in this town very long is well aware of  
names like Blodgett, Hunting, Butterworth, Idema, Frey, Pantlind, Meijer, Lowe, Wege, Baldwin, 
Cook, Sebastian, Keeler, DeVos, Eberhard, VanAndel and Pew.” The city’s population saw a modest 
uptick over the preceding decade, from 181,843 in 1980 to 189,126 in 1990. Another sign of  
brighter times was Voices and Visions, a project organized in the early nineties by the Grand Rapids 
City Planning Department comprised of  workshops featuring ordinary Grand Rapidians who collec-
tively brainstormed and formulated ideas for the future direction of  the city.  21
 The 1990s also marked a significant turning point in the history of  Amway. Richard DeVos’s 
health was on the decline. In July 1992, he suffered a stroke and then, in December, a heart attack, 
one so severe that four years later it required him to travel to London to get a heart transplant, since 
his age and medical history made him ineligible for a new heart in the United States. DeVos turned 
sixty-six that year, Van Andel sixty-eight. Van Andel wrote that after the stroke, “Rich and I both 
knew that someday our partnership would draw to a close, but neither of  us wanted to admit that 
that time had come.” It was at that point, he said, that “[w]e began to lay the groundwork for Rich’s 
resignation.” The heart attack in December ended up being the final straw. Shortly afterwards, De-
Vos stepped down as president of  Amway after thirty-three years at the helm, replaced by his son 
Dick. In his memoir, DeVos called his retirement “a blessing,” writing, “with Dick in that role I 
didn’t have any additional stress about the future of  our business.” In the aftermath of  his longtime 
business partner retiring, Van Andel wrote that “I knew that it was also time for me to consider 
stepping down from the chairmanship.” He did so on July 27, 1995, with his son Steve set to offi-
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cially take over as chairman on the first of  September. Moving forward, the second generation of  
DeVoses and Van Andels increasingly became the public faces of  their families and the business.  22
 Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel’s departures from Amway were not, however, the end of  
their involvement in business, community development, or — as we will see in the next chapter — 
politics. In 1991, for a cool eighty-five million dollars, DeVos became the owner of  the Orlando 
Magic. Orlando had by this point become the family’s second city. According to DeVos, he had orig-
inally intended to purchase a baseball team back when it looked like the MLB might create a new 
team there. Reporting from October 1990 indicated that the team would be called the SunRays and 
that DeVos was prepared to spend as much as ninety-five million dollars to nab them. However, 
when Miami was chosen instead, he opted for the Magic, since it fit better with the family’s living 
arrangements. “We spent winters in Florida, when basketball was played, and during the baseball 
season spent a lot of  time in Michigan,” DeVos pointed out in his autobiography. In January 2002, 
DeVos announced that he intended to sell the Magic on account of  his health. Two months later, 
though, he retracted the offer and decided to hold on to the team. A June 2009 article in the New 
York Times noted that the Magic have become an important asset for the family, with DeVos telling 
the Times that “[t]here just aren’t many family teams left anymore” and that “[t]he grandchildren are 
being told this is not something you buy and sell. This is something you respect and take care of.”  23
 Back in Grand Rapids, the founding families continued to make a variety of  investments in 
the fields of  medicine, entertainment, and education. In 1990, Richard and Helen DeVos gave five 
million dollars to construct a ten-story extension of  Butterworth Hospital that was dubbed the He-
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len DeVos Women’s & Children’s Center, which opened in September 1993. Richard DeVos had 
chaired the board of  directors of  the entity that operated the hospital, the Butterworth Health Cor-
poration, since December 1989. The Grand Rapids Press reported that “the center boasts almost 
200,000 square feet, rooms for more than 160 beds, and start-of-art monitoring devices in spacious, 
sun-lit isolation rooms.” In August 1994, they made another contribution to Butterworth, this time 
for the DeVos Women and Children’s Health Pavilion, which would offer “services for ‘comprehen-
sive health problems’ as well as education,” according to the Press.   24
 In the mid-nineties, the dream of  a downtown arena that had died many deaths since the 
early 1970s finally became a reality, thanks in no small part to one of  the founding families. On Sep-
tember 10, 1994, the Jay and Betty Van Andel Foundation donated ten million dollars to finance the 
construction of  a new arena — backers were looking to raise a total of  eighteen million dollars in 
addition to the forty-five million they were receiving from government sources. This was not the 
only local project the Van Andels backed that decade. Three years earlier, in May 1991, they an-
nounced that they were donating three million dollars to build a new home for the city’s Public Mu-
seum. Jay Van Andel’s involvement with the project dated back to 1981, when he told the city that 
March that he was willing to invest some of  his own money in a new museum. The Grand Rapids 
Press reported at the time that “Van Andel’s involvement is contingent upon the museum moving 
from its Jefferson Avenue site, which he believes lacks ‘visibility[.]’” He even identified where he 
thought it should go: a patch of  land next to the Ford presidential museum, on the western shore of  
the Grand River. The city’s Art and Museum Commission signed off  on the idea at the end of  
March 1981, and the museum stands there to this day. When the effort to solicit contributions for 
the museum began in October 1989, Van Andel headed up a so-called “Campaign Cabinet” that in-
cluded a number of  local figureheads and prominent philanthropists. Thanks to their generosity, 
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both of  these buildings bear the family name: Van Andel Arena and the Van Andel Museum Center. 
Ironically, given Van Andel’s political views, on May 14, 2008, Van Andel Arena played host to a rally 
for presidential candidate Barack Obama, which, the Grand Rapids Press reported at the time, “may 
have been the biggest free-admission event ever held in the arena,” with an estimated twelve thou-
sand in attendance.  25
 Another significant project that the Van Andels committed their money and their name to 
was the Van Andel Institute, a medical research facility that opened in Grand Rapids in 1996 that 
consists of  two entities: the Van Andel Research Institute and the Van Andel Education Institute. 
For Van Andel, the motivation to finance the Institute was deeply personal; in 1988, his wife Betty 
was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, while he learned that he had Parkinson’s. Although he confessed to 
having “great disdain for mainstream medical care,” Van Andel said that he gave money to create the 
Institute because “medical research is fascinating to me,” and he believed that the Institute would 
“yield real progress in medical science, with important implications for heart disease, cancer, and 
cognitive and nervous-system diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.”   26
 The institute made a name for itself  over the next few years. A June 2001 article in the Jour-
nal of  the National Cancer Institute profiled Dr. George Vande Woude, who left the National Cancer 
Institute after twenty-eight years to become director of  the Van Andel Research Institute in 1998. 
The article described how he wooed various researchers from across the country to come to Grand 
Rapids. One such person, a Harvard-trained researcher named Cindy Miranti, said that she joined 
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the Institute because “[h]ere they give you an annual budget, to support you and two others, a great 
startup package, no teaching responsibility, and 5 years to establish yourself.” In October 2016, the 
Grand Rapids Business Journal described the Institute as “a hub for life sciences” that was “competitive 
with other life science hubs, such as Boston, in attracting talented scientists to the region.”  27
 In October 1997, Grand Valley State University, one of  a handful of  colleges and universi-
ties located in the Grand Rapids area, began work on an expansion of  its satellite campus in down-
town Grand Rapids. (Grand Valley is based in nearby Allendale.) That included the Richard M. De-
Vos Center. The DeVoses contributed $7.75 million to the center, which was slated to cost a total of  
fifty million dollars. The DeVoses’s gift represented a little over half  of  the $15.1 million received 
from private sources. DeVos had a long history with Grand Valley State. In February 1975, Gover-
nor William Milliken put DeVos on the college’s Board of  Control. In February 1982 he gave a 
thousand dollars to help a group of  students who wanted to go to Texas for spring break rent a bus. 
That same year, in June, DeVos was added to the school’s Hall of  Fame. And in May 1992, he spoke 
at the university’s graduation ceremony.   28
 Work on the DeVos Center started in March 1998, one of  a number of  new buildings that 
were underway in the city. “If  1997 was the year of  renovating small buildings for downtown fun,” a 
Grand Rapids Business Journal article declared in December 1998, “then 1998 was the year for big con-
struction projects and national business recognition.” In January 2000, the DeVos Center received 
plaudits for helping to boost downtown Grand Rapids’s appeal and for drawing residents into the 
city rather than out into the suburbs. The Grand Rapids Business Journal reported that “[w]hile living in 
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outlying neighborhoods of  the city or the suburbs still appeals to a large number of  downtown 
workers, there have been enough changes in the downtown area to foster an interest in living down-
town.” The dedication of  the DeVos Center took place in September 2000. The Grand Rapids Busi-
ness Journal wrote that “[t]he center features 18 general classrooms, three distance education class-
rooms, two lecture halls, 18 conference rooms, a 232-seat auditorium, two 112-seat lecture halls and 
a 4,400-square-foot exhibitor hall.” In addition to the Seidman School of  Business, DeVos Center 
also hosted the Van Andel Global Trade Center, which started back in 1999 and dedicates itself  to 
helping area companies expand into international markets.   29
 Three years after the completion of  the DeVos Center, another addition to the Grand Valley 
campus opened its doors: the Cook-DeVos Center for Health Sciences. (The Van Andels gave some 
money to it too.) The Grand Rapids Business Journal dubbed the center a “Newsmaker of  the Year” for 
2003, noting that “it has been designed to house all of  GVSU’s health professions, from pre-natal to 
elderly care, under one roof[.]” The website for Grand Valley State University boasts of  the center’s 
“10,000 s.f. [square feet] of  wet lab research space, twelve general classrooms, two computer labs, 23 
teaching and research labs, a 150-seat auditorium, twelve seminar rooms, ten conference rooms, and 
two levels of  parking.” In May 2011, Grand Valley started building a new downtown home for its 
business school, having decided to move it out of  the DeVos Center, which could no longer ac-
commodate the size of  the program. The DeVoses backed this financially also.     30
 In 2001, seven years after the Van Andels got an arena named after them, the DeVoses also 
went in on an entertainment facility in Grand Rapids. That March, the city greenlit a $219.5 million 
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plan to renovate the city’s Grand Center. In May, the Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation donated 
fifteen million dollars. Because of  their substantial contribution, the Grand Action Committee, 
which oversaw the project, decided to rechristen it DeVos Place. The DeVoses’s foundation was not 
the only entity linked to Amway to give to the project: the company itself, along with the Amway 
Environmental Foundation, gave between a half  million and a million dollars each, which earned 
them the designation “Cornerstones,” while the Jay and Betty Van Andel Foundation were “Pillars,” 
meaning that they gave at least a million dollars. Dick DeVos, meanwhile, was one of  the three co-
chairs of  the Grand Action Committee.   31
 Construction began that summer, with a projected completion date of  December 2004. As 
work on DeVos Place was underway, the city undertook an initiative to promote Grand Rapids as a 
desirable city to hold a convention in. The Grand Rapids Business Journal reported in September 2001 
that the Grand Rapids/Kent County Convention and Visitors Bureau “plans to conduct a nation-
wide telephone survey of  meeting planners to gather data on what they want in a host community 
and facility, and will then use the findings to build a marketing and promotion plan for DeVos 
Place,” with the goal of  “target[ing] organizations nationwide that prefer to hold an annual meeting, 
trade show or convention in a ‘second tier,’ or mid-sized, community that offers good attractions but 
has a more relaxed atmosphere compared to larger destination cities or those with hectic tourism 
seasons[.]” Hopes were high about DeVos Place and its impact on the city. One year after the Visi-
tors Bureau began aggressively promoting DeVos Place, there were already forty-seven reservations 
through 2007, which, according to the Bureau, would inject upwards of  twenty-one million dollars 
into the city economy. A January 2004 article in the Grand Rapids Business Journal speculated about the 
potential ripple effects of  DeVos Place, citing several developers who indicated that the new center 
“could make downtown more robust and draw more restaurants there” and “that retail could also 
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grow there in the form of  small shops.” Additionally, the article suggested that “places to stay, eat 
and shop should spring up even if  DeVos Place doesn’t turn a tidy profit each year.”  32
 The construction of  DeVos Place proceeded in three stages. In June 2003, the project en-
tered stage three, which involved demolishing most of  the Welsh Auditorium, which was on the site 
of  the new center, to make way for the ballroom, though portions of  the auditorium remained and 
were incorporated into the new complex. The Welsh Auditorium, in operation since the 1930s, offi-
cially closed for good on June 1st. The following month, Grand Action announced that it wanted to 
pursue work on another part of  the DeVos Place complex, the DeVos Performance Hall, the arts 
center that the DeVoses had donated to back in the early eighties. They received the go-ahead for 
this additional project in September, which, the Grand Rapids Business Journal explained, used five mil-
lion dollars of  private money to “refurbish the seating, add new finishes to the walls and ceiling, in-
stall the infrastructure for a multi-media sound system, and put in new [l]ight fixtures.” The renova-
tions were slated to start in June 2004 and finish that September.   33
 DeVos Place officially opened in December 2004. That month alone, it hosted more than 
three dozen events. Nevertheless, DeVos Place posted a seventy-nine thousand dollar loss in Decem-
ber, a consequence of  lower-than-anticipated revenues and operating costs that exceeded projec-
tions. DeVos Place also ran at a loss in January, although February and March saw a turnaround, 
with profits of  $165,000 and $72,000, respectively. The Grand Rapids Business Journal reported in April 
that “[t]he fiscal year projection [which measured until the end of  June] has the convention center 
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losing $1.61 million.”  34
 2005 saw the start of  a six-year project that represents the founding families’s latest major 
addition to the Grand Rapids cityscape. That October, Spectrum Healthcare announced that it was 
building a new children’s hospital named after Helen DeVos. In a press release, Spectrum said that 
the new hospital aimed to “[k]eep families together, involved and informed,” to “[m]inimize pain, 
fear and anxiety,” and to “[e]nsure patient and family safety and security.” The groundbreaking took 
place about a year later, on October 3, 2006. In the interim, the hospital started trying to raise a 
hundred million dollars for its construction. At the time of  the groundbreaking, contributions stood 
at $88.6 million. By mid-July 2008, the drive had exceeded expectations, bringing in $102.46 million. 
About half  of  that — fifty million — came from members of  the DeVos family. At the same time, 
though, expenses had climbed as well. Back when it was first announced, Spectrum estimated that it 
would only need $190 million to build the hospital; now it was projected to cost two hundred and 
fifty million dollars. By November 2009, the cost had risen once again to $292 million, nearly fifty-
four percent higher than originally anticipated. During the course of  its construction, the hospital 
became one of  thousands of  “porkbarrel” projects that Michigan members of  Congress finagled 
into the federal budget. The proposed budget for 2008, for example, included $97,000 for the hospi-
tal, which Democratic Senator Carl Levin and Republican Representative Vernon Ehlers inserted. 
Ehlers asked for another $190,000 the following year.  35
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 The dedication ceremony for the Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital took place on December 
3, 2010, and the hospital officially opened for business the following month, on January 11, 2011. 
Among the notable aesthetic features of  the hospital was its artwork, made almost entirely by chil-
dren. In an interview, Dr. Robert Connors explained the thinking behind the decision, saying, “We 
were really trying to make this place a very healing place, a place that kids would identify with the 
minute they walked in. And I thought it would be a great idea to have the whole place full of  chil-
dren’s art.” The Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital has been key in building up the reputation of  
Grand Rapids’s medical industry. An article published in the New York Times on July 11, 2007, nine 
months after construction on the Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital began, reported that “Grand 
Rapids has never experienced anything near the concentrated magnitude of  the medical research, 
training and patient facility construction now occurring on Health Hill,” where the hospital was lo-
cated, now also known as the Medical Mile, noting that “a stunning array of  buildings is under con-
struction, reflecting a commitment of  nearly $1 billion by the area’s prominent families and medical 
institutions.” “By 2010, when construction is completed” the Times said, “those buildings….will pro-
vide enough space to treat thousands of  people a day and employ 5,000 people, 2,500 more jobs 
than exist now on Health Hill.” In May 2011 the Detroit Free Press declared that the new children’s 
hospital had “capp[ed] the transformation” of  Grand Rapids into “a thriving medical community 
that has helped prevent an aging manufacturing base from backsliding[.]”  36
 The same year that plans for the Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital were unveiled, construc-
tion crews broke ground on the JW Marriott Grand Rapids. In October 2004, Marriott and Amway 
announced that they would join forces to build a new hotel, the second time they had done so. 
(Amway already ran a Courtyard by Marriott in addition to the Grand Plaza.) As the Grand Rapids 
 Janice Allen, “New Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital Set To Open In January,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, De36 -
cember 3, 2010; Connors quoted in Nancy Chipman Powers, “Children’s hospital decorated entirely with children’s art-
work,” Detroit Free Press, March 17, 2011; Schneider, “Grand Rapids Lays Foundations for a Health Mecca”; Zlati Meyer, 
“A thriving Medical Mile transforms Grand Rapids,” Detroit Free Press, May 16, 2011, A1.
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Business Journal noted a few years later, the JW Marriott represented a somber milestone. It “was the 
last major project that [Amway] founders Rich DeVos and the late Jay Van Andel worked on togeth-
er,” the Journal noted, and as such it “help[ed] put another stamp on the pair’s business partnership 
and legacy.” Work on the hotel, which stands twenty-four stories tall and houses three hundred and 
forty rooms, took two years. The hotel opened on September 21, 2007. An article detailing the Mar-
riott’s interior design remarked that “[t]he decidedly modern, decidedly un-Midwestern decor makes 
it clear this is not the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel, or any other hotel around town.” Months before 
anyone checked in, though, the Marriott found itself  in hot water for one particular innovation: the 
nineteenth floor, originally reserved exclusively for women. A Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article published 
in June 2007, a month after the Marriott announced the so-called “women-only floor,” described the 
context for this decision, pointing out that “[m]ore than 40 percent of  all business travelers are 
women, and security is one of  the biggest issues they face[.]” Nevertheless, the backlash prompted 
Marriott to reverse course and drop the idea.   37
********** 
 Just as the second generation of  the founding families assumed more prominence beginning 
in the early 1990s, so too did the 2000s represent a coming-out for the third generation. The most 
notable example came in 2009 with the advent of  ArtPrize, an art competition begun by Rick De-
Vos, Dick and Betsy DeVos’s son and Richard DeVos’s grandson. ArtPrize aimed to transform 
 “Alticor Partners With Marriott to Lead New Hotel,” PR Newswire, October 5, 2004; Pete Daly, “JW Marriott Has 37
Touch of  Partners,” Grand Rapids Business Journal, May 21, 2007, 1; Susan R. Pollack, “New Marriott opens 9/21,” Detroit 
News, August 29, 2007, G4; Josh Slagter, “Marriott shows off  new downtown hotel,” MLive.com, August 27, 2007, 
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Grand Rapids, for a few days each year, into a massive art gallery. Artists who had applied to partici-
pate would showcase their work at various venues throughout the city, and attendees would have the 
opportunity to vote for their favorite on the Internet or using their phones. Of  the top ten, the artist 
with the most votes would get $250,000, with smaller cash prizes going to the rest. The Detroit Free 
Press reported in April, when the competition was announced, that “DeVos got the idea by combin-
ing his desire to create a signature cultural event for Grand Rapids with the entrepreneurial spirit of  
his family and his work using technology to allow people to connect in new ways.” The Press further 
explained that “[t]he competition breaks down traditional hierarchies in the art world by relying on 
the public to pick winners and placing the power to select the works with everday [sic] venues[.]” In 
much the same way that Jay Van Andel talked about the “free-enterprise approach to urban renewal” 
that he and DeVos took when helping to revitalize Grand Rapids, it is possible to characterize Art-
Prize as a free enterprise approach to an art competition, in which more or less anyone could sign up 
to have their art displayed and the outcomes were determined by the tastes and preferences of  “con-
sumers” (i.e., attendees) without the intervention of  “regulators” (i.e., art experts).  38
The inaugural ArtPrize competition took place between September 23 and October 10, 
2009. Among the participating venues was DeVos Place. The Grand Rapids Business Journal wrote in 
July that “[w]hen the Convention and Arena Authority agreed to make DeVos Place an official Art-
Prize venue, board members immediately heard from artists across the country in all types of  art 
fields.” What’s more, “[m]any of  them said they would donate their work for permanent display in 
the building if  their pieces could be spotlighted there for the competition.” In anticipation of  the 
event, DeVos Place underwent some modest cosmetic renovations. A week before the start of  the 
 Mark Stryker, “Art contest for digital age,” Detroit Free Press, April 24, 2009, C8.38
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competition, the Los Angeles Times estimated the number of  participants at twelve hundred, display-
ing their art at one of  a hundred and fifty-nine different locations.   39
 When ArtPrize 2009 officially kicked off, the attention it attracted surprised even its organiz-
ers. On October 2nd, about halfway through the competition, the Detroit News reported that the 
number of  voters stood at thirty thousand, three times more than anticipated. (Attendees had to reg-
ister in order to vote.) The top prize went to a Brooklynite named Ran Ortner for a painting titled 
Open Water No. 24. The event proved a boon to area businesses. The Grand Rapids Business Journal re-
ported that “[s]ome downtown restaurants ran out of  menu items on opening weekend due to the 
surge of  patrons brought downtown by the competition” while “[s]ome shops that normally closed 
on Sundays stayed open and experienced lines leading out the doors.” Gina’s Boutique, a clothing 
store run by a woman named Gina VanGessel, “held a free fashion show on the first Friday evening 
of  ArtPrize, featuring women’s clothing and accessories carried by the shop,” and VanGessel esti-
mated that the competition “did help draw people to it.” An article on DeVos Place indicated that 
“the art competition drew over 15,000 people to the convention center….to view the 29 pieces on 
display there.” Furthermore, “[t]he building also hosted the event’s closing reception that drew 2,700 
people to the Steelcase Ballroom and brought in roughly $18,000 in revenue.”      40
 ArtPrize generated approximately seven million dollars for the local economy. The combina-
tion of  outsized attendance and participation as well as its positive externalities led the Grand Rapids 
Business Journal to christen ArtPrize its 2009 “Newsmaker of  the Year.” Not all of  the responses to 
the first ArtPrize were positive, though. The Detroit Free Press’s art critic, Mark Stryker, complained 
 Stryker, “Art contest for digital age”; David Czurak, “DeVos Place a winner in ArtPrize,” Grand Rapids Business Journal, 39
July 13, 2009, 6; “ArtPrize builds excitement,” Los Angeles Times, September 16, 2009, D3.
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Maynard, “Brooklyn Painter Wins Popular Vote in Michigan Art Contest,” New York Times, October 9, 2009, A17; Jake 
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30, 2009, 4.
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that the competition’s top ten “was dominated by enormous but empty public works, gee-whiz ki-
netic sculptures, derivative ideas and entertaining divertissements” and that “[d]epth was in short 
supply[.]” Although he believed that “the competition’s uniquely democratic ethos has a valuable 
role to play in a world filled with juried art contests and fairs,” Stryker nevertheless suggested that 
the event’s organizers find “a way to bring expert opinion into ArtPrize to create a savvier 
electorate.”   41
 The unanticipated success of  ArtPrize ensured that it would become a repeat event. ArtPrize 
2010 saw the number of  participants rise from twelve hundred to just over seventeen hundred, while 
the number of  venues showcasing works grew from 159 to 192. Notably, perhaps in response to 
critics like Mark Stryker, the second competition featured a class of  awards allocated by qualified 
judges. As with the year before, local businesses sought to use the event to their advantage. A hand-
ful of  new small businesses opened in run-up to ArtPrize, and several places issued coupons or ran 
sales during the competition. Restaurant owners, many of  whom had been caught off  guard the 
previous year by the avalanche of  people who came downtown and were either closed on the Sun-
day after ArtPrize started or faced shortages, were better prepared the second time around. And they 
were right to be. Estimates at the time indicated that attendance at the second ArtPrize, which ran 
from September 22nd to October 10th, more than doubled from two hundred thousand the year 
before to four hundred and fifty thousand. This time around, a local artist, Chris LaPorte, came in 
first place, with a piece titled Cavalry, American Officers, 1921.  42
 David Czurak, “ArtPrize ‘best event downtown has ever had,’” Grand Rapids Business Journal, October 11, 2010, 1; 41
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 Once again, locals hailed ArtPrize for its impact on the economy. The Grand Rapids Business 
Journal offered up a number of  anecdotal accounts from businesses that saw a windfall from Art-
Prize: “Dan Gendler, president of  San Chez Bistro at 38 V& Fulton St., said the restaurant had its 
busiest day ever during ArtPrize’s first weekend….Mark Sellers, who owns HopCat at 25 Ionia Ave. 
SW with his wife, Michele, said sales during the first two weeks of  ArtPrize were 25 percent higher 
than HopCat’s previous two-week record — set during the inaugural competition last year….Chuni 
Raniga, owner of  Superior Watch Repair at 116 Monroe Center NW, said he had repeat customers 
during the event, and his sales of  watches and souvenirs were 25 percent higher this year than 
last….Nikki Dykstra, who owns woman’s clothing store Lee &Birch at 50 Louis Ave. NW, said her 
shop had consistent traffic and steady sales during the event.” Paid parking increased during Art-
Prize also. In an article published October 18th, the Journal reported that “[f]or the first time since 
October 2006, Grand Rapids Parking Services reported an increase in monthly parkers,” and al-
though that was not due entirely to ArtPrize, it just so happened that a lot of  the parking revenue 
came from areas where ArtPrize art was on display. About a week and a half  after ArtPrize 2010 
ended, city officials bestowed on Rick DeVos an award in recognition of  another successful year.  43
 ArtPrize has become an institution in Grand Rapids. In September 2013, at the start of  its 
fifth competition, Mark Stryker, a one-time critic, wrote that “[f]our years ago no one could have 
imagined anything like ArtPrize. Today it’s impossible to imagine Grand Rapids without it.” He 
hailed ArtPrize as “a signature cultural event for the city” that “creates a new context and process 
for contemporary art that empowers everyday audiences” and that “has paid big cultural dividends 
for Grand Rapids[.]” A year later, an article that ran in the University of  Michigan’s student newspa-
per, Michigan Daily, noted that whereas “[t]he world of  contemporary art has historically been domi-
nated by a small sliver of  individuals: art curators, writers, and aficionados,” ArtPrize and events like 
 Czurak, “ArtPrize ‘best event downtown has ever had’”; David Czurak, “City Parking Services sees increases in park43 -
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it were “allow[ing] contemporary art to be more accessible to the general population” and 
“bring[ing] the medium into its rightful place in the sun.” On the other hand, an October 2015 piece 
in Gawker authored by Peter Moskowitz, who attended that year’s event, had a decidedly different 
take on the competition’s impact. He wrote that “[d]espite the millions of  dollars awarded over the 
last seven years, ArtPrize has hardly made a splash beyond Michigan state lines” and that “ArtPrize, 
with few exceptions, has not produced artwork of  note, has not launched careers or changed dis-
course,” but instead “has made a few lucky people who will never have success in the actual art 
world moderately rich and somewhat venerated for a few days each year.”   44
 Still, the competition continues. On February 9, 2017, organizers of  the event issued a 
statement condemning President Donald Trump’s executive order restricting immigration from sev-
eral Middle Eastern countries, declaring that they were against “[d]iscriminat[ing] against anyone 
based on religion, race, gender, sexual identity, physical ability or economic status” as well as 
“[d]etain[ing] or persecut[ing] refugees and immigrants,” actions that they saw as violating ArtPrize’s 
“guiding principles.” ArtPrize 2017 featured a number of  pieces that doubled as political commen-
tary, criticizing the Trump administration or the DeVoses or, in one case, the lackluster response to 
the Flint water crisis.  45
********** 
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 In January 2011, a minor controversy broke out when Newsweek included Grand Rapids on a 
list of  “America’s Dying Cities.” The Grand Rapids Press countered by pointing out a number of  ex-
amples that underscored the city’s vitality, which included “[r]ecord ticket sales at Van Andel Arena,” 
the “[j]ust-opened Helen DeVos Children’s Hospital,” and ArtPrize, all of  which owed their exis-
tence in large measure to Amway’s founding families. That May, in response to the affront, a man 
named Rob Bliss created a music video that featured hundreds of  Grand Rapids residents lip-sync-
ing to “American Pie” by Don McLean. The video and the reaction to it compelled Newsweek to re-
verse course. In a Facebook post the day that the video was posted to YouTube, Newsweek said that 
the list “was done by a website called mainstreet.com — not by Newsweek,” that it had been “un-
fortunately picked up on the Newsweek web site as part of  a content sharing deal,” and that “it uses 
a methodology that our current editorial team doesn’t endorse and wouldn’t have employed.” “It 
certainly doesn’t reflect our view of  Grand Rapids,” the post concluded. In January 2013, in the 
conclusion of  his State of  the City address — delivered, it should be noted, at DeVos Place — 
Mayor George Heartwell hearkened back to the controversy, rhetorically asking his audience, “Re-
member when Newsweek magazine described Grand Rapids as a ‘dying city’? For that matter, do 
you remember Newsweek, which can no longer be purchased at the newsstand or delivered in the 
mail?”  46
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 And indeed, it looks as though the Newsweek piece had gotten ahead of  itself. The unem-
ployment rate in the Grand Rapids-Wyoming metropolitan statistical area spiked in the midst of  the 
Great Recession, jumping from 6.4 percent in January 2008 to ten percent in January 2009 and peak-
ing at 13.3 percent in July 2009. Since then, however, unemployment has trended downward. It de-
clined to 9.3 percent by January 2011, when the offending piece was published. Two years later it 
was at 7.3 percent, and it reached 5.7 percent in January 2014. In December 2015, the unemploy-
ment rate stood at 3.1 percent, the lowest since November 2000. A May 2015 Bridge Magazine article 
noted that “[a]mong Michigan’s top 10 counties for jobs growth [between the years 2005 and 2014], 
two West Michigan counties — Ottawa and Kent [where Grand Rapids is located] — added more 
jobs than the next eight combined,” though it also found that wage growth had not kept pace, pri-
marily due to the paucity of  labor unions compared to eastern parts of  the state. A month later, the 
magazine Area Development found that the Grand Rapids/Wyoming area was third in the country in 
terms of  “economic strength.” An article published in October 2016 by Buffalo Business First, a busi-
ness journal based in Buffalo, New York, lamented that despite the economic and demographic sim-
ilarities between Grand Rapids and Buffalo, “Grand Rapids is expanding its economy four and a 
half  times more rapidly — four and a half  times! — than Buffalo is.” “We simply aren’t keeping up 
with Grand Rapids,” the article concluded despondently. And Crain’s Detroit Business reported in Jan-
uary 2017 that “Grand Rapids has had the most vibrant economy among the state’s metropolitan 
statistical areas in recent years.” While parts of  eastern Michigan struggled to achieve growth, “more 
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young workers are heading to the largest city in West Michigan, where the downtown has enjoyed a 
revival with the addition and expansion of  higher education and health care industries.”  47
 
 It is hardly all good news for Grand Rapids, though. Poverty, for example, has been stub-
bornly high in recent years. In 2010, the Brookings Institution released a study entitled “The Subur-
banization of  Poverty.” It found that between 2000 and 2008, the poverty rate in the city of  Grand 
Rapids increased from 15.7% to 24.7%, while in the suburbs it rose from 6.3% to 11.2%. Of  the 
ninety-five metropolitan areas that the Brookings study surveyed, urban and suburban Grand Rapids 
had the largest percentage increases in poverty over that period: 8.9% in the city, 4.9% in the sub-
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Figure 5. Unemployment rate in Grand Rapids-Wyoming, January 1990-December 2017 
(Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GRAN326UR)
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urbs. The poverty rate for the city in 2008 was nearly twice the national poverty rate of  13.2%. In 
March 2016, the Grand Rapids Business Journal noted that Kent County had a child poverty rate of  
twenty percent in 2014, twenty-two percent higher than it was in 2005.  48
 Still, Grand Rapids has come a long way since the sixties and seventies, when postwar pros-
perity fueled an exodus from the city into the suburbs and left the downtown to rot. Surveying the 
city’s transformation, an October 2008 article in the Grand Rapids Business Journal concluded that “the 
renaissance of  downtown Grand Rapids can be attributed to the efforts of  many individuals and 
families.” Among those it called out, it heaped special praise on two in particular. “The Rich and He-
len DeVos and Jay and Betty Van Andel families,” the article declared, “have had an enormous hand 
in changing the face and skyline of  downtown Grand Rapids and injecting the city with new 
vitality[.]”   49
Over the past four decades, Amway and the founding families have poured hundreds of  mil-
lions of  dollars into the city of  Grand Rapids, financing, among other things, hotels, a university 
campus, hospitals and medical research facilities, and entertainment venues, as well as starting an art 
competition. As a consequence, the names DeVos, Van Andel, and Amway are ubiquitous through-
out Grand Rapids, since they grace a number of  the city’s landmarks. Those who sought to attract 
private investment to a city that had seen better days welcomed their contributions. At the same 
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time, their magnanimity elicited unease about the heavy hand that a single company headed by two 
very wealthy families was wielding over the direction of  the city’s future. 
 In addition to helping Grand Rapids bounce back from its nadir and cementing their posi-
tion as major power players in the region, the founding families have also used their money to ad-
vance their small-business conservative ideology by making Grand Rapids into a model for their vi-
sion of  the proper balance between government and the private sector. In certain cases, the link be-
tween investment and ideology has been fairly explicit. ArtPrize, for example, has sought to incorpo-
rate free-market principles into the process of  determining what does and does not constitute good 
art. And while it does not appear to be the case that, say, the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel or Van An-
del Arena were built for the purposes of  advancing an agenda, it is impossible to disentangle them 
from the ideological commitments of  the cofounders. As the following chapter explores in greater 
detail, Amway’s founding families have been firmly opposed to the notion, embodied most promi-
nently by the New Deal and the Great Society, that government ought to play a significant role in 
managing the economy or in guaranteeing certain basic goods and services to all citizens.  
 It is their belief, rather, that businesses and individuals should have wide latitude to do as 
they please without state interference, and that the duty to maintain the welfare of  local communi-
ties should fall on those living in those communities. Instead of  looking to the government to invest 
in revitalizing a declining city, Amway’s cofounders believed that men and women of  means — like 
themselves — ought to assume such responsibilities. Grand Rapids, then, stands out among count-
less other mid-sized Rust Belt cities that have dealt with similar problems over the past half-century. 
Thanks to the DeVoses and Van Andels, Grand Rapids has become a laboratory not only for how a 
city could try to pull itself  out of  the postindustrial abyss, but also for the right-wing political econ-




You are really capitalism in America. 
-Ronald Reagan to Amway distributors  1
 On November 23, 2016, President-elect Donald Trump announced his nominee for Secre-
tary of  Education. Several names were floated in the run-up. Many considered Michelle Rhee, the 
former chancellor of  the District of  Columbia Public Schools, a likely contender. However, one day 
before Trump made the announcement, Rhee indicated that she would not be joining the Cabinet. 
Rhee had met with Trump the weekend before, along with another potential pick: Betsy DeVos, the 
wife of  former Amway president Dick DeVos. DeVos was at once a conventional and unconven-
tional pick. On the one hand, she had spent over two decades championing “school choice,” a eu-
phemism for steering money from public education towards charter, private, and other nonpublic 
schools, a stance that Trump himself  supported. On the other hand, her advocacy work was the ex-
tent of  her experience in the field of  education: she had never been a teacher or worked in schools 
or sat on a board of  education.   2
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Times, November 19, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-trailguide-updates-michelle-rhee-
meets-with-donald-trump-1479608956-htmlstory.html (accessed January 7, 2019); Emma Brown, “Michelle Rhee takes 
herself  out of  the running for Trump’s education secretary,” The Washington Post, November 22, 2016, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/11/22/michelle-rhee-takes-herself-out-of-the-running-for-trumps-educa-
tion-secretary/?utm_term=.871b3740fe97 (accessed January 7, 2019); Emma Brown, “Trump picks billionaire Betsy 
DeVos, school voucher advocate, as education secretary,” The Washington Post, November 23, 2016, http://www.washing-
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Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 18.
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 This, however, did not stop Trump from nominating her. A statement from the President-
elect’s office called DeVos “[a] leader in the national school reform movement” and quoted Trump 
saying that “[u]nder her leadership we will reform the U.S. education system and break the bureau-
cracy that is holding our children back so that we can deliver world-class education and school 
choice to all families.” Many public school advocates as well as teacher’s unions condemned the 
choice. Randi Weingarten, president of  the American Federation of  Teachers, called DeVos “the 
most ideological, anti-public education nominee put forward since President Carter created a Cabi-
net-level Department of  Education” and said that “[i]n nominating DeVos, Trump makes it loud 
and clear that his education policy will focus on privatizing, defunding and destroying public educa-
tion in America.” A headline in the New York Times captured the larger political significance of  the 
DeVos pick: “In Betsy DeVos for Education, Trump Taps Into Michigan Royalty.”  3
 Betsy DeVos stands at the crossroads of  two of  the most prominent — and controversial — 
families in western Michigan. Before she became a DeVos, Betsy had been a Prince. Her brother is 
Erik Prince, founder of  the infamous private security firm Blackwater (now called Academi). The 
Prince family rose to prominence thanks to their father, Edgar, who, in 1965, founded an automo-
tive parts company called the Prince Corporation in Holland, Michigan, which, like Ada, belongs to 
metropolitan Grand Rapids. Edgar Prince was an inscrutable figure. Apart from some news cover-
age of  him and his company in local newspapers in Holland and Grand Rapids, publicly-available 
documents about him are virtually nonexistent: in photos, he bears a striking resemblance to his son 
Erik. The Prince Corporation is perhaps most noteworthy for developing and manufacturing the 
flip-down visors that drivers use to shield their eyes from sunlight. When Prince died in 1995, the 
 “Press Release –– President-Elect Donald J. Trump Intends to Nominate Betsy DeVos as Secretary of  the Department 3
of  Education,” The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119687 (ac-
cessed January 7, 2019); “AFT President Randi Weingarten on Nomination of  Betsy DeVos as Secretary of  Education,” 
American Federation of  Teachers, http://www.aft.org/press-release/aft-president-randi-weingarten-nomination-betsy-
devos-secretary-education (accessed January 7, 2019); Vanessa Friedman, Maggie Haberman, and Alan Rappeport, “In 
Betsy DeVos for Education, Trump Taps Into Michigan Royalty,” New York Times, November 23, 2016, http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/11/23/us/politics/donald-trump-transition.html (accessed January 7, 2019).
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company was doing $850 million in business annually. Like DeVos and Van Andel, he was active 
philanthropically. In November 1989, the National Society of  Fundraising Executives recognized 
him and his wife Elsa for their numerous contributions.   4
 Prince also made significant investments in his hometown. In the mid-1980s, Prince gave a 
million dollars to help build the Evergreen Commons Senior Citizen Center in Holland. Reporting 
on efforts to revitalize Holland in February 1991, the Grand Rapids Press stated that “Lumir, a sub-
sidiary of  the Holland-based Prince Corp., is downtown’s most aggressive developer,” noting that 
“Lumir has restored, rebuilt or constructed more than a half-dozen buildings and is also leading the 
way in business recruitment.” Prince’s work in the areas of  philanthropy and development earned 
him plaudits from the town’s Chamber of  Commerce in October 1985. And last but not least, 
Prince deployed the fortune he accrued from his company in service of  conservative causes, provid-
ing the funds to help start the Family Research Council in 1988.   5
 Edgar Prince passed away in March 1995 from a heart attack. The following year, Prince 
Corporation’s automotive division was sold to Johnson Controls Inc. for $1.35 billion. Erik Prince 
became a public figure against his will, when his company was investigated for the murder of  civil-
ians in Iraq in 2007. Before that, he, like his father, was notoriously elusive. An October 2007 article 
in the South China Morning Post noted that Prince “shields his face when photographers are present 
and once tried to have images of  himself  deleted after his appearance at a conference.”   6
 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of  The World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York, NY: Avalon, 2007), 4-5; “An4 -
other Deal In Auto Parts Consolidation: Johnson Control Set To Buy Prince Unit,” New York Times, July 19, 1996, D5; 
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 The nomination — and subsequent confirmation — of  Betsy DeVos to head the Depart-
ment of  Education is merely the latest installment in the voluminous record of  work that Amway’s 
founding families have done on behalf  of  the Republican Party and the conservative movement. In 
a 2014 piece for Mother Jones, reporter Andy Kroll wrote that “[t]he DeVoses sit alongside the Kochs, 
the Bradleys, and the Coorses as founding families of  the modern conservative movement.” The 
Center for Responsive Politics estimates that Richard DeVos gave around $3.7 million at the federal 
level since 1989. Over that same timespan his wife Helen donated $2.95 million, Dick $3.9 million, 
and Betsy $1.55 million.   7
 As the article’s authors acknowledge, those numbers do not even come close to capturing the 
full extent of  their politically-motivated giving. Kroll estimates that “[s]ince 1970, DeVos family 
members have invested at least $200 million in a host of  right-wing causes — think tanks, media 
outlets, political committees, evangelical outfits, and a string of  advocacy groups.” In addition to the 
money they have given to the Republican Party, Republican candidates for office, and various con-
servative groups, members of  the founding families have also had close personal ties to many key 
institutions on the American Right. Betsy DeVos, for one, once led Michigan’s state Republican Par-
ty and sat on the Republican National Committee. Jay Van Andel was finance co-chair of  the Mi-
chigan Republican Party in the early 1970s, and Richard DeVos was finance chair of  the national 
party in the early eighties. Both Jay and his son Steve Van Andel were U.S. Chamber of  Commerce 
chairmen. The DeVoses and Van Andels have also supported and helped to found a number of  or-
ganizations that have pushed various right-wing causes.  8
 Andy Kroll, “Meet the New Kochs: The DeVos Clan’s Plan to Defund the Left,” Mother Jones, January/February 2014, 7
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 The founding families’s role as conservative kingmakers — to appropriate a Phyllis Schlafly 
coinage — underscores the need to further widen the geographical terrain of  the New Right. For 
many years, owing in large part to Richard Nixon and his so-called “Southern Strategy,” its epicenter 
was thought to be in the ex-Confederacy. More recently, thanks to the work of  Lisa McGirr on Or-
ange County and Elizabeth Shermer on Phoenix, among others, the West and Southwest have be-
come recognized as important conservative foci as well. Meanwhile, Northern conservatism — 
which refers not simply to the fact that certain prominent conservatives happened to hail from 
Northern states, but also to pockets of  the American North that have served as incubators of  politi-
cal conservatism — remains comparatively marginalized. Regarding conservatives in southern Cali-
fornia, McGirr writes that “[t]ogether with their conservative brethren elsewhere in the South and 
the West, they recast the party of  Lincoln from the moderate Republicanism of  the eastern Wall 
Street establishment into a southern and western mold of  a far more conservative bent.”   9
 The “more conservative bent” that the Republican Party began taking in the 1970s, however, 
was by no means exclusively a “southern and western mold,” nor was East Coast “moderate Repub-
licanism” all that one could find in the American North. Grand Rapids helped give rise to powerful 
hard-right families like the DeVoses and the Van Andels and the Princes, who have used the wealth 
accrued from their businesses to influence both the ideological orientation of  Republican politics as 
well as government policy at the state and national levels. The Reformed Church, which, as dis-
cussed in Chapter I, was transplanted by Dutch immigrants who began arriving in western Michigan 
in the mid-nineteenth century, played a key role in fostering the region’s conservatism. It also directly 
shaped the cofounders’s own views. Grand Rapids thus underscores that a tight-knit relationship 
 For a discussion of  the Southern Strategy and the ways in which it manifested in Nixon’s presidency, see Patterson, 9
Grand Expectations, 702, 730-735; for works illustrating the role that backlash to the civil rights movement and greater 
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and Lowndes, From the New Deal  to the New Right; Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of  the New American Right 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism.
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between evangelical Protestantism and political conservatism existed outside of  the “Bible Belt.” Far 
from being minor league players, then, Northerners have played as vital roles as their Southern and 
Western counterparts in bringing the New Right to power.  10
 For decades, Amway has promoted independence, self-reliance, and a faith in the transfor-
mative power of  free enterprise among its distributors. As Chapter II showed, these principles 
formed the foundation of  compassionate capitalism. The company invoked them to call attention to 
the shortcomings of  employment and to sell the benefits of  direct sales. From the 1970s onwards, 
DeVos, Van Andel, and their family members also deployed Amway’s value system in the service of  
reshaping American government and politics, which is reflected in their support, at various mo-
ments, for lower taxes, fiscal belt-tightening, cutting regulations, and “school choice,” stances also 
adopted by the Republican Party and the larger conservative movement. In important respects, the 




 Detroit dominates almost any discussion of  Michigan in the post-World War II period. And 
for understandable reasons. Detroit was the automotive capital of  the nation, the beating heart of  
the American “arsenal of  democracy” during the Second World War. In the decades after 1945, it 
became the poster child of  the decay and decline of  many industrial cities and towns throughout the 
North and Midwest. Detroit — Democratic, multiracial, a stronghold of  the labor movement — 
embodied New Deal liberalism as well as the limits of  its politics.   11
 Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 19. 10
 The definitive history of  Detroit’s postwar collapse is, of  course, Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of  the Urban Crisis: Race 11
and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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 As important as Detroit is, however, it nevertheless merits some provincializing. On the op-
posite end of  the state, in Grand Rapids and western Michigan more broadly, an entirely different 
order reigned, one more amenable to conservatism than to liberalism, less diverse, and less welcom-
ing of  organized labor. Compared to eastern Michigan, western Michigan has been a Republican 
bastion. At the risk of  exaggerating the differences, it is worth stressing that postwar Detroit was by 
no means a liberal utopia. Colleen Doody has observed that strains of  conservative ideology — 
among them anti-Communism, anti-unionism, and a commitment to limited government — were 
present in Detroit in the 1940s and 1950s, arguing that “[t]here was no liberal consensus locally, par-
ticularly on issues of  labor and race.” Even so, there were some pointed differences between the two 
regions. The following chart lists the winners of  the presidential election in Kent County — home 
of  Grand Rapids — and Wayne County — home of  Detroit — from 1960 to the present, as well as 




	 In fifteen elections across fifty-six years, Kent County has gone Democratic only twice: 1964 
and 2008. And in both years, the margins of  victory were narrow. Lyndon Johnson beat Barry 
Goldwater by thirteen points, small considering the walloping Goldwater took that year: he lost 
Wayne County by 52.2%, the largest margin of  defeat in the state, and Michigan as a whole by thirty-
three points. And Obama beat McCain by only 1,573 votes. Kent County voted with the state in 
eight of  those fifteen elections. Writing in 1969, Kevin Phillips remarked that “Michigan, which for 
many years was the most Republican (and Northeastern) of  the Great Lakes states, is now clearly 
the most Democratic.” And yet, since 1960, the state has gone Republican forty percent of  the time. 
Kent County Wayne County Michigan
1960 Nixon Kennedy Kennedy
1964 Johnson Johnson Johnson
1968 Nixon Humphrey Humphrey
1972 Nixon McGovern Nixon
1976 Ford Carter Ford
1980 Reagan Carter Reagan
1984 Reagan Mondale Reagan
1988 H.W. Bush Dukakis Bush
1992 H.W. Bush B. Clinton B. Clinton
1996 Dole B. Clinton B. Clinton
2000 W. Bush Gore Gore
2004 W. Bush Kerry Kerry
2008 Obama Obama Obama
2012 Romney Obama Obama
2016 Trump H. Clinton Trump
Table 1: Presidential Winners in Kent and Wayne Counties, 1960-2016 
(Source: David Leip’s Atlas of  U.S. Presidential Elections)
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In all those instances, Kent County also voted Republican. Wayne County, meanwhile, remained 
steadfastly Democratic.   12
 Western Michigan’s conservatism was partially a function of  who lived there — and who did 
not. As detailed in Chapter I, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, Grand Rapids and the sur-
rounding region became home to a large, very religious Dutch immigrant population. Before the 
Civil War, the Dutch of  Grand Rapids tended to be Democrats: they were drawn to the party both 
because of  its opposition to a strong central government and because they were repelled by the na-
tivist constituencies inside first the Whigs and then the Republicans. The escalating sectional crisis 
over slavery in the 1850s started to affect a change, though, and by the 1870s there was a decided 
shift towards the Republican Party.   13
 The Calvinism that the Dutch brought with them proved simpatico with political conser-
vatism on several levels. When furniture workers in Grand Rapids sought to organize and launched a 
massive strike in 1911, Reformed churches were among the main groups opposing unionization (see 
below). Additionally, certain strains of  Dutch Calvinism mirrored the ideological commitments of  
many contemporary conservatives. The best example is the theology of  Abraham Kuyper, one of  
the most important Dutch Calvinist theologians of  the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In six lectures given at Princeton University in 1898, Kuyper outlined an expansive understanding of  
Calvinism, which he characterized as a “life system.” He rejected any effort to wall off  religion from 
the rest of  society, saying that “it is impossible for a Calvinist to confine religion to a single group, or 
to some circles among men” because “[r]eligion concerns the whole of  our human race.”  14
 Doody, Detroit’s Cold War, 119; Dave Leip, Atlas of  U.S. Presidential Elections, http://uselectionatlas.org (accessed 12
January 8, 2019); Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority, 356.
 Vanderstel, “The Dutch of  Grand Rapids,” 505-506.13
 Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2008), xi-xii, 8, 42. Portions re14 -
produced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 5.
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 Believing that Calvinist principles ought to suffuse all aspects of  everyday life, Kuyper de-
voted separate lectures to explaining the relationship between Calvinism and politics, art, and the 
sciences. In his lecture on politics, Kuyper argued that civil society stood separate and apart from 
government. He described “the family, the business, science, art, and so forth” as separate “social 
spheres” governed by God rather than the state, and thought that government ought to maintain a 
laissez-faire attitude towards them. “The state may never become an octopus, which stifles the whole 
of  life,” he declared, but instead “[i]t must occupy its own place, on its own root, among all the oth-
er trees of  the forest[.]” In the last of  his six Princeton lectures, Kuyper lamented the triumph of  
what he termed “modern life” over Christian principles, which he believed had led to social degrada-
tion. “The spirit of  this modern life,” he stated, “is most clearly marked by the fact that it seeks the 
origin of  man not in creation after the image of  God, but in evolution from the animal.” As a con-
sequence of  this shift, “the point of  departure is no longer the ideal or the divine, but the material 
and the low” and “the sovereignty of  God, which ought to be supreme, is denied[.]” To reverse the 
corrosive effects of  modernity, Kuyper called for a kind of  Calvinistic renaissance, specifically “the 
development of  the principles of  Calvinism in accordance with the needs of  our modern con-
sciousness, and their application to every department of  life.” As we will see, the politics of  
Amway’s cofounders reflected many of  Kuyper’s ideas about government and the role of  religion in 
public life.   15
 In addition to boasting a population inclined to embrace conservative principles, Grand 
Rapids and western Michigan have also lacked sizable communities of  color that, like the African-
American population in Detroit, have often proven reliable sources of  support for the Democratic 
Party and for liberalism. Again, consider Kent and Wayne counties: 
  
 Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, 69, 77, 83, 162, 177. For more on Kuyper and his place in Dutch Calvinist history, see 15
Bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America, 14-33. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 5.
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 In the early twentieth century, both counties were decidedly monochromatic. The 1930 cen-
sus, however, records the beginnings of  a change. Wayne County’s white population steadily declined 
over the course of  the twentieth century, such that by the end of  the century, whites made up barely 
half  of  the population. In Kent County, meanwhile, the white population shrank at a far slower rate, 
so that Kent County was about as white in 2000 as Wayne County had been in the 1950s. 
 Another important element of  the liberal coalition largely absent from western Michigan has 
been organized labor. What cars were to Detroit, furniture was to Grand Rapids. A February 1890 
article in the Grand Rapids Weekly Democrat proclaimed that “[t]his city has become the recognized 
furniture center of  the United States.” In 1890, Grand Rapids boasted thirty-one furniture compa-
























Figure 6. Share of  the White Population of  Kent and Wayne Counties, 1910-2000 
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau, prepared by Social Explorer, https://www.socialex-
plorer.com/a9676d974c/explore) 
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comprising one-third of  the city’s working population. Unsurprisingly, then, the seminal moment in 
Grand Rapids’s labor history was a strike by the city’s furniture workers in the spring and summer of  
1911. On April 19, 1911, strikers began taking to the streets in an effort to get their union, which 
belonged to the United Brotherhood of  Carpenters and Joiners, recognized. Despite attempts by 
union leadership to keep the peace, the strike, which lasted until August, saw street brawls and as-
saults on scabs as well as workers who had chosen not to join. Violence peaked on May 15th, when 
fighting broke out between workers and the police outside the factories owned and operated by the 
Widdicomb family.   16
 The strike lasted until August 19th. Although some workers saw their demands met at the 
firm level, the strike was by and large a failure. Several factors were responsible. Most immediate was 
the decision of  the United Brotherhood of  Carpenters and Joiners to pull out of  the strike, which 
took place on August 1st, the result of  a destabilizing power struggle at the top of  the union as well 
as the fact that it was running out of  money, burdened by legal expenses in a court case unfolding at 
the same time. More fundamental, however, were numerous fissures within Grand Rapids’s working 
class that not only precluded unity amongst workers, but also made many workers leery of  unions 
and class struggle. The Polish- and Dutch-American immigrant communities comprised a significant 
portion of  the city’s furniture workers, and they were divided along a variety of  lines: ethnicity/na-
tionality, religion (the Poles were Catholic, the Dutch Calvinist), patterns of  settlement within the 
city (each had their own ethnic enclaves), income (the Dutch generally earned more), date of  arrival 
(many of  the Poles were recent arrivals), and domestic life (the Dutch tended to have more children 
and live in larger homes).   17
 Grand Rapids Weekly article reproduced in Olson, A Grand Rapids Sampler, 87; Jeffrey David Kleiman, “The Great 16
Strike: Religion, Labor and Reform in Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1890-1916” (Ph.D. dissertation: Michigan State Universi-
ty, 1985), 3-4, 98-108; Olson, A Grand Rapids Sampler, 134-135.
 Olson, A Grand Rapids Sampler, 133; Kleiman, “The Great Strike,” 44-47, 119.17
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 Religion proved especially important. During the 1911 strike, Reformed churches came out 
against unionization, arguing that unions concerned themselves only with earthly matters and not 
spiritual ones and therefore a person could not be in a union and remain a good Christian. This 
happened at around the same time that the Brotherhood withdrew from the strike, but even before 
that, Dutch workers had been reluctant to participate, which was attributed to their religious sensibil-
ities. By contrast, many Polish workers, inspired in part by Pope Leo XIII’s pro-union encyclical Re-
rum Novarum, found cause to join the picket line.      18
 Another demographic factor that curtailed support for unions among both Dutch and Polish 
workers was that majorities in each community were homeowners. Jeffrey Kleiman has argued that 
“[t]he high degree of  home-ownership may not have been a measure of  mobility, but immobility, 
tying workers to an arrangement of  continued dependence upon the wage paying capitalists,” which, 
in turn, engendered “an exaggerated fear of  disruption.” Contemporary labor organizers were cog-
nizant of  all of  these problems. Two years after the strike, the IWW leader “Big Bill” Haywood 
wrote an article titled “What’s the Matter With Grand Rapids?” for the Wobbly paper Solidarity in 
which he pointed to many of  these facts as reasons why Grand Rapids had proven so inhospitable 
to unions.  19
 The failure of  the 1911 furniture strike and Reformed churches’s disapproval of  unions dealt 
a long-term blow to organized labor in the city. Michael Johnston, a local labor historian, explained 
that the strike gave birth to “[a]n anti-union reputation the city still has today” and that “[w]hen 
unions engaged in the nation’s second great wave of  strikes after World War I, Grand Rapids unions 
were too weak to go along. They barely survived the nationwide ‘American Plan’ instituted by busi-
ness groups to eradicate unions nationwide in the 1920s.”    20
 Kleiman, “The Great Strike,” 113-116.18
 Kleiman, “The Great Strike,” 35-36, 47-49, 62, 167.19
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********** 
 The politics of  DeVos and Van Andel — and, by extension, of  their families — have re-
mained fairly consistent over the past four decades. By Van Andel’s telling, their religious upbringing 
played a key role in shaping their views on government. In his autobiography, Van Andel wrote that 
“[m]y Dutch Calvinist background….provided much of  the impetus behind my [political] activity.” 
Both men subscribed to Kuyper’s belief  that religious principles ought to shape all of  society. Van 
Andel acknowledged that “[s]ome say that religion and politics don’t mix, or that politics is ‘dirty’ 
and Christians shouldn’t be involved,” but he brushed those concerns aside, writing, “[i]t was appar-
ent to me that religion was already in politics — the religion of  statism.” He went on to say that in 
order to keep government from exercising too much power and assuming responsibilities best left to 
private actors, it “must be limited by traditional moral principles.” He also declared that “[o]nly a 
society established upon the solid moral principles found in the Bible will be a truly free society,” 
that “[w]ithout the stability of  a Christian moral and ethical consensus, a society of  liberty can easily 
become a society of  libertines.” The consequences of  abandoning faith in God were, for Van Andel, 
cataclysmic: “An atheistic society denies God’s creation of  mankind, denies purpose in life, denies an 
ultimate reward for good and punishment for evil, destroys respect for human life, and eliminates 
moral integrity.” In his 1975 book Believe!, DeVos expressed a similar view, lamenting that “too many 
people have lost sight of  the fact that America is what it is today because God has blessed this land.” 
“This country was built on a religious heritage,” he proclaimed, “and we’d better get back to it.”  21
 Van Andel also explicitly embraced Kuyper’s political philosophy. He approvingly cited 
Kuyper’s views about the need to restrain government, declaring that “[w]ithout a clear understand-
ing of  the principles Kuyper taught, we are likely to fall into serious errors.” Unfortunately, as he saw 
 Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 140-141, 143, 163; DeVos and Conn, Believe!, 117. Portions reproduced in Mondom, 21
“Compassionate Capitalism,” 5.
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it, the United States had already erred. Van Andel bemoaned the growth of  the federal government 
over the course of  the twentieth century. About the social safety net, he wrote that “what used to be 
effective church-based or community-based charity is now an involuntary income redistribution 
scheme administered from Washington.” For Van Andel, the duty for caring for the less fortunate 
fell to voluntary civil society organizations, not the state. Regulation, in Van Andel’s mind, likewise 
represented “a massive usurpation of  the sovereignty of  other ‘spheres’ of  authority” since “people 
can usually look out for their own interests better than a distant bureaucrat can, and at far lower 
cost.” Echoing his business partner’s sentiments, DeVos declared that “as government gets more 
and more involved in the job of  running the nation’s businesses, the tools of  production come more 
into the control of  the government and not of  the people.” DeVos averred that government should 
intervene in the economy only when a business “does something criminal, or violates the public in-
terest[.]”   22
 One of  the earliest and longest-lasting political relationships that DeVos and Van Andel 
formed was, unsurprisingly, with Gerald Ford. Prior to becoming vice president and then president, 
Ford represented Grand Rapids in the House of  Representatives for twenty-four years. Ford’s elec-
tion to Congress in 1948 represented a backlash against Grand Rapids’s political machine, which for 
many years had been headed up by Frank McKay. McKay dominated state Republican politics and 
had served in a variety of  posts at the city and state levels since the 1910s: George Welsh, mayor of  
Grand Rapids for much of  the 1930s and 1940s, had once been his political protege. McKay’s reign 
was marked by bribery, illicit profiteering, and, in the mid-forties, the untimely and suspicious deaths 
of  two state senators, Earl Munshaw and Warren Hooper, who were cooperating with an investiga-
tion into kickbacks allegedly paid out to state legislators in exchange for votes.   23
 Van Andel, An Enterprising Life, 123, 141-142, 156, 159; DeVos and Conn, Believe!, 73-74, 85. Portions reproduced in 22
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 Challenging McKay’s influence was the Home Front, which formed in 1941 and included 
Ford as well as his father, Gerald Ford, Sr.. The Home Front successfully wrestled control of  the 
Kent County Republican Party away from McKay in 1942. In 1948, the Home Front persuaded the 
junior Ford to enter the Republican primary against one of  McKay’s men, Bartel Jonkman, who had 
been Grand Rapids’s congressman since 1940. Ford won handily, receiving 23,632 votes to 
Jonkman’s 14,341, and then went on to defeat the Democrat in the general election that November. 
In his memoir, Ford wrote that it was during that primary that he “formed the political philosophy 
I’ve maintained ever since. On economic policy, I was conservative — and very proud of  it. I didn’t 
believe that we could solve problems simply by throwing money at them. On social issues, I was a 
moderate; on questions of  foreign policy, a liberal.”  24
 Exactly when Ford’s relationship with the Amway cofounders began is unclear. In a 2009 
interview, DeVos indicated that “[w]e weren’t involved in his congressional days[.]” He said that al-
though he considered himself  a friend of  Ford’s prior to him becoming president, they were not 
friends “in any personal way[.]” In his autobiography, DeVos wrote that Ford “attended just about 
everything we dedicated in the early days of  Amway,” and said much the same in his interview, that 
Ford “would come out to Amway — I remember we put a new line in to make cans like shaving 
cans, pressurized containers. He came out and it was a big deal.” DeVos also organized a party for 
Ford after Nixon made him vice president. In September 1965, then-Congressman Ford inserted 
“Selling America,” one of  DeVos’s most well-known free enterprise speeches, into the Congressional 
Record. In later years, Ford wrote the forewords for Wilbur Cross and Gordon Olson’s Commitment to 
Excellence as well as Dick DeVos’s 1997 book Rediscovering American Values. Blurbs of  him praising 
DeVos and Van Andel also appeared in Compassionate Capitalism and An Enterprising Life, respectively. 
After Ford left the presidency, DeVos chaired the dedication committee for his presidential museum, 
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which opened in September 1981. When Ford died in 2006, both DeVos and Jay Van Andel’s son 
Steve served as “honorary pallbearers” at the Grand Rapids wing of  his funeral. In 2012, the Gerald 
R. Ford Museum unveiled plans to renovate for the first time in sixteen years, which included the 
construction of  the DeVos Learning Center, described on its website as a “state-of-the-art learning 
space for students visiting the Museum” where “learners of  all ages will engage in interactive and 
meaningful programs that seek to instill the qualities of  President and Mrs. Ford: character, integrity, 
public service, and civic education.” The Center opened in 2016.  25
 When asked in 2009 whether he “ever ask[ed] President Ford for a favor,” DeVos replied, 
“Not that I know of.” While that might have been technically true, the evidence is clear that the co-
founders and the company lobbied Ford on various matters before he became president. On Octo-
ber 23, 1973, as part of  the process of  confirming Ford as the new vice president, Jerome Zeifman, 
general counsel for the House Judiciary Committee, sent a letter to Amway’s vice president of  cor-
porate services, William Halliday, requesting information about the company’s ties to Ford: whether, 
for example, anyone at the company had ever reached out to Ford about a bill or made donations to 
his congressional campaigns.   26
 Halliday’s reply offers a window into the ties between Ford and the company. Halliday identi-
fied several bills that individuals from the company had communicated with Ford about. For exam-
ple, Halliday himself  wrote to Ford in October 1967 regarding H.R. 7977, which aimed to raise the 
cost of  postage, urging “that he seek proper amendment to the bill so that an undue burden would 
not be placed upon those industries relying upon the use of  third class mail as a means of  merchan-
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dising their products.” In January 1968 he again wrote to Ford to see if  he was willing to testify in 
committee against Senate Bill 1599, which would introduce new rules on direct sellers; Ford de-
clined. In 1971, Noel Black, director of  public affairs at Amway, had communicated with Ford about 
a “model bill” that Amway had written dealing with federal regulation of  phosphate detergents. Hal-
liday explained that “Amway was anxious that this legislation be adopted in order to forestall the 
adoption of  many state and local enactments.” Jay Van Andel wrote to Ford in February 1973 re-
garding H.R. 643, which would have placed limits on the FDA’s ability to regulate vitamins. (That 
specific bill never became law — three years later, however, thanks to the efforts of  Senator William 
Proxmire, some restrictions were imposed.) Halliday also listed a number of  occasions when Ford 
flew on company planes. He did note, though, that no one at Amway gave any money to Ford dur-
ing the 1968, 1970, or 1972 election cycles. Halliday sent a copy of  his letter to Ford on November 
14th along with a separate note in which he praised Ford’s performance at his confirmation hearing 
and declared that “if  future fortune should indicate that you become President of  the United States, 
I would feel that our country and its future would have been placed in very capable hands.”  27
 Among the more prominent Amway-related events at which Ford was present involved the 
Center of  Free Enterprise, a dodecagonal building added to the company’s Ada headquarters in the 
early 1970s. On May 15, 1971, Ford addressed a ceremony marking the start of  construction. The 
Center of  Free Enterprise was slated to open the following fall, and was to feature a number of  
right-leaning instructional exhibits on elementary economics. Among the items for tourists to see 
were “The Tree of  Economic Life,” intended to demonstrate how free markets encourage produc-
tivity, a “Corporate Money Flow Exhibit” that depicted the proportion of  a corporation’s revenue 
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that went to cover various expenses (taxes, salaries, shareholder dividends, etc.), and a Chamber of  
Commerce film called It’s Everybody’s Business.    28
 The Center cost three million dollars and officially opened on May 25, 1973. On November 
30, 1972, Jay Van Andel wrote to Ford informing him of  the planned May ceremony. “We believe 
that the opening of  the Center of  Free Enterprise is an event of  considerable national significance,” 
he said, and accordingly “[w]e feel it deserves the attendance of  a top official from the Federal Gov-
ernment for an address.” Van Andel set his sights big: “Let’s start at the top and suggest either the 
President or the Vice President. What do you think?” Ford replied on December 18th, informing 
Van Andel, “I doubt if  we can get the President, but I will speak to him personally after January 3rd. 
If  he can’t make it, I will personally work on the Vice President. From there we will go to the Cabi-
net where we should definitely have results if  the other two alternatives don’t materialize.” Neither 
Nixon nor Agnew wound up going, although Ford himself  was present. Several thousand attended 
the opening, the Press reported, which noted that “[o]nly one thing didn’t come off  as planned. The 
American flag got stuck at half-staff.”  29
 The Center of  Free Enterprise also sought to spread free enterprise ideology throughout the 
wider population. In the early 1970s, a number of  business executives and politicians worried that 
Americans, especially young people, were, as they saw it, disturbingly ignorant of  economics. In re-
sponse, companies like General Motors as well as the U.S. Chamber of  Commerce provided educa-
tional materials to students and teachers throughout the country that promoted free enterprise under 
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the guise of  improving knowledge of  economics. Wal-Mart, meanwhile, played an instrumental role 
in bankrolling Students in Free Enterprise, which targeted colleges and universities.  30
 The Center of  Free Enterprise was part of  this project. Along with the exhibits, the Center 
played host to the Institute for Free Enterprise. Beginning in the early seventies, the Institute orga-
nized yearly workshops for Grand Rapids area teachers to get a grounding in economics. The Wash-
ington Post reported in March 1981 that “[t]he institute has sponsored workshops around the country, 
instructing 2,000 teachers on ways to prepare lesson plans to help schoolchildren understand basic 
economic concepts.” Among the works sponsored by the company as part of  this educational cam-
paign was Choice: Suggested Activities to Motivate the Teaching of  Elementary Economics, which came out in 
1975. The book provided teachers from kindergarten through eighth grade outlines of  lessons in-
tended to introduce students to basic concepts around consumption, production, exchange, the role 
of  government in the economy, and more. The lessons were fairly non-ideological — they were not 
exactly predisposing students to, say, oppose regulation or the welfare state. One lesson worth not-
ing, though, targeted at seventh and eighth graders, asked them to evaluate different pieces of  regu-
latory legislation implemented during the New Deal and beyond. The list of  suggested laws included 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, the Full Employment 
Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act. Among the questions for the students to consider were “What effect 
has the increased government role had on economic freedom?,” “What effect has the increased gov-
ernment role had on the monopoly power of  businesses and labor unions?,” and “Could any pro-
grams be taken over and operated more efficiently by the private sector?”  31
 Moreton, “Make Payroll, Not War,” 54-58; Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart, 173-192. Portions reproduced in 30
Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 15-16.
 Truax, “Steel ‘Spider’ Frames Amway Hall”; Ed Hoogterp, “Teachers’ Workshop To Blend Subjects, Economic Con31 -
cepts,” The Grand Rapids Press, August 8, 1972, 3D, GRPC; Dan Morgan, “Selling Free Enterprise: Amway Combats Lib-
eral Ideology in Politics,” The Washington Post, Mar. 14, 1981, A1, A2; Amway Corporation, John Lewis, Peter Harrington, 
Dr. George Vredeveld, Choice: Suggested Activities to Motivate the Teaching of  Elementary Economics (Stevensville, MI: Educa-
tional Services, Inc., 1975), 157-159. Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 16.
  !299
 In addition to the economic illiteracy campaign, the cofounders inserted themselves into one 
of  the marquee political episodes of  the decade: the tax revolt. The movement picked up steam be-
ginning in the mid-seventies thanks to the onset of  stagflation. Inflation resulted in “bracket creep”: 
inflation boosted nominal incomes, pushing many Americans into higher tax brackets, at the same 
time that it ate away at purchasing power and made them poorer in real terms. The same happened 
with property values: inflation increased housing prices and, in turn, property taxes while eroding 
the real value of  homes. In response, voters throughout the country backed new limits on taxes, 
most famously Proposition 13 in California. The brainchild behind Prop 13, Howard Jarvis, ap-
peared on the June 19, 1978 cover of  Time magazine with the words “Tax Revolt!” in red and yellow 
lettering emblazoned over him. The tax revolt represented an early seminal moment in the rise of  a 
new Right eager for a basis on which to attack the welfare state.   32
 In 1976, the tax revolt came to Michigan. That year, two groups, Taxpayers United for Tax 
Limitation and the Taxpayers Federation of  Michigan, launched a campaign to pass Proposal C, 
which stipulated that tax revenue and government spending could not exceed 8.3 percent of  the to-
tal income earned in the state. Proposal C received the endorsement of  such luminaries as Milton 
Friedman, who visited Detroit in October to speak on behalf  of  the amendment. Opposition, 
meanwhile, came from several corners. The board of  trustees for Michigan State University came 
out against it, arguing that it would undermine funding for higher education. Elementary, middle, 
and high school administrators raised similar concerns. The Grand Rapids Press objected to “loading 
the constitution with revenue specifics when such policy clearly is the responsibility of  an elected 
Legislature.” And the Kalamazoo Gazette declared that if  passed, the initiative “would place Michigan’s 
elected leaders in a financial straitjacket.” Proposal C was defeated that November 43% to 57%. In 
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his Newsweek column, Friedman bemoaned its downfall, writing that “government employees and 
other special-interest groups have succeeded in bamboozling the naïve taxpayer[.]”   33
 Two years later, Taxpayers United tried again with a similar measure called Proposal E. In 
December 1977, a bipartisan group of  thirty-one state representatives and senators came out in fa-
vor of  it. That same month, Taxpayers United launched their campaign to put Proposal E before 
Michigan’s voters, which required collecting 266,000 signatures. To drum up support for Proposal E, 
Taxpayers United distributed pamphlets like “Michigan Needs A Limit On Taxes — Make It Hap-
pen,” published in a Q&A format that spelled out how the amendment would work and why it was 
necessary. They also solicited contributions from businesspeople in the state, such as D.R. Carlson, 
the owner of  Western Auto in Ishpeming, located on the Upper Peninsula. On a fundraising form 
dated October 31st, Carlson indicated that he was donating twenty dollars to Taxpayers United and 
noted in the margins that he was “giving to many other groups, too.” He also listed five other indi-
viduals for the group to contact and solicit contributions from. The most interesting part of  the 
form, though, is what Carlson put on the back. “Very probably you have contacted Rich DeVos & 
Jay Van Andel, starters of  Amway Corp.,” Carlson wrote. “If  you haven’t your [sic] missing a large 
opportunity as these ‘free enterprise’ gentlemen are true Americans & will help greatly. Call them in 
Ada, Mich; although I’m sure you have.”  34
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 They had. By the time Carlson made his suggestion, Amway and the cofounders had already 
been involved with Taxpayers United and the campaign for Proposal E for several months. Amway 
made three ten-thousand-dollar donations to Taxpayers United in March, May, and August of  1978. 
A financials sheet from Taxpayers United dated May 30th included Amway on its list of  “Major con-
tributors” alongside a handful of  other companies. The company even marshaled its Michigan dis-
tributor force on behalf  of  the amendment. In May, for example, the cofounders mailed out, on 
company letterhead, a note to their distributors encouraging them to sign petitions to get Proposal E 
on the ballot and to consider donating to Taxpayers United, assuring them that “[a]mounts as small 
as $5 will be heartily appreciated.”    35
 In contrast to 1976, the 1978 effort paid off, albeit narrowly. Proposal E passed with fifty-
two percent of  the vote, the margin of  victory a mere 136,166 votes. Following the victory of  Pro-
posal E, Taxpayers United for Tax Limitation and the Taxpayers Federation of  Michigan fused to 
form the Taxpayers United Federation (TUF). This new entity also had the backing of  Amway and 
its cofounders. On May 8, 1979, Noel Black sent a letter to the leadership of  TUF notifying them 
that the group would receive $39,000 in “seed money” from Amway. “These monies,” he explained, 
“should be viewed as the means by which the Federation can get off  the ground and raise money to 
become a properly funded and operated organization to ensure proper implementation of  the Tax 
Limitation Amendment and related activities, including the possibility of  additional initiatives.” In 
addition to providing startup money for TUF, at least two high-ranking company officials, Noel 
Black and David Cullen, Amway’s corporate communications officer, belonged to its management: 
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Black served on the executive committee while Cullen sat on the board of  directors. Both resigned 
their respective posts in July 1980, citing an inability to commit time to the group’s work.   36
 DeVos and Van Andel sent out letters to Michigan businesspeople to drum up support for 
TUF. On August 23, 1979, Kenneth Nyquist, executive director of  TUF, sent a letter to Noel Black 
stating that “[y]ou are requested to assist the work of  the T.U.F. Fundraising Committee in meeting 
our goal to raise $100,000.” It then went on to specify exactly how the cofounders should coordinate 
with TUF to obtain contributions: “First, a letter from Amway entrepreneurs Jay Van Andel and 
Richard De Vos will be sent to the prospective target. Two days later, a T.U.F. letter describing our 
activities and plans will be mailed. The T.U.F. letter closes by naming the solicitor who will be then 
making follow-up contact a few days later.” The cofounders mailed out a batch of  these solicitation 
letters, all identical in content, at the end of  October 1979. The letters began by informing their re-
cipients that “[a]fter six long years of  hard work, Constitutional tax and spending limitation is a reali-
ty in Michigan.” However, while “[s]ome of  the implementation [of  Proposal E] has followed the 
mandate of  the voters as expressed last November….it appears that the legislature has not fully un-
derstood the mandate in certain other elements of  implementation.” Accordingly, Taxpayers United 
Federation wanted to offer guidance to that end, which required money: “In a few days, you will re-
ceive a letter directly from Taxpayers United Federation requesting your financial aid. When you do, 
please respond generously.”  37
 Charles Dykema, executive vice president of  TUF, acknowledged the value of  DeVos and 
Van Andel to the group’s agenda in a letter to the cofounders dated October 11, 1980. “The best 
way for you to understand our appreciation,” the letter said, “is for us to consider what your gen-
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erosity has accomplished,” which included “ma[king] tax limitation a success” by preventing the pas-
sage of  “unconstitutional implementing legislation designed to defeat it.” In helping TUF to forestall 
this outcome, Dykema continued, “you have saved the people of  Michigan the untold expense of  
fighting unconstitutional laws in court” and, in turn, “you have prevented the courts from ‘legislat-
ing’ what the citizen-taxpayer will do.” The letter concluded by asking DeVos and Van Andel if  they 
were willing, for the price of  $17.76, to become official members of  the Federation. Dykema insist-
ed that “[i]f  I were to draw up a list of  persons who should be given honorary, unpaid life member-
ships in TUF, you and your partner would be at the top of  the list,” but the organization was unable 
to provide any “free rides” at that time.  38
 The same year that he and DeVos helped TUF get off  the ground, Jay Van Andel became 
chairman of  the U.S. Chamber of  Commerce on May 1st. Before this, Van Andel had served the 
Chamber in a number of  other capacities. He had been both chairman and vice-chairman of  Mi-
chigan’s Chamber of  Commerce, and in April 1972, he joined the national organization on its board 
of  directors, where he sat until he was elevated to chairman. The inflation problem was among the 
biggest concerns of  his chairmanship. In April 1980, Van Andel declared that combating inflation 
would require “a new Congress” with “members [that] are strong enough to make the hard decisions 
that need to be made[.]” As chairman, Van Andel strove to spread his economic views as far and 
wide as he could. A May 1980 article in the Grand Rapids Press published after his chairmanship had 
ended indicated that Van Andel had visited twenty-five cities across the United States in addition to 
traveling abroad. The article also noted that Van Andel “conservatively estimates that through his 
speeches and media coverage, his words have been heard by 25 million people.”   39
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 On May 2, 1979, his first full day in the position, Van Andel held a press conference in 
which he called for cutting back on regulation as well as adopting a balanced budget amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. In 1975, an organization called the National Taxpayers Union launched an ef-
fort to get states to demand a constitutional convention to pass a balanced budget amendment. By 
1979, thirty had done so. That January, the movement took on national significance after California’s 
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown jumped on board. Republicans on Capitol Hill toyed with the 
idea, though little consensus emerged on the specifics. Democrats, on the other hand, were largely 
against it.   40
 On October 11, 1979, Van Andel, in his capacity as chairman, testified before both the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law as well as the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution about a potential balanced budget amendment. In his opening 
statement before the House subcommittee, more or less identical to the one he gave before the Sen-
ate subcommittee, Van Andel declared that “the American economy, we believe, is in trouble, be-
cause our Government has too long operated in a fiscally reckless fashion — ignoring basic eco-
nomic principles in favor of  short-term political goals.” He — and the Chamber — thought that 
federal spending and taxes ought to each be capped at eighteen percent of  the nation’s gross nation-
al product and that “[a]cross-the-board budget cuts of  less than 2 1/2 percent annually over the next 
3 years could bring the budget into balance and accomplish that.” As for a balanced budget amend-
ment, Van Andel indicated that it was the Chamber’s opinion that “getting a constitutional amend-
ment will be time-consuming and, therefore, not helpful in the near term.” However, they did be-
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lieve that “[a] statutory limitation [i.e., tax and spending ceilings] followed by a constitutional limita-
tion would combine quick results with long-term benefits.”   41
 In subsequent questioning, Chairman Peter Rodino asked him to more precisely articulate 
the Chamber’s stance on an amendment, specifically whether the Chamber believed that “this 
Committee [should] be examing [sic] alternatives to a constitutional amendment[.]” Van Andel 
replied that while the Chamber was focused mainly on offering solutions to improve the country’s 
fiscal condition in the immediate future, they did still support adopting an amendment in “the long 
term[.]” Rodino also asked whether the Chamber ever supported the federal government running 
deficits. Van Andel conceded that “[t]here are circumstances when an unbalanced budget is probably 
necessary,” but in general he thought that “[t]he problem of  using the deficit to stimulate the econ-
omy is that unfortunately such use is subject to many political pressures[.]” He stuck to his guns 
when, towards the end of  questioning, Representative William Hughes asked him whether, in light 
of  predictions of  an impending recession, he would endorse deficit spending in 1980. Van Andel 
said no. When Representative Tom Railsback asked about the potential negative consequences that a 
balanced budget mandate might have on the social safety net, Van Andel insisted that the relatively 
modest cuts that the Chamber was proposing did not pose any grave threat to such programs.  42
 Reagan’s victory in 1980 arguably represents the high-water mark of  electoral conservatism, 
the triumph of  several decades of  work by movement activists. The cofounders were involved in 
both the 1980 campaign as well as the administration. DeVos and Van Andel contributed seventy 
thousand and sixty-eight thousand dollars respectively to help elect Reagan, making them among his 
largest benefactors, according to the Grand Rapids Press. On March 5, 1982, DeVos debated Grand 
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Rapids’s representative in the state legislature, John Otterbacher, a Democrat, at Grand Rapids 
Christian High School on the subject of  Reagan’s economic policies. DeVos, unsurprisingly, argued 
on their behalf. Two months later, in May, Amway co-sponsored a conference, convened inside the 
Amway Grand Plaza Hotel, that centered on Reagan’s proposals to shrink the federal budget. In De-
cember 1983, Amway hired Alexander Haig, Reagan’s former secretary of  state, as a “global consul-
tant.” Van Andel stated in his autobiography that when he and DeVos were introduced to Reagan in 
1980, they voiced their support for Haig at State. In February 1984, Haig went to Amway World 
Headquarters and received a tour of  the facility. He also held a press conference at which he criti-
cized Reagan’s decision to remove the Marines stationed in Lebanon in the wake of  the Beirut 
bombing the previous October.  43
 When the 1984 presidential campaign came around, Amway helped organize a rally called 
“Spirit of  America — Salute to Free Enterprise,” which was held on January 26th in Atlanta, Geor-
gia. Reagan addressed the event, which served as the unofficial kick-off  to his reelection effort. No-
tably, there was some consternation within Reagan’s team about associating the president with 
Amway. The Grand Rapids Press reported that Amway secured Reagan’s appearance at the rally only 
after it removed its name from the event. One Reagan aide indicated that “[w]e decided we didn’t 
want to do an Amway rally, in part because Amway had recently pleaded guilty to defrauding the 
Canadian government and was fined $20 million.” Nevertheless, an article in the Press published the 
day after the Atlanta rally indicated that “the gathering took on a distinctive Amway flavor,” due in 
large part to the presence of  the cofounders as well as the fact that “Amway distributors hand[ed] 
out half  the tickets to the event[.]” In his speech, Reagan touted the economic progress made since 
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the recession a few years earlier and spoke of  the need to further slash taxes as well as government 
spending. “Cutting back a runaway government which stifles the spirit of  enterprise,” he declared, 
“can be profoundly positive, like performing surgery on a patient to save his life.”  44
 Along with helping to elect — and reelect — Reagan, the cofounders undertook a number 
of  other political ventures in the eighties. Jay Van Andel remained part of  the Chamber’s national 
leadership even after his one-year term as chairman ended, chairing its executive committee from 
1980 to 1985. In that time, he testified twice more before Congress, albeit not as a representative of  
the Chamber. On April 19, 1982, he went before the House Ways and Means Committee’s Sub-
committee on Select Revenue Measures to discuss tax deductions and write-offs taken by Amway 
distributors, which, as noted in Chapter III, had brought some distributors under IRS investigation. 
Van Andel outlined the various steps that the company had taken to educate distributors about what 
taxes they owed and what they could and could not deduct, which included publishing relevant in-
formation in their manuals and magazines as well as working to prevent the dissemination of  incor-
rect information through distributor networks. One week later he was at the Senate Finance Com-
mittee’s Subcommittee on Oversight of  the Internal Revenue Service commenting on proposed leg-
islation that would amend how independent contractors like Amway distributors were classified un-
der the tax code as well as their reporting requirements. And in June 1985, Van Andel joined a panel 
of  other business executives in front of  the House Ways and Means Committee to offer his 
thoughts on Reagan’s tax reform proposals. Although he complained that “[t]he President’s proposal 
shifts some of  the total [tax] burden from individuals and small businesses to corporations,” which 
he thought amounted to going “from a more visible to less visible tax,” he remained broadly sup-
 Russakoff  and Williams, “Amway, Reagan team up for big ‘free enterprise’ rally”; Reagan aide quoted in Tom 44
Rademacher, “Amway to Share Rally Featuring Reagan,” The Grand Rapids Press, January 23, 1984, 1A, 2A, GRPC; “Rea-
gan Lauds ‘New Course’ In First Campaign Outing,” The Grand Rapids Press, January 27, 1984, 1A, GRPC; Ronald Rea-
gan, “Remarks at a Spirit of  America Rally in Atlanta, Georgia,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, https://www.rea-
ganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/12684g (accessed January 9, 2019).
  !308
portive, saying that “[t]he lowered rates of  the President’s proposal will stimulate 
entrepreneurship.”   45
 The eighties were much rockier for Richard DeVos. In March 1981, DeVos became finance 
chairman of  the national Republican Party. DeVos got the job in large measure on account of  his 
success over the preceding year leading the party’s Congressional Leadership Council, bringing in a 
million dollars. When DeVos took over the GOP’s financial operations, he looked to apply Amway-
style methods to fundraising by introducing “shareholders’ conventions.” Drawing inspiration from 
Amway’s own rally model, the idea was to stage events throughout the country that would galvanize 
grassroots Republican donors, encouraging them to give money as well as to reach out to people 
they knew to join the party. Despite a hundred-million-dollar haul under his watch, DeVos was oust-
ed on August 13, 1982 because he had allegedly concentrated too much on small-dollar contributors, 
leaving the party’s mega-donors feeling neglected. About a week later, DeVos publicly suggested that 
a group of  oil executives from Oklahoma were behind his removal. The RNC’s actions angered a 
number of  Michigan Republicans, who argued that DeVos only lost the post because he failed to 
show sufficient deference to big donors. Two years after the debacle at the RNC, DeVos got the op-
portunity to put his fundraising skills to work once again when, in May 1984, he was named finance 
chairman, as well as co-chair, of  a newly-formed pro-Reagan group called Citizens for America. Two 
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months later, DeVos went to the White House with other top figures from the group, where they 
met with Reagan along with some of  his advisors.  46
 DeVos was drawn into controversy yet again in 1987. That July, Reagan gave DeVos a seat 
on a new commission designed to tackle the AIDS epidemic. His appointment proved contentious 
for two reasons: first, the fact that he lacked a background in medicine, and second because of  his 
conservative religious views, which many saw as biasing him against gay people. That September, the 
ACLU and the Public Citizen Health Research Group criticized DeVos, along with three other indi-
viduals on the board, for allegedly being “extremists.” The two organizations called on Reagan to 
expand the panel to include more people with direct experience dealing with AIDS, like doctors 
treating AIDS patients, researchers, and those suffering from the disease. Those grievances were on 
full display when the panel met in D.C. that month. Protestors outside the National Press Club 
headquarters, where hearings were taking place, chanted slogans like “Richard DeVos we cannot ap-
plaud/Amway admits Canadian fraud.” Inside, an AIDS victim who came to testify lambasted the 
makeup of  the committee, saying at one point, “You ought to have experts, not somebody convicted 
of  fraud in Canada.” In the aftermath of  that tumultuous session, DeVos said that the committee 
could only succeed in its objectives if  it cultivated greater “credibility” with the public.   47
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 Along with vitriol from certain segments of  the public, the commission also faced a lot of  
internal turmoil: progress was slow, and because of  that, the fall of  1987 saw the departures of  ex-
ecutive director Linda Sheaffer, chairman Eugene Mayberry, vice-chair Woodrow Myers, and mem-
ber Franklin Cockerill III. Nevertheless, DeVos publicly denied any problems on October 8th, sug-
gesting that Mayberry had left because the work proved too taxing for him and dismissing reports 
of  tensions on the panel. Despite a difficult start, the commission did release a report on June 24, 
1988. DeVos did not agree with all of  its conclusions. For instance, he opposed a provision, voted 
through on June 17th, calling for legislation that would bar discrimination against those infected 
with AIDS, and he favored looser confidentiality rules that would allow medical professionals to 
learn if  someone they were treating had AIDS. He particularly bristled at the panel’s calls for more 
funding to support those struggling with drug addiction, believing that many of  them were beyond 
help.    48
********** 
 The early nineties saw the end of  Richard DeVos and Jay Van Andel’s tenures as president 
and chairman of  Amway. That said, they, along with the company and other members of  their fami-
lies, remained heavily invested — literally — in the Republican Party and the conservative movement 
throughout the 1990s and beyond. A September 1992 article in the Grand Rapids Press on fundraising 
by the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton campaigns in Michigan identified DeVos and Van Andel 
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as belonging to the upper echelon of  Bush donors, with contributions of  twenty-five thousand and 
seventy thousand dollars respectively.    49
 During the critical 1994 midterm elections, one candidate who benefitted significantly from 
Amway was Sue Myrick, a Republican running for a House seat in North Carolina. Myrick became 
an Amway distributor in 1992, and when she ran for Senate later that year, she actually fundraised at 
distributor functions. In addition, the company as well as distributor kingpin Dexter Yager support-
ed her campaign to the tune of  $16,500. She lost that race but won her House campaign two years 
later. Amway distributor networks proved key to her success. According to reporting by Mother Jones, 
“at least 171 Amway distributors and family members — 143 of  whom did not live in Myrick’s 
home state — apparently gave Myrick $178,660 in 1994.” Moreover, Myrick’s donation stream fea-
tured “an unusually large number of  small, mostly $10 contributions, including $117,211 recorded 
almost entirely on days she spoke at Amway rallies.” All in all, “$295,871 — nearly half  of  Myrick’s 
total [which was $669,525] — appears to have come through Amway.” Additionally, Dexter Yager 
used Amvox to encourage people to support Myrick, which was likely illegal under campaign finance 
law. Once in office, Myrick joined the so-called “Amway caucus,” a small clique of  House members 
who had also once done Amway. In late November 1994, no more than two weeks after Republicans 
pulled off  a stunning victory and took control of  the House, the New York Times reported that 
Amway donated $2.5 million to the party “for a newly built broadcast center at the Republican Par-
ty’s national headquarters” for the purposes of  “produc[ing] a weekly one-hour television program, 
‘Rising Tide’.” In addition, the center would bear Amway’s name.   50
 Two years later, in July 1996, in the midst of  the presidential race, the Republican candidate 
for president, Bob Dole, traveled to Detroit for a party function intended to raise money for the 
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GOP’s victory fund as well as to recognize Richard DeVos for his work on behalf  of  Republicans. 
That same month, Amway said that it had donated $1.3 million to finance the broadcasting of  the 
Republican presidential convention, slated to be held in San Diego. The day after the donation be-
came public, Dick DeVos said that the chairman of  the Republican National Committee, Haley Bar-
bour, had reached out to the company personally and solicited the donation. The company gave the 
money to the San Diego Convention and Visitors Bureau, not the party itself. The Washington Post 
explained that had the company simply given the money to the GOP, “under federal election law the 
RNC would then have had to dip into its pot of  contributions from individuals to pay for part of  
the air time,” and at that point in time it was “running short of  such funds[.]” Accordingly, some 
argued that Amway’s donation was deliberately designed to flout the law. The Democratic National 
Committee threatened to take the issue to the Federal Election Commission. In response to the up-
roar, as well as to the DNC following through on its threat, the party decided in mid-August to give 
the money back to Amway and to cover the $1.3 million expense out of  its own pocket.  51
 During the 1996 campaign, Democrats criticized Amway for allegedly using its financial in-
vestments in the GOP to influence legislation; in particular, to reverse a 1993 law that increased 
Amway’s tax liability on its overseas earnings, chiefly in Asia. The company, for its part, flatly denied 
any quid pro quo. At the end of  July 1997, however, House Republican leadership slipped in an 
amendment to a larger piece of  tax legislation that rolled back the 1993 changes. The Wall Street 
Journal reported that although there were other tweaks like this in the bill, “[t]he Amway provision 
stands out because it wasn’t in either of  the tax bills produced by the House or Senate.” An op-ed by 
Molly Ivins of  the Fort Worth Star-Telegram called the rider “a $283 million payoff  for Amway” in re-
turn for “a $4 million investment in campaign contributions” over four years. On August 11th, Pres-
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ident Bill Clinton signaled that would use the line-item veto on some elements of  the tax bill. The 
Amway amendment, however, was not among those up for the chop. At around this same time, De-
Vos also helped to insert language into another bill that would have forced the Federal Trade Com-
mission to allow two Grand Rapids area hospitals to merge: Blodgett Memorial Medical Center and 
Butterworth Hospital. (Recall that DeVos was both a board member at as well as a financial contrib-
utor to Butterworth.) The FTC had fought the move, citing concerns about market concentration.  52
 The company, as noted before, was reluctant to admit any sort of  connection between the 
money it gave and legislation like the 1997 tax amendments. Not every member of  the founding 
families was, though. Writing in Roll Call in 1997, Betsy DeVos noted that “[o]ccasionally a wayward 
reporter will try to make the charge that we are giving this money to get something in return, or that 
we must be purchasing influence in some way.” Rather than challenge the allegation, however, she 
said that she had “stop[ped] taking offense at the suggestion that we are buying influence. Now I 
simply concede the point. They are right. We do expect some things in return.”   53
 In addition to pushing legislation favorable to Amway, Republicans continued to turn to the 
company and the cofounders for money. On April 17, 1997, the New York Times reported that the 
party was actively cultivating contributions from big-money donors. Among the wealthy donors it 
had its sights on was Richard DeVos. Earlier that month, DeVos donated one million dollars to the 
party, which the Los Angeles Times reported was “believed to be the largest contribution from an in-
dividual donor since the FEC began reporting political donations.” The contribution was part of  an 
effort to pay off  debts accrued during the 1996 election. DeVos’s contribution represented around 
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eighteen percent of  the $5.6 million that the GOP received in the form of  “soft money” by the 
middle of  1997. On August 9, 1999, the New York Times wrote that the Republican Party was creat-
ing a special club for its mega-donors called Team $1 Million “whose members are treated to a 
smorgasbord of  benefits like private meetings with Congressional leaders.” The party already had 
something akin to this, known as “season pass holders.” These were individuals who donated a quar-
ter million or more to the party a year, and at the time there were thirty-six of  them. Among those 
thirty-six, the article noted, was Richard DeVos. Team $1 Million “reflects a major escalation in 
fundraisers’ expectations,” with the Times indicating that “[t]he party’s 36 season pass holders are 
now being asked to contribute an additional $250,000 this year and next[.]”  54
 Although Amway’s presence was strongest within the Republican Party, the company also 
had a foothold in the Clinton White House, albeit in a small and more symbolic way. A December 
21, 1996 Washington Post profile on Lanny Davis, the incoming White House special counsel, noted 
that he had once been an Amway distributor. According to the article, “[a]fter he narrowly lost a 
1976 House race, Davis, 51, began evangelizing for the motivational door-to-door distribution com-
pany,” which he apparently did “as a way of  supporting his then-wife, Elaine, in her wish for chal-
lenging, interesting work.” However, he gave up the business because “he could no longer deceive 
his friends and associates to lure them to Amway sessions.” Like the Wisconsin distributors sued 
back in 1982, the Davises did not disclose upfront to their prospects that they were pitching 
Amway.  55
********** 
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 The dawn of  the twenty-first century saw the second generation of  Amway’s founding fami-
lies take a more prominent role in politics. On June 13, 2001, Amway chairman Steve Van Andel fol-
lowed in his father’s footsteps and became head of  the U.S. Chamber of  Commerce. One of  Van 
Andel’s priorities at the outset of  his tenure was getting people to think better of  business, saying, 
“People infrequently talk about the things that businesses do that are positive, like the hundreds of  
millions of  people in the United States who are supplied health care by business and the donations 
businesses make to local charities.” Promoting global economic integration was also a significant fo-
cus. In early July 2001, Van Andel endorsed China’s ascension into the World Trade Organization, 
telling China Daily that “[f]or U.S. businesses, one of  the best things that can happen to help confi-
dence in the Chinese market is China becoming part of  the WTO.” In anticipation of  China eventu-
ally joining the WTO, Van Andel worked to help more American businesses penetrate the Chinese 
market. In October 2001, the Chamber partnered with the China Council for the Promotion of  In-
ternational Trade to help businesses in both countries navigate each other’s economies. In addition 
to championing WTO membership for China, he was also active in trying to get most favored nation 
status for China in the United States.   56
 China was not the only issue that Van Andel concerned himself  with, though. Van Andel 
spent much of  the summer of  2001 traveling across the United States speaking to various business 
and trade groups, urging them to support Trade Promotion Authority, which would expedite the 
process of  negotiating and establishing trading agreements with other countries. Crucially, Van An-
del wanted to make certain that any Trade Promotion Authority granted to the President would not 
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require future trade deals to include rules about worker’s rights or environmental protection. In early 
November, Van Andel and other Chamber officials traveled to Japan to encourage politicians there 
to reform the economy by, among other things, privatizing some state-owned enterprises.   57
 Van Andel’s tenure coincided with the terrorist attacks of  September 11th. In the aftermath 
of  9/11, he said, “I found myself  having to go from being a businessman, the free enterprise guy, to 
being a spokesman for my country, the freedom guy.” In addition to the destruction and loss of  life, 
9/11 also contributed to a minor downturn in the American economy. When interviewed by the Ja-
panese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun in April 2002 about the post-9/11 slump, Van Andel said, 
“My own view at the time [about the economic impact of  9/11]….was extremely optimistic.” The 
attacks notwithstanding, he believed that “U.S. economic fundamentals were strong” and that the 
American economy would weather the storm. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge some fallout, point-
ing out that “[b]ecause of  the uncertainty over the future that resulted from the terrorist attacks, 
business people held off  on capital investments,” but he was confident that this would reverse soon-
er rather than later.  58
 Since 2000, one of  the major hobbyhorses for the DeVoses, particularly the DeVos children, 
has been education reform, both in Michigan as well as around the country, which culminated in the 
nomination of  Betsy DeVos as education secretary in November 2016. In June 1999, the magazine 
Church & State reported that Dick DeVos was ready to spend big to help create a school voucher 
system in the state of  Michigan. By late February 2000, an organization called Kids First! Yes!, which 
DeVos co-chaired, submitted petitions to the secretary of  state for what became Proposal 1. Pro-
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voucher forces wound up collecting 150,000 more signatures than they needed to get the proposal 
on the ballot in November. Per the language of  the initiative, Proposal 1 would allow “indirect sup-
port to students attending nonpublic pre-elementary, elementary and secondary schools” and “re-
quire enactment of  teacher testing laws.”  59
 Support for and opposition to Proposal 1 came from a variety of  quarters. The Family Re-
search Council came out in favor of  Proposal 1 in October, with its president Ken Connor declaring 
that “Proposal 1 will improve the quality of  public education in Michigan as it encourages poor per-
forming schools to compete with other public and private schools.” It also received the backing of  
the Michigan Catholic Conference, the Islamic Association of  Detroit, and the Michigan Chamber 
of  Commerce, among others. Although it would make state dollars available to privately-run reli-
gious schools, there was by no means consensus among religious communities in the state on Pro-
posal 1. Catholics were among the biggest backers of  Proposal 1, with the Michigan Catholic Con-
ference launching a campaign to have priests deliver sermons about it at Mass. Conversely, the Unit-
ed Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church, and the United Church of  Christ all opposed the mea-
sure. Within the state’s Jewish community, the Jewish Coalition Against Vouchers, an umbrella group 
that included the Anti-Defamation League and B’nai B’rith, came out against Proposal 1, although it 
did have strong support among Orthodox Jews. The NAACP, the League of  Women Voters, and the 
Detroit Free Press also opposed Proposal 1.   60
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 Opposition to Proposal 1 was based on a variety of  factors. The League of  Women Voters, 
for instance, warned that “the real goal of  Proposal 1 is to eliminate the Michigan Constitution’s 
prohibition of  giving public money to private and religious schools.” Accordingly, it raised concerns 
over whether or not it would violate the First Amendment. In fact, the People for the American Way 
announced that it would challenge the voucher scheme on constitutional grounds if  it became law. 
Critics also raised objections to the provision requiring periodic testing of  teachers, arguing that it 
failed to specify exactly how teachers would be evaluated. Additionally, they attacked testing as an 
imprecise measure of  teaching quality and as redundant, since teachers were already observed and 
evaluated on a yearly basis. And finally, there were concerns that testing would discourage people 
from entering the profession and add to an already-existing deficit of  teachers.   61
 The DeVoses were among the most vociferous backers of  the measure. Dick DeVos gave 
two interviews to the editorial board of  the Detroit Free Press in which he defended the various provi-
sions of  Proposal 1. DeVos claimed that testing was necessary because “there are a large number of  
teachers within the current system who have, No. 1, never been tested; [and] No. 2, who may in fact 
be teaching courses that were not a subject of  their study, and may not have kept up with that in 
terms of  continuing education.” According to DeVos, testing would allow schools to weed out those 
teachers who simply were not qualified for their position, giving them the opportunity to improve or 
leave the profession altogether. On vouchers, DeVos said that they would give parents the ability to 
take their children out of  subpar schools and send them to better-performing ones: “If  you are 
caught in one of  the worst-performing school districts in the state, a district where less than two-
thirds of  the ninth-graders continue on to graduate, then we are saying to you, you should not be 
forced to send your child to such a school. You should have the opportunity to choose.” DeVos also 
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Michigan, California: Big money pouring into campaigns that back private-school proposals,” USA Today, October 12, 
2000, A17; Peggy Walsh-Sarnecki, “Voucher Proposal Would Test Teachers But Competency Exam Details Not Spelled 
Out,” The Detroit Free Press, October 3, 2000, A1; Mark Mayes, “Voucher proposal looming for teachers in Michigan,” 
Lansing State Journal, September 5, 2000, A1.
  !319
deflected concerns that vouchers would undermine separation of  church and state. Although he 
conceded that the vouchers would constitute “indirect support” for religious schools, he also insist-
ed that “[t]he provision that we are changing in the Constitution of  Michigan does not change the 
prohibition against direct subsidies from government,” and that vouchers were not materially differ-
ent from someone using federal financial aid to attend a religiously-affiliated college or university, 
which was legal.  62
 The DeVoses also backed the measure with their pocketbooks. A USA Today article detailing 
the various individuals and groups giving money to voucher initiatives in Michigan and California 
reported that “Amway president Dick DeVos and Catholic bishops are putting up most of  the cash” 
on behalf  of  Proposal 1. By the middle of  June 2000, Richard and Helen DeVos had donated one 
million dollars to Kids First! Yes!, as did Elsa Prince, the mother of  Betsy DeVos. Despite this, 
though, and despite the nearly thirteen million dollars overall that proponents managed to raise, 
Proposal 1 suffered a resounding defeat, 69.13% to 30.87%. An article in the Lansing State Journal 
pointed to several factors that contributed to the defeat. One was the fact that state Republicans 
were not united around Proposal 1. Among the opponents of  Proposal 1 was Michigan’s Republican 
governor, John Engler, who was apparently concerned that it would drive African-Americans to the 
polls and in so doing offer an electoral boost to Democrats. Additionally, the paper pointed out that 
“[s]upporters sent vague, confusing messages to voters early in the campaign,” refusing, for example, 
to “use the word ‘vouchers’ in advertising because they feared it would have a negative connotation 
with voters.” This led support for the measure to hemorrhage steadily in the months leading up to 
Election Day.    63
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 Proposal 1 was not the first time that members of  Amway’s founding families dabbled in 
education reform. Controversy arose in November 1981 over Jay Van Andel’s involvement with a 
pro-voucher group called the Education Voucher Institute. The group had circulated fundraising 
letters that bore both Van Andel’s signature and the logo of  the Amway Corporation. In response, 
several organizations, including the Michigan Elementary and Middle School Principals Association 
and the Michigan Association of  School Boards, protested by withdrawing planned gatherings at the 
Amway Grand Plaza Hotel. (The Michigan Association of  School Boards eventually changed its 
mind in early January 1982.) According to the Grand Rapids Press, although the Education Voucher 
Institute had the go-ahead to include Van Andel’s signature, they never got approval for the logo. In 
a 2013 interview, Betsy DeVos explained that her and her husband’s involvement in education re-
form stemmed, in part, from what they saw in their own hometown. She talked about going to Pot-
ter’s House, a private Christian school in Grand Rapids, and meeting parents who, in her words, had 
to make “a real sacrifice” in order to send their children there. According to her, that experience mo-
tivated them to commit themselves to providing the same breadth of  choices to struggling families 
as they themselves had.  64
 For Dick and Betsy DeVos, their Calvinist upbringing also motivated their interest in reform. 
The best evidence for this comes from remarks they made in 2001 at The Gathering, which Politico’s 
Zach Stanton has described as “an annual meeting of  some of  America’s wealthiest Christians.” 
That year, the DeVoses portrayed churches and public schools as antagonists, competing with one 
another over which would exercise greater influence over children. For them, reforming education 
meant empowering churches at the expense of  public schools. Dick DeVos told attendees that “the 
church has sadly retrenched from its center role in our community, to where now, as we look at 
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many communities in our country, the church, which ought to be, in our view, far more central to 
the life of  the community, has been displaced by the public school, as the center for activity, the cen-
ter for what goes on in the community.” A little later, he expressed his and his wife’s wish “that more 
and more churches will get more and more active and engaged in education — we just can think of  
no better way to rebuild our families and our communities than to have that circle of  church and 
school and family much more tightly focused and being built on a consistent worldview.” Betsy De-
Vos, meanwhile, remarked that “for many years, the church in general has felt that it’s important for 
the children of  the congregation to be in the schools, to make a difference, but in fact I think what’s 
happened in many cases in the last couple of  decades is that the schools have impacted the kids 
more than the kids are able to impact the schools.” These remarks directly paralleled the theology of  
Abraham Kuyper. Like Kuyper, the DeVoses believed that religion was inappropriately segregated 
from larger society, and they saw education reform as a way of  bringing religion back into the fold.  65
 Dick and Betsy DeVos’s advocacy work began in earnest in the 1990s. In 1990, Dick DeVos 
won a seat on Michigan’s State Board of  Education. His tenure was unremarkable. He showed up 
only about three-quarters of  the time, and although the term of  office was eight years, he ended up 
resigning after just two, citing his appointment as Amway’s president in December 1992. On May 6, 
1991, Dick DeVos spoke at the Grand Haven Community Foundation’s Excellence in Education 
Evening, where he lambasted American schools for falling behind their international counterparts. 
To remedy the disparity, DeVos championed introducing greater school choice as well as moving 
away from property taxes as the funding mechanism for schools.   66
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 As it turned out, both innovations were not far off, at least in Michigan. In the early nineties, 
two major problems plagued Michigan’s education system: poor student performance and the state’s 
reliance on property taxes to finance schools, which generated stark inequalities. The latter problem 
was dramatized when the Kalkaska school district closed near the end of  the 1992-1993 academic 
year because it had run out of  money: the town’s population had rejected raising local property taxes 
to fund the schools.   67
 To address these problems, governor John Engler and Republicans in the state legislature 
proceeded on two parallel tracks. First they overhauled how public schools were financed by ending 
the use of  property taxes to support schools and then putting up for voters’s consideration Proposal 
A, which introduced a dedicated school tax levied at the state level, with the revenue distributed ac-
cording to how many students a school district had, raised sales taxes slightly to compensate for 
some of  the lost property tax revenue, and ensured that all schools would get a guaranteed minimum 
amount of  funding. Proposal A passed in a March 1994 referendum.  68
 As Proposal A gestated, Engler set out to try and find ways to improve student performance 
in schools. He proposed a variety of  measures, calling for the adoption of  new standards and insist-
ing that the state do more to hold schools accountable for outcomes. He also wanted to issue “re-
port cards” for all schools so that parents would know how their school was doing and could re-
move their child from that school if  it fell short of  their expectations. And, of  course, he wanted 
Michigan to embrace charters. Engler derided the fact that, as he saw it, parents were compelled to 
send their children to a certain school simply because of  where they lived. For him, charters were 
essential if  parents were going to have any real ability to decide where their children were educated. 
He also believed that charters, which would not be subject to all of  the regulations placed on public 
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schools, would foster creativity and innovation in teaching. Two bills to establish charter schools in 
Michigan — one in each chamber of  the legislature — were passed in late 1993. The Senate version 
ultimately became law in January 1994. Amway itself  became involved in the effort to bring “school 
choice” to Michigan. After the property tax repeal, the company backed a call by the Michigan Man-
ufacturers Association for the state to prioritize reform over finding new revenue sources.  69
 In addition to backing initiatives like Proposal 1, the DeVoses have also inserted themselves 
into the world of  education reform advocacy groups. In the early 2000s, Betsy DeVos helped to cre-
ate the Great Lakes Education Project (GLEP), which she chaired until 2008 and which has played a 
significant role in helping to shape how the state of  Michigan regulates charter schools. According 
to a 2014 article in the Detroit Free Press, “GLEP has spent more than $1.3 million since 2003 in di-
rect and indirect contributions to candidates” in the state. The DeVoses, unsurprisingly, have been 
among the largest contributors to GLEP: Dick and Betsy DeVos have given a combined $610,000, 
while Richard and Helen DeVos each donated $260,000 and $230,000, respectively. In 2011, GLEP 
pushed for the passage of  Senate Bill 618, which eliminated restrictions on the number of  charter 
schools in the state. As part of  that effort, the Press reported that “GLEP spent about $30,000 in 
donations to state senators” while “$115,000 went to state House members in direct donations and 
advertising.” GLEP has also worked to try and oust politicians who do not back its vision of  educa-
tion reform, such as state representative Paul Muxlow, who opposed SB 618. During his 2012 prima-
ry, GLEP was at times spending more money against Muxlow than the man challenging him: “In 
July and August 2012, the organization pumped out $184,718.40 to try to defeat Muxlow. His oppo-
nent, Bob Eick, spent only $33,847 himself.” Muxlow held on, but just barely, with only 132 votes 
separating him and Eick.   70
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 In 2002, about a year after GLEP was formed, Dick DeVos spoke at the Heritage Founda-
tion and stressed the need to make education reform a political priority, arguing that “[w]e need to 
be able to offer a political consequence for opposition and political reward for support of  education 
reform issues.” The next year, Betsy DeVos started another group called All Children Matter, which 
has been active in political campaigns throughout the country. In 2004, for example, All Children 
Matter helped to primary Utah’s Republican governor Olene Walker because she had refused to sign 
voucher legislation passed by the state legislature. She was successfully ousted. Two years later, it 
gave money to defeat David N. Cox, a Republican state representative in Utah, in his primary be-
cause he had also opposed voucher legislation, which Education Week noted was “part of  a more-
than-$7 million campaign….to get supporters of  tuition vouchers and other forms of  school choice 
into legislative and governors’ offices in at least 10 states.” That year it also challenged Toni Hellon, 
a Republican state senator in Arizona. All Children Matter is probably most well known for a lawsuit 
that the state of  Ohio leveled against it in 2008 for an attempt to skirt restrictions on campaign con-
tributions. The state fined the group $2.6 million, which, to date, it has not paid.   71
 Betsy DeVos’s work as a professional advocate continued right up until late 2016. Before 
Trump nominated her, she was chairwoman of  the American Federation for Children, which was 
founded in March 2010. Its stated mission is “to promote the benefits of  — and the need for — 
school choice, make parents aware of  their options, mobilize grassroots supports [sic] and ensure 
private school choice laws work for students.” During the 2012 election cycle, American Federation 
for Children invested seven million dollars to support 219 pro-reform candidates, most of  them in 
the South and Midwest. Eighty-three percent of  them were elected to office. DeVos also sat on the 
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board for the pro-charter Foundation for Excellence in Education, started by former Florida gover-
nor and 2016 Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush.  72
 Michigan’s embrace of  charter schools has had mixed results. A June 2016 article in the New 
York Times on Detroit found that although the city — and Michigan as a whole — has a gobsmack-
ing number of  charter schools, it has not translated into quality schooling. In fact, the article pointed 
out, it has undermined schools by stretching education dollars thin. According to the article, “De-
troit now has a bigger share of  students in charters than any American city except New Orleans….
[b]ut half  the charters perform only as well, or worse than, Detroit’s traditional public schools.” 
Politico found that “[d]espite two decades of  charter-school growth, the state’s overall academic 
progress has failed to keep pace with other states,” noting that “Michigan ranks near the bottom for 
fourth- and eighth-grade math and fourth-grade reading on a nationally representative test[.]” The 
charter schools did not help. In fact, on the whole students in public schools scored better on the 
National Association of  Education Progress’s assessments than the charter school students did. A 
September 2017 piece in the New York Times Magazine similarly noted that “Michigan’s K-12 system 
is among the weakest in the country and getting worse. In little more than a decade, Michigan has 
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gone from being a fairly average state in elementary reading and math achievement to the bottom 10 
states.”    73
 In fairness, some Michigan charters have performed well. In June 2017, the New York Times 
profiled one such example: the West Michigan Aviation Academy. The school focuses on STEM 
fields and boasts two airplanes that it uses to provide flying lessons to its students. The West Mi-
chigan Aviation Academy was started in 2010 by none other than Dick and Betsy DeVos.   74
********** 
 Although Amway’s founding families have been politically active since at least the 1970s, it 
was not until the mid-2000s that one of  them tried their hand at elected office. On June 2, 2005, 
Dick DeVos announced that he was running for governor of  Michigan as a Republican. Like all of  
the cofounders’s children, Dick had a long relationship with Amway. Richard DeVos wrote in his 
autobiography that when he was younger Dick “spent some time as a tour guide,” recalling, “[u]sing 
his middle name, he introduced himself  to guests as Dick Marvin, so he wouldn’t be recognized as 
my son.” In the mid-1970s, he became a vice president inside Amway before leaving in 1989 to run 
his own company, the Windquest Group. Four years later, however, he returned to succeed his father 
as president of  Amway, a post he stayed in until 2002, when he went back to Windquest. He had no 
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political experience prior to his run. The closest he came was when he was on the state board of  
education, though, as noted earlier, his tenure was nothing to brag about.  75
 Dick DeVos’s name had been floated as a candidate for political office before. In 1992, there 
was talk that he might run for Senate against incumbent Donald Riegle, but after succeeding his fa-
ther at the company in December, DeVos took himself  out of  consideration. In February 2005, four 
mouths prior to him entering the gubernatorial race, the Ann Arbor News reported excitement among 
Republican operatives and politicians about the prospect of  a DeVos candidacy. Dick Posthumus, 
who ran for governor in 2002, described DeVos as “somebody who can provide that executive lead-
ership that can make tough decisions.” Although DeVos in his announcement eschewed any ideolog-
ical affiliations, his entry was seen as a boon to right-wing forces inside the state party. A columnist 
for the Ann Arbor News wrote that “[h]is candidacy allows more conservative Republicans to stick to 
their guns, hold true to core GOP principles of  lower taxes and smaller government, and make 2006 
a competitive referendum on the direction Michigan should take.”  76
 DeVos entered the race with several potential advantages. There was his name, for one, and 
its association with a successful Michigan-based company. And with that connection, of  course, 
came vast resources. The Detroit Free Press reported in April 2006 that “DeVos is almost without 
question the richest man to run for office in the state in the last century.” At the time of  his an-
nouncement, DeVos declined to indicate whether or to what extent he would self-finance his cam-
paign. It was a double-edged sword, though: there were questions even before he announced about 
whether his wealth would become a political liability, whether his opponents would use it to paint 
him as out of  touch with ordinary Michiganders. And then there was the fact that his opponent, in-
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cumbent governor Jennifer Granholm, stood on shaky political ground. A July 2006 Detroit Free Press 
article noted that whereas Granholm had been a popular up-and-coming Democrat back in 2004, by 
the middle of  2006 she was “in danger of  becoming a one-term wonder,” largely on account of  an 
economic slump that had hit the state’s carmakers hard.  77
 In light of  his opponent’s weakness, DeVos placed substantial emphasis in his campaign on 
the economy. Shortly after declaring his candidacy, he said, “In the last election there was no driving 
issue for the election. In this case there is — the economy of  the state of  Michigan is in serious dis-
repair. That’s a very significant driving issue.” A full-page newspaper ad from July 2006 illustrates his 
focus on the issue. The ad included a quote from DeVos proclaiming that “[t]he renaissance of  Mi-
chigan will not be complete without the renaissance of  Detroit,” and listed what he saw as the steps 
necessary for achieving this renaissance, including “[c]reat[ing] a job climate second to none,” 
“[d]iversify[ing] our economy” and “[c]onquer[ing] the international marketplace[.]” DeVos used his 
tenure as president of  Amway to argue that he knew how to improve the state’s sagging economy. A 
profile on DeVos in the magazine Hour Detroit observed that “DeVos is betting that a state hurting 
for business will turn to a businessman.”  78
 Granholm and the state Democratic Party, however, sought to turn DeVos’s business experi-
ence into a liability. One point on which they hit him repeatedly, for example, was that while he was 
president Amway cut 1,400 jobs in Michigan while at the same time its business in China grew. In 
her stump speeches, Granholm offered up a list of  “Top Ten Reasons to Vote Democratic On No-
vember 7.” Number ten said, “My opponent says he’s a Michigan jobs maker, but when you look at 
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his record at Amway, the facts are pretty clear…almost 1400 Amway jobs are, as the great Ernie 
Harwell would say, LOOOOOOOOONG GONE.” Throughout the campaign, the Michigan De-
mocratic Party issued a number of  press releases hammering DeVos on his business record. On 
September 24, 2005, the party accused DeVos of  “us[ing] his and his family’s millions of  dollars in 
soft money political contributions to promote the interests of  Amway in China, while he eliminated 
1,400 Michigan jobs.” In March 2006, the party attacked DeVos for misrepresenting his tenure as 
president of  Amway, stating that he cut hundreds of  jobs and invested hundreds of  millions of  dol-
lars in the company’s Asia market, and that “under Dick DeVos, the company floundered for the 
first time in more than a decade.” A September 2006 press release quoted the state party chair, Mark 
Brewer, saying that “President Bush and Dick DeVos’ failed trade policies are putting Michigan 
workers at an unprecedented disadvantage, while allowing China to flourish,” and that “Dick DeVos 
has a long record of  investing in China while cutting Michigan jobs. DeVos has helped China soar 
and Michigan suffer.” The Democrats’s tactic, particularly their criticisms of  Amway’s overseas busi-
ness, drew some backlash in media circles. An op-ed in the Detroit News in August 2005 said that the 
attacks lacked merit, arguing that there was no connection between Amway’s domestic job losses and 
its investments in China and that the company’s activities in China ultimately redounded to Mi-
chigan’s benefit, since it provided Amway with the resources to invest at home.   79
 DeVos’s proscription for the Michigan economy was well in line with the boilerplate free-
market policies that his father and Jay Van Andel had championed for decades. On taxes, he called 
for the repeal of  the state’s value-added tax on businesses, called the Single Business Tax. In its 
place, he supported “a tax on corporate profits or gross receipts[.]” Additionally, DeVos called for 
eliminating the income tax for low-income households as well as exempting businesses from having 
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to pay personal property taxes. This last proposal, which would have taken about $1.7 billion out of  
the state’s coffers, drew strong criticism from city and county officials, who feared that the plan 
would decimate local budgets.  80
 Although the economy was, as a headline in the New York Times put it, “Topic A” in the Mi-
chigan gubernatorial race, it was not the only campaign issue nor the sole point of  contrast between 
DeVos and Granholm. DeVos favored dramatic reductions in the state’s Medicaid program, citing 
Missouri as a model, which had implemented reforms that booted one hundred thousand recipients 
off  of  the program. On healthcare more broadly, the two candidates had different proposals for 
how to tackle rising costs as well as covering the state’s uninsured population. The Detroit News re-
ported in October that Granholm favored a state-federal partnership “to offer basic health plans to 
low-income residents,” while DeVos floated no specific program, believing instead that boosting 
hiring was the best way to expand access to healthcare, since it would (ideally) result in more people 
getting insurance through their employer. On cost control, though, he was more detailed, indicating 
that he would bring the cost of  healthcare down by introducing more information technology, in 
addition to “promot[ing] consumer-driven health insurance options and improv[ing] insurance pool-
ing options for businesses” as well as “provid[ing] incentives to Michigan colleges and universities to 
graduate more desperately needed health care professionals.” Granholm also supported greater IT 
use, along with continuing measures that she introduced to lower the cost of  prescription drugs as 
well as to encourage people to take better care of  themselves. DeVos opposed abortion in all cases 
except to save the mother, which won him the endorsement of  the Michigan chapter of  Right to 
Life. It was also on pro-life grounds that DeVos opposed embryonic stem cell research, although he 
was fine with the use of  adult stem cells, while Granholm was for it.  In September 2006, DeVos 
came out in favor of  having intelligent design taught alongside evolution in science classes, although 
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he insisted that the ultimate decision as to whether or not it was taught ought to rest with school 
boards. Granholm, meanwhile, insisted that intelligent design be kept out of  science classes entirely. 
On crime, Granholm opposed bringing back the death penalty while DeVos called for hiring more 
police — although it was unclear how he would pay for it, given his tax proposals — as well as sack-
ing the director of  the state Corrections Department, Patricia Caruso, after a man named Patrick 
Selepak was wrongfully let out of  prison and killed three people. Additionally, the Detroit News not-
ed, he supported reinstating the death penalty for certain offenses and was against the use of  “diver-
sion programs.” The two candidates did agree on one thing, though: they both opposed Proposal 2, 
an anti-affirmative action ballot initiative. (Proposal 2 wound up passing anyway.)  81
 The DeVos-Granholm race was one of  the most closely watched of  the 2006 cycle, not to 
mention one of  the most expensive. Jennifer Cook, an analyst for the Cook Political Report, de-
scribed Granholm as “the most vulnerable incumbent Democratic governor in the country.” By July 
2006, it had become the most expensive campaign in state history. DeVos had a slight edge over 
Granholm in fundraising, with $17.5 million versus her $11.2 million, $12.8 million of  which was his 
own money. Combined, they had already spent $20.5 million on the race. By the start of  September, 
the two campaigns had collectively raised $33.5 million and spent $25 million. For both candidates, 
some of  that money came from high-profile individuals from outside of  the state. Granholm, for 
example, received a donation from Steve Ballmer, the CEO of  Microsoft, while Blackstone Group 
CEO Stephen Schwarzman contributed to DeVos. The race also attracted involvement from prom-
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inent national political figures. On August 15, 2006, former President Bill Clinton visited the state to 
campaign on behalf  of  Granholm. As part of  his pitch, he linked DeVos to the Bush administra-
tion, telling an audience in Taylor, Michigan that “[y]our governor’s opponent thinks what Michigan 
needs is a state version of  Bush-Cheney government.” On November 4th, three days before the 
election, he made another appearance in the state, along with former New York City mayor Rudy 
Giuliani, who came to stump for DeVos. At the time, the race looked like it might have important 
national implications. In August 2006, DeVos acquired the rights to the URL www.devosforpresi-
dent.com, prompting speculation that he might use the governorship as a springboard for a presi-
dential run in 2008.  82
 The fortunes of  the two candidates fluctuated significantly over the course of  the race. On 
July 10, 2005, a little over a month after DeVos announced his candidacy, Granholm had a 51%-33% 
lead over him, and more than half  of  those surveyed approved of  the job she did as governor.  
More worryingly for Granholm, though, that same survey also recorded strong pessimism about the 
economy and the future of  the state more broadly. One year later, the script had flipped. On June 
13, 2006, the Detroit News reported that DeVos was beating Granholm by eight points in a poll con-
ducted by Detroit News/WXYZ-TV. Additionally, sixty percent now disapproved of  her leadership, 
although a slight majority still liked her personally. An op-ed on RealClearPolitics that same month 
downplayed the role of  money in the campaign, arguing that “DeVos has surged into the lead be-
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cause so far he has come closest to ‘capturing the future,’ not because he has ploughed the most 
money into campaign ads.”   83
 By September, however, Granholm had regained ground. The same Detroit News/WXYZ-
TV poll mentioned earlier recorded her in the lead once again, fifty percent versus DeVos’s forty-
two percent. Astonishingly, despite the fact that seventy percent of  those surveyed were bearish 
about the economy, they still gave Granholm a nine-point edge over DeVos on the question of  who 
was more likely to turn the economy around. The Detroit News cited Democratic attacks on Amway’s 
job cuts and investments in China, as well as “a distracting discussion of  social issues” triggered by 
DeVos’s comments about intelligent design, as the reasons for the loss of  his lead. Furthermore, 
although voters were down on the state of  the economy, the fault for that fell more on President 
Bush than on Granholm. By the end of  October, though, DeVos saw a minor surge. Although he 
failed to overtake her, he managed to bring the gap between himself  and Granholm down from nine 
to five points, thanks in part to an ad blitz.  84
 In the end, Granholm outperformed her poll numbers significantly and won the election 
handily, getting 56.36% of  the vote versus DeVos’s 42.3%. Her victory also represented a substantial 
improvement over her first campaign in 2002, when she beat Republican Dick Posthumus by only  
four percentage points. An op-ed in the Lansing State Journal credited Granholm’s victory to her at-
tacks on Amway’s business dealings in China. Although the author of  the piece was not sympathetic 
to the attack, calling it a “non-starter” and “spoon-fed pabulum,” he acknowledged its effectiveness 
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and argued that “[s]mart as they were and with money to spare, the DeVos team never developed its 
own symbol to whack the governor.” Beyond that, she also benefitted from voters seeing her as 
more trustworthy, along with the fact that she galvanized independents and voters of  both 
genders.  85
 Two years after Dick DeVos’s failed bid for the governorship was the 2008 election. Al-
though he did not follow through on the gestures he made during the governor’s campaign and 
stayed out of  the Republican presidential primary, he and members of  his family still participated in 
the presidential race. In May 2007, in the waning days of  the primaries, Richard DeVos made dona-
tions of  a thousand dollars to both Mitt Romney and Rudy Giuliani. When the general election got 
under way, Richard, Dick, Dan, and Doug DeVos, as well as their wives, all gave money to John Mc-
Cain’s campaign.  86
 John McCain lost that election, but Barack Obama’s victory and the Right’s reaction to his 
administration, as witnessed both by the rise of  the Tea Party and the wave of  GOP victories in the 
2010 midterm elections, gave the DeVoses new opportunities to exercise political influence. One of  
the most notable examples was their involvement in the fight against organized labor in their home 
state, beginning with Proposal 2 in 2012. Proposal 2 sought to amend the state’s constitution to 
guarantee labor unions the right to collectively bargain. The state Democratic Party as well as an ar-
ray of  labor unions, including the AFL-CIO, the UAW, AFSCME, and the Teamsters, endorsed Pro-
posal 2, while opposition came from the Republican Party and business groups, among them the 
Michigan Chamber of  Commerce, the Michigan Association of  Realtors, and the Michigan Manu-
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facturers Association, which declared that it “would inappropriately enshrine the terms of  employ-
ment in the constitution and deceitfully unravel as many as 170 laws designed to improve govern-
ment accountability, severely threatening Michigan’s economy.” Organized labor had spearheaded 
the inclusion of  Proposal 2 on the ballot in November, which, as the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette pointed 
out, was a bold move on their part, given the anti-union climate in several neighboring states at that 
time. “The ballot campaign,” the Post-Gazette wrote, “represents an attempt by unions and their De-
mocratic allies to slow or stop the wave of  Republican-backed measures adopted in Wisconsin, Indi-
ana, Ohio, Tennessee and other states in the last two years to curb collective bargaining and weaken 
unions, especially those representing government workers.” Proposal 2 was also a response to calls 
on the part of  some Republicans in the state legislature for Michigan to adopt a “right-to-work” law. 
Notably, the state’s Republican governor, Rick Snyder, opposed this at the time, viewing it as politi-
cally treacherous.  87
 Dick DeVos became one of  the key players in the opposition to Proposal 2. According to 
reporting by Mother Jones, DeVos, in concert with Ron Weiser, the RNC’s finance chair, “tapped their 
national donor networks, hauling in millions from Las Vegas gambling tycoon Sheldon Adelson, 
Texas investor Harold Simmons, and a slew of  Michigan business groups.” Additionally, the DeVos-
es collectively contributed two million dollars to an organization called Protecting Michigan Taxpay-
ers, which spearheaded the anti-Proposal 2 campaign. Protecting Michigan Taxpayers brought in 
more than $23 million to defeat the amendment, $3.12 million of  which was spent on TV advertis-
ing. The DeVos-led effort against Proposal 2 proved successful. On November 6th, fifty-eight per-
cent of  voters said no to Proposal 2, compared to just forty-two percent who voted yes. The Mi-
chigan Chamber of  Commerce hailed the defeat of  Proposal 2, declaring, in the words of  president 
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Richard Studley, that “[o]n Election Day, Michigan voters stood up against the negative campaign 
waged by union bosses and special interests by rejecting their attempts to hijack Michigan’s constitu-
tion for their own benefit.”  88
 The rejection of  Proposal 2 by a decisive majority of  voters emboldened DeVos and other 
anti-union forces in the state to go further. On December 6th, exactly one month after the election, 
Governor Snyder announced that the state legislature would now work to pass a right-to-work — or, 
in his words, “freedom-to-work” — law. In a press release, Snyder said that “it’s time to embrace the 
benefits that come with giving working men and women the freedom they deserve” and that a right-
to-work bill would “ensure that investors know Michigan is the place to do business.” Mother Jones 
reported that “on November 20, 2012, DeVos and Weiser met with members of  the Republican 
leadership, business bigwigs, and the top legislative aide to Gov. Snyder to pitch their plan” for right-
to-work legislation. During that meeting, Greg McNeilly, “Dick and Betsy’s longtime political advis-
er,” informed those assembled that “[h]e had recently formed a nonprofit group called the Michigan 
Freedom Fund,” which would spearhead the campaign for a right-to-work bill and “planned to raise 
millions from the DeVos family and other donors.” This, in conjunction with the downfall of  Pro-
posal 2, helped win Snyder and other Republican leaders over to the idea of  pursuing right-to-work 
in Michigan. The Michigan Freedom Fund ended up spending a million dollars on ads promoting 
right-to-work, which moved through the state legislature at lightning pace. Less than a week after 
Snyder had made his public about-face, a bill had passed both houses and was signed into law by 
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Snyder. According to Mother Jones, “DeVos worked the phones all the way to the end, even calling 
several lawmakers on their cellphones as they prepared to cast their votes.”  89
********** 
  
 2016 launched the DeVoses back into the national spotlight. In May 2016, the New York 
Times ran a story about GOP mega-donors who were wary of  Donald Trump. Among those who 
expressed reservations was Betsy DeVos, who told the Times, “Until we have a better reason to em-
brace and support the top of  the ticket, and see an agenda that is truly an opportunity agenda, then 
we have lots of  other options in which to invest and spend our time helping.” Other members of  
the DeVos family did give money to help elect Trump, though. The Trump Victory Fund received 
$70,000 from Richard DeVos as well as his children Daniel and Suzanne, along with $35,000 from 
his son Doug. No contributions came from Dick or Betsy DeVos, though. Betsy instead directed her 
dollars towards House and Senate races. She donated to several Senate candidates, among them Joe 
Heck (Nevada), Rob Portman (Ohio), Mark Kirk (Illinois), Pat Toomey (Pennsylvania), Ron Johnson 
(Wisconsin), and Marco Rubio (Florida), among others, as well as numerous House candidates, most 
of  them representing districts in Michigan. Overall, Dick and Betsy DeVos are listed as no. 68 on 
the Center for Responsive Politics’s list of  the largest individual contributors at the federal level in 
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the 2016 cycle, donating a little over $3.3 million. Richard and Helen DeVos, meanwhile, ranked no. 
59, with $3.84 million in contributions.  90
 Despite the fact that Betsy DeVos sat on the sidelines of  the presidential campaign, Trump’s 
victory redounded to her benefit with her nomination as education secretary. Her confirmation hear-
ing before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee was originally 
supposed to take place on January 11, 2017. On January 7th, however, news outlets reported that the 
committee’s Democratic members were lobbying to postpone it, citing the fact that the Office of  
Government Ethics (OGE) had not yet completed its review of  her. The hearing was ultimately de-
layed, although the official explanation cited scheduling issues rather than the need to wait for the 
OGE to complete its work.   91
 When the HELP Committee convened to consider DeVos’s nomination one week later, on 
the seventeenth, the OGE’s review was still not complete, a concern raised by Senators Patty Mur-
ray, the ranking Democrat on the committee, and Tammy Baldwin. Another point of  contention 
concerned the format of  the hearing. Members had five minutes to question DeVos, with only one 
round of  questioning. Although virtually all of  the Democrats objected and called for a second 
round, chairman Lamar Alexander refused, saying that he wanted the hearing for DeVos to run ex-
actly as it had for George W. Bush and Barack Obama’s nominees, something that he repeatedly re-
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ferred to as “the golden rule.” As it happened, Dick and Betsy DeVos had contributed to four of  
the HELP committee members who were deciding whether to advance her to a full Senate vote. 
Overall, seventeen members of  the Senate were beneficiaries of  the couple’s giving.  92
 Betsy DeVos’s exchanges with committee members were contentious at times. Senator 
Bernie Sanders asked DeVos about the amount of  money she and her relatives had given to the 
GOP.  When she replied that she was not sure of  the exact figure, Sanders asked her if  it was “in the 
ball park” of  $200 million. DeVos answered, “Collectively, over my entire family…[t]hat’s possible.” 
He then asked her if  she believed that her nomination was tied to those contributions. She said no. 
Senator Tim Kaine went back and forth with DeVos on whether or not all schools ought to be held 
to the same standards, a point on which she equivocated, saying at one point that “[a]ll schools that 
receive public funding should be accountable” but not committing to evaluating all schools the same 
way.  93
 On several occasions, DeVos appeared caught off  guard by some of  the questions, as in this 
exchange with Senator Al Franken on testing: 
Franken: I would like your views on the relative advantage of  doing assessments and using them to 
measure proficiency or to measure growth.  
DeVos: Thank you, Senator, for that question. If  I’m understanding your question correctly around 
proficiency, I would also correlate it to competency and mastery so that each student is measured 
according to the advancement that they’re making in each subject area — 
Franken: That’s growth. That’s not proficiency. In other words, the growth they’re making is in 
growth. The proficiency is an arbitrary standard.  
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DeVos: If  they’ve reached a level — the proficiency is if  they’ve reached a, like, third grade level for 
reading, et cetera.  
Franken: No, I’m talking about the debate between proficiency and growth —  
DeVos: Yes.  
Franken: And what your thoughts are on them.  
DeVos: I was just asking to clarify, then, what —  
Franken: This is a subject that has been debated in the education community for years [….]  
Franken never got a direct answer to his question. He subsequently remarked that “[i]t surprises me 
that you don’t know this issue” and argued that her confusion about the differences between growth 
and proficiency was proof  that the committee needed more time to question DeVos, saying, “we’re 
selling our kids short by not being able to have a debate on it.” Another place where DeVos stum-
bled had to do with the education of  students with disabilities. Senator Susan Collins asked DeVos 
if  she was willing “to fulfill the promise of  the 1975 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to 
fund 40 percent of  the additional cost of  educating a special needs child.” DeVos answered yes, al-
though she followed that up by saying that “this is an area that could be considered for an approach 
that would be somewhat different in that maybe the money should follow individual students instead 
of  going directly to the States.” Later, Tim Kaine asked her whether “all K-12 schools receiving 
governmental funding [should] be required to meet the requirements of  the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act,” to which she responded that it was “a matter that’s best left to the States.” 
At the very end of  the hearing, Senator Maggie Hassan returned to that exchange, pointing out that 
there was a tension between her statement that states should handle disabled students and the fact 
that the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act was federal legislation. Hassan asked her to 
clarify. When DeVos responded that “[f]ederal law must be followed where Federal dollars are in 
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play,” Hassan pressed her on whether she had known that the Individual with Disabilities in Educa-
tion Act was federal legislation. She replied that she “may have confused it.”  94
 Numerous observers panned DeVos’s performance. A summary of  the hearing published in 
the New York Times observed that “[i]n questioning by senators, she seemed either unaware or un-
supportive of  the longstanding policies and functions of  the department she is in line to lead, from 
special education rules to the policing of  for-profit universities.” In Slate, Dana Goldstein suggested 
that DeVos “revealed herself  to be either underprepared for the job or stiffly wedded to an ideolog-
ical, market-oriented vision of  education policy[.]” And the editorial board of  the Los Angeles Times 
declared that DeVos had “embarrassed herself,” that “she displayed an astonishing ignorance about 
basic education issues, an extraordinary lack of  thoughtfulness about ongoing debates in the field 
and an unwillingness to respond to important questions,” and urged senators to vote against her.   95
 As happened with the hearing, the HELP committee’s meeting to vote on DeVos was de-
layed on January 20th for one week, pushed from the twenty-fourth to the thirty-first, so that com-
mittee members could read through the OGE’s report on DeVos’s finances, which was released on 
the twentieth. Despite her underwhelming performance and lingering worries from the committee’s 
Democratic members about potential conflicts of  interest involving education companies in which 
she and her family had invested, the committee voted her through 12-11, with all the Republicans 
backing her and all the Democrats opposing. The following day, Republican senators Lisa Murkows-
ki and Susan Collins, both of  whom had voted for DeVos in committee, announced that they would 
not support her when she came before the Senate. Since the Senate was split 52-48 in favor of  Re-
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publicans, the loss of  Murkowski and Collins raised the possibility that her nomination might not go 
through. On February 7th, the Senate took up her nomination. Fifty senators — all Republicans — 
voted for her, while all of  the Democrats plus Murkowski and Collins voted against, forcing Vice 
President Mike Pence to cast the deciding vote in her favor, the only time a vice president has had to 
do so.  96
********** 
 When Jay Van Andel went before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Rev-
enue Measures in April 1982, he was ostensibly there to talk about tax compliance by direct sellers. 
His testimony, however, veered abruptly when it became Representative Wyche Fowler’s turn to ask 
questions. “If  you will allow me to ask you a couple of  questions off  of  the subject….I would be 
very interested in talking to you a little bit about Amway’s political activities,” he began. “I just won-
dered if  you would share with us your thoughts as to the proper extent of  political activity by an in-
stitution the size of  Amway and what efforts you try to make through all of  these publications and 
advice to your distributors as to what are the lines of  business and the promotion of  business and 
what is your advice on the promotion of  yours and Mr. Devos’ political theories?” Van Andel 
replied that “[w]e do believe that as a corporation, we can and should spend some of  our resources 
to attempt to preserve the free American way of  life, free enterprise,” but that “we have never made 
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it a practice to involve ourselves in matters that have to do with religious convictions….nor issues 
that have to do with specific political matters as far as Amway Corp. itself  is concerned.” Since 
“[t]he Amway distributor organization is probably the largest volunteer army in the world,” he be-
lieved that “it does not behoove us as leaders of  that kind of  organization to involve ourselves in 
those activities which would be divisive to such an organization.” Accordingly, whenever he or De-
Vos did engage in political activism, they were “very careful….that we do this as individuals on an 
individual platform and not on a corporate platform.” When asked whether he or DeVos intended 
to send political material to Amway distributors during the 1982 and/or 1984 elections, Van Andel 
answered no.  97
 In his testimony that April, Van Andel portrayed a firm wall of  separation between Amway 
and politics. Others have had a different perspective. In his exposé, former distributor Steve Butter-
field declared that Amway was “a political movement, with definite aims respecting public opinion, 
government policy, collective bargaining law, education and economics.” In addition to detailing 
DeVos and Van Andel’s own political activism, he alleged that distributor networks, like the Yager 
network to which he had belonged, engaged in political education. He wrote that “tapes and recruit-
ing literature seek to frighten people with the specter of  Communism and Socialism” and that 
“[f]rom the stage, leaders constantly program their audiences to favor complete unregulated freedom 
of  corporations to invest, make profit and do business as they see fit.” During Reagan’s first presi-
dential campaign in 1980, he claimed that “[e]very Seminar and Rally that I attended….was turned 
into an occasion for campaign propaganda.”  98
 In the end, the truth is closer to Steve Butterfield’s take than Jay Van Andel’s. Although the 
founders and their families did much of  their political work in their capacity as private citizens, 
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Amway has not stayed out of  the fray entirely. We have seen two examples of  Amway used to ad-
vance specific political or ideological objectives: the Center of  Free Enterprise and the Proposal E 
campaign in 1978. The company has also offered direct financial support to candidates and political 
parties, like when it sponsored the Spirit of  Free Enterprise rally in 1984 or when it gave money for 
the 1996 Republican National Convention. A March 1981 article in the Washington Post observed that 
“Amway is a company with interests that go beyond selling soap,” detailing a number of  ways that 
the company was used as a vehicle for the cofounders’s political worldview, including the Center of  
Free Enterprise,  a “nationwide newspaper advertising campaign” focused on issues such as “infla-
tion, budget deficits, government regulation, government growth and overtaxation,” and a column 
authored by the cofounders called “Business Viewpoint” that ran in a number of  publications, in-
cluding Amagram, the magazine sent to distributors. Even one of  the company yachts, the Enterprise 
III, was impressed into political service. The Washington Post ran a story about the Enterprise III in 
June 1981 when it made an appearance in the Capitol, dubbing it “the Cadillac of  yachts.” The arti-
cle took stock of  some of  the ship’s amenities: “The 292-ton, steel-and-teak behemoth boasts five 
plush staterooms, a bar, two lounges, galley, library,….stereo system, closed-circuit television alarm 
and a crew of  nine.” It returned in September 1985, hosting several parties for D.C. big-wigs. The 
Grand Rapids Press reported that  “[o]n a typical evening dinner cruise, the 35 guests included seven 
members of  Congress — three from Michigan — an ambassador, several trade lobbyists and con-
gressional staffers.” This was by no means an isolated incident. The Press said that such galas were 
held aboard the Enterprise III “[a]bout every 18 months[.]”       99
 Further evidence of  how Amway has promoted the cofounders’s politics can be found in a 
series of  advertisements sponsored by the company in 1975, all aiming to illustrate the virtues of  
free-market capitalism. One of  them, titled “Why The Car In Your Garage Is Not An Edsel And 
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What That Fact Proves,” gave various examples of  how market competition encouraged innovation 
and lowered prices. Another told the parable of  a country whose residents once “competed vigor-
ously with each other in the marketplace,” and in so doing “became the envy of  the world.” Gradu-
ally, however, complaints arose about the inequalities that this unfettered competition produced. As 
a consequence, “[t]he successful majority became self-conscious about their success,” which led to 
“laws to give the earnings of  some people to others who had not earned them” as well as “[l]aws to 
try to guarantee material ‘success’ to everyone.” As a consequence, “it became harder and harder to 
succeed — so fewer people did,” and eventually “the world looked elsewhere for leadership.” A 
third, titled “Why There’s No Such Thing As A Free Lunch,” said that “[g]overnment is never a 
source of  material goods” and that “everything that government gives to the people, it must first 
take from them.” All of  the posters sported the same tagline on the bottom: “Free Enterprise — 
You Know It Works.”  100
 Even if  Amway had not done any of  these things and maintained precisely the sort of  fire-
wall that Van Andel described in his 1982 testimony, it would still be impossible to neatly cleave the 
business from the ideological commitments and political work of  the founding families. For one, the 
company has enthusiastically touted the liberating potential of  free enterprise to its distributor force, 
although, as Chapter II discussed in detail, the company’s vision of  free enterprise was grounded in 
a critique of  actually-existing capitalism. At a more fundamental level, the success of  Amway both in 
the United States and abroad made the founding families’s ascent to political kingmakers possible. 
Just as it is impossible to imagine the names DeVos and Van Andel gracing Grand Rapids’s cityscape 
without the Amway fortune, it is also safe to say that these two families would not have had much, if  
any, political influence, either at the state or national levels, if  they were not rich. Amway, then, of-
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fers further evidence of  the outsized role that moneyed interests have played and continue to play in 
American politics.  101
 Amway also challenges the popular association of  the American North, particularly after the 
1960s, with either Democratic or liberal Republican politics, in contrast to the rock-ribbed conser-
vatism coming out of  the South and West. Grand Rapids’s conservatism developed organically and 
independently of  those movements, a product of  the area’s anti-union animus, its relatively small 
non-white population, and the influence of  Dutch Calvinism. Going forward, scholars should rec-
ognize Grand Rapids as an important and influential epicenter of  modern American conservatism.  
 The conservatism found in Grand Rapids and laundered through Amway had several key 
characteristics. First, it was old, tracing its roots back to the Dutch settlers who arrived in the mid-
nineteenth century. Second, it was grounded in a “conservative subculture” — to borrow the subtitle 
of  David Bratt’s book — centered on the Reformed church. And third, it did not stress race. Lisa 
McGirr argues that although both southern and western strains of  conservatism included “demands 
for local control and opposition to federal power,” these manifested differently, writing that “racial 
issues did not occupy the same prominence in the life, ideas, and politics of  Southern California as 
they did in the former confederate states in the 1960s.”  102
 This same is true of  Grand Rapids. Of  course, no account of  conservatism in Grand 
Rapids, the state of  Michigan, or the American North more broadly is complete without race. 
Colleen Doody, Tula Connell, Katherine Cramer, and Daniel Kramer and Richard Flanagan all took 
stock of  the importance of  race and how racial anxieties formed an indelible part of  various sorts 
of  conservative activism as well as affinity for conservative ideas in the regions that they studied. As 
noted earlier, western Michigan’s racial homogeneity is undoubtedly one of  the reasons why the re-
 For recent works that delve into this subject, see Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of  the Billionaires Behind 101
the Rise of  the Radical Right (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2016) and Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History 
of  the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America (New York, NY: Viking, 2017).
 Bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America; McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 14-15.102
  !347
gion has leaned to the right. Around ten percent of  Michigan voters went for George Wallace in 
1968, which, notably, was about the same proportion of  voters Wallace got in Wayne County. 
Meanwhile, 7.2% of  voters in Kent County voted for Wallace. Moreover, as Todd Robinson has 
documented, Grand Rapids has had its fair share of  racial strife. But when we look at the co-
founders’s own politics, “racial issues” were not front and center. Rather, their small-business con-
servatism led them to concentrate on issues like taxes, federal spending, regulation of  the economy, 
and school choice. This is not to say that the cofounders’s policy preferences did not have disparate 
racial impacts — they most certainly do, school choice especially — but there is no evidence, at least 
in the case of  DeVos and Van Andel or their children, that race informed their stances.   103
 Ultimately, what Grand Rapids, along with the handful of  other case studies of  Northern 
conservatism, underscores is that although postwar conservatism did exhibit regional varieties, it was 
not a strictly regional phenomenon. As the geographic scope of  the study of  conservatism has ex-
panded, first out of  the South into the West and Southwest and now increasingly into the North, it 
has become clearer that conservatism did not become the country’s dominant political philosophy 
by maturing in one part of  the country and then metastasizing and imposing itself  over the rest. 
Rather, the Right’s national triumph in the 1970s and 1980s occurred because it was able to link to-
gether disparate individuals and groups across the country under a common ideological banner. 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The Amway Idea has been in worldwide circulation for over 50 years. The beliefs and thinking behind 
it have influenced millions of  people. There is nothing odd or mysterious about it. It is the classic 
American Idea of  personal freedom, hard work, delayed gratification, a giving spirit, positive attitude 
and good, honest character. When people try to grab success without these basics, they crash and 
burn. There are reasons why America works. And to discard these reasons for a cheap, easy ap-
proach is to slam hard into the wall of  history. 
-Ron Ball  1
 In May 2009, Amway marked the fiftieth anniversary of  its founding. Celebrations took 
place in Grand Rapids as well as Las Vegas. Distributors in Grand Rapids were treated to perfor-
mances by Sting and LeAnn Rimes, while Elton John headlined the Vegas wing of  the festivities. An 
article in the industry magazine Successful Meetings detailed some of  the numerous logistical hurdles 
that organizers had to overcome. When the celebrations shifted from Grand Rapids to Las Vegas, 
twelve hundred people made the transcontinental journey. The magazine reported that “[j]ust mov-
ing them from McCarran International Airport to the MGM Grand required hundreds of  stretch 
limos and chauffeured cars” and that “Gulfstream executive jets went on multiple flights, in convey-
or-belt fashion, to move the participants.” Because it was a multinational crowd, organizers “had to 
provide simultaneous speech translation in 27 languages, as well as accommodate a host of  dietary 
restrictions and regional food preferences ranging from halal, to kosher, to providing hot soy milk 
and rice porridge for breakfast.”  2
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 As merry as the attendees undoubtedly were, this anniversary was marked by a significant — 
and tragic — absence. On December 7, 2004, Jay Van Andel died; his wife, Betty, had passed away 
that January. This did not mean that he was absent from the celebrations, though. In fact, he ap-
peared in Las Vegas on the second-to-last day, taking the form of  a hologram that “spoke” with his 
longtime business partner and friend.  3
 The ten years between Amway’s fortieth and fiftieth birthdays began with a reinvention and 
ended with a restoration. On March 3, 1999, Amway embraced the growing commercialization of  
the Internet by unveiling Quixtar, its online retail arm. A statement put out by the company de-
scribed Quixtar as “a unique web-based business opportunity for entrepreneurs” that “will share the 
proven, time-tested sales and marketing plan used in the Amway business and will feature globally 
recognized brands like ARTISTRY(R) skin care and cosmetics, NUTRILITE(R) nutrition and well-
ness products and SA8(R) laundry care products” in addition to “a wide range of  unique products 
and services from other top companies plus links to dozens of  other on-line shopping sites[.]” Since 
the website would also feature non-Amway products, Amway came up with the Quixtar name to 
avoid any confusion with its in-person business. Quixtar would run on a version of  the Amway 
business model: customers would get access to the Quixtar marketplace through a distributor, and 
whenever they made a purchase, a portion of  that would go to their “upline.”   4
 In the run-up to the launch of  Quixtar, speakers at distributor rallies and functions primed 
their audiences to embrace the new platform. Their remarks alluded to both the awe and unease that 
the Internet and digital technology inspired in the late 1990s, much of  which sounds comically 
anachronistic now. Distributor Patsy Lizardi, for example, recalled that she “saw a microwave in a 
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magazine the other day that while you’re cooking your chicken, let’s say, for twenty minutes, you can 
access your bank account on the door of  the microwave.” On the flip side, Todd Rainsberger cau-
tioned his audience, “Don’t be put off  by the terminology, don’t be put off  by the technology,” 
while Pedro Lizardi assured everyone that “you don’t need to know computers, you don’t have to, 
but you have to lose your fear. You don’t have to be an expert, you just have to have the vision, you 
have to have the desire, you have to have the dream that you want a better life for your family[.]” 
These speakers cast Quixtar as the newest frontier on which distributors would have the opportunity 
to acquire their fortunes. Chuck Vogt told an audience that “what you’ve got here, with the Amway 
Corporation and with Quixtar and all of  this blending together, is a hyper-growth situation that can 
be yours if  you choose to take advantage of  that. You’ve got the best of  the best right in front of  
you.” Todd Rainsberger said that “Quixtar is in a unique position,” that “nobody else in the world 
can do what Quixtar is gonna do.” Quixtar, he said, was better situated than most online retailers to 
succeed because “[w]e’re not starting up from scratch,” and also because there were so many people 
already involved in Amway: 
Most Internet-based companies spend between thirty and forty dollars a person — for each cus-
tomer they have they spend between thirty and forty dollars in advertising. Because if  somebody 
starts up, nobody knows who they are….And then nobody stays. Somebody orders from Amazon, 
I’ve ordered from Amazon, but then the next time I’m driving down the street and I decide I need a 
CD or a book I pull in to Barnes & Noble or wherever — I have no loyalty there. But Amway, 
Amway over forty years has proven that they are the masters of  creating customer loyalty. And so 
when Quixtar fires up, everybody who is in Amway will pay a small fee to be grandfathered in to 
Quixtar. And so you’ll take the same loyalty — and you’ll still be able to order from 800 numbers if  
you’re one of  those people who doesn’t like computers — but over here, in Quixtar, you’ll take the 
same loyalty. 
  
“Quixtar,” he declared, “has put us in an incredible position to take advantage of  the most powerful 
trend in retailing in history.”  5
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 Quixtar debuted on September 1, 1999. It did not go well. The website was not prepared to 
handle the flood of  traffic that came its way, resulting in slow service for some and no service at all 
for others over the first few days. Once the bugs were worked out, though, Quixtar took off. On 
December 21st, the company put out a statement boasting that the website “has generated sales sur-
passing $100 million after just 100 days in business,” that it was “logging sales of  more than $2 mil-
lion per day,” and all “with no advertising at all.” Not long after it went live, an author named Coy 
Barefoot released The Quixtar Revolution, which detailed the backstory behind Quixtar’s inception and 
explained the historical significance, as he saw it, of  the website. (The book was number nine on the 
Wall Street Journal’s list of  best-selling business books on November 5th.) Barefoot called Quixtar 
“[o]ne of  the most impressive ventures to hit the Internet,” one that “promises to be a major player 
in the new world of  ecommerce.” “Quixtar.com provides a new way for us to think about what a 
company is really capable of,” he wrote in the final chapter. “It raises the bar in ecommerce, provid-
ing a new benchmark for what it means to create community; to offer convenience, service, options 
— and most of  all, opportunity.” By the end of  its first year, Quixtar had done $518 million in busi-
ness, making it the seventh most successful sales site on the Internet, according to the National Re-
tail Federation. Distributors selling through Quixtar earned $143 million in bonuses on those sales.  6
 Quixtar was part of  a larger set of  changes occurring at Amway at the dawn of  the twenty-
first century. In February 2000, in response to the growing shift towards digital sales, Amway sig-
naled that it would downsize its workforce, though it gave no hard figures at the time. Those came in 
May, when Amway said that it was letting go thirteen hundred of  its twelve thousand employees 
worldwide, the majority of  those in the United States. There were also symbolic changes afoot. In 
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October 2000, Amway announced the creation of  Alticor, an umbrella entity that would encompass 
both the online (Quixtar) and face-to-face (Amway) sides of  the business. The name Quixtar origi-
nally referred only to the online platform. Beginning in 2003, though, Quixtar became the name of  
the entire company, but only in North America. Even the company’s leadership did not stay the 
same. On September 1, 2002, Doug DeVos succeeded his brother Dick as president of  what was 
now Alticor.   7
 Quixtar (the website) helped Amway/Alticor rebound after the lackluster way it closed out 
the nineties. Amway’s revenues stood at $5.3 billion in 1994 and increased to $7 billion by 1997. 
Over the next two years, though, there was a noticeable slip, first down to $5.7 billion and then to $5 
billion, so that by 1999 the company was exactly where it had been back in 1994. This decline, due 
primarily to developments in Asia, among them the Chinese government’s war on direct sales, 
prompted its own round of  job cuts, two thousand in all in 1998. Sales improved in the 2000s, 
though. By 2004, they were at $6.2 billion, $1.1 billion of  which was from the Quixtar site. Sales 
were just shy of  six and a half  billion for both 2005 and 2006, and then they rose again in 2007, hit-
ting $7.1 billion. The company’s fiftieth year in business saw revenues reach $8.4 billion.  8
 Amway/Quixtar had its share of  problems to contend with in the new millennium. There 
was, of  course, the ongoing defamation fight with Procter & Gamble, though the company’s part in 
that was mostly over by the early aughts, as well as the 2007 civil suit alleging that the company was 
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still running a pyramid scheme. In October 2007, Quixtar went on a defamation crusade of  its own, 
taking legal action against thirty individuals who had attacked the company on the Internet. In 
March 2008, the company brought a lawsuit against one of  its competitors, MonaVie, a direct sales 
firm that dealt in speciality juices, on the grounds that MonaVie was misrepresenting the health ben-
efits of  its products and poaching Quixtar distributors. The parties reached a settlement two and a 
half  years later.  9
 But perhaps the company’s biggest problem was that it changed too much. Though Quixtar 
the website was a success, Quixtar the brand proved a drag on the company. The Orlando Sentinel re-
ported in October 2008 that “only 3 percent of  Americans recognized the Quixtar name, but 77 
percent still knew Amway.” As a result, the company decided that it would once again become 
Amway. Amway reintroduced its old moniker ostentatiously, partnering with Tina Turner in July 
2008 for a concert series that kicked off  that fall and went throughout the United States and Canada, 
using the shows to showcase its products and its “new” name. By the end of  2009, “Quixtar” was 
gone, replaced by Amway Global.   10
********** 
  
 Quixtar — the name and the website — was just the latest effort by Amway to reinvent it-
self. The company has transformed in myriad ways, assumed many different identities, over its long 
and profitable life. Amway began as a network of  Nutrilite distributors who decided to secede from 
their parent company and start their own business, ditching vitamins in favor of  soap. Starting with 
the move into Canada in 1962, the company that was originally called the American Way Association 
 “Quixtar suing 30 people over Internet postings,” Deseret News, October 14, 2007, A6; “Quixtar Files Suit Against 9
MonaVie To Protect Consumers, Halt Unfair Competition,” PR Newswire, March 18, 2008; Jones, Amway Forever, 117.
 Jones, Amway Forever, 170; “What’s Amway got to do with it?” Orlando Sentinel, October 31, 2008, 4; Anne Bond Em10 -
rich, “Amyway [sic] Enters Spotlight,” Grand Rapids Business Journal, July 28, 2008, 1; “Amway Global to be Presenting 
Sponsor of  'Tina Turner Live in Concert' 2008 North American Tour,” PR Newswire, July 10, 2008.
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took on an increasingly international flavor, appearing in more and more countries and selling more 
and more of  its products abroad, until now its Americanness feels like little more than a technicality. 
In order to ensure its embrace by consumers — and suspicious governments — around the world, 
Amway has had to tailor its product line and its business model to suit local demands, introducing 
new items or modified versions of  its standard fare as well as expanding beyond direct sales.  
 The 1970s were a particular pivotal moment for the company and the two men who founded 
it. After about fifteen years of  more or less smooth sailing, the Amway model come under its first 
serious scrutiny with the FTC investigation in 1975. In response to the Commission’s findings, as 
well as a number of  other lawsuits and attacks in the public forum over the subsequent decades, 
Amway had to amend elements of  the Sales and Marketing Plan, in addition to becoming somewhat 
more transparent about what being a distributor entails and just how successful — or not — most 
distributors are. The seventies were also when the company decided that, in addition to selling prod-
ucts and recruiting distributors, it would also become an ambassador for the free market, opening 
the Center of  Free Enterprise and launching a nationwide effort to enlighten Americans about the 
virtues of  capitalism.  
 This was, of  course, the same time that conservatives throughout the country were begin-
ning to mount a full-throated, multi-front challenge to forty years of  liberal dominance of  American 
politics. Amway’s cofounders had no intention of  sitting out the fight, contributing their time and, 
crucially, their money to a number of  right-wing campaigns and organizations at the state and na-
tional levels, a commitment that has endured to the present. But while the company itself  thrived, its 
home base — Grand Rapids — languished under the weight of  postwar economic changes. In re-
sponse, the company and cofounders committed considerable resources to making Grand Rapids an 
economically vibrant and attractive city, in the process underscoring their ideological commitment to 
private beneficence over state investment. 
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 That Amway has simultaneously served as a business, an ideological vehicle, and a spring-
board for the political machinations of  two very rich men and their families means that it lends im-
portant insight into one of  the most complex and consequential developments in the United States 
in the decades following 1945: the rise of  conservatism and, in particular, the redemption of  free 
enterprise. DeVos and Van Andel highlight the important contributions of  small-business conserva-
tives to the Right’s victories in the 1970s and 1980s. Small-business conservatives stood out among 
other free enterprise advocates in that they did not concern themselves solely with “big 
government.” For small-business conservatives, both the activist state and employment had the po-
tential to undermine liberty and encourage dependency. According to them, true freedom required 
individuals to own their own businesses.  
 Small-business conservatism allows us to make sense of  a paradox at the heart of  Amway. 
On the one hand, DeVos and Van Andel aggressively promoted free markets and railed against gov-
ernment intervention in the economy. At the same time, Amway’s promoters were often very critical 
of  actually-existing capitalism, pointing out limits on upward mobility as well as the fact that many 
people found their jobs dreary and unsatisfying. According to Amway and its cofounders, direct 
sales embodied an economic model that promised to provide material and psychological rewards 
unavailable elsewhere. DeVos called this model “compassionate capitalism.” 
 Compassionate capitalism had its roots in a turbulent and transformational moment in 
American history. The end of  the Second World War secured America’s position as a global super-
power and ushered in a period of  never-before-seen economic growth that helped give rise to the 
modern middle class. The combination of  prosperity and America’s demonstrated military prowess 
should, in theory, have made for a content and ebullient populace. Instead, the fifteen years after the 
war saw a nation rife with tension and unease. In part that was because America was not alone in its 
superpower status: the Soviet Union was expanding its influence over Eastern Europe and East Asia 
and, like the United States, boasted a formidable military. The added ingredient of  nuclear prolifera-
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tion raised the not unrealistic possibility of  a war that might permanently upend human civilization. 
On the domestic front, meanwhile, there were a number of  social ills that prosperity never amelio-
rated, among them white supremacy, the repression of  gays and lesbians, and the effort to return 
women back to the domestic sphere following their brief  flirtation with employment during the war. 
 And then there was the problem that prosperity, at least in part, contributed to: the crisis of  
autonomy. The sorts of  jobs that allowed many (white) Americans to buy a house in the suburbs, fill 
it with the latest gadgets and conveniences, and park a car in the driveway also sparked concerns that 
Americans were losing the individuality, independence, and self-reliance that had existed in earlier 
periods of  the nation’s history. Instead of  being able to work for themselves, increasing numbers of  
Americans were now members of  The Organization, under the direction of  managers and supervi-
sors, the pace and nature of  their work all dictated to them. Added on top of  this was the growing 
emphasis placed on conformity, on dressing and acting and shopping and living like one’s neighbors 
and colleagues, which became not only a way of  participating in and contributing to the economic 
boom, but also, in a moment of  panic over Communist subversion, of  demonstrating loyalty to the 
nation. Some Americans sought to remedy the discomfort they felt pharmacologically, redeeming 
prescriptions for millions of  dollars’ worth of  anti-anxiety medications. Others turned inward, to 
self-help, a philosophy with roots dating back to the first English settlers in North America, and its 
relatively younger cousin, positive thinking. Self-help and positive thinking taught that individuals 
alone determined the quality of  their own lives, that adversity was the result of  not thinking and act-
ing correctly. Enthralled by the notion that they could improve their lot by their own initiative, many 
Americans consumed books written by the likes of  Norman Vincent Peale and David Schwartz or 
joined self-help movements like Dianetics.  
 The crisis of  autonomy influenced the development of  compassionate capitalism. Compas-
sionate capitalism was supposed to be free of  the alienation and tedium that social critics saw as so 
rampant in postwar capitalism. Instead of  self-interest, people would be motivated by a desire to 
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improve the lives of  those around them and help them achieve their dreams. They would do what 
was right, rather than what might earn them the most money.  
 Direct sales was meant to exemplify compassionate capitalism and promised to rectify capi-
talism’s shortcomings. The cottage industry of  books and tapes that arose to train and retain Amway 
distributors — or, as the company’s critics alleged, to brainwash them and drain their bank accounts 
— presented direct sales not just as a way to get rich, but also as a way to live a truly fulfilling life. 
Direct sales offered an escape from the shackles of  the job, with its set hours and wages and its 
mundane, unpleasant tasks that reduced life to a rut. The Amway Sales and Marketing Plan allowed a 
person to trade in that tedious, low-paying job that did not pay the bills or put food on the table for 
an “independent” business that everyone in the family could participate in, that brought parents 
closer to their children, that made it possible to buy a Cadillac or a vacation home, and that intro-
duced one to a community of  distributors who would become lifetime friends. Being an Amway dis-
tributor meant that a person could be their own boss: they would own and operate their own busi-
ness, they could work as much or as little as they wanted on their own schedule, and they could earn 
as much as they wanted or needed. The example of  Amway thus illustrates that, although animus 
towards “big government” was important, postwar free enterprise ideology also had a positive vi-
sion, in that it aimed to appeal to desires for self-mastery, material well-being, and economic inde-
pendence. 
 Compassionate capitalism complemented the cofounders’s personal hostilities towards the 
interventionist state. An economy comprised of  well-meaning, enlightened individuals is one in 
which the state need not interfere with regulation, since everyone can be counted on to behave in 
ways that take the interests of  others into account and that are not harmful or destructive. A com-
passionate capitalist economy also obviates the need for a robust social safety net, since people will 
be inclined to help out others. The fact that it is impossible to neatly disentangle compassionate cap-
italism from the cofounders’s views on government underscores that these were not merely two sep-
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arate philosophies that DeVos and Van Andel happened to promote simultaneously. Rather, they 
were part and parcel of  a larger, cohesive ideology: small-business conservatism.  11
Amway also expands our picture of  the geographical distribution of  the conservative coun-
terrevolution. For a long while, conservatism was treated as a kind of  contagion that originated in 
one region and then gradually spread out across the rest of  the country, with the South as ground 
zero. In recent years, thanks in particular to growing attention to the West and Southwest, the 
South’s exceptionalism has waned. The North, however, has yet to be thoroughly woven into the 
history of  postwar conservatism. Amway demonstrates that this is long overdue. The Dutch immi-
grants who arrived in western Michigan in the mid-nineteenth century and populated places like 
Grand Rapids also transplanted a stern, uncompromising Calvinism that helped turn the region into 
a conservative stronghold. Dutch Calvinism was DeVos and Van Andel’s gateway into conservatism, 
shaping their ideological affiliations and the nature of  their political work. Scholars need to continue 
exploring other parts of  the North with similar right-wing pockets and then, if  possible, integrate 
them with one another so that we may better understand the role that Northern conservatives and 
Northern strains of  conservative thought played in the Right’s national victories.
**********  
  
 Richard Marvin DeVos died on September 6, 2018 at the age of  ninety-two. Eleven months 
earlier, in October 2017, his wife of  sixty-four years, Helen, passed away after suffering a stroke. 
DeVos was the last living member of  Amway’s founding generation. With him gone, Amway now 
 Portions reproduced in Mondom, “Compassionate Capitalism,” 19.11
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rests squarely in the hands of  his and Van Andel’s children, and, one assumes eventually, grandchil-
dren.  12
 His death will also leave an indelible void when Amway’s elites gather in Las Vegas in 2019 
to mark Amway’s sixtieth anniversary. On January 13, 2017, the company posted a video to its You-
Tube channel. “The countdown has begun to Amway’s 60 Year Anniversary Celebration,” the video 
description reads. “Start 2017 off  by focusing on the future so you can join us in 2019! #A60.” The 
video, fifty-two seconds long, bills the event as “the largest ever gathering of  Amway’s top 
leaders.”  13
 It is unclear what more will change by then. On October 11, 2018, Amway announced a sig-
nificant overhaul of  its leadership structure. It was ditching the president/chairman model intro-
duced by DeVos and Van Andel, and instead it would now have a single CEO, Milind Pant, a former 
president of  Pizza Hut, effective January 2, 2019. Steve Van Andel was already scheduled to step 
down as chairman at the end of  the year, and now Amway President Doug DeVos would follow 
suit. Through it all, one thing has stayed the same. “Make It Happen,” the YouTube video reads at 
the forty-three second mark. And then, two seconds later: “Make It to Vegas.” For Amway, in 2019 
no less than in 1959, it is all about the dream.  14
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